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Session 4-E • Foreign Languages
Disorders and Sciences and
& Literatures
Session Chair: Emily Borghard
Psychology
Session Chair: Robert Owens, Communicative
Disorders and Sciences
Pages 1-13
Resilency and Intervention for Children
Alice Brunet
Faculty Sponsor: Ganie DeHart, Psychology

The presentation will be a general summary of an independent psychological review on resiliency and
intervention. The primary basis of the literature review
will be developing programs that promote resilient
skills in children. The beginning of the presentation
will be an overview of the extensive literature on resilient children and the skills they acquire during difficult times. Then, the most common skills that resilient
children use will be the basis of looking at different
intervention programs that are specifically designed
for children. At the end of the presentation, an analysis
of each intervention program will be made and future
intervention programs that promote resiliency will be
suggested.

Session 3-E • English
Sexualities and the
Prison-House of Gender
Session Chair: Emily Plessas
Faculty Sponsor: Maria Helena Lima, English

Pages 25-30
The Provinces of Central France: A Study in
Geography, History, Industry, and Culture
Erinn Kehoe
Faculty Sponsor: E.R. VanVliet, Foreign
Languages & Literatures

This paper examines the distinctive quality and characteristics of the central provinces of France. This area
is unique in its diversity: a mix of scenic mountains and
fertile valleys, agriculture and industry, contemporary
life and ancient customs, rural countryside and modern cities. Although the population density of this region is lower than in other parts of France, the culture
and industry of these provinces have a strong impact
on the rest of the country. This area also holds an important place in the history of France, beginning with
the influence of the Romans and continuing through
the modern day. An examination of the diverse geography, industry, and culture of the central provinces
presents a view of life in France as a whole.

Pages 31-37
Un Voyage en France
Amy Lafleur
Faculty Sponsor: E.R. VanVliet, Foreign
Languages & Literatures

This presentation (in French) will describe cultural
and historical facts about France, in the form of a tour.
The tour is the second half of a hypothetical voyage to
Pages 14-18
France. It leaves from Montpellier and explores
"Creating Womanhood"
Provence and the French Riviera. It then continues
Chelsea Rives
north through Burgundy and Alsace-Lorraine, then
A close reading of Jennifer Finney Boylan’s She’s Not
progresses west to Normandy, while stopping in many
There, a transition from male to female memoir, makes notable sites on the way.
the author question every perception of gender differences held until that moment: Why are some people
Pages 31-46
born into the “wrong” body? What causes gender
The Arhuacos: The Struggle
“dysphoria” [for lack of a better name]? Can we recreAlice Brunet
ate ourselves? What exactly happens during a sex
change procedure? What does it mean to BE a woman? Faculty Sponsor: Cristina Rowley, Foreign Lan-

guages & Literatures

The Arhuaco people are descendants of the Tairona,
Pages 19-24
who like the Inca and the Aztec, had a highly devel"Sexualizing Black Women in America"
oped civilization. Some aspects of Tairona civilization
Lindsey Wiltse
included development of advanced irrigation systems,
In current media depictions of African-American
impressive architectural knowledge, and commerce
women, including rap music, they are most likely dewith other native peoples over great distances. Their
scribed as overly sexual, flaunting shapely bodies to
culture also had a strong connection to the earth and
men who are willing to be pleased by women who
nature which was an integral component of their behave no other function than pleasing them. Since the
liefs, customs and traditions. The Tairona inhabited
Biblical creation story, in the official reading, Eve sets what is today northern Colombia well before the arria precedent for all women to be sexual temptresses,
val of the Spanish conquistadors. They resisted and
regardless of race or class. When and why have black fought against the Spanish conquest, but in the end the
women alone begun to bear the brunt of a hyper sexu- few remaining survivors had to retreat to the mounalized culture on their bodies?
tains, where they lived in isolation and developed
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what is known today as the Arhuaco culture. Ever since then, the Arhuaco have
continued to resist an outside world that
demands they integrate themselves into modern Colombian society at the cost of their own
culture and beliefs. This presentation will describe the culture, beliefs, and traditions that the
Arhuaco people are fighting to preserve. It will
also detail their struggle to protect and foment
their culture among their youth, who are more susceptible to the influence of the outside world.

Pages 47-52
Relief du Sol et Climat
Stephanie Murdock
Faculty Sponsor: Richard VanVliet, Foreign Languages & Literatures
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tion of prisoners to other countries for the purpose of
torture, constitute violations of international law. Contrary to what the Bush administration and its supporters have argued, these policies are illegal and have
not been more effective at protecting the United States
than legal methods. In fact, by reducing the moral
standing of the country and alienating individuals
throughout the world, especially Muslims, they have
strengthened anti-American extremism and increased
the danger of terrorist attacks against the United
States.

Pages 110-132
Imposing Democracy: State Building and
the War on Terror
James Maxfield Duhe

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 fundamentally reprioritized US foreign policy. In this environment, the Bush administration crafted what came to be
known as the “Bush Doctrine.” Though a precise definition of the Bush Doctrine remains contested, definiSession 2-G • English
tions typically include the idea that the US may preemptively attack countries harboring terrorists and
Shakespeare
that the US should support the spread of democracy.
Session Chair: Daniel Carroll
But, after eight years, the United States is still not safe.
Faculty Sponsor: Eugene Stelzig, English
This paper analyzes democratization as an element of
the Bush Doctrine through case studies of Iraq and
Pages 53-57
Afghanistan. US attempts to democratize these counLooks Can Be Deceiving: Angelo's
tries have angered local inhabitants, locked the United
States into situations where withdrawal is difficult, and
Intentions in MEASURE FOR MEASURE
damaged relations between the United States and
Michael Langen
other countries. Overall, the Bush administration’s
Angelo’s Intentions in Measure for Measure Reputations are important, especially for those in positions of efforts to impose democracy in these countries have
been ineffectual and counterproductive at combating
power. In Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, some
terrorism. I conclude with policy prescriptions for the
readers see Angelo as deserving the reputation of a
moral man who is earnestly trying to clean up Vienna, Obama Administration; namely, America must remove
itself from the political processes of Iraq and Afghanibut happens to take things too far in his strict treatstan, rebuild ties with the international community,
ment of Claudio’s case. They believe that, by the
play’s end, Angelo truly repents for succumbing to the and develop a strategy for complete US withdrawal
from these areas.
temptation of Isabella. Other readers, however, see
Angelo as a power -hungry tyrant who is hypocritical
Pages 133-159
in his preaching of strict morality, and view him as
being ill-intentioned all along, pursuing his selfish
State Capacity, Social Mobility, and
agenda at the expense of Isabella and others. I will
Terrorist Groups in Thailand and the
argue that while Angelo tries to dupe others into seePhilippines
ing him as a well-intentioned, just, and pious leader,
Sarah
McDonald
the truth is that he is ill-intentioned, selfish, and unjust.
Thailand and the Philippines face similar security issues; including separatist violence in their Southern
provinces. However, the developmental paths of the
Session 4-I • Political Science &
two countries and the governments’ reactions to the
International Relations
minority ethno-religious separatist movements, the
State Responses to Terrorism
Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the Philippines,
have varied greatly. In Thailand, the government’s
Session Chair and Faculty Sponsor: Victoria
Farmer, Political Science & International Relations desire to create a singular national identity from
mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds has created
periods of forced assimilation tempered by attempts at
Pages 58-109
conciliation. Conversely, the Philippines continued
POWs in the War on Terror
colonial policies of economic and political oppression
of the Moro but created the institutions necessary for
Andrew Petracca
The mistreatment of prisoners in U.S. custody between social pluralism. The differing policies of the Thai and
Filipino governments have shaped the orientation of
September 11, 2001, and January 2009, including inthe separatist movements within the countries.
definite detentions, unfair trials, the use of interrogation techniques amounting to torture, and the deportaA 15 minute presentation, in French, on the climate
and geography of continental France.
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Currently, the size and power of MILF in
the Philippines has forced the government
to attempt peace talks with the group. However, in Thailand the reclusive nature of the
BRN C remains hinders communications with
the Thai government. This paper demonstrates
that the actions taken by the governments of
Thailand and the Philippines have fostered current separatist and terrorist movements. Addressing these problems will require state policies that
reflect pluralism and institutions that support social
aspirations.

Session 1-J • Honors
Honors Capstone II:
From Places Apart
Session Chair: Olympia Nicodemi
Faculty Sponsor: Olympia Nicodemi, Mathematics
Pages 160-170
Sir Thomas Roe at the Mughal Court:
Seventeenth Century and English
Cultural Assumptions
Katherine Schwartz
Faculty Mentor: Joseph Cope, History

This paper seeks to explore how, although in reality
the inferior partner in trade, the English in India
thought of themselves as superior. To do this, I will
analyze the journal of Sir Thomas Roe, the first official
English ambassador to the Mughal Court, in light of
English and Mughal history, English cultural constructions, and the works of contemporaries such as Edward Terry and the Emperor Jahangir. This paper will
show that Roe judges the people of the Mughal court
by English cultural standards, and uses these assumptions to claim English superiority. Furthermore, the
paper will show that, while not intentionally written
with imperialist aims, Roe's journal does demonstrate
that the basic attitudes of the later imperialist

Pages 171-204
Front and Center: As Anthropological
Analysis of Drag Queens in
American Culture
Seth Palmer
Faculty Mentor: Rose-Marie Chierici, Anthropology

Judith Butler’s concept of gender performativity revolutionized the way that academics conceive of gender,
and has subsequently become a critical perspective
for feminist and queer analyses in a variety of disciplines. The new anthropology of genders and sexualities uses this theoretical framework and focuses specifically on “institutions of ambiguity” that challenge
gender dichotomies across the globe. Such institutions
highlight the importance of understanding gendered
and sexualized categorizations as cultural constructions embedded in a specific historical, spatial and
cultural context. Continuing in that tradition, this paper
is an examination of drag queens in contemporary
American culture, with a specific focus on the politics

Published by KnightScholar, 2010

SUNY Geneseo

of drag performance. With historical roots that can be
traced back to Shakespearian theater, the practice of
drag performance in the United States has evolved
over time, yet it continues to challenge traditional notions of masculinity and femininity in American culture. Data collected from literature, fieldwork experiences, interviews, film, and social networking and
video sharing websites will be utilized to examine the
meaning of drag and the lives of those who perform in
it.

Session 1-M • Political Science &
International Relations
International Security Policy
in the 21st Century
Session Chair and Faculty Sponsor: Jeremy Grace,
Political Science & International Relations
Pages 205-247
Hugo Chavez's Foreign Policy in
Latin America
Lucy Coates

Strengthened by increased revenues from the oil
boom of the 2000s, Venezuelan President Hugo
Chávez has pursued a much more extensive foreign
policy than his predecessors, cultivating relations with
numerous countries throughout Latin America and the
world. Analysis of Chávez’s Latin American foreign
policy reveals that he, like the petro-state decisionmakers before him, has used petrodollars to fund
large, long-term projects and agreements intended to
further his goals of promoting a leftist agenda, minimizing foreign dependence, and increasing Venezuelan influence in the region. However as the oil boom
ends, Chávez is likely to fall into a petro-state trap by
overextending Venezuela’s oil revenues, rendering
him unable to sustain his capital-intensive projects.
This paper will begin by analyzing Chávez’s regional
foreign policy, its effectiveness in accomplishing his
goals, and the implications that his policy has had
throughout the region. In the context of the ending oil
boom, this analysis can be used to predict the effects
of the failure of Chávez’s foreign policy in Latin America. Analysis of Chávez’s foreign policy and his reaction to the decrease in the value of oil should serve as
an example when analyzing the foreign policy decisions made by other petro-states.

(Continued on Next Page)
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Session 2-M • Political
Science & International
Relations Politics and Policy
in American Government
Session Chair: Marilyn Klotz, Political Science
& International Relations
Pages 248-250
Political Process as Envisioned
by the West Wing
David Lombardo
Faculty Sponsor: Marilyn Klotz, Political Science &
International Relations

The challenge of illuminating people about the political process, how we elect our leaders and how they
govern, is tackled by The West Wing. During its tenure it educated people bored with C-Span, unable to
appreciate George Will, and possessing a fetish for
snappy dialogue. The main critique of the show was
that it presented an idealistic version of a world that is
generally grimmer and less eventful. Regardless, the
show used story lines straight from real life and even
foretold events that later occurred. The show dealt
with issues in a manner unfamiliar to a casual political
observer, pulling aside a curtain that hindered full
comprehension of events, and therefore provided an
accurate picture of how politics is played. For my
presentation I will address certain issues dealt with on
The West Wing, which have traditionally been out of
reach to the public, and assess how accurately the
show portrays the developments compared to their
unfolding in reality. Specifically, I will touch on the
Presidential election process, which becomes the major focus of the last two seasons, the art of crafting a
public message, and a general look at the legislative
process, with a focus on political gamesmanship.

Session 1-P • School of Education
The Denial of Universal Human
Rights: An Exploration of Examples
and Justification

SUNY Geneseo

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to Justice Everywhere.”
This is the calling of prophets to speak up for those
that may not be able to speak up for themselves. With
their help, tomorrow holds a brighter future for everyone.

Teaching & Learning Center
and Leadership Education
Development & Training
Pages 257-260
The Ghana Project
Jesse Parent, Rejoyce Owusu, Ben DeGeorge, Hannah Schmidt, and Clark Driscoll
Faculty Sponsors: David Parfitt, Teaching &
Learning Center, and Tom Matthews, Leadership
Education, Development & Training

The Ghana Project is a civic engagement and service
learning project. This poster presentation will be
about the happenings of the project, which is in its first
year, starting last semester (it is to be a long term project). Born out of GOLD’s civic engagement efforts,
The Ghana Project was created with two main goals:
the first being to share Ghanaian culture, help educate
others on life in Ghana, and share experiences with
another country; the second, long term goal, is to raise
money to help build a school in Ghana. The first year
of The Ghana Project has been one of getting people
used to Ghana, introducing them to the blossoming
African country. The poster will review the events of
the Project – such as the educational model of last semester, and the cultural events & speakers of this year
– as well as discuss the nature of the project itself. It
will also talk about the fundraising efforts of the Project, and relate them to the goal of assisting development in Ghana by means of building a school. Finally,
there will be mention of the future plans of the Project,
continuing into next year. (See Dance Performance at
5:30pm.)

Session Chair: Lwam Tecleab
Faculty Sponsor: Jane Fowler-Morse, Ella Cline
Shear School of Education
Pages 251-256
Tomorrow Will Shine
Geoff Griffiths
Student Commentator: Lwam Tecleab,

Prophets are those people who speak up against injustice and call for social change. This paper examines
the Prophets Hosea, Amos, and Jonah from the 8th
Century BC and how they speak out against corruption
in their time period. They argue for an end to misfortunes and injustices. It will also argue that Martin Luther King Jr. is a modern prophet. In his “Letter from
Birmingham Jail,” King calls for an end of the suppression of civil and natural rights. King asserts that,
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A Literature Review of
Resiliency and Intervention for Children

Submitted by Alice Brunet
This paper was completed as part of an in- through potentially adverse situations. The
focus of this paper will be to provide an
dependent directed study mentored by
overview of the resilience research and its
Dr. Ganie DeHart.
results, discuss a potential theory, review
and analyze current intervention programs,
Abstract
There have been many psychological stud- and then suggest future research studies and
ies that sought to explore the specific skills intervention prevention programs.
It is important to note that the term
that resilient children develop in adverse
resiliency was not always used to define
situations. This literature review is an attempt to provide an overview of the results children who thrived through adverse situaof previous resilience research that focuses tions. Initially, researchers classified these
children as “invulnerable” (Anthony, 1974)
on children. From these results a general
theory of resiliency will be discussed. Next, or as “stress-resistant” (Garmezy, Masten,
different types of implemented intervention & Tellegen, 1984). It was thought that these
programs that aim to promote resilient skills children had a unique quality that other chilin children will be reviewed and analyzed. dren did not possess to help them endure
Lastly, suggestions for future resilience re- their adverse situation. Further research on
these children indicated that this unique
search studies and intervention prevention
quality turned out to be something more deprograms will be made.
velopmentally mundane. For example, GarGeneral observations of children in mezy, Masten, and Tellegen (1984) initially
potentially at-risk situations have suggested researched children who were potentially
vulnerable to develop schizophrenia. This
to researchers that there are a group of
highly at-risk children who seem to be less research provided data on the development
of children born to schizophrenic mothers
negatively affected by their adverse situation and sometimes may even demonstrate over a 12-year period of time. The primary
purpose of the research was to observe if
positive effects. From these observations,
researchers have sought to understand why children who had schizophrenic mothers
were at-risk to have developmental deficits,
certain children in adverse situations are
more capable of overcoming and prospering which also could potentially contribute to
the development of schizophrenia. Despite
than their peers in similar situations. Even
the initial focus of the research, results of
though there has been no definite answer,
the study indicated that there was a group of
resilience research has indicated a general
at-risk children who were grouped into a
trend of skills that these thriving children
develop in order to overcome their situation. “stress-resistant” category. These stressFurthermore, research has also attempted to resistant children were defined as children
promote these certain skills in intervention who were exposed to stressful situations,
but were still able to maintain a normal if
programs in an attempt to assist children
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not higher developmental level of
competence. Conversely, their atrisk peers who were not classified as
stress-resistant tended to have more
developmental problems. Many variables were used to measure the child’s
development level to determine if an atrisk child was developmentally comparable
to their peers not in an at-risk situation. Results indicated that IQ was the highest and
most significant predictor of achievement
scores, even when controlling for socioeconomic status. Also, a significant interaction was found that indicated when children
had high achievement, stress had little effect
on their IQ score; however if children had
low achievement, low stress did not significantly influence their IQ scores, but high
stress correlated with a significant drop in
IQ score. This interaction suggests that even
though children may have achievement, a
stressful environment may have the potential
to hinder their performance and development.
These results suggest that children
who have high achievement are more focused on obtaining a goal and not letting
their stress level influence their performance. Further research was conducted on
competence in children to better understand
how competence can predict future success.
For example, Masten, Coatsworth, Neeman,
Gest, Tellegen, and Garmezy (1995) observed 191 children in a longitudinal study
that focused on competence across childhood and adolescence. Competence was examined because it is a long term, complex
developmental process that has direct observable behaviors. Throughout the study
there was a focus on academic competence,
conduct competence, and peer and social
competence. For only the adolescents, there
was also a focus on job competence and romantic competence. Results indicated that
childhood academic success predicted adolescent academic attainment and job success.

SUNY Geneseo

Also, childhood conduct competence
strongly predicted later conduct competence
and also predicted job and academic success.
Furthermore, childhood social competence
predicted both social and romantic competence. In general, the relationship between
academic conduct and social competence
from childhood to adolescence was mediated
by the consistent stability of academic conduct and social competence across childhood
to adolescence. These results suggest that it
is important for children to have a stable environment throughout adolescence in order
to develop proper competence levels that
have the potential to predict future success.
A similar study was then conducted
to examine if serious adversities can affect
the development of competence in children.
Therefore, Masten, Hubbard, Gest, Tellegen,
Garmezy, and Ramirez (1999) observed how
adversities may threaten the development of
competence. Differences were examined between resilient adolescents and their maladaptive peers who had not successfully developed in the face of adversities. Resilient
children were also compared to their competent peers who had developed successfully
but had not experienced any serious adversities. Resilient children in this study were
defined as children who were developmentally sound even though they were facing
long-term adversities that had great potential
to disrupt regular development. This study
focused on competence in relation to adversity by examining academic competence,
conduct competence, and peer and social
competence. A longitudinal study was conducted using 189 children from two urban
schools. Measures were taken when the children were eight to twelve years old, fourteen
to nineteen years old, and seventeen to
twenty-three years old.
Overall, results indicated that the development of competence is related to the
availability of psychosocial resources, children facing adversities are not as likely to
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have as many available resources.
The results also indicated that if
children in adverse situations do
have access to reasonably good resources then they are more likely to
have generally good outcomes even in
the face of adversity, and maladaptive
adolescents tend to be stress-reactive and
have a history of adversity, low resources,
and problems with the development of a
broad range of competencies. Furthermore,
the combination of low IQ and high adversity was also related to conduct problems
that were evident in childhood and worsened
over time. Interestingly, resilient adolescents’ intellectual functioning had no significant differences when compared to their
competent peers. Also, all competent adolescents regardless of adversity level reported
similar levels of availability to resources and
psychological well-being. In general, few
differences were found between competent
and resilient individuals other than adversity
level. These findings suggest that resources,
such as cognitive skills, are general advantages for development that can possibly assist children in succeeding in both adverse
and non-adverse situations.
Research has indicated that developing competence can predict future success in
many different domains. Furthermore, research has also indicated that resilient children, unlike their peers who are also facing
adverse situations, are able to adapt and be
developmentally comparable to their competent peers. Therefore, this research suggests
that one way that resilient children adapt and
succeed is by having sufficient resources,
such as cognitive skills, as a way to buffer
against their adversity. However, the previous studies mentioned are unclear as to what
specific resources or skills resilient children
use to assist them through their adverse
situation.
Other longitudinal studies in the resilience literature have been conducted that

SUNY Geneseo

focus more specifically on the potential
skills and resources that resilient children
may use, as well as noting overall general
trends. For example, Werner (1994) conducted a 30-year longitudinal study on the
entire birth cohort of 698 children in the year
1955 on the island of Kauai. Approximately
one-third of the children in this cohort
(n=201) were designated as high-risk because they were either born into poverty, had
experienced moderate to severe degrees of
prenatal stress, and/or lived in a family environment troubled by chronic discord, parental alcoholism, or mental illness. From this
high-risk cohort, approximately two-thirds
(n=129) of these children did develop serious learning or behavior problems by age
ten that continued to worsen by the age of
eighteen. These children also had significantly higher rates of developing mental
health problems, having a delinquency record, and/or being directly involved in a
teenage pregnancy.
However, one-third of these highrisk children (n=72) did develop into competent and successful young adults. Furthermore, no one in the resilient group developed any serious learning or behavior problems in childhood or adolescence. In this
study, they were categorized as resilient because they had successful outcomes despite
their adverse situation, sustained normal
competence levels under stress and successfully recovered from trauma. These observations are important to the resilience literature
because they provide support of resiliency
using unobtrusive measures in a naturalistic
setting.
Interestingly, in this study there was
evidence of a genetic predisposition for
these resilient children to be able to successfully overcome their situation. For example,
as infants, these children elicited positive
attention, were very active, and expressed
fewer negative habits. Furthermore, pediatricians and psychologists who examined

3
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them as toddlers noted their alertness, autonomy, their tendency to
seek out novel experiences, and
their positive social orientation. Developmentally, in concurrence with previous research, these resilient toddlers
were more advanced than other nonresilient children and were on the same developmental path as their peers not facing
adverse situations. In elementary schools,
their teachers reported that the resilient children were socially accepted among their
peers. In high school they were observed to
be nurturing, responsible, achievementoriented, assertive and independent.
These resilient children were also
noted of developing specific skills and becoming involved with certain activities that
fostered their resilient nature. By the end of
high school, resilient adolescents had developed a positive self-concept and an internal
locus of control and had found emotional
support outside of their own family; also,
their self-esteem and self-efficacy increased
when they participated in a responsible position such as a job. They tended to participate
in extracurricular activities that were enjoyable to them and also acted as a place of refuge when things were bad at home. They
were also noted to participate in volunteer
work that was focused on preventing others
from going through their current adverse
situation. In a way, these resilient children
had a specific disposition that led them to
have stability over development and the desire to seek environments that promoted
positive outcomes and reinforced their resilient nature. Even though resilient children
may have some biological factors that influence them to become resilient, these findings
may also suggest that there are certain skills
that resilient children develop, such as positive self-concept, internal locus of control,
and the ability to find social support groups,
to help them through their adverse situation.
These results were further supported

SUNY Geneseo

by Cowen, Work, Wyman, Parker, Wannon,
and Gribble (1992) in a study conducted on
10- to12-year-old urban children who were
classified as either stress-affected or stressresilient. To qualify for either of these two
groups, the child needed to have at least four
stress-related events that were reported by
their parents using the “Life Events Checklist”. Furthermore, to classify as stressaffected, the child had to score in the bottom
one-third on at least two of the three adjustment measures used in the study and score
no better than the middle one third on the
third measure. To classify as stress-resilient
the child had to place in the top one third on
two of the three adjustment measures and no
worse than the middle one third on the third
measure. These three adjustment measures
were based on three different evaluations
indicated by their parent, former teacher, and
current teacher. Overall, the stress-resilient
children exceeded the stress-affected children on all measures of adjustment. A nonclassified group was also included in this
study that was demographically matched to
the other two groups, but did not have four
or more stress related events reported by
their parents. The non-classified group had
consistently higher scores on all adjustment
measures than the stress-affected group, but
lower scores than the stress-resilient group.
The purpose of the study was to compare the
stress-affected, the stress-resilient and the
non-classified groups on a variety of levels
using data that were collected over two
years.
Results of the study indicated that
there was a tendency for the stress-resilient
group and the non-classified group to significantly exceed the stress-affected group
on test scores, but they tended not to differ
from each other. Also, for measures of obeying rules and reading and math achievement,
the stress-resistant group significantly exceeded the non-classified group and the nonclassified group significantly exceeded the
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stress-affected group. Overall,
stress-resilient children reported
significantly higher levels than the
stress-affected group on all competence and esteem measures except athletic competence, five of six self-rated
adjustment scores, all empathy scores,
problem-solving strategy measures, and
both internal and realistic control expectations. These results are consistent with previous research, suggesting that even though
resilient children are going through an adverse situation, developmentally they are
comparable to their peers who are not currently dealing with an adverse situation.
The results of the study were replicated by Hoyt-Meyers, Cowen, Work, and
Wyman (1995) in a similar study conducted
on 7- to 8-year-olds. The methodology of
this study was identical to the previous study
on stress-affected and stress-resilient children; however, some factors of the study
were adjusted to compensate for the participants’ younger age. Results indicated that IQ
scores were significantly higher for stressresilient children than for stress-affected
children. Overall, results of the study supported previous research; however, the results were less robust. These findings are
important because they support findings of
previous research that resilient individuals
are consistently at a significantly higher
competence level that their non-resilient
peers in similar adverse situations at different stages of development.
The resilience literature indicates that
there is a significant difference between resilient children and their non-resilient peers
who are also in adverse situations. Even
though it is hard to define resiliency based
upon each individual situation, the culmination of research indicates that there is a general trend that resilient children follow in
order to cope and succeed through their adverse situation. According to Masten (2001),
even though there is some indication in the
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research that resilient children may have a
specific genetic disposition, resilience is primarily a common phenomenon that results
from normal development being put to the
test in extreme situations. In order to be resilient, children need to first face a significantly adverse situation that tests their development and adaptational resources. Therefore, it is suggested that non-resilient children who are also in adverse situations are
not fully developed and do not have sufficient adaptational resources. Their developmental impairments are exposed and prolonged because of their stressful adverse
situation. It is suggested then that if these
non-resilient children had comparable access
to resources and the opportunity to develop
the necessary resilient skills, they would also
have the ability to become resilient in their
adverse situation. Furthermore, if children
not currently in an adverse situation were
also equipped with resilient skills and had
access to resources, then potentially it would
help them through future adverse situations.
In order to successfully promote resilience skills in children, intervention programs need to first consider promoting some
of the skills that resilient children use. Some
of these resilience skills include: selfregulation, self-esteem, self-efficacy, internal locus of control, emotional intelligence
and resourcefulness (Luthar 2005). In general, the adaptation skills that resilient children use are potentially universally helpful
for different adverse situations. Therefore,
interventions need to be able to be specific
enough to focus on individual problems but
also be broad enough to cover a wide range
of adaptation skills that work in different
adverse situations. Also, according to Sale,
Bellamy, Springer, and Want (2008) it is
also important that the intervention instructors are carefully selected. Results indicated
that participants who perceived higher levels
of trust, mutuality and empathy in their instructors had significantly greater
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improvements in their social skills.
Furthermore, it is important
for future research to explore what
stage of development is the prime
time for an intervention teaching adaptation skills. According to Simmons,
Burgeson, Carlton-Ford and Blyth (1987),
the transition between 6th and 7th grades is
difficult for children because of personal life
changes and school transitions (e.g., moving
into junior high, going through puberty, dating). Results of the study indicated that from
6th to 7th grade there was a significant drop
in GPA and extracurricular participation.
Therefore, it may be important to equip children with resilient skills before 7th grade in
order to prepare them for their potential life
changes.
Some interventions that currently
exist are focused on helping the high-risk
population of children to teach them how to
cope and introduce them to resilient skills.
For example, the Penn Resiliency Program
focuses on children who are at risk of developing depression and/or anxiety through internalization of their emotions. The main
purpose of this program is to reduce internalization of problems in high-risk children
to avoid future potential negative consequences. This is accomplished by teaching
the children how to use more accurate cognitive styles, problem-solving skills, and how
to seek out positive, supportive relationships.
This cognitive-behavioral intervention is primarily designed for adolescence.
The program is conducted in 12 90-minute
sessions by school counselors and teachers
who have been trained in the intervention
program and are supervised while conducting the program. There is an emphasis in the
program to help students use specific skill
sets to improve their problem solving skills
and enhance their ability to cope with daily
stressors in life, as well as preparing them to
deal with and overcome future major set-
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backs. The primary skills that are taught in
this program are: emotional regulation, impulse control, causal analysis, realistic optimism, self-efficacy, empathy, and the ability
to reach out to others for help. Participants
learn how to recognize their personal
thoughts and reactions in certain situations
and how to change their reaction to something more positive and optimistic by taking
the time to analyze their situation before reacting.
A longitudinal study was conducted
to analyze the effectiveness of this program.
The intervention group was compared with a
control group of randomly assigned young
adolescents who did not receive the intervention. Results indicated that participants
in the intervention condition significantly
improved their explanatory styles, which
was still significant even after a three year
follow-up. Furthermore, after three years of
follow-up the intervention group also reported lower levels of depressive symptoms
and were less likely to report moderate to
severe levels of depressive symptoms when
compared with the control group (Reivich,
Gillham, Chaplin, & Seligman, 2005). These
results indicate that providing at-risk children with resilient skills may potentially
help them succeed through their adverse
situation.
Another intervention program that
was developed with a focus on high-risk
youth is the Resolving Conflict Creatively
Program. The program was founded in 1985
in New York City with a focus of reducing
the high levels of violence found within the
school systems. Prior to the intervention,
teachers who were going to be the instructors for the intervention received a 25-hour
course to introduce them to concepts and
skills in social and emotional learning and
how to teach using an interactive approach.
Teachers were also given regular classroom
coaching by staff developers. Regular instruction was used to teach at least one
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lesson from the curriculum with
duration and content varying depending on the age of the children.
The primary techniques taught within
the intervention were emotion identification, active listening, assertiveness,
emotional regulation, negotiation, mediation, empathy development, active listening, conflict resolution skills, and understanding and respecting inter-cultural differences.
Because the primary focus of implementing this intervention was to reduce the
high levels of violence in the New York City
school system, the Resolving Conflict Creatively Program was not evaluated until close
to ten years after implementation. When an
evaluation was finally conducted, a quasiexperimental design was used to test the effectiveness. However, it is difficult to completely assess this program due to the varying types of programs used based on adjustments made during the intervention for age
appropriateness. Results did indicate that
high rates of instruction in this intervention
across two years were significantly related to
positive changes in children’s academic
achievement and social and emotional developmental trajectories. Furthermore, results
also indicated that there was a significant
decrease of violence within the targeted
schools by using the intervention model.
Therefore, it can be inferred that the Resolving Conflict Creatively Program was successful in its primary goal of reducing violence in the targeted school system by teaching children resilient skills (Brown,
Roderick, Lantieri, & Aber, 2004). This
gives further support that it may be possible
to influence resiliency in children by helping
them develop the necessary skills.
Another school based intervention
program that promotes similar skills that resilient children have been noted to use is the
Penn Optimism Program. The program is a
12-week, school-based intervention that is
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facilitated by a trained leader for groups of 8
- to 12-year-old children. The intervention is
based upon cognitive-behavioral therapies
that allow participants not to only learn
about new skills, but also to participate and
engage in hypothetical situations using these
new skills. It is hypothesized that if the children have practice in hypothetical settings
using these new skills, then they will be
more likely to continue using them in their
everyday life. Participants in the intervention
are children in fifth and sixth grade who
were selected because of their self-reports to
be at risk for depression and their perception
of family conflict and cohesion at home. The
intervention is divided into three separate
phases. During weeks 1-5 children learn
about cognitive base strategies such as having a more optimistic outlook, being able to
problem solve, and understanding emotions
by how they develop and are expressed.
During weeks 6-9 the children are taught
more behaviorally-oriented skills such as
assertiveness, negotiation, relaxation, coping
strategies, dealing with procrastination, enhancing social skills and decision making. In
weeks 10-11 there is a focus primarily on
different aspects of problem solving. Finally,
in week 12 there is a review of everything
that the participants have learned during the
intervention.
In one empirical study to test the effectiveness of the program, children were
randomly assigned to either an intervention
or a control condition. After the intervention
was completed, every six months for two
years all participants completed a questionnaire that assessed what they had learned
from the intervention. Results indicated that
participants in the intervention condition experienced significantly fewer symptoms of
depression and were more optimistic than
the control group across the two-year
evaluation period. These results suggest that
the intervention promoted a sense of hope,
which buffered against developing an
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increased risk for depression
(Shatte, Gillham, & Reivich,
2000).
The three aforementioned interventions that promoted skills similar
to those of resilient children were successful in helping at-risk populations to
overcome and/or succeed through their adversity. However, research has also indicated that these intervention-based programs
are also useful for all children. For example,
Greenberg, Kusche, and Riggs (2004) investigated the effectiveness of PATHS
(Promoting Alternative THinking Strategies)
which has existed for over 20 years. Under
this program it is believed that schools
should include emotional and social development in their curricula; furthermore,
teachers need to be better educated as to how
to improve children’s emotional and social
development. The program is designed to be
taught by elementary school teachers from
kindergarten through 5th grade through a
curriculum that includes lessons that promote both cognitive-academic and socialemotional development. Some skills included in the program are self-regulation,
practicing self-control, self-talk, emotional
regulation, behavior control, emotional identification, and proper emotional expression.
The schools implementing this program also
promote a supportive and nurturing school
environment. Lessons are designed to be
flexible in different situations but still have
the ability to teach specific skills and/or lessons.
Effectiveness of the PATHS program
was evaluated for both the regular education
curriculum and for the fast track program.
The regular education study was conducted
on second and third graders participating in
the PATHS program and also a control
school not implementing the PATHS program; schools were randomly assigned to
conditions. There were no significant differences between the groups on outcome meas-
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ures at the beginning of the intervention. At
the end of the intervention, results indicated
that the intervention group demonstrated significant improvements in social problem
solving skills and emotional understanding.
Furthermore, intervention participants were
also significantly less likely to provide aggressive solutions, were more likely to be
prosocial, and had lower rates of conduct
problems, anxiety and depression.
The PATHS fast track program was
a large, randomized intervention used to reduce serious aggression and conduct problems in schools. The program was conducted
in four different American location; in each
location approximately fourteen schools
were randomized equally to either intervention or control conditions. The main purpose
of the program was to integrate a set of prevention programs that served the entire
school as well as selective programs that targeted children entering first grade with highrisk behavior. The study was conducted in
three successive years with three different
cohorts of first graders. Results indicated
that schools in the intervention condition
had a significant improvement in social adaptation with lower peer ratings of aggression and disruptive behaviors, lower teacher
ratings of disruptive behavior, and improved
classroom atmosphere as assessed by an observer.
Both the normal PATHS intervention
and the fast-track program had significant
positive results when implementing interventions that promote resilient skills in all
children. This possibly suggests that by providing an environment that promotes these
skills, children will be able to develop the
necessary age-appropriate skills to overcome
adversities. Furthermore, this may suggest
that current school systems may eventually
need to implement similar programs in
which children learn about more than just
scholastic competence, but also about emotional and social competence.
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Another school-based intervention
program that promotes similar
skills that resilient children use is
the Seattle Social Development Project. The program combines three primary components of improving the
teachers’ classroom management and instructional practices, introducing an instructional program teaching self-control and social competencies using cognitive behavioral
methods of instruction, and providing school
-based workshops for parents of participating students. The purpose to the program is
to promote positive social development
through a prosocial pathway by strengthening the child’s bonds to both school and
family in order to prevent adolescent health
and behavior problems.
Beginning in 1985, 18 elementary
schools in Seattle participated in the study.
Participants were interviewed nine times
through the age of 21. Four different types
of interventions were implemented to observe which type of intervention would have
the most long-term effects. The different interventions were: full intervention, which
received the full intervention from first
through sixth grade; late intervention, which
received the full intervention but only from
fifth to sixth grade; parent-training only intervention, in which only the parent portion
of the intervention was conducted from fifth
to sixth grade, and a control that received no
intervention.
Teachers in the assigned intervention
classrooms completed a five-day training
course on proactive classroom management,
effective direct instruction strategies, and
promoting cooperative learning. The main
purpose of the teacher training was to create
a classroom environment that is conducive
to learning with minimal disruption to classroom activities and promoting prosocial behaviors (e.g., problem solving, emotional
identification, conflict resolution). Parents
who had with children in the full and late
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intervention condition or who participated in
the parent-only intervention were offered
courses to learn about child behavior management skills (offered first through second
grade), skills on how to support their child’s
academics (second through third grade), and
skills on how to reduce their children’s risk
of drug use (fifth through sixth grade). Only
the parents with children in the full intervention participated in the courses when their
children were in first through sixth grades;
parents in all other interventions, except for
the control group, only participated in the
course when their children were in fifth
through sixth grade.
Results of all interventions indicated
a significant positive improvement in social
behavior after the intervention was completed; however, after conducting follow-ups
when the participants were ages 18 and 21,
only the full intervention participants had
significant positive life changes when compared to the control group. For example, the
follow-up at age eighteen indicated that only
the participants in the full intervention were
significantly more attached and committed
to school, had significantly better grades and
achievement, and had less misbehavior when
compared to the control group. Furthermore,
significantly fewer participants in the full
intervention condition reported using violent
behavior, heavy use of alcohol, sexual activity, and having multiple sex partners when
compared to the controls. The late intervention participants also reported positive outcomes after completion of the intervention
program; however results were not as robust
or consistently significant when compared to
the controls. Furthermore, at age 21 followup participants in the full intervention were
significantly more likely than the controls to
have graduated from high school, to have
completed two or more years of college, and
to have been employed in the past month;
they were also more committed to their present jobs. Self-reports of emotional health
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at age 21 were also significantly
better for the full intervention participants, who reported better emotion regulation, fewer social phobia
symptoms, and fewer suicidal thoughts
(Hawkins, Smith, Hill, Kosterman, &
Catalano, 2007).
The results of this study are important because it suggests that interventions
may need to start at an earlier age, for example first grade, and continue for a few years
in order to have any successful long-term
resilience effects. The previous studies mentioned did not have more than a two-year
follow-up after the intervention was complete. It would be interesting to study if
these interventions have any long-term effects in predicting the success of individuals
who participated in the intervention. It is
important to this body of research that follow-ups are included until at least the end of
adolescence to indicate long-term effects.
Without these results, it will be hard to determine if the intervention is useful in providing resilient life skills for the child for
more than a few years. Even though the
aforementioned interventions are not necessarily focused on promoting resilience in
children, the skills they are promoting are
very similar to the skills that resilient children develop. Adding long-term follow-up
studies to these interventions will help us
understand if it is possible to promote resilience by simply equipping children with the
necessary tools and skills. It will also help to
understand which specific resilient skills and
tools that are promoted in the study demonstrate significant, long-term effects.
Another noted skill that resilient children develop is to seek out healthy, supportive relationships. One intervention that promotes the development of healthy peer relationships is the Youth Relations Project.
Early adolescence is the beginning stages of
dating, and because these teens have no previous experience of healthy dating relation-
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ships, this may become a time of selfexploration and experimentation with their
romantic identity. During this time, it is hypothesized that adolescents who are in an
adverse situation and have no understanding
of a positive and intimate relationship because of childhood maltreatment are at high
risk for becoming involved in violent and
abusive dating relationships. Furthermore,
peer pressure may encourage adolescents to
get involved in dating relationships even
though they may not necessarily feel ready,
which could also potentially result in a violent and abusive dating relationships.
The purpose of the Youth Relations
Project was to give direction during this experimental time with the potential that this
learning will have long-term effects of helping adolescents seek out positive and healthy
intimate relationships. This preventionbased program was targeted at both males
and females ages fourteen through sixteen
who were considered to be at-risk of developing abusive relationships due to their own
history of maltreatment. The program was
conducted in 18 sessions that focused both
on preventing abusive behavior and on promoting healthy and non-violent relationships
by equipping adolescents with necessary
tools to make informed choices and enhance
relationship competence. The program is
based on aspects of attachment theory and
social learning theory and includes feminist
explanations of relationship violence. Some
of the things that adolescents are taught
within the program are the differences between a healthy and abusive relationship,
how to get access to useful resources, examples of good and bad dating patterns, proper
emotional expression, and how to actively
listen, have empathy, and problem solve.
Results indicated that when compared to controls who did not participate in
the intervention, adolescents who were randomly assigned to the intervention demonstrated a significant decrease in all forms
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of victimization and physical and
emotional abuse perpetration. Furthermore, a two-year follow-up indicated that the intervention participants were significantly less abusive
toward their dating partners and reported
less, physical, emotional, and threatening
forms of abuse by their partners. These results suggest that the intervention was successful in providing the necessary tools for
adolescents to avoid becoming involved in
unhealthy and abusive relationships (Riley,
& Masten, 2005). However, it would be interesting if the study also examined whether
the quality of the participants' intimate relationships was significantly better than the
controls and whether these skills were also
used to seek out an intimate relationship
with a mentor. This would help to understand if this intervention promoted the development of relationships similar to the
kind that resilient individuals find that are
healthy and supportive through difficult
situations.
Overall, the research on resilient
children has indicated that even though they
may be experiencing different adverse situations, resilient children generally use similar
skills and resources to overcome and succeed. Furthermore, it is theorized that these
children are resilient because they are fully
developed for their age and are simply using
their developmental skills in extreme situations. Therefore, it is suggested that nonresilient children, whether they are currently
in an adverse situation or not, are also capable of becoming resilient if they are
equipped with the proper developmental
skills and resources. Interventions that promote resilient skills for both at-risk and not
at-risk children support this idea in that there
were significant positive changes for participants in the intervention condition of all of
the studies. This suggests that with the correct intervention program, children may be
able to learn how to better adapt to their ad-
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verse situations or to be prepared for future
adverse situations.
However, before the proper intervention is developed, more research needs to be
conducted on how to promote resiliency in
children. Current interventions need to include long-term follow-up studies to better
understand if the intervention program has
long-term effects. This will help to determine what age is the best time to start the
intervention, how long it should last, what
specific skills to promote, and how to implement the program most effectively. It may
be useful to first use an experimental design
to better control for and test what specifically will contribute to a successful intervention program. One way this could be accomplished would be to design a study that includes two or more separate controlled
workshops that have identical curriculum
and comparable environments. However, in
the intervention workshops, things such as
teaching specific resilient skills and different
intervention methods would also be included
within the curriculum. After the workshops
are completed, evaluations of the intervention workshops can be made by comparing
results to the control workshops.
Finally, it is important that research
continues to search for the most effective
way to promote resiliency in children. It may
be possible to develop a program in which
children learn about these resilient skills and
resources as a part of everyday life. Previous
research has suggested that it may be possible to incorporate these skills into classroom
instruction by equipping teachers with the
necessary tools and guidance. Based upon
previous research, further research on this
topic may indicate that an intervention to
promote resilient skills may just mean incorporating emotional and social learning into a
school’s curriculum. Providing these children with constant exposure and practice to
resilient skills in a supportive atmosphere
may assist all children to become resilient

11
Published by KnightScholar, 2010

17

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47

Great Day 2009

in the face of any adversity.
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Creating Womanhood
Submitted by Chelsea Rives
of visibility. By 1996 trans issues started to
be covered by the gay media (Wilchins 26).
Recognition is spreading as each year
passes, with the help of people like Jennifer
Boylan willing to step into the spotlight.
Jenny volunteers her private life to the public in order to further understanding and acceptance. As she tells Christopher Muther,
“I think most people are surprised that we
don’t sit around talking about sex changes
all day. We talk about homework and pracI. Out of the Closet and Into the Spotlight ticing trumpet, radical and revolutionary
things like that. We’re changing the world
Jennifer Finney Boylan, author of
She’s Not There, is one of the most inspira- by living a quiet, normal life” (Muther).
Just today, while flipping through the chantional women I have ever come across. I
can honestly say that while researching her nels, I saw an ad for a new television series
for this paper, I fell in love with her. Jenni- on WE entitled “Sex Change Hospital.” It’s
these seemingly small steps that will change
fer’s raw honesty and bravery is a goal all
the world.
women should strive to reach. Jenny was
fortunate enough to have the resources,
II. Let’s Talk About Sex(ual Reassignment
namely the love and support of her family
Surgery)
and friends, as well as the money necessary
In 2000 Jennifer began her transito undergo the transition from male to female. She was also blessed to be born in the tion. Although it would have been possible
to transition prior to the new millennium, it
era that she was. The end of the century
would have been significantly more diffiwas a wonderful time for the transcommunity. As Riki Wilchins reminds us, cult. According to Alison Oram, the first
documented sex change was performed in
the 1990s saw gender advocacy reaching
new heights (Wilchins 21). We can thank
Germany of 1930. The patient was Lili
Elbe. The most publicized sexual reassignVirginia Prince for this. In 1960 Virginia
held the first convention for cross-dressers ment surgery is the former US soldier Christine Jorgenson in 1952 (Oram 278). As hosin a discreet hotel room. This convention
pitals began shying away from sex change
was an anonymous way for people to exprocedures, private doctors took over, this
press themselves in a shame-free environment (Wilchins 22). Since then a vast social shift made sex-reassignment surgeries much
network has been forming, making it possi- easier to access, as well as more affordable
ble for cross-dressers, transgendered and
(Wilchins 23).
transsexual people alike to enter the realm
What does it mean to be a woman?
Why are some people born into the right
body, while others aren’t? What is the
cause for this? Do we create ourselves?
Endless questions run through my mind as I
reread She’s Not There. For every question
answered, another is formed. Jennifer Boylan’s transition from male to female has,
without a doubt, forever changed my perspective on womanhood.

https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47

14
20

: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009

Great Day 2009

SUNY Geneseo

While reading of Jennifer’s transition my curiosity was peaked.
What exactly happens during a sex
change procedure? Reluctantly I put
down She’s Not There and ventured
over to my computer. After about ten
minutes I found a website that looked legitimate. Dr. Chettawut Tulayaphanich is a
doctor in Thailand who performs sexual reassignment surgeries. The standard procedure costs nine thousand American dollars.
Dr. Tulayaphanich requires his patients to be
diagnose with gender dysphoria by a psychiatrist, or someone equally qualified. The
patient must have lived exclusively in the
opposite sex role, as well as take hormones,
for the six months prior to surgery (Dr. Tulayaphanich). According to Richard Wassersug, hormone treatment has two main
physiological aims. The first being to eliminate the secondary sex characteristics as
much as possible. The other, to induce the
secondary sex characteristics of the desired
sex. This is done through various combinations of estrogen and anti-androgen
(Wassersug 102). The results include fat
redistribution, the diminishing and softening
of body hair, breast development, nipple
sensitivity, softening (and typically the drying) of skin, and occasionally the loss of energy and vitality (Wassersug 103).
Dr. Tulayaphanich replicates the vagina in its entirety, from the clitoris to the
vestibule of the vulva. The scrotal skin is
the most favorable material for the vaginal
wall, although tissue from the anus can also
be used. If this is used the procedure is typically more expensive. After surgery the
most important thing for a patient to do is
vaginal dilation. This is done under the supervision of a nurse until the patient is
deemed ready to proceed on her own. Using
vaginal stents of varying sizes, the goal is to
gain and maintain maximum depth, which is
approximately six inches. This will be done
for the rest of the patient’s life under a set

schedule. Two months after surgery the patient can have intercourse; the majority of
Dr. Tulayaphanich’s patients are able to
reach orgasm within a year (Dr. Tulayaphanich).
III. Biting Your Own Teeth
“And part of it is – ready for this? –
still learning what it means to be a woman,
and feeling content, even excited by what I
learn and feel” (Boylan, home page). Now
fifty, Jennifer is still learning about what it
means to be a woman. I’d like to argue that
this is not because she used to be a man, because she never was a man. “I always had to
choose to be James. Being Jenny, though,
isn’t like that. I just am” (Boylan, She’s Not
There 162). Yes, she once had the body of a
man, but it is important to remember that a
body is nothing more than a vessel. Jennifer, like so many others, is still finding herself. After all, human beings are nothing
more than ever changing, ever evolving
works of art. We are born blank canvases
that are continuously painted and repainted
until the day we die. (And who knows,
maybe long after.) As a young child Jenny
would play “girl planet.” Walking through
the woods pretending she was stranded on a
planet whose atmosphere transformed her
into a girl, Jennifer always knew she was
truly female. “Remember when you woke
up this morning – I’d say to my female
friends – and you knew you were female?
That’s how it feels. That’s how I
knew” (Boylan, She’s Not There 22).
The Merriam-Webster dictionary has
numerous definitions for woman. The first
being “an adult female person” and another
being “of a distinctively feminine nature” (Merrian-Webster). Following the first
definition, to be a woman she would have to
possess the female reproductive organs. But
following the second, she would simply
need to act and feel like a woman. So what
is it that makes us who we are? Why was I
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born into the “right” body, while
Jenny was not? It’s clearly not
biological, so then is it psychological? Some have argued that gender is
a social construct. Up to this very moment, as I type these very words, I have
whole-heartedly agreed. But under that
argument, how would you explain transsexuals? They are quote obviously not socially geared towards being females. If this
was the case, then there would be no such
thing as transsexuals, or only a handful. We
have ruled out biology and psychology/
society. So, my dear reader, what is left?
What makes us, all of us, who we are? Why
are some people female and some male, and
still others are another sex that language, and
far too many people, have ignored? Is there
some force out there decided what game we
will play? I believe gender is too complex
for one answer. Maybe it is part social construction, part biological; maybe it’s another
factor that we haven’t even dreamt of yet.
We are young, and we know little, no matter
what many would like to believe. Maybe
we’ll never have an answer to this mindboggling question, but it’s certainly wroth
the thought. As Alan Watt’s has declared
“trying to define yourself is like trying to
bite your own teeth” (Moncur).

was something others would find both impossible and hilarious” (Boylan, She’s Not
There 21). Imagine, if you will, a toddler
clutching a safety blanket. Look into that
child’s eyes. Do you see fear? Do you see
sadness? Most would assume these emotions are caused by something trivial, such
as a thunderstorm or a strange face. Would
you even think of the possibility that this
child was thinking, in a toddler’s limited
language, that she was not in the right body?
Imagine the confusion Jenny must have felt.
Imagine the turmoil. How could a parent
know? And if that child expressed her
thoughts, how would the news be taken?
Would it be shrugged off as a child’s game?
It isn’t uncommon for a transwoman
to now at a young age. Take Hanna Rosin’s
article about Brandon for example.
“Brandon, God made you a boy for a special
reason,” his mother Tina told him one night.
“God made a mistake,” he replied. From
toddlerhood he gravitated towards “girly”
activities, such as playing with Barbies and
dressing up in his mother’s heels. In fact,
his first full sentence was “I like your heels.’
Never having heard the word transgender
until Brandon was eight, Tina was lost. She
believed Brandon was the only boy who
dealt with these issues. But eventually she
connected with an internet community of
parents of transgendered children. Shortly
after this she brought Brandon, his stepfather Bill, and her two other children to the
Trans-Health Conference in Philadelphia.
Here Tina found the support she needed, and
became convinced that Brandon’s issues
were real. “This is nothing we can fix. In
his brain, in his mind, Brandon’s a girl.”
This realization was emphasized b the conversation Brandon, who was then introducing himself as Bridget, unbeknownst to his
parents, had with a fellow child. “Are you
transgender?” asked his friend. “What’s
that?” replied Brandon. “A boy who wants
to be a girl.” “Yeah. Can I see your

IV. “This is nothing we can fix.”
Now let us look at the initial journey
– maybe you can find the answers that evade
me. As I mentioned earlier, Jenny knew
from a very young age that she was not a he.
“Although my understanding of exactly how
much trouble I was in grew more specific
over time, as a child I surely understood
enough about my condition to know it was
something I’d better keep private.” Early
on, she was faced with this incalculable burden, a frightened child knowing that there
was something seriously amiss, knowing
that it must be kept a secret. “By intuition I
was certain that the thing I knew to be true
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ing in Baltimore, James, like so many others, gathers all the girls clothing he has, including makeup and accessories, and throws
them away (Boylan, She’s Not There 83).
He has been seeing Grace, and is falling in
love with her. But he is not cured by love.
Nor is he cured by marriage and a family.
“I often woke up and lay there in the
dark…I’m the wrong person, I thought, I’m
living the wrong life, in the wrong
body” (Boylan, She’s Not There 102). At
age forty two she realizes that the time for
self acceptance has come. The time to speak
to Grace has come. “The burden that had
been mine alone for all these years was now
Grace’s, and in the weeks that followed she
walked through her days broken and
crushed” (Boylan, She’s Not There 127).
Jennifer is an extraordinarily lucky woman.
Grace, after a long journey of her own, never
leaves Jenny. She sticks with Jenny, and is
with her to this very day (Harkavy). The
parents tell their two young boys, and Jennifer is dubbed “Maddy,” a combination of
mom and daddy (Boylan, She’s Not There
V. Maddy Wasn’t Cured
Years pass, the toddler matures into a 159). Jennifer tells her friends, some in person, some through a letter, and begins her
preteen. Jennifer, then James, is now ten.
transition. She is shown an amazing amount
“The first time I remember trying to come
of love and support from all. Of course
up with some sort of solution to the being
there are questions and confusion, all of
alive problem was about 1968” (Boylan,
She’s Not There 22). James goes for a long, which she handles very well, and with much
humor.
solitary walk, and contemplates his life.
Has Jennifer’s journey been made
How many ten year olds delve into such
heavy, philosophical questions such as this? any easier because she is a writer and professor of literature? Was it any easier for her to
“And then I thought, Maybe you could be
imagine her life in a different body? Maybe
cured by love” (Boylan, She’s Not There
it was easier to imagine herself in the correct
23). Fast forward, James is in graduate
school, and is living his private life as a fe- body, but I don’t think there is any way to
ease such a journey. I don’t believe Jenny
male, feeling afraid and secluded. “I was
ever had a choice. Yes, getting the surgery
sitting on top of a mountain of secrets so
was a choice, but being a woman wasn’t.
high that it was impossible to see the earth
Some factor other than her own desire made
anymore” (Boylan, She’s Not There 70).
Her struggles would have been greatly less- that a non-choice. What was that factor? I
haven’t the slightest idea. I have no idea
ened if she had the support of a transwhat makes us who we are. Society plays a
community, if acceptance was something
she could have fathomed. Later, while liv- major role, of course, but how big of a role
balloon?” The stark simplicity of
this dialogue says it all. To
Bridget, there is no question. She is
a girl. Rosin explains that “before
they have much time to be shaped by
experience, before they know their sexual orientation, even in defiance of their
bodies, children can know their gender” (Rosin 1).
It is vital that these communities and
conventions exist. Without them, countless
numbers would be floundering, drowning in
their own troubles. Thousands would feel
even more isolated than they already do.
And this doesn’t only go for the transsexuals
themselves, but their friends and families as
well. These outlets help people accept the
truth that transsexualism is not a choice that
can be reversed, and that steps can be taken
to help those who suffer. Now, if only there
were more awareness campaigns centered on
this issue. In good time? Maybe, but I’d
rather not wait.
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when it comes to what sex you are?
Dear reader, I regret that I cannot
give you a set answer. What I have
presented is a pallet, quite like She’s
Not There, a base work to identify questions for you to answer.
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Sexualizing Black Women
in America
Submitted by Lindsey Wiltse
Girl, what makes you wanna fuck with me now?
I’ve been wantin’ to fuck wit’ you for quite a while
Is the money makin’ you wanna fuck with me?
Whoa…if money’s gonna make me slam these
hoes…then alright.
“Fuck Dat Bitch” by 50 Cent

“God damn lil’ buddy take off your
clothes and let me see that apple bottom and
that brown booty,” croons Crime Mob in
their song “Rock Her Hips.” Being an obvious jab at black female sexuality, “apple
bottom” is modern slang for a large, shapely
rear end, calling out the “brown” aspect of
her behind. In current media depictions of
African American women, and specifically
rap music, they are most likely described as
overly sexual, flaunting shapely bodies to
men who are all too willing to be pleased by
women eager to please them. I have noticed
advertisements for clothing where white
women are being suggestive, showing a bit
of skin or biting their lips for a come-hitherand-you-will-see look, while black women
are more likely to be half-clothed, legs
open, and laying on a bed, inviting the
viewer to her body. I have noticed that African American women are indeed more
likely to be sexualized in American society.
In the Biblical creation stories, revered in
our culture, Eve, when eating the fruit of the
Tree of Knowledge, sets a precedent for all
women to be sexual temptresses, regardless
of race or class. When did black women
bear the brunt of a hyper sexualized culture
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on their bodies, and why are they picked out
over others?
Born in the eighties and early nineties, this generation has grown up in something referred to as “hip hop culture.” Hip
hop culture, as I have learned, was started
by black and Latino youths in the Bronx and
consist of four distinct elements: rapping,
deejaying, break-dancing, and graffiti. The
culture evolved in response to white supremacy in American society. Following the
Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement, minorities were looking to successfully migrate into mainstream white society.
Moving away from a perceived lack of individuality in New York City at that historical
moment, hip hop allowed men to make a
significant name for themselves in their
communities. In the time since it hit the
mainstream airwaves in 1979, hip hop culture has grown to dominate the media. Rappers and the lifestyles they promote bring in
an enormous amount of money to producers, fashion designers, artists, and the executives in charge of television, radio and advertising. As a significant creative force in
modern society, hip hop continues to positively reinvent itself. According to rapper
KRS-ONE, “creativity is seen as feminine.
In these single families that many of us
grew up in, we didn’t have any fathers, so
we were missing the analytical sides of ourselves. Instead, we are creative and
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intelligent, and this comes from
our mothers. There is creativity in
graffiti, in b-boying” (qtd. in Goldblum). Many lower-income families,
the ones directly impacted by hip hop,
are mother-led, single parent households,
according to KRS-ONE. He admits that hip
hop is based on a feminine creativity experienced by these men without fathers in their
lives. If the very thing that causes their individuality and expression is a feminine characteristic, one attributed to their own mothers, then the exploitation of women prevalent within the culture is difficult to explain.
MySistah’s contributor Ayanna begins to offer an explanation as to the role
and status of women in hip hop culture. She
states:
All women, but mostly black women
in particular are seen in popular hiphop culture as sex objects. Almost
every hip-hop video that is regularly
run today shows many dancing
women (usually surrounding one or
two men) wearing not much more
than bikinis, with the cameras focusing on their body parts. These images are shown to go along with a
lot of the explicit lyrics that commonly contain name calling to suggest that women are not worth anything more than money, if that.
Women are described as being only
good for sexual relations by rappers
who describe their life as being that
of a pimp. In many popular rap
songs men glorify the life of pimps,
refer to all women as they think a
pimp would to a prostitute, and promote violence against women for

'disobeying.' (1)
Within this interpretation, the ideals
of creativity lauded by KRS-ONE that are
passed through the mother become lost in
chauvinism. While it started out as a way to
relieve frustrations and stake an identity
within a white supremacist society, hip hop
culture in the twenty first century has
shifted slightly from its original goals. Instead, what I see are rappers obsessed with
sex, women, masculinity, and capitalism.
Since the emergence of so-called “gangsta
rap,” mainstream hip hop culture promotes a
lifestyle of money hungry men and women
which, seen just in its media portrayals,
leads to stereotyping of black women as insatiable sexual creatures. The images of voluptuous, gyrating women, circling their
rear on a man’s groin does not convey creativity, but instead, objectifies African
American women.
Significantly, the origins of the
South Bronx inspired music and lifestyle
found markets in the suburbs of the same
city it emerged in. The mostly white populations that moved out of the city after World
War II enjoyed this form of art and music
enough that the appeal to white audiences
influenced the corporate white interests. In
fact, without the large numbers of suburban
and rural audiences, the lasting power of hip
hop music would not exist. In 2008, without
getting into too much detail, I will say that
through product endorsements and corporate funding, hip hop is largely fueled by
white CEOs. In this capitalist and patriarchal nation, the people in power provide
capital to the rap artists and their record
companies to produce a particular image.
This same image appeals to the audiences

20
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47

26

: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009

Great Day 2009

SUNY Geneseo

who see mainstream rap on television. While I am not saying that
African American men do not have
any role in the production, I am willing
to note the strong hand of white influence that goes into the making of rap music. The hypermasculinity associated with
hip hop culture would not exist if it were not
for the hypersexualization of black women.
Key historical aspects that cause white producers of music to encourage, consume, and
portray African American women in such a
manner need to be identified. Since there is
this influence, the images projected of African American women in this culture are manipulated by not only those who endorse it
(white men) but also those who consume it
(a largely white population). Kobena Mercer believes that “certain types of imagery
are responsible for causing actual violence
and abuse in society at large” (133), stating
that “music is a key site in everyday life
where men and women reflect on their gendered and sexual identities” (141) . I will
focus on the role white America plays in the
oversexualization of black women currently
manifested in a popular music form and lifestyle that exists today.
Bell hooks states that “white supremacist ideology insisted that black people, being more animal than human, lacked
the capacity to feel and therefore could not
engage the finer sensibilities that were the
breeding ground for art” (67). If African
Americans cannot, under white supremacist
ideology, connect with a white aesthetic appeal, then what they produce in their view is
not “art.” What their music is, then, is something outside of art, some sense of
“otherness.” This suggests the reasoning

behind a white push behind a hip hop market and the portrayal of the women within it.
Not only are African Americans made into a
social other in regards to artistic creation,
but African American women, specifically
in hip hop culture, are placed on a different
spectrum of “other.” Women, as a gender,
are perceived as closer to nature due to our
ability to birth children and men are seen as
closer to civilization since they are seen as
the ones making buildings and government
systems. Since women as a whole are perceived as closer to nature, black women in
particular are even more so. Black slave
women were brought over from Africa,
where they were seemingly taken from the
jungle. By living in a “natural” setting instead of a civilized world, they were not
ranked on par with white women, who lived
in “civilization.” They would be more natural, and unbridled sexuality is not a trait associated with the whiter, Western world, but
more seen with the darker people overtaken
by colonialism. Under a white system, black
women in hip hop culture are contrasted to
white women; black individuals are ranked
more deviant than white individuals. Black
women, being seen as an Other, are inherently different than white women, therefore
allowing her to be depicted as more sexual
than others.
In the strand of thought that linked
black women with animalistic, unbridled
sexuality comes the Jezebel stereotype created in Antebellum American society. Rupe
Simms suggests that the “preeminent features of the dominant ideology that justified
their exploitation of female slaves…that
contributed substantially to the social construction of African women’s
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gender” (880). The supremacist ideology maintained that slave women
were able to be sexually exploited,
thereby leading to numerous African
American women being raped and
treated solely as sexual objects by their
white masters. Simms defines the Jezebel
stereotype:
The sex-starved woman, who was
childishly promiscuous and consumed by lustful passions. Her sexual aggression, fertility, and libidinous self-expression were considered limitless. The Jezebel image
concretized Black female subordination, justifying the rape of African
women by white men. According to
this portrayal, the African woman
truly enjoyed being ravaged by her
master…so that abusing her was
simply satisfying her natural desires…the Jezebel image sustained
the domination of white men. (882)
The Jezebel image allowed for white men to
relate to black women in a more primitive
manner than they would their white counterparts. If slave women loved being ravaged,
then indeed they differed from the white
women whose bodies were not used for
pleasure. This relates to the images seen in
hip hop videos. While using different intentions, the dozens half naked women allowing men to place dollar bills underneath
their thong underwear for a good look at
their rear end allude to this antediluvian
stereotype; black women are rendered in
this image of limitless libido by a continually supremacist society. Again, this compares to the black women as a socialized
Other because it places her as differing from

white women. Black women only want sex,
according to the Jezebel stereotype, and in
such a framework, white women are defined
as not wanting sex. Hip hop portrayals of
women as a Jezebel type figure identify to
the white consumer base that African
American women are inherently more sexual than white women.
Rape, as noted by Edward Shorter,
is not only a way for men to prove their sexual dominion over women but for all men to
keep all women in a state of fear in order to
triumph over them. In this manner, the
women are seen as a dispensable sex object
and remain protective over their genitals at
all time. Simms suggests that the Jezebel
image, beginning in the nineteenth century,
sustained the domination of white men over
black women. The Jezebel imagery described by Simms directly relates to
Shorter’s definition of rape. When black
women are accused of being insatiable sex
creatures, then indeed the power structure is
maintained; white men remain in control
over the bodies of women, and most especially, black women. In the antebellum
south, “no law existed to forbid the rape of
female slaves by their masters. The rape of
an enslaved woman by someone other than
her master was considered trespass, a property crime against the slave
owner” (Sitomer 10). What this rape without consequence attitude does is relegate
black women to a status of property, to be
used as how their white owner saw fit. Although there is no legalized ownership of
black bodies anymore, there is the objectification of black bodies. If they are being portrayed in a sexualized manner, then it invites a voyeurism of their sexuality by
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consumers. If their consumers are
mostly young, suburban, white
males, then their bodies are being
controlled by these same men that influence their media portrayal, which
will coincide with eventual negative and
consequential stereotypes.
Mercer is sure to pronounce that
“patriarchal culture constantly redefines and
adjusts the balance of male power and privilege, and the prevailing system of gender
roles, through a variety of material, economic, social and political structures” (137).
Slavery is one such institution where sexual
power, due socioeconomic and political influence, can cause an individual to become
a body instead of a person. A capitalistic,
racist and patriarchal culture can lead to the
imagery seen in the lyrics and videos of
mainstream hip hop artists to be pervasive
and influential. Before the Civil War, black
women were often forced into polygamy
and polyandry, with black men mating with
other black women as decreed by a slave
master in order to produce children with
traits the slaveholder desired. In polygamous systems, one man would be made to
mate with a variety of women or one
woman would mate with a few males. Now,
multiple women dance upon, lick their lips
and shake their hips at the one man, usually
the man rapping into the microphone. In
Kristen Gentry’s “Hip Hop Culture and
Contemporary American Literature” class,
we have spoken of a few clips shown of
documentaries where many of the men
speak of them and their friends either trying
to get physical with one girl, or having pride
that they all have gotten physical with her.
In polygamous situations, the woman will

be seen as wanting sex, and desiring all of
these men to have her, or willing to compete
with other sexual women for one man by
putting herself out there more than they
have. Although there is a significant difference between forced sexual intercourse and
the willingness of girls to submit to this
viewing of their bodies, the images in mainstream media bring up an idea reminiscent
of polygamous situations. This stereotype
reaching back to Antebellum America is not
something that should continue over a hundred years later.
Magnus Hirschfeld, in his 1932 article entitled “Racism” explains sexualizing a
group of people in a way that sums up, in an
obvious manner, any predilection anyone
may have to stereotype, as is done with African American women. He says, “sexual
peculiarities…are so equally distributed
among the nations and among every stratum
of the population that there can be no excuse for assigning what are merely individual characteristics to groups or races, and to
parties or the advocates of specified opinions” (230). An objection would be to say
that the women who are portrayed in these
videos and the media know what they are
getting into when they sign on to appear
scantily clad or overly sexual. That would
be a fair argument, but what is not fair is
when the millions of women who do not
make a conscious decision to appear in this
manner in mass media are assigned the
characteristics and behavior of the few who
do. It becomes an issue when certain people
in power make the decisions of who and
what will appear in what form, while in doing so, harm a plethora of women who
should remain unaffected. It is not the
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women who are grinding in bikinis
that become the problem, but the
fundamental flaw is when hypersexualization is attributed to all African
American women, not solely the ones
who profit from making themselves out
to appear so.
White Americans, and most specifically white men, have a fascination with the
bodies of women, especially black women.
Instead of the use of African American
women’s bodies through forced rape during
slave times, the hypersexualization of
women through hip hop culture allows for a
white gaze on black female sexual bodies.
bell hooks later writes that “consumer capitalism has not been able to completely destroy artistic production in underclass black
communities” (67). In opposition to what is
seen on television, there is a huge underground rap and hip hop scene where hypersexualization of women does not occur.
This is where hip hop is created without
white influence, and calls to its roots in jazz
and reggae, both black art forms. It is the
mainstream attitude of black women being
more sexual than white woman is hammered into the minds of the American public through the media. To me, this is a peculiar social phenomenon. This is a continuation of slavery mindset in the twenty-first
century that is being perpetuated not only by
black rappers, but many of the white audiences who fuel the consumer base. There is
nothing inherently sexual about black
women, but instead, there is a sexuality
placed upon their bodies, first by colonizers,
then by the slaveholders, and now by the
popular media. I think there needs to be an
understanding on the meaning placed on the

space of other people. With this meaning,
these perceptions and stereotypes can be
overturned and African American women
would not be unnecessarily targeted for consumption in today’s society.
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France: Chapitre VProvinces du Centre
Submitted by Erinn Kehoe
Les provinces centrales de la France
sont une région intéressante et variée qui
s’étende à couvrir une bonne partie de la
superficie de ce pays. Ces provinces, qui
incluent la Touraine, l’Orléanais, le Berry,
le Nivernais, Le Bourbonnais, l’Auvergne,
la Marche, et le Limousin, offrent un peu de
tout. Quant aux éléments géographiques, on
y trouve des montagnes, des plateaux, des
fleuves, et des vallées – même des volcans
éteints. Il y a des industries variées et de
l’agriculture de beaucoup de genres, du
monde contemporain mélangé avec la vie
du passé, de la plus rurale campagne et de la
ville moderne. On rencontre dans cette région des gens de tous les parcours de la vie,
et une étude des provinces diverses du Centre donne une petite vue de la vie en France.
Aujourd’hui, les provinces du Centre
font partie des régions modernes du Centre,
du Limousin, et de l’Auvergne. La plupart
de cette région est sur le grand Plateau Central, mais un peu (partie de la Touraine, le
Berry, et l’Orléanais) fait partie du Bassin
Parisien1 et l’Auvergne et le Limousin appartient au Massif Central (Evans 134). L’élévation augmente du nord-ouest au sudest;2 l’Orléanais et la Touraine sont les plus
basses, tandis que l’Auvergne est la plus
montagneuse (la plus haute élévation de cette région se trouve en Auvergne à Mont Dore qui arrive à 6188 pieds [Evans 133]). Ce
territoire est arrosé par plusieurs fleuves
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(comme la Loire et le Rhône) et par des rivières (comme le Cher, l’Indre, la Vienne,
la Saône, et l’Allier) (Evans 105, 134). On y
trouve beaucoup de terres qui sont bonnes
pour l’agriculture, mais aussi avec beaucoup
de brandes et de forêts de châtaigniers en
abondance (Evans 135). A cause de la difficulté de traverser ce pays et de communiquer aux époques d’autrefois il n’y a pas de
grand centre de commerce et d’industrie
dans ce local ; au lieu d’un seul, plusieurs
centres ont développé (Evans 135). Ces centres se trouvent souvent à un lieu qui leur
permet de relier les gens des montagnes et
les gens de la basse terre.
Aujourd’hui, les provinces du Centre
font partie des régions modernes du Centre,
du Limousin, et de l’Auvergne. La plupart
de cette région est sur le grand Plateau Central, mais un peu (partie de la Touraine, le
Berry, et l’Orléanais) fait partie du Bassin
Parisien et l’Auvergne et le Limousin appartient au Massif Central (Evans 134). L’élévation augmente du nord-ouest au sud-est ;
l’Orléanais et la Touraine sont les plus basses, tandis que l’Auvergne est la plus montagneuse (la plus haute élévation de cette
région se trouve en Auvergne à Mont Dore
qui arrive à 6188 pieds [Evans 133]). Ce
territoire est arrosé par plusieurs fleuves
(comme la Loire et le Rhône) et par des rivières (comme le Cher, l’Indre, la Vienne,
la Saône, et l’Allier) (Evans 105, 134). On
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trouve beaucoup de terres qui sont
bonnes pour l’agriculture, mais aussi avec beaucoup de brandes et de
forêts de châtaigniers en abondance
(Evans 135). A cause de la difficulté de
traverser ce pays et de communiquer aux
époques d’autrefois il n’y a pas de grand
centre de commerce et d’industrie dans ce
local ; au lieu d’un seul, plusieurs centres
ont développé (Evans 135). Ces centres se
trouvent souvent à un lieu qui leur permet
de relier les gens des montagnes et les gens
de la basse terre.
La Touraine est une assez petite province à l’est de cette région, connue comme
« le jardin de la France » (Evans 104-5). La
Loire, le fleuve qui coule de l’est à l’ouest à
travers la province, est le plus long et le
moins navigable de la France3 Tours, une
ville industrielle et commerciale, est la capitale de la Touraine et se trouve au bord de la
Loire. On y trouve une école préparatoire de
médecine et de pharmacie. Près de Tours, il
y a beaucoup de châteaux construits pendant
la Renaissance dans la vallée de la Loire qui
sont maintenant de grandes attractions touristiques (Denoeu 268). Par exemple, le château de Chambord qui se trouve à 40 kilomètres au sud-est d’Orléans était bâti pour
François 1er par l’architecte Pierre Neveu
(Denoeu 268). Ce château, qui était le préféré de Louis XIV, est le plus vaste des châteaux de la Loire (Denoeu 269). Il y a d’autres châteaux qui sont plus petits qui Chambord, comme Blois, qui n’est pas loin de
Chambord (Denoeu 269) et qui était le préféré de Catherine de Médicis et de Louis
XII (Denoeu 270-1), et Amboise, qui est
perché sur une falaise au-dessus de la Loire
et est connu comme le lieu de la mort de

Léonardo da Vinci en 1519 (Denoeu 272).
Chenonceau, un des plus célèbres châteaux
de la région, est connu comme « le château
des dames » parce que c’était la résidence
de la maitresse d’Henri II, Diane de Poitiers,
et de sa femme, Catherine de Médicis (mais
à temps distincts, bien sûr) (Denoeu 272).
Pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale plus
de 2000 blessés français y étaient soignés
(Denoeu 272). Maintenant ce château appartient à Menier, le chocolatier célèbre
(Denoeu 272). Ce n’est pas pour rien que la
Touraine est souvent appelée « le pays des
châteaux » (Denoeu 272).
Un autre surnom commun pour la
Touraine est « le jardin de la France » (Denoeu 272), à cause de la grande
productivité de la région. Cette fertilité est à
cause de la proximité de la Loire et du bon
sol que le fleuve y dépose quand il y a des
inondations fréquentes (Evans 104). Cet endroit est renommé pour ses produits agricoles, comme les vins, les eaux-de-vie, et les
fruits secs. Un vin célèbre qui vient de cette
région est le vouvray, une boisson légère et
pétillante produite à Vouvray (Denoeu 32).
La Touraine produit aussi des rillettes de
Tours, un produit alimentaire spécial. On y
trouve aussi la production des tissues comme des soieries, des lingeries, et des tapis.
Cette région a des industries comme l’imprimerie, la fonderie, et la production de
produits chimiques et de meubles. On y exploite les ressources minières comme le tuffeau, une pierre blanche qui était utilisé
pour construire les châteaux de la Loire
(Denoeu 46). En plus de toutes ces industries et touts ces produits la Touraine est
connue comme la patrie de nombreux peintres comme Clouet, Fouquet, de Boucicaut,
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et Destouches. Un autre fils important de cette région est l’écrivain
Honoré de Balzac, écrivain des romans, des essaies, des critiques littéraires, et des articles journalistiques. Cet
auteur, qui est un des plus célèbres de la
France, a écrit les romans comme Eugénie
Grandet, Le Père Goriot, et d’autres. La
Touraine est divisée en trois départements
aujourd’hui : l’Indre-et-Loire, le Loir-etCher, et l’Indre.4
L’Orléanais est la province la plus
au nord du Centre ; elle se trouve au nordest de la Touraine. Le capitale de l’Orléanais est Orléans. Cette ville a été fondée par
les Romains sur la Loire et appelée Cenabum Aureliani (Evans 100). Les sièges de
cette ville par les Anglais en 1423 et 1429
restent célèbres, et c’était à Orléans que
Jeanne d’Arc a inauguré sa mission merveilleuse qui devait sauver la France de la domination anglaise. Aujourd’hui, Orléans est
sur une grande route importante et est
connue comme un important marché central
à cause de son déplacement dans le tournant
de la Loire ; elle ne se trouve pas trop loin
du plus grand centre d’affaires et de culture
de la France, Paris (Evans 100). Chartres est
une autre ville importante dans l’Orléanais,
connue pour sa cathédrale ancienne qui a été
construite à l’époque gothique. Les produits
de l’Orléanais incluent des vinaigreries, du
chocolat, des pépinières (Denoeu 38), des
fruits, des grappes de raisin, et des légumes
(« Provinces »). Ce pays a aussi de l’industrie dans le domaine des constructions mécaniques. Aujourd’hui, l’Orléanais est divisé en plusieurs départements modernes : le
Loiret, le Loir-et-Cher, l’Eure-et-Loir, et

une partie de l’Essonne et de la Sarthe
(« Provinces »).
La province du Berry est au sud de
l’Orléanais et à l’est de la Touraine. La capitale de cette région est Bourges, connue
pour une magnifique cathédrale gothique du
XIIIe siècle. Cette cathédrale célèbre a des
détails exaltants, comme cinq grandes portes de façade et des vitraux complexes
(Denoeu 263). Autrefois, le Berry était un
grand corridor entre la Bourgogne et l’Aquitaine, mais quand les modes de transport ont
changé son emploi s’est réduit aussi (Evans
104). Ce pays est renommé pour ces produits agricoles, comme le blé, les moutons,
les vins, et le fromage, et pour la gastronomie berrichonne (Evans 104). Le Berry a de
l’industrie dans les domaines de la lingerie
et de la confection et il produit aussi de
l’houille et du fer, qui est utilisé dans la fonderie de canons (Denoeu 47). Cet endroit est
la patrie de George Sand, l’auteur de nombreux romans, contes, et pièces de théâtre.
Elle a raconté des histoires de la vie rustique
de son pays natal dans les romans comme
La Mare au Diable, François le Champi, et
Les Maîtres Sonneurs (Denoeu 218). Maintenant, le Berry est divisée en quelques départements ; les deux principaux sont l’Indre et le Cher (« Provinces »).
Si on continue vers l’est du Berry,
on trouve la province du Nivernais. La capitale, Nevers, se trouve sur la Loire et est
connue pour son palais ducal et pour sa ferronnerie (Evans 139). En 1429 Jeanne d’Arc
a pris cette ville du contrôle des Anglais envahissants (Denoeu 22). Cette région, qui
est assez rurale et très boisée, a servi comme
route entre Lyon et Limoges et entre la
Bourgogne et le sud-est de la France, mais
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aujourd’hui ses routes de communication et de voyage ne sont pas si
importantes qu’autrefois (Evans 139).
Les célèbres produits du Nivernais sont
des vins et des faïences. Cette province
est aujourd’hui connue comme le département moderne du Nièvre (« Provinces »).
Une autre province du Centre est le
Bourbonnais, qui se trouve au sud du Berry
et du Nivernais. La capitale de cette région
se trouve sur l’Allier et s’appelle Moulins.
Le Bourbonnais est connu comme le siège
de la maison des Bourbon, qui a pris son
nom du château qui se trouve près de Moulins, le Château Bourbon (« Provinces »).
Plusieurs membres de la dynastie des Bourbon étaient des rois de la France du XVIe
siècle au XIXe siècle, quand la monarchie a
été abolie en France (« Provinces »). Cette
province est un pays de bocage ; elle est assez pastorale et rustique (Evans 139). Le
Bourbonnais fait des produits dans les industries de la confection et du cuir. Aujourd’hui, la région du Bourbonnais est le
département moderne de l’Allier
(« Provinces »).
L’Auvergne se trouve le plus au sud
des provinces du Centre. La capitale, Clermont-Ferrand, est un centre important pour
tout le plateau central ; les activités agricoles de cette région se situent autour de la
ville (Evans 138). Une des plus célèbres cathédrales de la France, Notre-Dame-du-Port,
est à Clermont-Ferrand (Denoeu 256) ; aussi, une des plus importantes universités de
ce pays s’y trouve (Denoeu 336). Cette capitale est un centre de fabrication de pneus
(les usines de Michelin s’y trouvent)
(Denoeu 43) et de la construction de voitures (Evans 138). La géographie de ce lieu

est intéressante et variée. L’Auvergne comprend la région de la France qui s’appelle
« le Massif Central », qui est une chaîne de
volcans éteints (Evans 134). Ces montagnes
étaient faites quand, à l’époque tertiaire, des
laves noires ont coulé des fissures dans le
plateau central à cause des convulsions de la
terre (Denoeu 6). Les volcans éteints sont
appelés « puys », duquel le plus haut (à
4800 pieds) s’appelle le Puy-de-Dôme
(Evans 138). La Limagne, une grande plaine
du Massif Central, fait partie de l’Auvergne.
Cet élément géographique est le fond d’un
ancien lac et fait maintenant partie de la vallée de l’Allier (Evans 138). La grande et
fertile plaine, arrosée par l’Allier, est un bon
lieu pour cultiver des céréales, des betteraves à sucre, et des fruits ; on y trouve aussi
des vignobles (Evans 138) et l’élevage du
bétail est y répandu (« Provinces »). Avec
toute cette fertilité, ce n’est pas étonnant
que l’Auvergne soit connue pour ses produits alimentaires, comme le chocolat de
Royat, les pâtes-alimentaires, les fruits
confits et les fromages (« Provinces »). L’élevage de brebis est idéal dans les montagnes rocheuses de la région, et le fromage
qui s’appelle « le roquefort » y est fait du
lait de ces brebis.5 Le lait est ramassé,
chauffé, mis en moules, et ensemencé avec
le penicillium roqueforti. Puis, le fromage
est séché et vieilli dans les caves célèbres de
Roquefort-sous-Soulzon (« Fabrication »).
Beaucoup de gens de cette région travaillent
dans cette industrie importante
(« Fabrication »). Il y a aussi de l’industrie
dans les secteurs des pneus, de la métallurgie, et de la houille blanche (Denoeu 47).
L’Auvergne est une célèbre région
touristique. Une grande attraction est ses
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nombreuses stations thermales,
comme celles à Royat, à la Bouboule, et à Mont-Dore. Les sources chaudes des stations thermales viennent du
volcanisme de la région (Evans 138).
L’Auvergne est aussi distinguée pour être
la patrie de Blaise Pascal. Ce physicien,
philosophe, et écrivain est mort avant d’avoir achevé son apologie de la religion chrétienne dont les fragments ont été publiés
posthumes sous le titre de « Pensées ». On
rappelle souvent une de ses phrases célèbres
à propos de l’homme : « L’homme n’est
qu’un roseau, le plus faible de la nature,
mais c’est un roseau pensant ». Aujourd’hui, la province de l’Auvergne est divisée
entre les départements de l’Allier, du Cantal, de la Haute-Loire, et du Puy-de-Dôme
(« Provinces »).
Le Limousin et la Marche sont les
provinces au sud-ouest de la région centrale
de la France. La Marche, qui est quelquefois
considérée comme faisant partie du Limousin, a sa capitale à Guéret. Cette région produit des bijoux et du granit. Le Limousin, au
sud de la Marche et considéré comme une
partie du Massif Central, résonne encore
avec l’impact de ses habitants d’autrefois.
Par exemple, la province était nommée d’après les « Limovaces », une tribu gallique
qui y habitait avant que les Romains aient
envahi. Limoges, la capitale du Limousin, a
été fondé comme « Augustoritum » par les
Romains, d’après le gué à Limoges sur la
Vienne (« ritum » qui veut dire « gué » en
latin) (Evans 137). Au fil des années, Limoges est devenu un grand centre chrétien et a
attiré beaucoup de pèlerins (Evans 137). Un
bâtiment célèbre à Limoges est la cathédrale
de Sainte Étienne, édifice gothique construit

entre 1273 et 1520 (« Provinces »). Deux
autres établissements importants sont un
musée des céramiques et l’Université de
Limoges (« Provinces »). La capitale est
connue pour la littérature des troubadours
en plus de ses bâtiments romains diverses
(Evans 137). Limoges est actif dans plusieurs industries, y compris la fabrication
d’émail, de l’équipement électrique, des pièces d’auto, du papier, et des chausseurs
(« Provinces »).
Le Limousin en général est connu
pour l’agriculture et la production de cuir.
L’élevage de bétail est répandu dans toute
cette région (Denoeu 38) ; les bœufs des
boucheries de Limousin sont célèbres
(« Provinces »). Les fermiers élèvent aussi
des chevaux et des volailles et ils cultivent
des châtaigneraies pour le bois et pour les
fruits (Evans 136-7). Du seigle, du sarrasin,
et des pommes de terre sont des récoltes
communes du Limousin. On y trouve des
distilleries et des fabricants de porcelaines
fines et des chaussures. Le Limousin a une
industrie du lainage (Evans 137) et il produit des tissus et des tapisseries
(« Provinces »). Aujourd’hui, cette région
est divisée entre les départements actuels du
Corrèze, de la Creuse, et de la Haute-Vienne
(« Provinces »).
Les provinces du Centre sont vraiment intéressantes et variées. Il y a un grand
contraste entre les hauts puys de l’Auvergne
et les rivières aux vallées de la Touraine et
entre la vie agitée et moderne de la ville de
Clermont-Ferrand et la vie rurale et calme
du Berry. On trouve toutes sortes d’industries dans ces provinces : vins, soieries, lingerie, imprimerie, fonderie, produits chimiques, chaussures, meubles, cuirs, pneus, et
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d’avantage, tous de la région centrale de la France. C’est aussi un
bon lieu pour la production des produits agricoles, avec ses sols riches et
ses nombreux fleuves et rivières. L’influence des Romains est forte dans ces
régions, et il y a beaucoup de beaux bâtiments et d’impressionnantes constructions
d’autrefois. Les provinces du Centre sont
importantes dans l’histoire et la culture de la
France, et elles continuent de l’être jusqu’à
nos jours.
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Un Voyage en France:
Deuxième Moitié
Submitted by Amy Lafleur
Nous recommençons notre tour de la
France à Montpellier et nous partons de cette ville. Nous continuons vers l’est et vers
la Côte d’Azur. Notre premier arrêt est à
Arles. Nous restons dans cette ancienne
ville avec son histoire romaine et sa culture
artistique. C’était la résidence de Vincent
Van Gogh. Bien que Van Gogh ait été néederlandais, il a passé beaucoup d’années de
sa vie en France. Il a ajouté beaucoup au
mouvement artistique en France, parce qu’il
a peint les paysages de la France. À Arles,
on peut voir quelques scènes des tableaux
de Van Gogh. Par exemple, on peut voir le
café dans lequel Van Gogh a peint « Café
du Soir ». En réalité, ce café a été remodelé
pour avoir l’air d’être comme celui dans la
peinture.1 Une autre caractéristique importante d’Arles est sa riche histoire. À Arles,
il faut jeter un coup d’œil aux vestiges de
l’Empire Romain.
D’Arles, nous faisons des excursions
à d’autres sites importants. Nous allons
vers l’ouest au Pont du Gard. Cet ancien
pont était un aqueduc qui a été bâti par les
Romains. Cette région australe de la France
a été conquise par les Romains au deuxième
siècle av. J.-C. et elle faisait ensuite partie
de l’Empire Romain. Après avoir vu cet
aqueduc célèbre, nous retournons à Arles.
Le jour suivant, nous allons faire une autre
excursion, cette fois-ci à Avignon.
Avignon était très important dans
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l’histoire européenne et l’histoire française,
toutes les deux. Au quatorzième siècle, de
1309 à 1377, les papes habitaient à Avignon. C’était « l’exil babylonien ».2 De
nos jours, nous pouvons voir le Palais des
Papes à Avignon. À Avignon, il y a un autre pont célèbre. C’est le Pont St.-Bénezet
qui est plus connu comme le Pont d’Avignon de la chanson pour les enfants.3 Ce
pont est très vieux, mais la moitié du pont
existe seulement de nos jours. L’autre moitié du pont a été détruite en 1668.4
Nous finissons notre séjour à Avignon et nous continuons le long de la Côte
d’Azur. Notre point d’intérêt prochain est
Marseille. Pour aller à Marseille, nous traversons le Rhône. Ce fleuve vient de la
Suisse et du nord et elle se jette dans la mer
Méditerranée. Sur la rive orientale du Rhône est la province de Provence. La Provence a une histoire très longue. Les Romains
ont conquis cette partie de la France. Plus
tard, beaucoup d’artistes et écrivains habitaient en Provence, par exemple, ce sont les
peintres : Paul Cézanne, Vincent Van Gogh,
Pablo Picasso et Henri Matisse qui ont tous
choisi d’habiter en Provence.
La Provence est une belle province à
côté de la mer Méditerranée. Cette région
est connue pour ses plages et son histoire, et
aussi pour son architecture. Plusieurs maisons en Provence, particulièrement à la
campagne, sont faites en pierre. Les toits
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en général ont des tuiles romaines
rondes.5 Les maisons sont bâties
pour les protéger contre le mistral.6
Ce vent froid et sec est très violent et il
se passe souvent en hiver.7
Nous arrivons à Marseille. Marseille
est la deuxième ville de la France et c’est
aussi un port important.8 Cette ville a été
fondée par les Grecs qui l’appelaient
« Massalia ». C’est une vieille ville. À
Marseille, nous pouvons voir le Château
d’If, le site de la prison du Comte de Monte
Cristo et l’Homme du Masque de Fer dans
les romans d’Alexandre Dumas père, située
dans une île qui n’est pas loin de la côte de
Marseille. Cette prison est célèbre à cause
du livre Le Comte de Monte Cristo par
Alexandre Dumas, dans lequel le protagoniste a été emprisonné au Château d’If.
Un autre point d’arrêt est Nice. Cette
ville sur la Côte d’Azur est très connue pour
ses plages. Nice était située en Italie jusqu’en 1792 quand les Français l’ont saisi.9
Nice est restée une partie de la France jusqu’en 1814. De 1814 à 1860, Nice appartenait à l’Italie.10 Puis la France a regagné le
contrôle de Nice en 1860 et Nice continue à
être une ville française en ce moment. C’était la résidence de deux peintres importants : Henri Matisse et Marc Chagall.11
Nous voyageons de Nice à Monaco.
Monaco est une principauté autonome qui
est située à l’intérieur des frontières de la
France. C’est une principauté francophone.
Monaco est peut-être connue aux États-Unis
à cause de l’actrice américaine Grace Kelly,
actrice célèbre des années 50 qui s’est mariée avec le prince Rainier de Monaco ; et
ainsi elle est devenue princesse. La Principauté de Monaco est aussi connue pour le
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Grand Prix de Monaco et Le Rallye de Monte Carlo, seule ville de Monaco.12 À Monaco il y a de bons exemples d’architecture de
la Belle Epoque. Par exemple, il y a l’Opéra
de Monte Carlo et le Grand Casino de Monte Carlo qui est mondialement connu.13 Tous
les deux ont été conçus par Charles Gagnier,
architecte français, célèbre pour avoir fait
l’Opéra Paris, le Palais Gagnier.14 Après
avoir vu Monaco, nous retournons à Nice et
nous y resterons la nuit.
Le jour suivant, nous voyageons de
Nice à Lyon. Lyon est une ville qui est située à la convergence du Rhône et de la Saône. À Lyon, le Rhône change de direction et
il coule vers le sud vers la mer Méditerranée.
Lyon est aussi située dans la région du Rhône-Alpes. À Lyon, nous voyons beaucoup
d’histoire. Il y a des bâtiments qui datent de
la Renaissance à Lyon.15 Surtout important,
nous pouvons voir les traboules sous la cité.
Ces tunnels ont été utilisées tout au long de
l’histoire, originairement pour la livraison
plus vite de la marchandise en soie, puis,
plusieurs années plus tard ces traboules ont
été utilisées par la Résistance française pendant l’occupation allemande.16 Ayant exploré la ville de Lyon, nous goûtons la cuisine
lyonnaise, mondialement connue. Nous
goûtons des plats du porc et de la tripe.17
Les personnes aventureuses peuvent goûter
le sabodet, une saucisse qui est faite de la
tête de cochon ou aussi un autre plat : la tête
de veau. Ce sont des spécialités de la cuisine lyonnaise. Nous pouvons aussi goûter du
vin lyonnais comme le vin du Beaujolais.18
Après deux jours à Lyons, nous continuons à
Dijon en Bourgogne.
La Bourgogne est une région très
importante. Il y a de bons vins et
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des fromages qui viennent de la
Bourgogne, et il y a des sites importants de la civilisation mondiale
en Bourgogne. À Dijon, nous pouvons
goûter la cuisine bourguignonne, comme les escargots, spécialité de la Bourgogne.19 La Bourgogne, en particulier Dijon,
offre le jambon avec persil.20 Dijon est aussi
connue pour la moutarde.21 De Dijon, nous
faisons des excursions à la campagne bourguignonne pour aller à Autun, à Vézelay, et à
Cluny, tous sites religieux très anciens.
La première excursion est faite à Autun, connue pour sa cathédrale de SaintLazaire. Cette cathédrale, qui a été bâtie de
1120 à 1146, était faite par un artiste qui
s’appellait Gislebertus.22 Elle est notée pour
son architecture, parce que Gislebertus a signé son travail,23 et en plus Gislebertus a
sculpté toute la cathédrale.24 Nous admirons
la cathédrale, mais puis nous voyageons à
Cluny. À Cluny, nous voyons l’ancienne
abbaye qui date du dixième siècle au Moyen
Âge.25 L’abbaye est tombée en ruine mais
ces vestiges démontrent la grandeur de l’Église au Xe siècle.26 Cluny a aussi servi comme modèle architectural pour d’autres lieux
religieux comme St. Pierre à Rome.27 Ensuite, nous retournons à Dijon pour y rester la
nuit.
Le lendemain, nous voyageons à Vézelay où nous visitons la Basilique Ste.Madeleine. Cette basilique était très importante dans l’histoire parce que beaucoup de
pèlerins y ont voyagé pour visiter les reliques
de St. Marie de Magdalen.28 L’architecture
remarquable de Vézelay est aussi à noter et
c’est un bon exemple du changement du style romanesque au style gothique.29 Puis,
nous retournons à Dijon pour passer la nuit.

Au matin, nous quittons Dijon et nous voyageons à Strasbourg.
En continuant vers le nord-est, nous
nous trouvons en Alsace et plus tard en Lorraine. Cette région de la France était très importante dans l’histoire de la France. Les
Français et les Allemands se sont battus pendant longtemps pour obtenir le contrôle des
deux provinces. L’Alsace et la Lorraine sont
connues pour ces changements de contrôle
franco-allemands et pour l’influence allemande dans ces provinces. La proximité de
l’Allemagne influence la culture de l’Alsace
et celle du nord de la Lorraine. Quand on
pense à la choucroute, on pense à Allemagne, mais en Alsace et en Lorraine cette
nourriture est aussi une spécialité. En Alsace, qui est plus près de l’Allemagne, on mange de la choucroute avec du jambon, mais en
Lorraine, on mange de la choucroute avec du
poivre noir et avec du genièvre.30 L’Alsace
et la Lorraine sont aussi connues pour leur
foie gras qui est dans des pâtés et dans des
terrines.31 Une autre nourriture que les deux
régions préparent est la quiche, une tarte
avec des œufs, du lait, et de la crème.32 On
peut y ajouter d’autres ingrédients pour créer
des variétés de quiche. Vous connaissez probablement la quiche lorraine qui ajoute du
jambon. Il faut
goûter ces nourritures particulières de ces
régions.
Nous entrons premièrement en Alsace, la région plus près de l’Allemagne. Elle
partage une frontière avec l’Allemagne. Un
fleuve qui s’appelle le Rhin sépare les deux
pays. Notre point d’arrêt suivant est Strasbourg, ville française située près du Rhin et
près de la frontière allemande. Strasbourg
est une ville très importante à la France et à
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l’Europe. C’est la capitale de
l’Europe dans laquelle le parlement
européen se situe.
Nous finissons notre séjour à
Strasbourg et nous voyageons vers
l’ouest en Lorraine. Nous visitons à
Metz, ville en Lorraine. La Lorraine est
connue pour une fille paysanne qui entendait les voix des saints qui lui ont dit qu’elle
devait sauver la France. Cette fille était
Jeanne d’Arc et bien qu’elle ait été « la Pucelle d’Orléans », elle est originaire de la
Lorraine. Jeanne d’Arc est née à Domrémy
(connue maintenant comme Domrémy-laPucelle). Nous restons la nuit à Metz et
nous faisons une excursion le jour suivant à
Domrémy-la-Pucelle, lieu de naissance de
cette héroïne française. Domrémy-laPucelle est situé à peu près quatre-vingts
kilomètres au sud de Metz, sur la rivière La
Meuse.33 Dans le village, on peut voir la
maison natale de Jeanne d’Arc et la vieille
Église de Domrémy-la-Pucelle.34 Nous explorons la campagne lorraine dans laquelle
Domrémy-la-Pucelle est situé. Puis nous
restons la nuit dans une petite auberge qui
est à côté de l’église.35
Le matin suivant, nous retournons à
Metz et nous prenons le train pour Reims
que nous trouvons dans la province de la
Champagne. Cette province est peut-être le
plus connu pour sa boisson qui prend son
nom de la province. C’est le champagne !
Cette boisson est un vin mousseux, gazeux
et pétillant.36 C’est une caractéristique importante de la Champagne, mais c’est n’est
pas la seule caractéristique à noter de la
Champagne. En Champagne, nous trouvons
un point d’intérêt : Reims.
À Reims il y a la cathédrale dans
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laquelle les rois de la France ont été couronnés. Cette cathédrale importante s’appelle
la Cathédrale de Notre-Dame.37 C’était dans
cette cathédrale qui est pleine de grandeur
que tous les rois français ont été sacrés depuis Clovis. La tradition a continué jusqu’en 1825.38 Notamment, nous nous souvenons que Jeanne d’Arc avait dû emmener
le dauphin à Reims pour qu’il puisse recevoir sa couronne. Nous visitons la cathédrale et nous apprenons tout au sujet de la production du champagne. À Reims, nous pouvons aussi voir le chef-d’œuvre de JacquesLouis David qui démontre la mort de Marat
dans sa baignoire. Cette peinture, célèbre et
importante, est dans le Musée des BeauxArts de Reims.
Le jour suivant nous continuons notre tour de la France. Nous traversons une
autre région, la Picardie, en chemin pour
Rouen. Rouen est une ville qui est située en
Normandie. La Normandie est connue pour
sa proximité de la mer, La Manche ; Guillaume le Conquérant et pour le débarquement de la deuxième guerre mondiale des
alliés le 6 juin 1944.
La Normandie est aussi connue pour
ses nourritures. En particulier, la Normandie est connue pour son fromage. Le camembert, un fromage doux, à pâte molle de
vache, vient de la Normandie.39 La Normandie est aussi connue pour ses pommes et
son cidre.40 Nous goûtons tous les deux.
Notre premier arrêt en Normandie
est à Rouen. Dans cette ville-ci, nous apprenons davantage du sujet de la vie de
Jeanne d’Arc. C’était dans cette ville que
Jeanne d’Arc a été brûlée vive en 1431.
Les Bourguignons qui l’avaient capturée,
l’avaient vendue aux Anglais. L’Église,
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sous de l’influence des Anglais, a
trouvée Jeanne d’Arc coupable de
l’hérésie et l’a condamnée à la mort.
Plusieurs années après la mort de Jeanne d’Arc, on l’a trouvée innocente et
elle est devenue sainte de l’église catholique en 1920. Aux années 70, l’Église de
Jeanne d’Arc a été bâtie au même endroit où
Jeanne d’Arc a été brûlée vive. Nous visitons aussi la tour dans laquelle Jeanne d’Arc
a été emprisonnée. Cette tour est en ce moment un musée dédié à Jeanne d’Arc.41
Nous quittons Rouen et en continuant vers l’ouest, le long de la côte, nous
voyageons à Caen. Nous quittons la Haute
Normandie dans laquelle Rouen est située et
nous entrons dans la Basse Normandie, dont
la capitale est Caen.42 Guillaume le Conquérant venait de Caen. Avant de conquérir
l’Angleterre, Guillaume le Conquérant était
chef de la région.43 Nous visitons l’Abbaye
aux Hommes, bâtie par Guillaume le
Conquérant au onzième siècle. Le jour suivant, à Caen nous pouvons aussi apprendre
tout au sujet de la deuxième guerre mondiale. Il y a eu une grande bataille à Caen en
1944 dans laquelle la plupart de la ville a été
détruite à cause d’un feu qui a duré onze
jours.44 La bataille de Caen et les horreurs
de la deuxième guerre mondiale ont été
commémorés dans un monument qui sert
aussi de musée.45 Après avoir vu le mémorial, cette visite, nous voyageons à Bayeux.
Bayeux était la première ville à être
libérée pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale.46 Néanmoins, elle est très connue pour
la Tapisserie de la Reine Mathilde, la femme de Guillaume le Conquérant, et on croit
que la reine et ses dames d’honneurs l’ont
faite.47 Cette grande tapisserie célèbre dé-

montre la conquête d’Angleterre par Guillaume le Conquérant. Nous visitons le musée et nous voyons cette tapisserie remarquable. Après avoir vu la tapisserie et après
avoir appris tout au sujet de Guillaume le
Conquérant, nous faisons une petite excursion aux plages de Normandie. Ce n’est pas
une excursion de loisir à la plage ; au
contraire c’est une excursion pendant laquelle nous apprenons tout au sujet de la
deuxième guerre mondiale, et en particulier,
au sujet du débarquement des alliés en Normandie. Nous voyageons à la plage Omaha
qui est probablement la plus connue des plages du débarquement allié en Normandie.
C’est près de Bayeux. Le 6 juin 1944, les
soldats alliés ont essayé de saisir la batterie
de la Pointe du Hoc, qui était située entre la
plage Utah et la plage Omaha.48 C’était une
bataille très violente. Plusieurs soldats sont
morts avant la prise de la batterie. À la plage, nous avons un moment de recueillement
de ce qui s’était passé. Il y a plus de soixante ans et nous pensons surtout au courage
des soldats. Après avoir vu les plages du
débarquement normand, nous retournons à
Bayeux pour y rester la nuit.
Le jour suivant nous voyageons à
d’autres plages du débarquement de la Normandie. Nous visitons les musées qui sont
situés le long de la côte pour apprendre tout
au sujet des événements du 6 juin 1944.49
Nous visitons les cimetières qui sont aussi
situés le long de la côte près des plages.50
Puis nous retournons à Bayeux pour y rester
la nuit.
Au matin, nous voyageons de
Bayeux à Mont St. Michel, une île située au
large de la côte de la Basse Normandie. De
la côte, nous pouvons traverser le sable
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The Arhuacos
Submitted by Alice Brunet
Today, the indigenous societies of
Latin America are not very well known in
the modern world. However, there are many
lessons that these indigenous societies can
offer to help improve all societies. One indigenous society that is very interesting and
still exists today is the Arhuacos. This
group has a great deal of knowledge of nature and they believed that they know how
to maintain the equilibrium of the world. In
general, the lessons that can be learned from
the Arhuacos have the potential to improve
many different areas of daily life.
The Arhuacos were decedents of the
nomadic tribe called the Chibchas, which,
because of their size, later divided into two
groups, the “Musicas” and the “Taironas”.
The Taironas are the direct ancestors of the
Arhuacos. In fact, the survival of the Tairona society was threatened when the conquistadores arrived in South America. In
order to preserve their knowledge and beliefs, survivors from the Tairona society fled
up the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, Colombia, the highest coastal mountains in the
world (“Arhuacos”). It was important to the
Taironas that their society continued to exist
in order to maintain the balance of the
world. Even though it was impossible for
the surviving Taironas to reconstruct their
original society, they developed four new
societies based on their belief system: the
Kogis, the Kankuamos, the Wiwas, and the

Arhuacos (“Tairona”). Fortunately, the
Spanish never colonized this land and these
four indigenous societies still exist today
(Ereira 142). However, these societies, including the Arhuacos, continue to fight in
order to protect their cultural identity from
the influence of outside cultures and to
maintain the balance of the world.
The Arhuacos continue to live like
their ancestors in the Sierra Nevada located
in Santa Marta, Colombia. Because of their
isolated location high up in the coastal
mountains, the area is very biologically diverse (“Arhuacos”). It is not surprising with
this great biological diversity that the Arhuacos are very interconnected with nature.
According to the Arhuacos, Santa Marta is
the center of the world and contains all the
knowledge of the world. They believe that
it is still important to continue maintaining
the balance of the world in order to preserve
the knowledge of the mountains (“We
Live”).
Like the Taironas, the Arhuacos
have leaders within their society called
“mamos”. The mamos have the responsibility to keep order and balance within the society and with nature; the mamos are the
priests, the unbiased judges, the elected
politicians, and the chiefs of their society.
Furthermore, the mamos preserve the
knowledge of their history, culture and wisdom that gets passed on to each new
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generation. It is determined at
birth if a boy is to become a mamo
and if he is chosen, he goes through
an extensive training to learn all of the
knowledge that has been learned
throughout the centuries (Lizarralde 43).
Even though the Arhuacos live in an
isolated area because of their location in the
mountains, between 1870 and 1880 colonizers and priests started to invade their land
and purposely tried to change their culture
(“The Thought”). This was the beginning of
a continuous battle to preserve their culture
that the Arhuacos still face today. Luckily,
in 1890 a law was passed in Colombia that
allowed the Arhuacos to participate in the
national government. Because of this, the
Arhuacos had the opportunity to learn about
the economic, political, and social aspects of
the Colombian government. To this day, the
Arhuacos continue to be very politically
savvy and involved in modern day politics.
Although it has not been easy for the Arhuacos to gain governmental support, their consistent and respectful persistence has promoted some positive changes for their culture (Lizarralde 45).
An example of the Arhuacos' struggle to protect their culture and land is when
the Capuchin mission was established in
1908. This was a mission established by
Christians who wanted to domesticate the
indigenous tribes of the Sierra Nevada. The
Christians believed that the indigenous tribes
were savages and they needed to be Christianized. In order to achieve this goal, the
Christians constructed churches on their land
and began to teach the Arhuacos the Spanish
language and the teachings of Catholicism.
The Arhuacos were very respectful to the
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Christians even though the Arhuacos did not
want them on their land, but were stubborn
about changing their belief system. This
made it impossible to convert the indigenous
population. Because of this, the Christians
decided to concentrate on converting the Arhuaco children. In order to do this, the outsiders would kidnap the Arhuaco children
and place them in an orphanage where they
would teach them their ways (“The
Thought”). When the Arhuaco children arrived at the orphanage, they did not have
access to the world outside of the orphanage
walls. The Christians prohibited the Arhuaco children in the orphanage to speak
their native language, cut their hair, and
dressed them in modern day clothing
(Lizarralde 46).
In order to avoid the invasion of outside groups like the Capuchin mission and
repair the damages caused to their society by
these outside influences, the Arhuacos in
1930 decided to have the highest mamos talk
with the Colombian government. After
much persistence, the Arhuacos eventually
convinced the Colombian government to
give the Arhuacos complete rights to their
land, but this did not last long. In 1962 the
Arhuacos had to fight for their land again
because, against the request of the Arhuacos,
the government constructed a public road in
order to facilitate military observation of the
land (Lizarralde 46-47). The Arhuacos were
very mad about this because these new military bases were located on Arhuaco sacred
land. This made it impossible for the Arhuacos to continue their ancient tradition of having sacred rituals that preserved nature and
the balance of life.
The Arhuacos had to once again

39
Published by KnightScholar, 2010

45

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47

Great Day 2009

SUNY Geneseo

fight for their land because the Colombian government claimed that
they did not have proper documentation for the land rights of the indigenous
people. It is believed that Simon Bolivar approved the decision to give exclusive possession of the Sierra Nevada to the
indigenous group. Even though the mamos
had kept documentation of this decree, the
Colombian government did not recognize
their records as appropriate documentation
of their rights to the land. To fight against
this, the Arhuacos decided to rally with other
indigenous tribes of the Sierra Nevada. For
many decades the battle continued, fighting
against the missionaries and the government,
and fighting for their rights to the land. Finally on March 14th, 1984 the Arhuacos territory was proclaimed a reservation (“The
Thought”).
Despite their success, the Arhuacos
continue to have problems with the missionaries who are trying to convert them and influence their culture. One reason why this is
still occurring is because the Arhuacos believe that everything and everyone in the
world is free and cannot be controlled. The
Arhuacos also believe that everything in the
world is equal and there is no hierarchy of
power. Because of this, it is very difficult
for the Arhuacos to assert any authority over
others, including over the missionaries (“The
Thought”). Interestingly, the Arhuacos today do not desire any reparations for any of
the negative events that have occurred because of the influences of outside groups
such as the missionaries. The Arhuacos only
desire that these groups leave their land.
Furthermore, the Arhuacos state that they
are willing to put behind them these negative

experiences if these outside groups would
simply respect the Arhuaco culture (“We
Can”).
Because of the Arhuacos respectful
mentality to outside groups, there have been
many changes to their traditional lifestyle
due to these outside influences. One example of this is evident in the Arhuacos' education system. The Arhuacos believe that all
school subjects, like science, cannot simply
be taught through a structured system (“The
Thought”). Instead, they believe that everything in nature has significance and can
teach the most important life lessons (“Our
Family Tree”). Before the arrival of outsiders, none of the Arhuacos had the ability to
read and they did not have a modern system
of education. However, during this time the
Arhuacos believe that there was more organization, more respect for everything, and
more harmony with nature (“We Suffer”).
When the missionaries arrived, they constructed their own schools and forced the
Arhuacos to learn their language and religion in their structured system. Furthermore,
if the Arhuacos did not obey and if they did
not learn their lessons, the Arhuacos were
punished.
These new schools hindered the Arhuacos’ ability to preserve their culture and
wisdom. Therefore, the Arhuacos needed to
develop a more organized system of education in order to continue teaching within
their society their native language and culture (Lizarralde 45). Now, in order to preserve their culture, a dictionary of their language has been written and their oral stories
that have been passed down from generations also have been written down. Furthermore, today the majority of the Arhuacos
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can speak their native language because in all of the twenty-eight Arhuaco towns, the Arhuaco children
are learning their native language in
schools (“Arhuacos”). Despite these
new-age changes, the mamos still do not
like using a structured school setting. The
mamos question if the children are really
paying attention and learning. The mamos
desire to continue teaching in a more traditional way, but they realize that the threats
of outside influences must be met with this
new structure in teaching (“We Suffer”).
Another problem that the Arhuacos
have due to the influence of the western
world is with illegal drugs, specifically as it
relates to coca. For the Arhuacos coca is
called “ayu” and it is their most sacred plant
because it facilitates a connection with nature. Furthermore, coca is an essential part
of their sacred rituals and also of their daily
life in general (“We Can”). For example,
the Arhuacos maintain friendships by exchanging coca with each other. Because the
coca plant is very sacred to the Arhuaco society, there are many restrictions related to
the use on this plant. For instances, selling
coca for money is not allowed, only the mamos know how to properly cultivate coca,
and permission from the mamos is needed in
order to be able to use coca (“Ayu and Crisis”). Typically, when an Arhuaco man
turns twenty years old it is then allowed for
him to have coca in his possession at any
time (“We Can”). It is important to note that
the Arhuacos do not use the coca plant as a
narcotic; they chew the plant in order to
minimize fatigue and hunger, improve their
memory and increase their energy (Elsass
51).
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According to Colombian laws, only
indigenous groups are permitted to cultivate
coca for personal use. For the rest of the
Colombian population, the cultivation of
coca is considered to be illegal (“We Can”).
Nonetheless problems with the Colombian
drug trade, especially with cocaine and marijuana, have persisted since 1982. That same
year all non-indigenous groups were supposed to leave the Sierra Nevada because the
land was decreed a reservation under Colombian law. However some of the missionaries and colonizers continued to live on the
land. With the help of some mestizos, the
missionaries and colonizers who stayed
started to grow illegal plants (“We Live”).
The Arhuacos knew that these illegal coca
plantations were used to produce and sell
cocaine. Not only was this a grave violation
of this sacred plant, but these illegal plantations also created many problems for the Arhuacos (“Ayu and Crisis”). In order to prevent the production of these illegal plants the
Colombian government, with the help of the
United States, had planes spray herbicides
and pesticides on these lands (“We Can”).
These chemicals also destroyed the Arhuacos' crops and contaminated their water, and
as a result the Arhuacos started to become
increasingly sick. The Arhuacos also suffered because their most important and most
sacred plant no longer received the respect
for its great quality to connect the Arhuacos
with nature (“Ayu and Crisis”).
In general, the Arhuacos continue to
have many problems that are caused by the
influence from other cultures. Tourism to
the Sierra Nevada is destroying the natural
life and is negatively influencing the daily
life of the Arhuacos (“‘Pagmentos’ and
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Balance”). Now, some Arhuacos
are wearing baseball caps, expensive watches, driving Jeeps, drinking
excessive amounts of alcohol, and listening to modern music. What is most
important is that this contact with the outside world has negatively effected the
younger generation of the Arhuacos because
they no longer desire to live as traditional
Arhuaco and want to be a part of the modern
world (“Arhuacos”). Also, the tourism industry has been promoting a more commercialized system in the Sierra Nevada to attract more tourism. For example, Archuaco
women are encouraged to sell their handcrafted bags and clothes (“We Head Towards”). In order to fight against this outside pressure to modernize their society, the
mamos organized the “Gonavindua Tairona”
in 1987 (“Arhuacos”).
However, the only way in which the
Arhuacos will be able to completely protect
their culture is with the help of the Colombian government. Because of this, the Arhuacos and especially the mamos, continue
to educate themselves on the Colombian
government system and frequently go to Bogotá in order to fight for their rights. The
Arhuacos have also contacted ministers, foreign ambassadors and philanthropic groups
that fight for human rights to help assist
them in gaining their rights. At this point,
the Arhuacos want more than anything to be
able to declare the Sierra Nevada a reservation where only indigenous groups can live
and where they will be able to preserve their
society and their natural environment
(“Arhuacos”). The Arhuacos have had some
success in achieving this with the help of
political groups, but it has not been enough
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to completely gain back their land.
And, even though the Arhuacos have
received some political help and have improved their situation, the Arhuacos have
had to be stubborn and persistent because
sometimes the government only creates
more problems. One example is when the
army established military bases on the Arhuaco territory (“‘Pagmentos’ and Balance”). Furthermore, the government does
not always try to resolve the problems that
the Arhuacos are trying to address. For example, when the Arhuacos tried to reclaim
their land as a reservation, the government
instead focused on creating health and education programs and promoting Christian
teachings. Disappointingly, instead of helping the Arhuacos, sometimes the government only focuses on modernizing the Arhuacos (“Regaining the Land”). It is almost
impossible for the Arhuacos to defend themselves and each year their territory is becoming smaller because the government is continuously dividing their land (“The
Thought”).
Unfortunately the Arhuacos have
also become innocent victims of the violence
in Colombia. For example, according to eyewitness testimonies, on November 29, 1990
heavily armed men in national uniforms
forced three mamos traveling to Bogotá off
the bus. Later, on December 13, the same
three bodies were found dead with many indications that the men had been tortured
(“Three”). Another example occurred in
2003 when two Arhuacos were found beheaded (“Indians Beheaded”). It has become a constant battle for all of the indigenous groups of the Sierra Nevada to avoid
these unjust persecutions.
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Interestingly, it was agreed
amongst the Arhuacos that none of
them would fight in Colombia’s internal war or be associated with any of the
guerrilla groups. Even though the Arhuacos know it is a dangerous time not to
defend themselves, they have decided to
solely focus on preserving the natural environment and maintaining the equilibrium of
the world (“We Live”). In reality, the Arhuacos realize that this war has the potential
to completely destroy their society. It has
become more and more common that members of FARC, a guerrilla group of Colombia, force the indigenous people to become
soldiers. If they refuse, the guerrilla group
kills them. Many of the indigenous groups
that lived near the Arhuacos needed to flee
into the jungle in order to survive. The Arhuacos are very fearful that their society will
soon end in a mass genocide if no drastic
changes are made. But the Arhuacos do not
desire to fight. They only want to continue
living their sacred way of life (Forero).
There are many groups, like Amnesty International, Survival International, and Tairona
Heritage Trust, that are trying to preserve the
indigenous tribes of the Sierra Nevada, but
their efforts have not brought enough change
to protect the Arhuacos from the negative
consequences of this internal war.
The Arhuacos have tried to improve
their situation during this crisis, but the authority of even the highest mamo in the
modern government is no longer as powerful
as it was in the past. Despite this fact, the
Arhuacos have decided that they will no
longer negotiate with the government. They
want all of their demands met. The Arhuacos
realize that a stronger centralized govern-
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ment is needed to be able to improve their
situation and because of this, the Arhuacos
have become very stubborn in order to survive, protect the natural environment and
preserve the balance of life in their region
(“We Suffer”). It is very interesting that
even today the Arhuacos continue to be very
loyal to nature, just like their ancestors.
Sadly, only 25 percent of the Arhuaco sacred forest has been preserved (“We
Live”). The forest has been destroyed by a
multitude of causes such as: contamination
from herbicides and pesticides, deforestation, overpopulation, pollution, a decrease of
the cultivation of traditional crops, and the
increase of illegal plantations. There is no
longer enough forest to maintain the biological diversity of the Sierra Nevada. Because
of this, the Arhuacos believe that very few
people in the modern world respect nature as
well as they should or take enough responsibility in protecting nature (“Our Family
Tree”). Just like the modern population
needs to pay for electricity in their house,
the Arhuacos believe that they also need to
respect nature in order to protect their planet
(“Ayu and Crisis”).
The connection that the Arhuacos
have with nature has allowed them to see the
negative changes that are currently occurring
within nature. For example, they have observed that plants are flowering prematurely,
bees are disappearing and are no longer pollinating plants, birds and butterflies are
changing their migration patterns, the snow
on the mountain peaks are melting, there is a
decrease in humidity, the rainfall pattern is
changing, and the rivers are drying before
they connect to the sea. Even though the Arhuacos are not familiar with the phrase
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“global warming”, they are well
aware that the flora and fauna are
being effected by the lack of focus on
preserving the environment. The Arhuacos know, without the help of modern
day sciences, that the average temperature
of the world has increased and that it is a
negative result of practices within modern
societies (Cycon).
If these problems are not resolved
soon, the Arhuacos believe that there could
be an increase in sicknesses worldwide and
plagues of insects that will cause much destruction (“We Live”). In general, there has
been an increase in developing preservation
programs in order to improve the current
situation. However the Arhuacos could be a
key asset in assisting this cause since they
have many centuries of experience and the
desire and will to protect the natural environment (“We Suffer”). An important start,
according to the Arhuacos, should start with
their land. They believe that the Colombian
government should buy all the territory in
the Sierra Nevada that is currently owned by
non-indigenous people and give it back to
the Arhuacos. In their opinion, this is the
best solution to improve the environmental
balance of the territory and would also provide the Arhuacos with the opportunity to
preserve their society (“We Live”).
The Arhuacos have survived for
more that twenty-five centuries and have
consequently acquired a substantial amount
of knowledge. There are many lessons, including how to preserve nature, which we all
can learn from the Arhuacos. Other important lessons can be learned from the Arhuacos’ daily life and general philosophy. For
instance, the Arhuacos do not grow more
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food than they need; instead, all of the crops
in the Arhuaco territory are for all of the Arhuacos. Each family has many crops, but if
an Arhuaco needs a plant that they do not
have in their own crop, they simply can walk
to another Arhuaco crop and take the plants
they need (Elsass 47). The Arhuacos have a
lifestyle that is very communal and nonmaterialistic. It is a society where neighbors
freely share all of their possessions and
knowledge.
However, the Arhuacos are competitive with regard to acquiring knowledge.
They will constantly challenge each other to
determine who is the most knowledgeable
person. It is a very friendly competition and
it does promote the acquisition of information (Elsass 49-50). The Arhuacos have realized that an obsession with acquiring products or being materialistic in general does
not promote happiness. Materialism is
something very important in modern society,
but recent psychological studies tend to
agree with the Arhuacos that this lifestyle
does not promote happiness. One thing that
does promote happiness is obtaining more
knowledge. Even when the conquistadores
were settling in the Americas in search of
power and gold, the Arhuacos had the mentality to live a simple, non-materialistic and
purposeful life. It is possible that modern
day objects are distracting the world from
the most important things in life and thus
preventing a simple, but very purposeful life.
The Arhuacos also know how to
maintain the balance of power within their
society thanks to the mamo leaders. The
Arhuacos always need to obtain advice from
the mamos and receive permission for anything that is not part of the traditional
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lifestyle (Elsass 47). Furthermore,
when the mamos help other Arhuacos, the mamos are required to be unbiased (Elsass 48). The mamos have
essentially all of the power within the
society. However the mamos do not have
any special privileges for having this role.
They need to be a model of how to obey the
sacred laws and because of this, the mamos
are very respected within the community. It
is very interesting that the Arhuacos have
had a successful society with impartial and
effective leaders and have survived for many
centuries. In general, the mamos have a
very important role because they also have
the responsibility of learning, remembering,
and passing on the history, knowledge and
wisdom that have been compiled for many
centuries.
The modern world has much to learn
from the Arhuacos’ model of society, from
their desire to acquire knowledge, their respect for one another, and the unbiased leadership of the mamos.
The attitude of the Arhuacos toward
tradition has led them to become opponents
of the dominant society's development ideology, which regards the Indians as poor people who need to develop and take in new
things. The Indians have often rejected development experts who come in to the area,
because they do not believe they need to be
developed. On the contrary they have
stressed that Indian culture is a prerequisite
for white civilization. (Elsass 63)
In a way, the Arhuacos are the oldest
ecologists in the world because of their intimate relationship with nature (“We Live”).
The modern world can learn a lot from the
Arhuacos' persistent and respectful nature

that has lasted more than twenty-five centuries. Especially important is how to live in
harmony with both nature and each other.

Works Cited
"Ayu and Crisis." Universo Arahuaco. La

Casa Indigena Gunnavindua. 2005. Web. 8
Mar. 2009. <http://
www.festivaldepoesiademedellin.org/
pub.php/en/Corporacion/Universo_Arhuaco/
index.htm>.
“Arhuaco Indians in Columbia.” Dismal
World. 2006. Web. 15 Jan. 2009. <http://
www.dismalworld.com/minorities/
arhuaco_indians_in_columbia.php>.
Cycon, Dean. "Will Coffee Be a Casualty of
Climate Change?" 25 Jan. 2008. Chelsea
Green Publishing. Web.10 March 2009.
<http://www.alternet.org/
environment/74602/?page=1>.
Elsass, P. Strategies For Survival: The Psychology of Cultural Resilience in Ethnic Minorities. Trans. Fran Hopenwasser. New
York: University Press, 1992.
Ereira, Alan. The Elder Brothers. New
York: Knopf, 1992.
Forero, Juan. "After Centuries, Colombian
Tribes Are Now Imperiled by a Civil War."
14 May 2001.
"Indians Beheaded in Sierra Nevada." 23
Dec. 2003. Survival. Web. 9 Mar. 2009.
<http://www.survival-international.org/
news/195> .

45
Published by KnightScholar, 2010

51

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47

Great Day 2009

Lizarralde, R., Beckermann, St., &
Elsass, P. Indigenous Survival
Among the Bari and Arhuaco:
Stratagies and Perspectives. Denmark:
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1987.

SUNY Geneseo

"Three Arhuaco Indian Leaders Murdered."
6 March 2009. In SAIIC Newletter, Vol 5
( 3&4). Web. 22 Dec. 1990. <http://
saiic.nativeweb.org/ayn/dec1990.pdf>.

"We Can Forgive If They Can Respect." 30
April 2006. Yahoo News. Web. 10 Mar.
"Our Family Tree: Learning Balance From 2009. <http://hotzone.yahoo.com/b/hotzone/
the Heart of the World." 24 July 2008. Real- blogs3751>.
ity Sandwich. Web. 10 Mar. 2009. <http://
www.realitysandwich.com/
"We Head Towards Self-destruction." Uniour_family_tree_learning_balance_heart_wo
verso Arahuaco. La Casa Indigena Gunnarld> .
vindua. 2005. Web. 8 Mar. 2009. <http://
"'Pagamentos' and Balance." Universo Arahuaco. La Casa Indigena Gunnavindua.
2005. Web. 8 Mar. 2009. <http://
www.festivaldepoesiademedellin.org/
pub.php/en/Corporacion/Universo_Arhuaco/
index.htm>.

www.festivaldepoesiademedellin.org/
pub.php/en/Corporacion/Universo_Arhuaco/
index.htm>.

"We Live a Transitional Situation: A conversation with the Mamos Francisco Zalabata and Crispín Izquierdo”. Universo Arahuaco. La Casa Indigena Gunnavindua.
"Regaining the Land Within the Black
2005. Web. 8 Mar. 2009. <http://
Line." Universo Arahuaco. La Casa Indige- www.festivaldepoesiademedellin.org/
na Gunnavindua. 2005. Web. 8 Mar. 2009. pub.php/en/Corporacion/Universo_Arhuaco/
<http://
index.htm>.
www.festivaldepoesiademedellin.org/
pub.php/en/Corporacion/Universo_Arhuaco/
"We Suffer the Consequences of the
index.htm>.
Wrongly Called 'Civilization'.” Universo
"Tairona Heritage Trust." 2008. Web. 9 Mar. Arahuaco. La Casa Indigena Gunnavindua.
2009. <http://tairona.myzen.co.uk/
2005. Web. 8 Mar. 2009. <http://
index.php>.
www.festivaldepoesiademedellin.org/
pub.php/en/Corporacion/Universo_Arhuaco/
"The Thought of Our Reborn Mamos." Universo Arahuaco. La Casa Indigena Gunna- index.htm>.
vindua. 2005. Web. 8 Mar. 2009. <http://
www.festivaldepoesiademedellin.org/
pub.php/en/Corporacion/Universo_Arhuaco/
index.htm>.

46
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47

52

: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009

Great Day 2009

SUNY Geneseo

Relief de Sol et
Climat de la France
Submitted by Stephanie Murdock
Résumé
Après avoir lu, on devrait être capable de localise la France précisément sur
la carte du monde, remarquer quelque chose
à propos de ses frontières et leurs effets sur
l’histoire de la France, de généraliser le relief de la France et identifier ses traits importants suivants.
Où se trouve la France?
France est un pays en forme d’un
hexagone qui se trouve dans la partie ouest
du continent européen. Elle est au sud de la
Grande Bretagne (avec qui elle ne partage
aucune frontière) et nord de l’Italie et l’Espagne. Elle couvre la superficie entre le mer
Méditerranée et la Manche de sud à nord, et
entre le Rhin jusqu’à la mer atlantique de
l’ouest à l’est. Elle n’est pas vraiment isolée
comme une île, mais aussi n’est pas vraiment continental. Comme M. Michaud décrit, “Elle apparaît plutôt comme un isthme
fortement rattaché au continent.”1
La France est située entre le 40e et
le 50e parallèle nord, et entre le 5e méridien
ouest et le 8e méridien est (Michaud 8).
Pour orienter un sens de ces faits, on peut
imaginer une ligne de latitude que traverse l’océan Atlantique entre l’Europe et les
Amériques. La France se trouve presque
exactement à l’est de la frontière entre les
Etats Unis et Canada, vers 3,000 miles loin
de NY. La frontière septentrionale de la
France partage la même latitude que la Baie
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d’Hudson. Au sud, elle est sur la même ligne que Détroit. Mais, à cause du Gulf
Stream, qui réchauffe les littoraux de France, le climat est bien diffèrent des villes aux
mêmes latitudes aux Etas Unis.
Malgré les obstacles à ses frontières, la situation de la France sur la carte du
monde a fait que la France est un endroit
important pour l’échange des idées et aussi
pour le commerce (Michaud 9). Elle est
comme un carrefour pour l’Europe, avec un
lien a l’est avec le contient d’Europe et aussi un front avec l’océan Atlantique et la Méditerranée.
Avec une superficie de 551,670
kilométrés carrées2, la France est le plus
grand pays d’Europe, sauf la Russie. Pour
un sens de ces chiffre, la France est quatrecinquièmes la taille de Texas.3 Si on multiplie l’état de New York quatre fois, le résultat est à peu près la taille de la France
(Denoeu 4).
Les Froniters
La France partage une frontière
avec les huit pays suivants; la Belgique,
l’Allemagne, la Suisse, l’Italie, l’Espagne,
le Luxembourg, l’Andorre et Monaco. La
plupart de ses frontières sont naturelles, sauf
la frontière du nord-est avec la Belgique et
le Luxembourg. (On y trouve le fôret des
Ardennes dont quelques-uns rappellent une
frontière naturelle, mais, historiquement,
elle n’est pas bien pour protéger la France).
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Trois du six frontières sont maritimes. A cause de ses littoraux plutôt
naturels, au cours des siècles du développement, la France a eu moins de
difficulté de unifier ses peuples sous
une compréhension commune de leur
nationalité, pas comme autres pays
(l’Allemagne, la Tchécoslovaquie, etc.).
Les frontières naturelles de la France sont ses montagnes et ses littoraux. Au
nord-ouest, (et un petite peu, vers l’est près de Belgique - le Mer de Nord et) la
Manche protège la France. Trouvant le même littoral plus au sud, autour de la Bretagne, on trouve la frontière avec l’océan
Atlantique. A la frontière espagnolfrançaise, il y a les Pyrénées. Au sud-est, en
Provence et au Languedoc, la mer Méditerranée crée une frontière naturelle (et en
plus des plages magnifiques). Plus vers
l’est, on trouve les Alpes, la frontière naturelle avec l’Italie. Les Alpes sont bien
connues autour du monde, parce que ce sont
les montagnes plus hautes de l’Europe. Pour
plus de détail sur les Alpes, voir la section
“Montagnes”.
La France a 5.200 kilométrés de
bordures, de ce chiffre 3.100 kilomètres
sont des côtes littérales (Denoeu 16). En
comparaison, 3.100 kilomètres sont deuxcinquièmes de la taille du littoral des Etats
Unis (Denoeu 16). Donc, c’est un chiffre
vraiment impressionnant étant donné la taille relatif de chaque pays. La France touche
trois (certaines affirment quatre) étendues ;
l’océan Atlantique, la Mer Méditerranée, la
Manche et la Mer du Nord. La Manche est
un canal qui se trouve entre la France et
l’Angleterre. Elle limite la France au nordouest. Un peu plus loin à l’est se trouve la
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Mer du Nord, qui aussi touche une petite
partie de la France au nord-ouest. A la frontière de l’ouest, la France baigne
dans l’océan Atlantique. Et au sud, entre la
France et l’Afrique, on a le littoral célèbre
de la Méditerranée. On trouve des plages
magnifiques et célèbres sur toutes les côtes,
de la Mer Méditerranée, la Manche et l’océan Atlantique.
La seule frontière artificielle française se trouve au nord-est de la France,
avec la Belgique, le Luxemburg et l’Allemagne. Elle est toujours le point la plus vulnérable d’attaque. Depuis les Gaulois et
jusqu'au 19ème siècle (l’invasion d’Allemagne pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale)
c’était ici ou la plupart des envahisseurs
sont entrés dans la France. Pendant l’époque
entre-deux-guerres la ligne Maginot, une
ligne de fortifications, y a été créée comme
une tente de protection de la France d’invasion.4
Le tunnel sous la Manche a été fini
en 1994, donc depuis la France est aussi
connectée à Angleterre. Il est important
pour le transport des produits et aussi pour
les voyageurs. Mais ce n’est pas une vraie
frontière géographique.
Relief du Sol
Le relief de la France est composé
des montagnes, de collines, de fleuves et de
gorges. En bref, Michaud décrit le relief de
la France ainsi, “l’aspect d’un théâtre antique, dont la scène serait le bassin de Paris et
dont les gradins s’élèveraient progressivement du nord à l’ouest et au sud à l’est”(11).
Si nous faisons une ligne entre le nord-est
de la France, près de Belgique, jusqu'au sud
-ouest de la France, et nous coupons en
deux le pays, nous trouvons deux parties
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distinctes. A gauche, au nord-est
de la France, on trouve un relief
plutôt plat, sauf quelques collines. En
Bretagne on trouve ces collines, mais
elles n’ont pas plus de quatre cents mètres en hauteur (Deneou 5). Dans l’outre
partie, à droite, le sud-est de la France, on
se trouve de vraies montagnes : les Pyrénées, le Massif Central, les Vosges, le Jura
et les Alpes. Elles se trouvent, pour la plupart, aux frontières à l’exception du Massif
Centrale qui (comme il se nomme) se trouve
vers le milieu de la France.
Montages
Les Alpes est les plus célèbres de
montages d’Europe, comme ce sont les
montages les plus hautes en Europe. Elles
sont aussi les montagnes plus jeunes de la
France (Denoeu 11). Elles sont situées dans
le sud-est de la France, à la frontière entre la
France et l’Italie. Dans les Alpes, on trouve
Mont Blanc, le point le plus haut d’Europe
avec 4.087 mètres, ou 15.781 pieds (Denoeu
11). Le versant des Alpes francophones est
moins raide que l’autre, donc elle est plus
navigable. Les Alpes sont aussi connues
pour leur beauté. M. Denoeu raconte,
“Citions…les Alpes de Savoie où Saint
François de Sales, évêque de Genève au debout du dix-septième siècle, s’y disait plus
près de Dieu que partout ailleurs”(11). Cette
citation illustre la magnificence des Alpes à
travers les siècles. Un fait intéressant sur les
Alpes, c’est l’historie du son nom. Le mot
‘alpe’ signifie à l’ origine, “pâturage de altitude haute” (Denoeu 11). Dans les pentes
les plus hautes des Alpes, on trouve du
feuillage. En conséquence, les Alpes sont se
nomment telles qu’elles le sont.
Le Massif Central est un grand
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plateau qui se trouve au centre de la France.
M. Deneou a remarqué qu’il “est le plus
vaste et plus varie des massifs montagneux
français” (6). Il illustre son point avec le
fait que le Massif Central, “occupe le septième de la superficie de la France” (6). Il a le
sobriquet du Plateau Central.
Un peu moins connues, mais quand
même une chaîne de montagnes célèbres
sont les Pyrénées qui sont situées à la frontière franco-espagnol. Denoeu dit que,
“Leur arêtes sont vives et nues ; leurs crêtes
sont aigües, en dents de scie et fort élevées”(10). Le point le plus haut des Pyrénées se trouve en Espagne, le pic d’Aneto
avec 3.400 mètres en hauteur, ou 11.000
pieds (Denoeu 10). En contraste des Alpes,
le versant français des Pyrénées est plus raide que la côte espagnole (Denoeu 10). Ce
fait est intéressant pour son influence sur le
cours du fleuve la Garonne. L’histoire des
Pyrénées est riche et fameuse. C’était au col
de Roncevaux, ou Roland a été tué en 778
après J.-C. “avec toute l’arrière-garde de
l’armée de Charlemagne” (Denoeu 10). Cet
événement est devenu célèbre à cause de la
“Chanson de Roland” (qui a été écrit sur le
sujet) et est la plus vieille œuvre de littérature française qui survie jusqu'à nos jours.
Une autre histoire intéressante s’est passé
dans les Pyrénées pendant le mi-19eme siècle, au Lourdes (au bord nord des Pyrénées).
C’est là, on croit que le Vierge Maire a apparu à Bernadette Soubirous, et encore aujourd’hui cette grotte est un lieu de pèlerinage (Denoeu 10).
Entre les Alpes et les Vosges, à la
frontière de l’est (avec l’Allemagne et la
Suisse) se trouve le Jura. Son sommet atteint 1.723 mètres (5,600 pieds), une figure

49
Published by KnightScholar, 2010

55

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47

Great Day 2009

SUNY Geneseo

à 160 mètres moins que la hauteur
du puy de Sancy dans le Massif
Central (Denoeu 10).
Encore au nord des Alpes et du Jura, et toujours sur la frontière de l’est,
sont les Vosges, qui se trouvent en Alsace-Lorraine, à la frontière avec Allemagne.
Son sommet est le ballon de Guebwiller,
avec plus de 1400 mètres (Denoeu 8).
Fleuves
Il y a cinq fleuves importants en
France : la Seine, le Rhône, la Loire, le Rhin
et la Garonne. Ils traversent la France et
sont des sources d’eaux importantes à l’intérieur de la France. Les peuples anciens s’ont
installés près de l’eau, donc même aujourd’hui on trouve beaucoup de villes sur ces
fleuves.
La Seine est le fleuve le plus célèbre de France, parce qu’elle traverse Paris,
la ville la plus célèbre de France. Elle coupe
Paris en deux parties, la rive gauche de la
Seine (partie sud) et la rive droit (partie
nord). C’est le plus lent des cinq grands
fleuves et aussi c’est le plus régulier
(Denoeu 20). Sans la Seine, la Paris que
nous connaissions, n’existerait aujourd’hui.
Elle est très navigable, un trait important
pour l’histoire de Paris à propos des invasions et du commerce. Sa source se trouve
sur le plateau de la Cote d’Or, et elle se jette
à la Manche, au Havre (Denoeu 20). La Seine vide l’eau de la cuvette de la région de
Paris. Le nom ‘la Seine’ est dérivé du nom
d’une divinité d’eau celtique, Sequana
(Denoeu 20). Le Havre, l’embouchure de la
Seine, est une autre grande ville sur la Seine
(Hendrix et Walter, 13-14). Elle coule vers
le nord et au Havre se jette dans la Manche.
La Rhône est située au sud-est de

la France. Elle coule de sa source dans les
Alpes Suisses, traverse la Lac de Genève, et
entre la France. Puis, près de Lyon, elle
tourne vers le sud et coule dans cette direction jusqu'à elle se jette dans la mer Méditerranée (Hendrix et Walter, 20).
Le plus long des fleuves français à
1.000 kilomètres (620 milles) de longueur,
un quart de la longueur de la Mississipi,
c’est la Loire (Denoeu 22). La Loire est un
fleuve très irrégulier. Elle grandit en printemps, et “souvent déborde malgré les hautes digues qui la langent, surtout à partir
d’Orléans” (Denoeu 22). En été, le niveau
d’eau diminue et dans beaucoup d’endroits
on peut la traverser sans perdre pied
(Denoeu, 23). Son estuaire est très important pour le commerce. Sa source est dans la
Massif Central, dans les Cévennes, et elle
coule vers le nord jusqu’à Orléans, où elle
tourne (avant le Bassin parisien) vers
l’ouest. Elle se jette dans l’Atlantique à
Saint-Nazaire, près de Nantes. Entre Nantes
et Orléans se situe Tours, une autre ville importante développée à cause de sa proximité
du fleuve.
Le Rhin constitue une partie de la
frontière qui sépare la France de l’Allemagne. On peut l’appeler une frontière naturelle, mais celle qui est plus difficile à défendre car les fleuves sont plus faciles à traverser que les montagnes. Le Rhin a une importance dans le domaine du commerce
(Hendrix et Walter, 10). C’est un fleuve
grand et profond (Hendrix et Walter, 10).
La Garonne est la plus courte des
cinq fleuves, avec 12km de largeur et 30
mètres de profondeur, mais elle est très vite
(Deneou 24). Sa vitesse de débit est égale à
la somme de la vitesse de la Seine et la
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la Loire ensemble (Deneou 23). Sa
source se trouve dans les Pyrénées
espagnoles et elle coule vers le nordouest dans la direction de la France.
Car le versant française des Pyrénées
est très raide, “elle descend en torrent” (Deneou 23). Elle passe des villes
célèbres comme Toulouse, Agen et Bordeaux. Près de Bordeaux, la Garonne rejoint
son estuaire, la Gironde, qui coule vers le
nord et se jette dans l’océan Atlantique
(Hendrix et Walter, 20).
Les Régions Bas
Le Bassin Parisien est au nord de la
France. Au fond de cette cuvette se trouve
Paris. La partie extérieure du Bassin est
composée de la falaise de Champagne et à
l’ouest les collines de Normandie
(Deneou,12).
Les Gorges Verdon sont la deuxième plus grande gorge du monde. Avec 50
kilomètres en longueur et jusqu’à 700 mètres profondeur, c’est reconnu comme étant
le plus haut canyon d’Europe. Elles se trouvent au sud de la France, près de Nice.
Climat
On ne peut pas généraliser le climat en France. Bien que tempère en général,
toutes les régions ont des différences de
climat distinctes. On peut diviser le climat
de France en quatre parties ; le climat maritime, le climat continental, le climat montagnard et le climat méditerranéen (Michaud
12).
Dans les régions près de l’océan
Atlantique, (compris le nord, le Bassin parisien, la Normandie, la Bretagne, l’ouest et le
sud-ouest) le Gulf Stream règle le climat
maritime. Le Gulf Stream est un courant
qui port d’air chaud des trophiques aux par-

ties à l’ouest du hémisphère. Donc, il sert à
réchauffer ces régions et à modérer le climat. Le climat maritime n’est ni trop froid,
ni trop chaud. Les mêmes régions sont habituées aux pluies, mais elles ne durent pas
trop longtemps ni versent en grande quantité.
Trop loin à l’est pour être effectué
par les effets modérant du Gulf Stream, on
trouve le climat continental. Au Massif
Central, le Jura et les Alpes, on a les hivers
plus froids et plus rudes, et les étés chauds,
“avec des pluies d’orages” (Deneou 14).
Mais, malgré les températures basses en hiver, cette région est populaire avec les gens
qui aiment faisant du ski.
Le climat montagnard est semblable à celui du climat continental. Il se
trouve dans les Alpes, le Jura, les Vosges et
le Plateau Central. Ce climat est caractérisé
par trois points, “hivers longs et rudes, étés
court et pluvieux, [et] pluies et neiges en
toutes saisons” (Michaud 12).
Le climat méditerranéen (bien
sûr, dans la zone méditerranéenne au sud de
la France) est célèbre et connu surtout au
monde. Là, le climat est souvent très favorable, et en conséquent, c’est une région très
populaire avec les touristes. La région méditerranée est caractérisée par des étés chauds
et secs, et des hivers tempérés (Deneou 14).
En automne, on a des pluies, souvent à torrents. Ce climat est aussi connu pour ses
vents forts, le plus célèbre d’entre eux c’est
le mistral, un vent sec qui a des effets positifs et d’autres négatifs. On croit qu’à cause
du mistral, l’air et la lumière de cette région
est très claire. (Il faut se souvenir que cette
région est aussi connue pour ses artistes importants, qui ont été attirés à cette région
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la beauté de la lumière). Mais
de l’autre côte, le mistral produit
des incendies de temps en temps.
Comme capitale et ville célèbre, on
va parler un peu plus en détail du climat de Paris. Il se trouve dans la région
du climat continental, donc avec des hivers
froids et des étés chauds. La température
moyenne en janvier à Paris est 2 dégrées
celsius, ou 36 fahrenheit, selon une étude de
1993.5 M. Deneou présent un exemple qui
illustre le climat de l’hiver du Paris, “Les
Parisiens ne peuvent patiner sur les lacs et
étangs… que quelques jours par an” (14).
En juillet, la température moyenne de Paris
est 18 dégrées celsius, ou 36 dégrées fahrenheit (Noin).
DOM-TOM
Il faut mention un peu les DOMTOMS (les départements et les territoires
d’outre-mer) qui aussi constituent une partie
de la géographie de la France. Ce sont la
Corse, Saint Pierre et Miquelon, Saint Martin, Saint Barthélémy, la Guadeloupe, la
Martinique, la Guyane Française, la Polynésie Française, la Mayotte, la Réunion et la
Nouveau Calédonie. Leurs reliefs du sol et
leurs climats sont bien variés selon leurs
emplacements sur le globe et leurs traits
physiques.
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Looks Can Be Deceiving: Angelo’s
Intentions in Measure for Measure

Submitted by Michael Langen
In Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, there are two common interpretations
for Angelo’s character. The first interpretation sees Angelo as a moral man, who is
earnestly trying to clean up Vienna, but happens to take things too far in his strict treatment of Claudio’s case. He succumbs to the
temptation of Isabella—a temptation he had
never known before—but he repents for it
by the play’s end. The second interpretation
sees Angelo as power-hungry, and hypocritical in his preaching of strict morality.
He is ill-intentioned and pursues his selfish
agenda at the expense of others. Angelo
tries to dupe the other characters into interpreting him the first way, but in truth, the
second interpretation is more accurate.
Angelo appears modest when he, at
first, refuses the Duke’s offering of the ruling position. He says: “Let there be some
more test made of my mettle / Before so noble and so great a figure / Be stamped upon
it” (Measure 1.2.49-51). Despite his humble
appearance, Angelo is actually quite excited
about receiving such a position of power.
The way he uses the power given to him
proves this. He immediately begins using
his power to enforce the law to an unprecedented extreme; he sentences Claudio to
death for sleeping with Juliet out of wedlock, even though Claudio was engaged to
marry her. Angelo is told to clean up the
city, but he takes it too far. His steadfastness
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in sticking to extremes demonstrates his
love of power, and his refusal to give any of
it up. Angelo even refuses the advice of the
more experienced Escalus, who advises Angelo that he might regret being so strict
(2.2.10-13). Angelo ignores him, asserting
that he is the only one who will have any
say in the matter.
One could argue that Angelo is not
power-hungry, and must be wellintentioned, since the Duke trusts him with
his position upon his leave. There is evidence, however, that the Duke does not actually trust Angelo to do a good job, and
that he knows that Angelo is going to be
corrupt. After the Duke gives up his power,
he does, after all, stick around in disguise to
keep an eye on things. The fact that he does
not let Angelo rule on his own, without being secretly monitored, suggests that he
does not trust Angelo with power. When
speaking to Friar Thomas, the Duke explains that “Lord Angelo is precise, / Stands
at a guard with envy, scarce confesses / That
his blood flows or that his appetite / Is more
to bread than stone. Hence shall we see, / If
power change purpose, what our seemers
be” (Measure 1.3.50-54). The Duke suspects that Angelo is more corrupt than he
seems to be, and he is interested in seeing if
giving him power will expose his corrupt
nature. At the end of the play, the Duke tells
Isabella to plead her case to Angelo, telling
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her: “Here is Lord Angelo shall
give you justice. / Reveal yourself
to him” (5.1.28-29). The Duke knows
that Angelo will not give her justice,
yet he seems to test him, like he does at
the beginning of the play when he gives
him power. The Duke’s words cannot be
taken at face value, as he bears another face
for most of the play. His true self does not
consider Angelo to be a trustworthy leader
any more than he thinks that Angelo will
give Isabella justice at the end of the play.
David Bevington agrees that “the Duke obviously expects Angelo to fall” (415).
Angelo lives up to, or perhaps down
to, the Duke’s expectations and fails as a
leader. He abuses his power, and his motivation is selfish, not moral. Angelo does not
have ethical reasons behind his strict punishing of Claudio. He claims that he is using
Claudio as an example in an effort to clean
up the city and bolster respect for the law,
but he proves to be uninterested in respecting the law when he propositions Isabella.
One could argue that he was merely tempted
by sexual lust on that one occasion, and that
his motivation for punishing Claudio is still
that he wants to set an example so that the
law will be respected and justice will be
pursued. This, however, cannot be true, because he claims that he will pardon Claudio
if Isabella sleeps with him. If Angelo pardons Claudio, then he discredits his stance
that Claudio must be used as an example.
He prioritizes selfish desires over what he
claims Vienna needs. Personal motivation
clearly influences his decision more than an
honorable pursuit of justice does. His selfish
motivations are further exposed when he
threatens that, unless Isabella sleeps with

him, he won’t only have Claudio killed,
he’ll have Claudio tortured. He is clearly
not chiefly concerned with justice, but in
using his power to fulfill his own selfish
desires, even at the expense of others.
Angelo’s treatment of Claudio cannot be defended as just in any way. His intentions are not to punish Claudio for unethical behavior, nor to make an example
out of him. He states that “He should have
lived, / Save that his riotous youth, / with
dangerous sense, / Might in the times to
come have ta’en revenge” (Measure 4.4.2830). It is out of fear of revenge that Angelo
upholds Claudio’s death sentence, not out of
concern for justice. Angelo values himself
and his power over any of the lofty ideals
that he claims to stand for. John Simmons
notices that it is “only when [Angelo] infers
that there is some personal gain to be realized that he adjusts any judicial decision” (283). Angelo explicitly states that he
uses his power, not to uphold justice, but to
promote his own personal pleasure. He admits to Isabella: “I give my sensual race the
rein” (Measure 2.4.161). He also admits to
being cruel. When Isabella refuses to sleep
with him to save her brother, Angelo asks
her: “Were not you then as cruel as the sentence / That you have slandered
so?” (2.4.110-111). Ruling with cruelty and
prioritizing the fulfillment of personal
wishes over justice are not the actions of
good-intentioned leader.
If someone is power-hungry then he
will not make a good ruler. His decisions
will be clouded by the goal of attaining and
retaining power, instead of making decisions based on what is best for the people.
Angelo is a bad and dangerous leader
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because of his “excessive appetite
for power” (Simmons 284). At face
value, he seems to be standing up for
justice, claiming that he “must not
make a scarecrow of the
law” (Measaure 2.1.1). This is a noble
goal, and it makes sense to enforce the law,
but it would be wise to remove the laws that
are unfair and unreasonable so that the law
can be enforced with dignity and respect.
Angelo does not, however, do away with
nonsensical laws like the one that punishes
Claudio for sleeping with his fiancée. Doing
so would reduce Angelo’s power. Instead,
he enforces that law to its full extent and
sentences Claudio to death. Simmons recognizes that Angelo “administers justice in its
most severe form in order to establish himself as the hardnosed stand-in ruler he
wishes to appear to be” (283). If Angelo
were more interested in public service instead of power, he might realize that by killing Claudio, he would be responsible for the
very thing that he claimed to be trying stop
in the first place—the creation of a fatherless child. This does not seem to bother Angelo, though. Instead, he seems only to be
interested in doing things his way, and using
his power to the maximum extent possible.
And what greater show of power could there
be than to suppress basic human instincts?
Angelo can only suppress others’
instincts because he is too weak, hypocritical, and corrupt to apply the same standards
to his own behavior. Simmons recognizes
Angelo as “a power seeker, unable to curb
the very libidinous desires he so severely
judges in others. He serves as a classic example of hypocritical behavior” (284). Angelo claims that he would want the same

treatment if he were he to commit the crime,
as he says: “Let mine own judgment pattern
out my death / And nothing come in partial” (2.1.30-31). However, when it comes
to the test, he does not stand by this noblesounding declaration. At the end of the play,
when Isabella brings forth her case against
him, he does not admit to his crime, but instead tries to get out of it by trying to discredit Isabella, saying that “she will speak
most bitterly and strange” (5.1.38). Rosalind
Miles observes that “Angelo desperately
(and hypocritically) shores up his self-image
in the eyes of the world, and of the
Duke” (207).
At first, in the final act, Angelo tries
to protect his image instead of accepting the
punishment that, earlier in the play, he said
he would deserve and accept. It is only after
the Duke reveals himself, and Angelo
knows that he is caught, that he kneels and
begs for the death sentence (Measure
5.1.374-382). I disagree with M.C. Bradbrook, who contests that “in this alone Angelo is not a seemer; he has the consistency
to sentence himself” (394). I see Angelo’s
plea as a final, desperate attempt to avoid
punishment. He does not actually hope to be
killed in the name of justice. Instead, I think
that he hopes to appear as if he has learned
his lesson, and therefore does not need to be
punished. The Duke may be the one in disguise for most of the play, but Angelo is just
as much a seemer, and deserves to be punished for it. I agree with Samuel Johnson,
who believes that “every reader feels some
indignation when he finds [Angelo]
spared” (qtd. in Geckle 72).
One who argues that Angelo is an
essentially good-intentioned person who
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happens to fall victim to temptation could point to the evidence that
Angelo struggles with his lust for Isabella. Miles points to Angelo’s
“amazement, disgust, and grief expressed in the soliloquies of 2.2 and 2.4,”
stating that they “almost invariably elicit
an unconditionally sympathetic response
from the audience” (199). I am one of the
variants who do not feel sympathy for Angelo upon seeing his self-examination. Just
because Angelo is surprised by his lust for
Isabella does not mean that he is a goodintentioned ruler. One can abuse authority
and still feel surprised at feeling sexual lust
if one has never felt that before. His surprise
over his sexual lust does not excuse his
other corruptions, and by acting on that lust,
he only adds to his moral corruptness. As
Miles points out, “He is undoubtedly suffering as he wrestles with his conscience, but
he is still using his every means to save
himself from exposure… the establishing of
this blind and destructive self-interest is
hardly to be regarded as a sympathetic
stroke of characterization” (211).
If one were to still argue that Angelo
is ultimately good-intentioned, but falls victim to temptation, one could point to the fact
that Lucio instructs Isabella to charm Angelo into changing his mind. He says that
when women “weep and kneel, / All
[men’s] petitions are as freely theirs / As
they themselves would owe them” (Measure
1.4.81-83). In addition, Lucio tells her to
“touch him” (2.2.75) in an attempt to persuade him into giving in to her. Further, one
could point out that Angelo is not the only
one tempted by Isabella, as she also charms
the Duke when she kneels and begs him not

to give Angelo the death sentence. The
Duke suggests that Isabella has seductive
power because he grants her wishes and pardons Angelo from death, and then he expresses his love for her by proposing marriage. This evidence alone certainly makes
Isabella seem, in some way, seductive, and
Angelo seem like a victim of manipulative
flirting—but Angelo quickly shows that it is
Isabella, not he, that is the victim. Angelo
exploits his power and propositions Isabella
because he thinks that he can get away with
it. If she were to try to expose him, nobody
would belief her word over his, due to his
high status. William Lawrence points out
that “[Angelo’s] readiness not only to put
Isabella in her dreadful predicament in order
to satisfy his lust, but also to break faith
with her and to kill her brother, do not point
to native virtue” (113). If one still tried to
claim that Angelo is originally goodintentioned, and only falls to evil measures
due to his temptation for Isabella, I would
refer to Lawrence’s statement: “One further
piece of evidence seems to point to Angelo’s native baseness: his flat refusal to
temper justice with mercy, and spare Claudio, long before the dishonorable proposal is
made to Isabella” (114).
It is surprising that Angelo is not
more merciful toward Claudio, since he recognizes that “we are all frail” (Measure
2.4.122). Angelo says: “Blood, thou art
blood” (2.4.15). Bevington explains that
Angelo is saying that “no position of authority or birth, no matter how lofty, can protect
a person from the instinctual power of desire” (431). I would expect Angelo to have
more sympathy for Claudio’s situation,
since he, too, acted on lust. But instead of
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showing Claudio mercy, Angelo
asserts that one cannot write “‘good
angel’ on the devil’s horn” (Measure
2.4.16). Angelo does not actually serve
justice, though, because he punishes
Claudio for personal, not ethical, reasons.
Simmons points out that Angelo “does not
apply the law in any consistent manner. In
his application of the laws, people suffer
unequally depending on his arbitrary, biased
perceptions of them” (283).
One could still argue that Angelo
must have been good-intentioned, though,
or else Isabella would not have begged the
Duke to pardon him. Isabella claims that she
partly thought that “A due sincerity governed his deeds, / Till he did look on
me” (Measure 5.1.454-455). It is important
for one to remember, though, that Isabella
only asks for him to be pardoned after
Mariana begs her to do so, so that she won’t
be left without a husband. Isabella, being
the devout Christian that she is, is of course
willing to forgive Angelo, especially at the
request of poor Mariana, whom Angelo
quickly left when she lost her dowry in a
shipwreck. The fact that Isabella has sympathy for Mariana and forgives Angelo does
not relieve him of the guilt that he has acquired from his selfish, menacing dealings.
While Angelo appears pious by punishing lechery, he forgets that his God is
merciful. Angelo certainly does not engender this quality. Through his treatment of
Claudio, Isabella, and Mariana, Angelo
demonstrates that his own selfish interests
are more important to him than anyone else.
Angelo is greedy, power-hungry, and unjust. He abuses his authority and takes advantage of other people. From the beginning

of the play on, his intentions are solely to
gain and demonstrate power, and to look out
for his own interests, at the expense of others if necessary. If one is tempted to interpret Angelo as good-intentioned, one should
consider that his selfish, hypocritical, and
corrupt ruling pushes Isabella to run to the
Duke, begging for “justice, justice, justice,
justice!” (Measure 5.1.26).
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I. Introduction
The foundation of civil liberty in
modern democratic societies is the due process of law, the guarantee that no person shall
be deprived of his or her freedom without a
just cause, nor receive any punishment not
duly and legally prescribed, nor suffer any
punishment that would be inhumane or destructive of dignity. In the United States
equal justice for all people before the law,
during times of peace and war, is enshrined
not only in the Constitution but also in the
international laws that bind us and connect
us with the rest of the world. The promise
of fair and equal justice is one of the principles our country was founded upon and an
ideal that should earn us the respect and admiration of the world.
It is, however, an
ideal, one that Americans and citizens of
other free nations have done too little to
make an everyday reality. Arbitrary arrests,
unfair trials, torture and degrading treatment
are not remnants of the distant past, and neither are they the sole province of oppressed
countries controlled by strongman dictators.
For democratic societies they are not entirely
new, either. In the United States, for example, the use of torture in correctional facilities and by police officers throughout the
country has not been uncommon in the last
several decades (Conroy 33). The torture of
captured enemies during wartime by American soldiers occurred as well, during the
Vietnam War (Greer 372).
These violations, however shameful,
do not approach the scope or scale of the
most recent assault against the principle of
due process in the United States. Beginning
during the immediate the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001,

59
Published by KnightScholar, 2010

65

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47

Great Day 2009

and ending only with its departure
from power in January 2009, the
administration of President George
W. Bush placed suspected terrorists under arrest for indefinite periods of time
in a manner contrary to the laws of war,
denied those prisoners fair trials, authorized
the use interrogation techniques, such as
stress positions and simulated drowning
(also called “waterboarding”) that are torturous or degrading to human dignity, and sent
suspected terrorists overseas for the purpose
of interrogations where torture had a high
likelihood of occurring (the so-called
“extraordinary renditions”). The Bush administration asserted that these acts are legally justified by presidential military authority and beyond the ability of any law to
prevent (Greer 384). One effect of these actions was to reduce the importance of obeying international law and respecting the humanity of prisoners in the minds of American personnel, leading to situations where
abusive behavior went beyond the original
intent of the administration, such as the infamous abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib
Prison in Iraq by American military police
(Gourevitch 103).
It is tempting, in times of great national crisis, to act with less restraint than
the principles of justice would otherwise allow. Let it not be said that Al Qaeda is not a
serious threat, because it does pose a grave
danger, and in a way that the United States is
not used to fighting against. It is true that
international terrorist networks cannot be
defeated with conventional military doctrine,
but that doesn’t mean that Americans have
to abandon these principles, especially not
for the sake of measures which may seem
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very effective and “tough” but are actually
counterproductive.
The closest historical
analog to the behavior of the Bush administration towards prisoners is the internment
of Japanese-American citizens during the
Second World War, supposedly to prevent
sabotage, a decision which was ordered by
President Roosevelt and backed by the Supreme Court. It is well-known today that the
danger of sabotage was very small and the
internment is considered one of the great
shames of the United States’ history. The
mistreatment of detainees and disregard for
international law over the past several years
has not only been unnecessary but may have
actually strengthened our enemies, and there
is little doubt that the attempts to institutionalize and legally justify the use of torture
will also go down as one of the most shameful parts of American history.
Other countries that have tried to circumvent the rule of law during times of war
or national crisis have suffered for it. The
experimental tactics used by the United
Kingdom against Irish Catholics only exacerbated the threat of the Irish Republican
Army and left a black mark on British history. The Israeli government’s attempts to
institute legal coercive interrogations in a
limited manner led to a spiraling pattern of
systemic abuse. Both cases illuminate different ways that ignoring international law
can and has harmed the interests of the
United States.
The indefinite detention of so-called
“unlawful enemy combatants,” denying such
persons access to impartial courts when they
are in custody, and the use of certain interrogation techniques amounting to torture and
degrading treatment are all violations of
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multiple instruments of international law. They have also hurt the
interests of the United States by damaging its reputation and moral authority
abroad and encouraging ordinary people
of foreign nations to take up arms against
us. It will benefit the United States to observe international law in all future endeavors.
II. Overview of International Law
Regarding Prisoners
1.Introduction
International law comes in many
forms; unlike municipal (i.e., domestic) law,
there is not an orderly hierarchy of official
law-making bodies in international politics,
and for that reason international law arises
from the consensus of states. Treaties are
written agreements among two or more
states, and in modern times they are probably the most important type of international
law (Shaw 89).1 A large number of treaties
that regulate state behavior towards prisoners are binding on the United States, many
of which reflect broader principles and ideals. For that reason, it will be sufficient to
focus on treaties in an analysis of what international laws regulate how the United States
must treat detainees in the war on terror.
There are two major types of international law that affect how states must treat
those in their power: humanitarian law and
human rights law. International humanitarian law, more formally known as jus in
bello, regulates state practice in times of
war; it prescribes how states must treat prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territories, among other things (Shaw 1055).
International human rights law regulates the
way states treat people in their power in gen-
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eral; in many cases such law explicitly forbids the derogation of certain rights even
during wars or emergencies (256). Treaties
representing both types of law are binding
on the United States and thus are relevant to
its conduct in the war against terrorism.
2. Categories of protected persons
The Four Geneva Conventions of
1949 and their Additional Protocols are the
core of international humanitarian law, and
are universally recognized as law (ICRC).
They prescribe legal protections for any
imaginable class of person who may come
under the control of a belligerent power in
the course of an armed conflict. The Third
1949 Geneva Convention (hereafter GC III)
protects prisoners of war. Its provisions apply during any period of international armed
conflict, regardless of the existence of an
official declaration of war or recognition of
a state of war by any party to the fighting.
GC III defines “prisoners of war” to include
regular soldiers of a party to the conflict,
duly authorized civilian crews, laborers, correspondents, and mechanics that accompany
military units, and members of the merchant
marine. Also included are members of militias or resistance movements that follow certain rules: having a clear command structure;
wearing a distinctive mark that can be distinguished from a distance; carrying arms
openly; and obeying the laws and customs of
warfare. Also included are soldiers of a government not recognized by a Detaining
Power, which don’t necessarily need to meet
all the same conditions as militias to qualify
for POW treatment. Furthermore, belligerent captives whose status under GC III are in
doubt must be treated as if they qualify as
prisoners of war until a “competent
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tribunal” can determine otherwise.
The Fourth Geneva Convention (hereafter GC IV) protects civilians not otherwise protected by the
other three conventions and who are in
the power of a foreign state during a war
or occupation, if they are nationals of a
state belligerent to the conflict. Persons that
participate in a conflict without qualifying
for protection under GC III would, if they
are nationals of a state party to the conflict,
be entitled to the protections of GC IV
(Dormann 50). The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (hereafter AP
I) provides additional rules for the conduct
of international conflicts. It has not been
ratified by the United States, but some of its
provisions, notably Article 75, are commonly regarded as reflecting customary international law and are thus binding regardless (Sands 150). Article 75 describes
“Fundamental Guarantees,” the basic rights
accorded to anyone in the power of state
party to a conflict who is not otherwise protected by another provision of AP I or any of
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Civilian
nationals of a state that is not a party to a
given conflict, for example, would not qualify for protected person status under the
Conventions and would therefore fall under
Article 75’s protection. Article 75 (or more
precisely the customary law it reflects, in the
case of the United States) thus makes it impossible for anyone to be in the power of a
state without having some guarantee of protection under international humanitarian law
(Dormann 73).
In the early days of the United Nations two legal instruments were created
which were vital to the later development of
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major human rights treaties. The first is the
UN Charter itself, which states that the UN
should support universal observance of human rights in Article 55. The second is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948, which proclaimed a universal standard
of rights that should be observed and protected. At the time these were not enforceable in any meaningful way, although they
may have become binding to an extent since.
Their chief importance lies in the road they
paved toward more concrete legal instruments later on (Shaw 261).
The major human rights treaties
which regulate state behavior towards detainees are the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR)
and the United Nations Convention Against
Torture, both of which the United States has
ratified (OHCR). According to General
Comment 31 of the Human Rights Committee, states parties to the ICCPR have an obligation to ensure the rights of all people in
their jurisdiction or effective control, even if
they are outside said state’s territory. Article
5 of the Torture Convention likewise enjoins
all state parties to outlaw torture in any territories under their jurisdiction.
3. General rights and treatment
Part II of GC III describes in general terms the rights of POWs, in that they
are to be treated humanely, given appropriate medical care, and treated without undue
discrimination. Part III, which includes Articles 17-107, describes POW rights in
greater detail. Prisoners of war are only required to provide accurate information about
their identities, including, name, rank, and
social security number or equivalent. Their
quarters must be as good as those of
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soldiers of the Detaining Power in
the same area, particularly regarding
space and bedding allowed, and must
not be deleterious to the health of prisoners, and are not to be located in a
place that is especially close to combat
zones. Food and water must be provided
sufficiently to keep the prisoners healthy and
prevent weight loss, and clothing suitable for
the local climate must be given to the prisoners and repaired or replaced as is necessary.
Camps must be clean and sanitary, and have
necessary facilities for the medical treatment
and monthly inspection of prisoners. All
prisoners must be allowed to practice their
religion, and if there is no clerical official to
provide appropriate services among the prisoners then one must be provided by the Detaining Power. Discrimination based on
race, religion, nationality, or language is
prohibited. Prisoners must be able to write
letters to their families informing them of
their situations whenever they are captured,
transferred to another camp, or hospitalized,
and they must be allowed to receive letters
and send at least two letters of their own per
month, barring difficulties in procuring
translators and censors.
GC IV allows for the internment of
persons protected by its provisions only if
necessary to military security, and guarantees internees largely the same set of rights
that prisoners of war have under GC III. It
states in Article 5 that, unlike GC III, a protected person engaged in or definitely suspected of hostile activities may be detained
without being entitled to certain rights otherwise guaranteed if they would be harmful to
the security of the occupying power, such as
the right to communication, although full
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protection must be restored as soon as possible.
Part III of the ICCPR, covering Articles 6-27, guarantees the right to life, protection against degrading treatment, discrimination, and slavery, the right to freedom and
practice of religion, the right to recognition
as a person under the law, and the right human treatment and respect for their dignity
to everyone under the jurisdiction of a state
party to the Convention. According to Article 4 certain derogations may be made from
the Convention only if required by an emergency situation; Article 4 also states that
such derogations can not be applied toward
the rights to freedom from torture and discrimination, or the right to free exercise of
religion.
4. Fair trial rights
GC III provides that prisoners of war
who are accused of crimes must have fair
trials in regularly constituted, independent,
and impartial courts, by the same procedures
under which soldiers of the detaining power
would be tried. Proceedings must be held as
quickly as possible, and if it is necessary to
confine a prisoner before said proceedings
such confinement must last no longer than
three months. POWs on trial have the right
to a qualified advocate, meet said advocate
in private, call witnesses in their defense,
and appeal decisions. POWs convicted of
crimes must have their sentences served in
the same facilities and in the same manner as
soldiers of the Detaining Power in equivalent situations. Persons who are protected
by GC IV have largely the same trial rights
as prisoners of war, and if convicted should
be kept separate from other detainees. Article 75 of AP I prohibits any sentence or
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punishment from being carried out
“except pursuant to a conviction
pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the
generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure…”
Article 9 of the ICCPR prohibits
arbitrary detention, mandates that anyone
charged with a crime be “entitled to a trial
within a reasonable time…,” and states that
anyone under arrest has the right to have a
court review the lawfulness of the arrest and
order him freed if it is illegal. Article 14
guarantees the rights of all persons facing
criminal charges to a legally established, independent, impartial court, to be presumed
innocent before being found guilty, to summon witnesses in his defense, and to examine witnesses against him.
5. Prohibitions against torture and other
degrading treatment
GC III prohibits the use of torture as
an interrogation method in Article 17 and as
a method of punishment in Article 87, and in
Article 130 lists torture as a “grave breach”
of the Conventions requiring state parties to
find and bring to trial anyone accused of
committing it. Article 32 of GC IV prohibits
causing physical suffering of protected persons, including torture, and like GC III lists
torture as a “grave breach” in Article 147.
Article 75 of AP I prohibits torture and degrading treatment under any circumstances
whatsoever. Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture and degrading treatment, and Article 4 lists this as a right that may not be
derogated in a time of national crisis or
emergency.
The Convention against Torture, as
might be expected, goes into much greater
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depth on this issue than other relevant treaties. It defines torture in Article 1 as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act
he or a third person has committed or
is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by
or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an
official capacity.
Article 2 requires state parties to
take effective measures to ban torture and
states that nothing whatsoever, even a public
emergency, can justify torture. Article 3
bans sending a person to another country
where there is a real danger of that person
being tortured. Article 5 declares that the
illegality of torture must extend to all territories under the jurisdiction of the state parties
or onboard ships and aircraft registered to
the state parties. Article 10 states that anyone involved in the treatment of detainees
should be educated on the prohibition of torture, and Article 11 requires state parties to
review rules and practices of detention and
interrogation with an eye toward preventing
torture. Article 16 additionally requires state
parties to prevent “other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
which do not amount to torture as defined in
article 1” from being committed by public

64
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47

70

: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009

Great Day 2009
officials in territories under their
jurisdiction.
6. Execution and enforcement
a. The Red Cross
The International Committee of
the Red Cross (hereafter ICRC or Red
Cross) is an international non-governmental
organization that has provided assistance to
prisoners and the wounded in times of war
for since the mid-nineteenth century. It has
been closely involved with the creation, implementation, execution, and enforcement of
most instruments of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their predecessors (Shaw 1163).
International law provides the
ICRC a special legal mandate to perform
humanitarian functions during times of international armed conflict. GC III guarantees
the ability of the ICRC to act as a neutral
protecting power during a conflict; this entails the authority to ensure the shipments of
mail and relief to and from places of internment, receive reports about the labor conditions of prisoners, and propose the creation
of a Central POW Information Agency,
among others. Article 125 of GC III commits state parties to assist charitable organizations, especially the ICRC, deliver relief to
POWs. Article 126 states that ICRC delegates must have the ability to visit any place
where prisoners of war are held, employed,
or transported without restriction and to hold
interviews with prisoners in private. These
liberties are not contingent on the ICRC being recognized as a protecting power by the
detaining power in question. GC IV provides similar powers to the Red Cross regarding inspections, relief, and insurance of
shipments to and from places where persons
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under its protection are detained.
Unfortunately, the ICRC is limited
in its ability to publicly protest against violations that it observes because of its traditional stance on confidentiality. It maintains
neutrality in order to more fully guarantee its
access to prisoners, refugees, and other persons that may require its help, so the ICRC
has very rarely made public its knowledge of
transgressions against international humanitarian law (Shaw 1079).
b. Prescriptions for domestic enforcement
The Geneva Conventions also place
certain responsibilities on state parties with
respect to their enforcement. Both GC III
and IV require the dissemination of the text
of the conventions in both peace and war, as
well as the inclusion of their study in
courses of military and civil instruction.
Personnel that have responsibility for protected persons must have access to copies of
the conventions at all times and receive special instruction as to their provisions. State
parties are also required to provide effective
legal sanctions against committing grave
breaches,2 bring any person accused of a
grave breach to trial regardless of nationality,3 and to otherwise suppress all acts contrary to the Conventions that are not grave
breaches.
The ICCPR requires state parties to
protect each right guaranteed by its provisions by the force of domestic law. Articles
4 and 5 of the Convention against Torture
require state parties make torture illegal under domestic law and do whatever is necessary to establish jurisdiction over torture in
any territory under is control. Articles 6 and
7 mandate that states parties must arrest any
person alleged to have violated the
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convention and either extradite that
person or put the case to its own authorities for the purpose of prosecution.4
c. Treaty mechanisms
Since there was no pre-existing
organization like the ICRC to manage issues of human rights law, the ICCPR and the
Torture Convention both set up special committees with enforcement duties. Part IV of
the ICCPR, comprising Articles 28-45, mandates the creation of a Human Rights Committee, whose members are elected by and
from the states parties to the Covenant.
State Parties are required to submit reports
on their efforts to guarantee the rights listed
in the CCPR one year after it enters into
force, and the Committee has the power to
request further reports at any time afterwards. The Committee may also receive
complaints from one state party about another’s alleged failure to fulfill its obligations under the CCPR and attempt to solve
any such dispute by mediating negotiations
between the parties involved if it decides
that all domestic remedies have been exhausted or unreasonably delayed.5 In cases
where the Committee is unable to resolve
and issue it may appoint an ad hoc Commission to further attempt to create an amicable
solution. The Committee also has the responsibility to submit an annual report of its
activities to the General Assembly of the
United Nations. The Committee can issue
General Comments that explain and interpret
the Covenant’s provisions; General Comment 31, mentioned above, is an example of
such a comment.
Article 17 of the Convention against
Torture prescribes the creation of the Com-
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mittee against Torture, a body consciously
modeled on the Human Rights Committee of
the ICCPR (Nowak 586). State parties must
submit reports to this Committee not just
one year after the Convention enters into
force for them but every four years thereafter as well, in addition to whatever other reports the Committee requests. In cases
where well-founded evidence indicates the
possibility of torture being carried the Committee can invite the state party concerned to
cooperate in examining the evidence and
making observations based upon it. If it is
warranted, the Committee may also make a
confidential inquiry into the matter, which
may involve visiting the territory of the state
party in question. It has similar powers to
the Human Rights Committee regarding the
power to mediate disputes between state parties if domestic remedies have been exhausted, and it may also receive communications from individuals claiming to be victims
of violations of the Convention if a state
party with jurisdiction over said individuals
recognizes the competence of the Committee
to do so.
d. UN organizations
There are also other organizations
that are outside of the specific framework of
the relevant treaties, which are important to
monitoring and investigating the way prisoners and detainees are treated throughout the
world, including official bodies of the
United Nations. One such organization is
the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (hereafter OHCHR), which is
the primary executive body of the United
Nations responsible for human rights. It coordinates and organizes the efforts of all the
UN groups with some responsibility for
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human rights (Forsythe 4).
The Human Rights Council,
a subsidiary body of the United Nations
General Assembly, was created in 2006
in order to more effectively address human rights violations throughout the world.
It took over the task from its predecessor,
the Human Rights Commission, which came
under intense criticism for the poor human
rights record of some of its members. The
institution of the Council, a body with largely
similar powers, intended to ameliorate that
problem by having its members elected by the
General Assembly (76). It is tasked with performing “Universal Periodic Review,” a process that entails the cooperative examination of
human rights situations in all member states of
the United Nations. The Council may also
receive and discuss credible communications
regarding “consistent patterns of gross and
reliably attested violations of all human rights
and all fundamental freedoms occurring in any
part of the world and under any circumstances,” if domestic remedies have been exhausted. The Human Rights Council also has
the power, inherited from the Commission, to
establish “special procedures,” which are mandates that empower their holders (who are usually expert individuals) to investigate, advise,
and make public reports on specific areas of
their expertise. Such mandates may be assigned either to specific countries or to thematic issues relating to human rights (Shaw
283).
There is such a mandate regarding torture; the title of the person holding that mandate is “Special Rapporteur on torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.” According to the official web
page on the OHCHR’s web site, the Special
Rapporteur has the responsibility to transmit
appeals and other communications regarding
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torture to state governments, perform factfinding missions, and make annual reports to
the Council and the UN General Assembly.
He or she can act with far more independence
than most other legally established human
rights entities, including the Human Rights
Council itself, because he or she is not bound
by the constraints of the usual exhaustion of
domestic remedies rule (Weissbrodt 693). 6
e. NGOs
There are, of course, many important
organizations dedicated to protecting human
rights and investigating breaches of international law that are not affiliated with the
United Nations or any government at all. Two
of the most important non-governmental organizations (or NGOs) that concern themselves with the treatment of prisoners and detainees are Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International.
Human Rights Watch has a relatively
small membership, made up of about 230 experienced and influential professionals. It
works to promote human rights by conducting
investigations into alleged abuses of all sorts
throughout the world, publishing their findings
publicly (unlike the Red Cross) in order to
shame and embarrass abusers through media
attention, and encouraging them to make reforms (Korey 309). Through its fact-finding
and lobbying it also seeks to influence governments and international organizations throughout the world, especially the United States
government (344).
Amnesty International, by contrast, is
a mass-movement organization that draws its
influence from large grassroots membership.
Amnesty International performs many activities draws its influence from large grassroots
membership. Amnesty International performs
many activities
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similar to those of Human Rights
Watch, such as fact-finding, observation, appealing to governments and reporting its findings publicly and widely;
it also mobilizes its large numbers for
other tasks, such as large-scale demonstrations, petitions, letter-writing campaigns,
and protests against policies that infringe on
human rights (Clark 9). Amnesty International focuses special attention on prisoners
that have been illegally detained or abused
while in custody, although it deals with other
human rights issues as well (12).
f. Legal prosecutions and punishments All of
the aforementioned executive bodies, committees, and NGOs perform vital tasks such as
fact-finding, publishing, and engaging with
abusive actors to change their policies. Let it
not be said that what they do is unimportant;
their operations are necessary to uncovering
and preventing illegal abuses of detainees.
None of them, however, have the responsibility or the power to enforce international law
the way “enforcement” is commonly thought
of in domestic law: arresting, charging, trying,
and punishing individuals that make transgressions against the law. Historically, that task
has fallen, for better or for worse, to state governments.
If an individual commits or orders to
be committed an act of abuse against a prisoner of war, then obviously the government of
the state to which he is a national has the right
and duty to put that individual on trial for the
crime. If the abuse is ordered or condoned at
the highest levels of government then, of
course, there is little chance of such a prosecution actually taking place. There is no universally applicable system of sanction and punishment in international law as exists in domestic law (Shaw 4). Therefore, in such situations the responsibility for capturing and
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prosecuting alleged abusers has usually fallen
to some other state or group of states, according either to the principle of prosecuting offenses committed against themselves or the
principle of universal jurisdiction.
Two of the most important examples
of the former principle at work are the Tokyo
and Nuremberg trials of German and Japanese
leaders and soldiers after the Second World
War.7 That a state has a legitimate right to
prosecute those who are alleged to have committed war crimes against them or their nationals, so long as fair trial standards are applied,
is a longstanding principle of international law
appealed to by the Allies to justify the trials.
The “victors’ justice” challenge, the assertion
that a court is illegitimate because it has been
created by the winners of a war to judge the
defeated, was presented by the defendants at
Nuremberg, Tokyo, and other ad hoc international courts throughout history, but never
with any success (Boister 32). The claim that
the Allies were legally unable to combine their
jurisdiction and form a single court, which was
presented by the defendants at the beginning
of the Tokyo trials, was unanimously dismissed out of hand by the court (178).
State governments clearly have a legal
right to prosecute alleged war criminals, including POW abusers,8 and may combine their
jurisdictions into a single court. These rights
were exercised in the post-World War II trials.
The manner in which those rights were used,
however, left much to be desired regarding
fairness. The trials were conducted as military
tribunals, even if they were of an international
character, and therefore would probably not
pass the requirements for a fair and independent court required by the ICCPR and the Geneva Conventions. The charters which established the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals
allowed them to ignore “technical rules of
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evidence” and admit anything they
deemed to have relevance to the
case in Articles 19 and 13, respectively.9 The Tokyo Tribunal in particular suffered from a host of problems,
including inter alia political and ethnic
bias on the part of the judges, the disproportionately high rejection rate of the defense’s evidence, the abnormal length of the
trial, and the relative lack of time and resources available to the defense. It did not
come close to meeting fair trial standards,
even at the time when it took place (Boister
89-114). Regardless of the importance of
these trials to the development of modern
international law, as a model for carrying out
that law today they are sorely lacking.
The latter half of the twentieth century has seen the increasing adoption of the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction, which
holds that certain crimes are so heinous that
any court may charge, try and convict an
offender regardless of the territorial limits of
its jurisdiction. War crimes, including grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, have
fallen under universal jurisdiction since
1945 (Shaw 595). Article 7 of the Convention against Torture arguably gives states
parties the authority to prosecute alleged torturers even when they are not nationals and
the alleged crimes are claimed to have occurred outside the territory state in question.
During the famous Pinochet extradition
hearings, British judge Lord Millet even
claimed that the prohibition of torture by
custom afforded extraterritorial jurisdiction
to national courts even without taking into
account treaty law (599). The application of
this principle relies on alleged offenders being within the territorial jurisdiction of a
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state government that is willing to prosecute
them, and some governments are more supportive of the doctrine than others. Belgium,
for example, has made universal jurisdiction
an explicit part of its national law. Several
world leaders accused of crimes against humanity have been charged by its courts, including Yasir Arafat, Ariel Sharon and Paul
Kagame, and Belgian courts have convicted
several Rwandans of participating in genocide (Macedo 3). The United States government, on the other hand, has been generally
hostile toward the concept. Some influential
political and legal experts argue, not without
some merit, that universal jurisdiction could
be abused by state governments in order to
threaten or punish foreign political opponents that would otherwise be protected by
state sovereignty (6). Many state governments will probably refuse to endorse universal jurisdiction because of such concerns,
and so as a solution to the problem of punishing transgressors against international law
the doctrine will be, by itself, inadequate.
In 2002 an institution was created
that seeks, if not to solve, then at least to
ameliorate some of the problems involved in
enforcing international law by providing the
services of a permanent and independent tribunal, namely the International Criminal
Court (hereafter ICC). According to Article
5 of the Rome Statute, the international legal
instrument which created the ICC, it has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and
war crimes. Article 6 defines “crimes
against humanity” to include torture, murder, rape, and imprisonment in violation of
international law, while Article 7 defines
“war crimes” to include grave breaches of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
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Unfortunately, the United States
has not ratified the Rome Statute,
arguing that the independent prosecutor may bring politicized charges
against Americans who, since the
United States is so heavily involved in
world affairs, are more exposed than citizens of other countries (Eleas 7). Since
2002 the U.S. government has actively opposed the ICC in a number of ways. Congress has passed an act that prevents federal
agencies from cooperating with the ICC and
prevents U.S. participation in peacekeeping
missions where there is any danger that
American personnel will be prosecuted by
the ICC (11). Therefore, it is unlikely be
involved in the resolution of the issue of detainees in the war against terrorism.
7. Conclusion
Between the Geneva Conventions,
their Additional Protocols, and the aforementioned human rights treaties, there is no
person, of any category, at any time, in any
situation, anywhere in the world, during war
or peace, who is not protected to some degree by international law. There can be no
detainees or prisoners outside the law as far
as the treaty obligations of the United States
are concerned, regardless of their status as
terrorists or criminals, and no matter
whether they are held within or outside of
U.S. territory.
III. Violations Committed by the Bush
Administration
1. Introduction
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush has authorized
a series of military and intelligence operations known collectively as “the war against
terrorism.” In the course of this war mem-
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bers of the United States military and intelligence services have continuously, willfully,
and systematically violated the rights of
thousands of prisoners under both humanitarian law and human rights law, under the
orders and condoning of top officials including generals, members of the Cabinet, and
the President.
American personnel have consistently failed to perform adequate background checks needed to accurately determine whether detainees are POWs, criminals, or innocent civilians who were arrested
by mistake or falsely implicated in military
or terrorist activity. The rights of habeas
corpus and access to regularly established
courts have been denied to prisoners in Iraq
and Guantanamo Bay based on specious legal reasoning, and hundreds of innocent people have been detained for years before being released without charges. Conditions in
prisons run by Americans throughout the
world have been inhumanely unhygienic and
dangerous, sometime through neglect and
sometimes as part of a deliberate plan to
weaken the morale of prisoners prior to interrogation. Detainees have been subject to
torture and inhuman, degrading treatment by
Americans in the course of both interrogations and disciplinary actions. Some prisoners have also been subject to so-called
“extraordinary renditions,” where they have
been transported to other countries for the
purpose of being interrogated and tortured
by non-Americans. In some cases American
forces have extra-judicially killed prisoners
or allowed them to be killed by allied forces.
All of these actions are both morally outrageous and strictly prohibited by international
law.
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2. Arrest without just cause
a. Afghanistan
Even during the initial combat operations in Afghanistan during 2001
there were significant problems with the
identification and processing of prisoners.
A major element of these difficulties was
the U.S.’s reliance on the Northern Alliance,
a group of anti-Taliban militias. The Alliance provided the bulk of the ground troops
during this period so that large numbers of
American soldiers would not have to be
committed, even though their forces had a
history of brutality that rivaled their foes in
the Taliban (Worthington Guantanamo Files
5). In the chaos and confusion of the war, a
number of people were captured by Northern
Alliance soldiers and then turned over to the
Americans for interrogation who had very
little or no connection at all with the Taliban
or Al Qaeda, including travelers, relief
workers, low-ranking foot soldiers, refugees,
and religious teachers (30-38).
Pakistan was another nominal ally of the
United States in the war against the Taliban
and Al Qaeda. Pakistani soldiers and government officials proved themselves just as
haphazard and careless in rounding up prisoners to be turned over to the United States
as the Northern Alliance forces. Thousands
of refugees fled across the AfghanistanPakistan border during the course of the war,
and Pakistani soldiers arrested hundreds of
them, mainly foreigners, and turned them
over to the Americans on extremely spurious
grounds. As with the prisoners captured by
the Northern Alliance, there were few people of any real intelligence value among
these prisoners, only a diverse mix of foot
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soldiers, religious scholars, and civilian refugees (49).
The unreliability of American allies to
adequately screen prisoners was exacerbated
by the United States’ own policy of offering
bounties for alleged members of the Taliban
and Al Qaeda. Numerous prisoners have
testified that they were falsely accused of
working with or for terrorist groups and then
“sold” to the Americans (46). For example,
one Saudi Arabian explained that he crossed
into Pakistan and was denied access to the
Saudi embassy by Pakistani soldiers until
they handed him over to the United States in
exchange for money (Sebaii 45-46). There
is also evidence that Afghani warlords from
the Northern Alliance have earned money
for transferring suspected terrorists and lowranking Taliban fighters into American custody (Raman).
American personnel also made their own
blunders when it came to identifying and
capturing suspected terrorists in Afghanistan, the most incomprehensible being the
arrest of five political prisoners that had previously been held by the Taliban. Because
these men were foreigners, the Northern Alliance forced them to remain in prison even
after the Taliban had been driven off, supposedly for their own safety. Even though
they had been imprisoned by the Taliban for
being suspected anti-fundamentalist spies,
American agents later took them prisoner
and sent them to the Guantanamo Bay
Prison (Worthington Guantanamo Files
114).
Given the chaotic nature of war in general, the especially disorganized nature of
Afghanistan, and the obvious risks that
unlawful and unwarranted arrests would
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arise from offering these bounties,
the United States should have been
extremely careful in examining the
backgrounds of prisoners and checking
the stories of those who claimed innocence. In fact, American officials were
incredibly lax in this regard, assuming as a
matter of course that most or all of the detainees in U.S.-run prisons in Afghanistan
were guilty of committing or conspiring to
commit acts of terrorism. The tribunals
mandated by GC III to determine whether a
belligerent belonged to a protected category
of persons were completely absent at this
point in time (90). Without any legallyprescribed mechanisms for determining who
belonged in prison, the United States has
held hundreds of people prisoner without
any legally justifiable reason for unacceptably long periods of time before discovering
or deciding that they are not threats and subsequently releasing them without charge.
An example of the stubborn refusal of
United States government officials to consider that a prisoner might not be a terrorist
during this time is the case of Mohammed
Sadiq. He was a civilian who was over 80
years old when he was arrested by American
soldiers, apparently because one of his family members was suspected of working for
the Taliban. Even he, as obviously harmless
as he was, spent several months under arrest
before the United States released him
(Raman). Many others whose innocence
could have been determined by a brief investigation immediately after their capture were
held prisoner in Afghanistan and Cuba for
years before being released without charge.
There was, for example, Khalid al Morghi,
the son of a senior Saudi Arabian military
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officer, who took a leave of absence from
his white-collar job to perform charitable aid
work in Afghanistan – hardly the portrait of
a hardcore terrorist, or any sort of combatant
at all. He was still held, first in Afghanistan
and later in Guantanamo Bay, for over four
years before being released (Worthington
Guantanamo Files 54).
The “competent tribunals” required by
GC III to determine the eligibility of prisoners for protection under humanitarian law
did not appear until years after the war began, and even then they were too little, too
late. The Combatant Status Review Tribunals that were announced in July 2004 suffered from tremendous difficulties for a several reasons. First, the prisoners were denied access to lawyers during the tribunals.
Second, the court was allowed to hear secret
evidence to which the prisoners had no access. Third, the tribunals were held far away
from the battlefield and a long time after the
persons in question had been captured, making it very difficult for the defendants to call
witnesses who might have known them to
testify on their behalf. Finally, even when
prisoners did provide addresses or telephone
numbers for people that might have testified
for them, the court apparently made no effort
whatsoever to find them (267).
To sum up, the United States exhibited
extreme negligence and willful disregard for
international law in the way it processed alleged terrorists and criminals during the
early part of the fighting in Afghanistan.
The shocking thoughtlessness with which
prisoners were initially assumed to be guilty
and subsequently held in custody for months
or years without an investigation was in direct contravention of international
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humanitarian and human rights
law10 and also offensive to common
moral sensibilities. The Bush administration and U.S. military and government officials should have anticipated
the possibility of wrongful arrests during
a confusing and complicated war, but instead displayed an attitude of unwarranted
confidence that anyone under arrest must
have done something to deserve it, an attitude which it would carry into its handling
of the long-term detention, trial procedures,
and treatment of prisoners outside of Afghanistan.
b. Iraq
The Abu Ghraib prison facility was taken
over by the United States in 2003, initially
as part of the creation of a new Iraqi criminal justice system; most of the other prisons
in the country had been ransacked beyond
salvation by looters, and there were few
other options available. It was not intended,
at first, to be used for detention operations
by the American military (Gourevitch 19).
The increasing frequency of insurgent
attacks in Baghdad caused American authorities to change that policy. Iraqis arrested by American soldiers on patrol were
put into Abu Ghraib because there was literally nowhere else for them to go, even
though the prison’s location in a hostile area
meant it came under mortar attack frequently. GC III provides that POW camps
or other internment areas should not be located in especially dangerous places, and the
Red Cross determined that American personnel had not taken sufficient measures to
offer protection from shelling to the prisoners (Greenberg 403). Military prisoners and
civilian prisoners were supposed to be han-
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dled separately from each other, and officially there was an attempt to do that, with a
temporary tent encampment meant specifically for the civilians. However, the distinction between the two types of prisoners
became less and less meaningful to the
guards and administrators as the number of
prisoners continued to increase beyond what
they had been prepared to handle
(Gourevitch 23).
Many prisoners were arrested on little
evidence and were held long after they
should have been released. In 2003 Red
Cross inspectors were told by intelligence
officers that they believed well over half the
prison population of Iraq was kept there mistakenly (Greenberg 388). It was not uncommon for American soldiers on patrol to arrest anyone and everyone who was around
during the aftermath of an attack. Firing
weapons in celebration was a fairly common
practice in Iraq, and according to a member
of the Justice Department’s Iraq rebuilding
team, people were arrested for doing it
(Gourevitch 23). The biggest problem was
that it was difficult for these people to get
released from Abu Ghraib even after it was
fairly apparent that they did not belong.
Even when judges and lawyers arranged for
a prisoner to be released, the military would
sometimes prevent it from happening. Some
of the delays were probably just the result of
bureaucratic errors, but the increasing demand for useful intelligence about insurgents also started to contribute as well; often
prisoners that would otherwise have been
released were kept in the prison because of
supposed “intelligence value,” assessments
that the top on-site civilian administrator put
little stock in (24).
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The system of notification and information dissemination in Iraq was
extremely flawed in 2003 as well. It
was rare for those making arrests to
properly inform suspects or their families of why they were being arrested or
where they were taken, and the military
usually failed to notify the families of suspects detained while away from their homes
that they had been arrested at all. The
ICRC, which otherwise would have helped
notify families as quickly as possible, often
received no or improperly completed paperwork from the United States military, resulting in unnecessary delays (Greenberg 389).
Among all the prisoners at Abu Ghraib,
the ones that arguably least deserved to be
there were the mentally ill ones, of which
there may have been as many as ten. Many
were delusional or schizophrenic, engaging
in violent and unhygienic behavior that was
unsafe for other prisoners, the guards, and
themselves. These people should have been
in a mental hospital instead of a military
prison, or at least under the care of qualified
mental health professionals. There were
none at Abu Ghraib, and even though many
potentially helpful drugs were available at
the facility, without doctors to prescribe
them guards just gave the mentally ill prisoners Benadryl and tried to deal with their
behavior as best as they could (Gourevitch
145).
Many prisoners who were not obviously
innocent civilians, including insurgents and
some former members of Saddam Hussein’s
Iraqi military, which had been officially disbanded after the capture of Baghdad, were
held by the United States officially as nonPOWs because they were not members of a
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military force of a State Party to the Geneva
Conventions. According to one interrogator,
a senior intelligence official reported that
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had told him
that insurgents were not protected by the Geneva Conventions and all interrogation techniques were usable, including dogs (211).
Rather, their detentions were justified as the
necessary imprisonment of those suspected
of spying, sabotage, or other hostilities. Article 5 of GC IV does allow such detentions,
but the ICRC has always held that its provisions should only be applied to exceptional
cases and on an individual basis (33). Applying it to the detention of thousands of
prisoners at the same time may, arguably,
have been within the letter of the law, but it
was most certainly in violation of its spirit.
The American soldiers in Baghdad can be
excused for being aggressive with initial arrests; however, that people with no apparent
connection to insurgents or terrorists were
kept imprisoned instead of released quickly
is unacceptable. Especially in a war zone
with a shortage of space for prisoners, there
seems little rationale for detaining more people than absolutely necessary. The same
overly confident attitude from Afghanistan,
the idea that anyone who was put in jail by
an American must have done something
wrong, was combined with the chaotic state
of the country, its new justice system, and
the American command structure to create a
situation where many innocent civilians
were put in prison for far longer than they
should have been.
3. Indefinite Detention and Unfair Trials
The prison at the Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base, Cuba, has held over 750 prisoners
since it opened in January 2002 (CBC).
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None of them had a fair trial or
easy access to an impartial court
while they were there, a situation that
has famously been called a “legal black
hole” (Steyn). The legal basis for their
imprisonment was President Bush’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, which
stated that any non-citizens of the United
States could be detained, without any specified time limit, if the President believed they
were involved in terrorism or if it was in the
interests of the United States that they be
detained (Greenberg 26).
The Bush administration chose Guantanamo Bay as the location of the prison specifically to prevent the detainees from ever
having access to an independent court in
which they could challenge their detentions,
complain about their treatment, or have a
fair trial. A memorandum submitted to the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense on 28 December 2001, written by John
Yoo and Patrick Philbin, who were both
Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals at the
time, demonstrates that quite clearly. The
memo argued that federal courts should not
and probably would not find that they could
exercise jurisdiction over an alien detained
in Guantanamo Bay, and that chances were
small that a judge would decide to grant a
habeas corpus hearing in response to a petition filed by such a person (37).
Why was the administration so intent on
preventing federal courts from having access
to the detention camp? Apparently, top officials had already decided that all of the prisoners were guilty, and they didn’t need or
want any independent court to get involved
and potentially challenge their decisions.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for
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example, stated publicly in January 2002
that the Guantanamo prisoners were
“committed terrorists,” and later that same
month said that the prisoners were among
the worst, most violent criminals in the
world. American generals gave statements
to similar effect about the prisoners as well
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 127).
These statements were being made about
people who had never appeared in a court of
law, much less been convicted in a fair trial.
The simplest solution to preventing the
detainees from filing for habeas corpus or
otherwise justifying their release would have
been to classify them as prisoners of war,
which Secretary of State Powell indeed argued should have been done (Greenberg
123). However, for reasons which will be
explained below, the administration decided
to classify them as “unlawful combatants” in
an attempt to prevent the Geneva Conventions from applying to them (Worthington
Guantanamo Files 128). The government
was trying to have it both ways: locking up
prisoners indefinitely and without putting
them on trial as if they were POWs, but otherwise behaving as if they were criminals.
The administration wasn’t entirely opposed to the idea of trials, but it wanted
those trials on its terms and more or less under its control. The same Military Order that
President Bush issued to justify the detention of suspected terrorists also provided for
military tribunals to determine whether suspected terrorists were guilty of war crimes,
and that the danger to the United States
posed by such persons necessitated that the
rules of law and evidence in normal cases
could not be applied. According to the order, appointments to said commissions
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would be made by the Secretary of
Defense, and either he or the President could review and decide on the
conviction or sentencing of a trial. Furthermore, any person subject to such a
tribunal would be unable to appeal the
decision in any American, foreign, or international court (Greenberg 25-28). Because
the judges would be military officers who
take orders from the President they could
never be truly independent of executive authority (Koh “The Case Against Military
Commissions” 339). Military tribunals as
prescribed by the President’s Military Order
would almost certainly never meet the fairness and independence requirements of either the Geneva Conventions or the ICCPR.
One need not turn to hypothetical situations to see how unfair a trial by military
commission would be, of course. The first
military trial of an “unlawful combatant” to
be successfully concluded (in July 2008,
more than six years after the Guantanamo
prison opened) was the trial of Salim Hamdan, a man accused of working as a driver
and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden. (It
was, in fact, because of his exclusion from
parts of an earlier trial that the Supreme
Court decided that military commissions
violated the Geneva Conventions in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld.) The trial was riddled with
problems, including the hearing of secret
testimony behind closed doors, the acceptance of hearsay evidence of highly dubious
validity, and the presentation of pointless,
prejudicial evidence, supposedly meant to
inform the jurors about the nature of Al
Qaeda, but which served only as terrifying
propaganda (Worthington “A critical overview”).
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What’s worse, the court’s sentence seems
to have no relationship with the reality of
Hamdan’s detention. A Pentagon spokesman has stated that even when Hamdan is
finished serving his sentence,11 he may still
be subject to potentially indefinite detention
as an “enemy combatant” (CNN). This is
nothing less than a mockery of justice and a
demonstration of the paradoxical reasoning
of the Bush administration. Hamdan was
deprived of prisoner of war rights for allegedly violating the laws of war, but even after
he has been convicted and punished according to what passes for justice in Guantanamo, the administration wants to hold
him indefinitely as something other than a
POW anyway. This, at least as much as
anything else, should prove that President
Bush and his advisors did not care about justice or the rule of law, whether international
or domestic, when it comes to the detainee
victims of the war against terrorism.
4. Torture
a. Overview
Torture and activity degrading to human
dignity have been used during the war on
terror by the United States, at first, as interrogation methods, in spite of the unequivocal ban on such techniques by international
law. The use of such techniques was authorized at the highest levels of the civilian and
military command structure (Greenberg
360).
b. Torture by American personnel
i. Afghanistan
The use of torture and degrading treatment began early on during military operations in Afghanistan, even before the official
opening of any permanent prison sites. Notably, in December 2001 John Walker
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Lindh, known colloquially in the
U.S. media as “the American Taliban,” was made to pose for humiliating photographs, threatened with death,
taped to a stretcher while naked during
interrogations, and denied medical treatment for his injuries, including a bullet
wound in his leg, for several days
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 82). The
office of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,
who was monitoring the interrogation
closely, authorized the military interrogators
in charge of Lindh to “take the gloves off”
during the process (Roth and Worden 165).
Another detainee who, like Lindh, immediately received extra attention from American
soldiers and interrogators because of his race
and nationality, was David Hicks, an Australian who fought for the Taliban. Hicks has
claimed in an official affidavit that shortly
after he was handed over to American authorities he had guns pointed at him and was
threatened with death, and that later he was
imprisoned onboard a naval ship where he
was not given sufficient quantities of food.
He also stated that he was transported to unknown locations and forced to kneel in uncomfortable positions for hours at a time
while being struck by guards before being
transported to the Kandahar prison (Bonner).
A permanent prison in Kandahar opened
in January 2002, and for the first time a large
number of prisoners were entered into the
interrogation system. At first the interrogators tried to hew to the rules of behavior set
by the Geneva Conventions and military
regulations, but as the demand for useful
intelligence increased they became more
violent. Many prisoners were physically
beaten, restrained, had their fingers broken,
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or had hard objects thrown at their heads
during interrogations. Even these methods,
brutal as they were, are relatively tame compared to the most extreme techniques used
by some interrogators outside the usual Military Intelligence chain of command, including Special Forces soldiers and agents of the
CIA and FBI. These extreme techniques
included burning prisoners with scalding
liquids and cigarettes, sexual violations, and
application of electrical shocks. Many prisoners asserted that these actions were often
photographed and that those photographs
were used in later interrogations to threaten
prisoners (Worthington Guantanamo Files
94-98).
The behavior of the prison guards was, if
anything, even worse. The relaxation of Geneva Convention standards, combined with
the general spirit of taking vengeance for the
September 11 terrorist attacks, made the
American guards especially prone to violent
overreactions and arbitrary abuses. American soldiers were told that their prisoners
were “nobodies,” and at least one believed
that if the Geneva Conventions had been applied and the prisoners labeled as “soldiers”
then they would have been treated with more
respect (Jehl). Beatings were common responses to rule violations, and prisoners
were often denied adequate amounts of sleep
because of “inspections” during the night
that forced them to stand outside in the cold.
Even harsher exposure to extreme cold was
not unheard of at Kandahar, either, as many
prisoners stated that they were exposed to
the cold while naked, and at least one had
cold water thrown on his body during the
night. “Stress positions,” the binding of
prisoners in a way meant to cause them
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physical pain, was also fairly common.
Psychological abuses also occurred, often in tandem with the physical ones. Prisoners were often forced to
go naked while they were abused and
were mocked and photographed in the process. Many had their beards, which are important to maintain for Muslims, shaved
against their wills. Although each detainee
was given his own copy of the Koran, some
guards damaged and desecrated the holy
books in order to taunt them; yelling insulting profanities about Islam and the Prophet
Mohammed were fairly common as well
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 88).
The Kandahar facility was the main U.S.run prison in Afghanistan for only a few
months, and in the spring of 2002 many detainees were transferred from that location to
the prison at Bagram Air Force Base, which
has served as the central United States military prison in the country ever since. As a
prison camp Bagram left much to be desired,
with hastily thrown together cells and pens
made from wood and barbed wire, and windows boarded up with rusty sheets of iron
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 170).
The abuse from guards and interrogators
did not improve during the transition from
Kandahar, either. Stress positions and sleep
deprivation were incorporated into interrogation routines as pressure to obtain intelligence grew stronger. Even the most welltrained and ethical military interrogators
went farther than they had before the move,
keeping prisoners awake in long sessions for
as long as the interrogators themselves could
stay up, a process informally called
“monstering.” The name reflected that these
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early interrogators considered it the worst,
cruelest technique that they were willing to
use. When new, less experienced interrogators were sent to work at Bagram they increased the upper limit of sleep deprivation
to 36 hours, ordered increased amounts of
isolation and handcuffing outside of interrogation rooms, and generally allowed themselves to use other coercive techniques with
greater frequency as time went by (Mackey
471). Unwarranted violence from the guards
was as bad as it had ever been in Kandahar,
if not worse, and the litany of beatings, humiliations, religious insults, death threats,
rapes, and electrical torture continued unabated (Worthington Guantanamo Files
170).
The perhaps inevitable result of this culture of abuse was death; at least two Bagram
inmates have died as a result of physical
abuse from guards. Both confirmed deaths
were largely caused by reservists untrained
in detention using powerful blows to the legs
as disciplinary measures. Mullah Habibullah was shackled in a holding cell and struck
in the legs repeatedly over several days before he succumbed to his injuries and died
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 188). The
second man, known only as Dilawar, was
chained and beaten repeatedly for apparent
non-compliance during an interrogation, and
died after five days. Official press releases
ascribed the deaths only to heart attacks, but
documentation from army doctors indicates
that the damage to the legs was the most important factor (McCoy 126). Two of the soldiers directly involved in the deaths were
convicted of criminal abuse in 2005 and sentenced to only a few months imprisonment;
no officers were prosecuted at all (BBC

78
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47

84

: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009

Great Day 2009
News).
ii. Guantanamo Bay
During most of the first year of its
existence, interrogations at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility were
fairly mild. During this time mistreatment involved general conditions, like open
-air cages for living quarters and insufficient
amounts of food, an atmosphere of uncertainty leading to intense fear, and large
amounts of verbal abuse from the guards
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 132). The
worst, most violent transgressions were
committed by the Extreme Reaction Force,
or ERF, a squad of soldiers in riot gear who
would respond to minor or nonexistent misbehavior with incredible savagery. Tarak
Dergoul, a Guantanamo detainee that was
frequently targeted by the ERF because he
organized prisoner strikes, was so traumatized by his experiences that he needed psychological counseling after his release
(Rose).
Conditions in Guantanamo became much
worse in October 2002 when, due to frustrations from the lack of good intelligence, Major General Geoffrey Miller was appointed
as the new commander of the base. His
predecessor was considered “soft” for allowing detainees to keep their Korans and criticizing guards for committing verbal abuse
(Goldenberg). It was Miller that decided
that the best way to obtain results was to coordinate the activities of the Military Police
guards and the Military Intelligence interrogators - as he put it, to “set the conditions.”
This meant that every aspect of the lives of
the detainees was geared toward making
them “break” under interrogation. In practice, this meant more beatings of
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“uncooperative” prisoners by guards, including, the continued use of the ERF teams, and
the institution of new interrogation routines
involving prolonged exposure to extreme
temperatures
and
sleep
deprivation
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 193).
Miller’s appointment roughly coincided
with high-level decisions to explicitly authorize more violent forms of interrogation.
In November 2002 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld responded positively to a request for
new interrogation methods, explicitly allowing such techniques as stress positions, sensory and sleep deprivation, removing religious paraphernalia, the forced shaving of
facial hair, and the use of dogs to frighten
detainees. Rumsfeld rescinded his authorization several weeks later (Greenberg 237239). According to an official log that was
leaked to Time magazine, during that interim
the harsh techniques were used against Mohammed al-Qahtani, infamously known as
the “twentieth hijacker” of the September
11th attacks, including sleep deprivation and
stress positions. Additionally, female interrogators would frequently invade his personal space in order to humiliate him.12 Recently, the top legal military official in
Guantanamo Bay has stated that she will not
refer al-Qahtani to prosecution because the
treatment he suffered amounts to torture
(Woodward).
The administration was apparently
pleased with the changes that General Miller
had brought to Guantanamo Bay. In September 2003, he was sent to Iraq in order to
provide a similar overhaul to the interrogation operations at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad, where the same practice of
using the guards to constantly maintain an
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environment supposedly conducive
to successful interrogations was instituted and mentioned in the Army’s
internal
investigation
of
abuse
(Goldenberg).
iii. Iraq
An ICRC report released in 2004 and
based on data gathered between February
and November 2003 indicates that during
that period in Iraq some level of brutality on
the part of United States military personnel
was present in every step of the detention
process. At the time of arrest soldiers would
often threaten or strike suspects who had
their hands cuffed behind their backs. During transfers to prisons the treatment was
even worse, as several severe beatings were
reported, many resulting in serious injuries
and a least one resulting in death. At least
two cases of major burns caused by forced
contact with hot metal surfaces were also
reported (Greenberg 390). The very worst
documented instances of mistreatment,
which rose to the level of torture according
to the Red Cross, occurred during interrogations performed by members of the US
Army’s Military Intelligence Corps.
The most common technique used by
Military Intelligence (or MI) interrogators at
Abu Ghraib was the solitary confinement of
interrogation subjects in completely empty,
totally dark rooms, for days at a time, while
naked; cooperation with interrogators merited “rewards” such as beds, clothing, and
light. Other abusive methods observed by
the Red Cross included sleep deprivation,
binding of the hands in a manner that caused
wrist wounds, and being forced to walk
through the facility’s hallways while naked.
The ICRC medical inspector discovered that
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several detainees had psychological problems, such as poor memory and suicidal tendencies, which were judged to have resulted
from the physical and mental stress of their
interrogations (Greenberg 393).
Oddly enough, the report stated that the
worst sorts of abuse mostly did not occur to
detainees that were being held in regular
prison facilities run by military police. It
noted that guards sometimes slapped or
shoved detainees, and that one disciplinary
measure used against detainees was forced
exposure to the sun while handcuffed for as
many as four hours, in addition to the more
ordinary measures of temporary solitary
confinement and withholding of cigarette
rations (Greenberg 397). That raises the
question: Why was it that most of the soldiers charged and convicted with crimes in
regard to the Abu Ghraib scandal were
members of the Military Police Corps, and
not MI personnel, when their behavior was
relatively benign by comparison?
Part of the answer is that some MP
guards were committing serious abuses that
the ICRC apparently did not observe or collect information about. In accordance with
General Miller’s transplanted Guantanamo
policy the MPs took orders regarding prisoner treatment from interrogators, who consisted mostly of MI personnel, but also
anonymous officials thought to be working
for the FBI or CIA, called OGA (for “other
government agencies”) by the guards. The
MPs were responsible for maintaining the
sleep deprivation of certain prisoners with
yelling, door slamming, or loud music and
taking away clothes from certain detainees
and providing only women’s underwear for
them to wear, in order to humiliate them.
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Often the MPs were instructed to
“soften up” detainees prior to interrogations; how exactly was left to
their discretion, but the most common
method was forcing them to exercise for
several minutes (Gourevitch 98). This
behavior had psychological repercussions,
not only for the prisoners but for the guards
as well. One MP guard described how the
process had numbed him to the point where
he was no longer shocked or repulsed by
what he was asked to do. Torturing prisoners
at the behest of interrogators had become a
normal experience for him (104). Given the
deleterious effects on the moral sensibilities
of the MPs, it is not surprising that they displayed unwarranted violence towards prisoners on their own later.
The best-known image of abuse from
Abu Ghraib is a photograph of a man wearing a poncho and hood, standing on a box
with wires attached to his hands. On November 3rd, 2003, the MPs had been told that
this prisoner was lying about his identity and
were instructed to make him to confess his
real name. At first his treatment was typical
- sleep deprivation, yelling, stress positions,
forced exercise. Then, inactive electrical
wires were tied to his fingers, and the prisoner was told he would be electrocuted if he
fell off of the box he was standing on (177).
It looks bad, and it is bad, but for all of the
photograph’s infamy it doesn’t come close
to being the worst abuse at the prison, even
by the Military Police.
The most egregious acts carried out by
MPs on their own initiative and not at the
behest of interrogators took place a few days
later. A group of seven prisoners thought to
have instigated riots out in the tents were
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transferred to the MI cells, and for several
hours before the guards brought them to
their cells they were stripped naked, beaten
about the hands, feet, face and chest, verbally assaulted, forced to form a “pyramid”
or “dog-pile” while being photographed, and
put in positions simulating sex and masturbation. The MPs had never committed
abuse on that scale before, and they never
did again (196). It was unusual enough that
several guards felt the need to report the incident to superior officers, but none of them
seemed to make much of it (200).
Because of reports of prisoner abuse, lax
discipline, and prisoner escapes at Abu
Ghraib, an investigation was launched. The
result was an Army document referred to as
the “Taguba Report” after the general in
charge of the investigation. The report
found that abuse of prisoners by guards had
occurred; in addition to the aforementioned
examples, improper use of military dogs,
threatening detainees with rape and death by
gunshot, and pouring phosphoric substances
from chemical lights onto detainees were
also described in the report. Of the thirteen
people named as suspects, two were civilian
contractors, one was an MI sergeant, and the
rest were all members of the Military Police,
none above the rank of Staff Sergeant
(Greenberg 417). General Taguba also
found that the guards at Abu Ghraib had insufficient training in detention operations
and the rules of international humanitarian
law, and that copies of the Geneva Conventions were not provided in sufficient numbers to American personnel or the prisoners,
and that prison commander General Karpinski had done too little to disseminate information and prevent abuse. He
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recommended an overhaul of operating procedures, training in detention and the laws of war for all personnel involved with prisons, and an
inquiry into MI interrogators regarding
their role in prison abuse (420).
When the shocking photographs of the
abuse at Abu Ghraib taken by soldiers were
leaked to the press and shown on national
television some sort of action was necessary.
Several Military Police and a few Military
Intelligence soldiers were court-martialed
and convicted of crimes such as assault, conspiracy, or dereliction of duty. Only one
commissioned officer, who was found innocent, was court-martialed. A few others
faced fines and administrative reprimands,
and Brigadier General Karpinski was demoted one rank and relieved of her command. No one was charged with torture or
war crimes. No OGA or civilian interrogators were ever brought to trial. Brigadier
General Jane Karpinski, the MP commander,
was demoted one rank. General Miller was
never brought to account for his recommendations, and senior officials were not held
responsible for allowing the situation to deteriorate to such a level in the first place
(270). Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez,
who had authorized the use of extreme psychological torture techniques that had been
developed by the CIA without telling the
MP commander or officers, faced no official
consequences either (McCoy 134). What
the guards did in Abu Ghraib was wrong,
and they should have been punished for it;
using orders from a superior as a justification for war crimes has been a non-starter
since the Nuremberg trials. However, that
doesn’t mean that those who gave the orders,
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and those who created conditions where
such orders could conceivable be given and
carried out, do not bear any responsibility
either.
iv. Secret prisons
In addition to the major prisons in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Cuba, smaller prisons officially known as “black sites” that were operated by the Central Intelligence Agency existed in those countries and other places
throughout the world, including Thailand
and Eastern Europe. These black sites were
used for the purpose of detaining and interrogating prisoners thought to possess especially important information about Al Qaeda
or other terrorist organizations without any
official oversight or acknowledgment of
their existence. The so-called “ghost” prisoners were held secretly, without access to
lawyers, agents of the press, or representatives of the Red Cross, and their CIA interrogators were allowed to subject them to the
same types of degrading and torturous methods that had been used in Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo (Priest “CIA Holds Terror Suspects”).
Several “enhanced” interrogation techniques were also officially authorized for use
at the black sites in addition to what was
standard elsewhere, including a severe form
of stress positions that could be used on a
prisoner for over forty hours at a time, constantly dousing naked prisoners with cold
water while locked in a cold cell, severe
sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation and
bombardment and, most infamously, waterboarding. This latter method involves binding a prisoner, covering his mouth, and
pouring water onto his face in order to cause
the same physiological and mental
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sensations as drowning. These
procedures were used against about
a dozen prisoners believed to be senior members of Al Qaeda who possessed important information, including
Khalid Sheik Mohammed (or “KSM”),
who is regarded as the primary planner of
the September 11th attacks (Ross). Waterboarding was used on three of these prisoners; KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and Abd alRahim al-Nashiri (Bradbury “Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture”
6). Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times in
August 2002, and KSM suffered it 183 times
in March 2003, averaging out to approximately 3 and 6 waterboarding sessions per
day, respectively (37).
The other ghost prisoners, while not subjected to the most extreme “enhanced” techniques, still suffered a great deal, especially
the ones being held in the black sites of Afghanistan. Several prisoners who have been
released from the secret prisons in that country reported multiple forms of torture and
abuse, including sleep deprivation, starvation, and exposure to extreme cold weather.
One unidentified inmate of a secret prison in
Afghanistan that was codenamed the “Salt
Pit” had his clothing removed on the orders
of a CIA interrogator and subsequently died
of hypothermia in his cell during the night
(Priest “CIA Avoids Scrutiny”).
The black sites represent the very worst
excesses of the Bush Administration’s detainee policy. The level of torture, the secrecy and lack of accountability, and the total subversion of due process and international law went beyond even the Guantanamo Bay camp. Fortunately, much like
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Guantanamo the black sites were ordered
closed by an executive order of President
Obama shortly after his inauguration. Unfortunately, the fact that these senior Al
Qaeda members, including Khalid Sheik
Mohammed, underwent waterboarding and
other forms of torture and degrading treatment will immensely complicate their future
trials.
c. Extraordinary renditions
The term “extraordinary rendition” refers
to the practice of secretly transporting a prisoner to another country, generally the same
one where the prisoner in question was born,
and giving him into the custody of that
country’s security forces in order to be interrogated and potentially prosecuted. In itself
the idea is not necessarily illegal, but since
2001 the Bush administration has turned
over many prisoners to foreign countries
when there has been a high probability, or
even an expectation, that they would be tortured while in their custody, contravening
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture.
Renditions were practiced on a limited
basis during the 1990s, exclusively for individuals with standing arrest warrants or in
absentia convictions in foreign countries
(usually Egypt), with safeguards to protect
innocent people from rendition and some
sort of assurance that torture would not take
place, although even back then those assurances were generally not worth much
(Mayer). As bad as the program was in the
1990s, the flaws of the rendition program
were magnified as its use was expanded after September 2001.
Under the Bush administration the CIA
has renditioned several people only suspected of terrorism, and in many cases the
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evidence connecting these persons
with terrorist organizations was very
weak. For example, Maher Arar is a
Canadian citizen who was born in
Syria. He was arrested in an airport because he knew (vaguely) another man
suspected of terrorism. On that flimsy basis
Arar was transported to Syria, where he was
held for a year and tortured by security personnel before being released without
charges; the Syrians had apparently not
found any connection between him and any
terrorist organization in that time (Mayer).
In addition to Egypt and Syria, prisoners
were also renditioned to other countries
where torture and prisoner abuse are known
to be fairly common, including Uzbekistan
and (to a lesser extent) Jordan. CIA officials
not only suspected that these countries were
torturing the prisoners that they were receiving from the United States but expected it;
the senior CIA operative in the Uzbek capital told the British ambassador that he knew
that the Uzbek government was torturing
prisoners for information (Grey). At least
one man was transported from Pakistan to
Morocco expressly because the Moroccans
were willing to use methods that the Pakistanis weren’t, including the infliction of
small cuts all over the body over a long period of time (Worthington Guantanamo Files
230).
It is impossible to imagine that the threat
of prisoners being tortured once sent into the
custody of these countries is not substantial
enough to qualify for Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. In carrying out extraordinary renditions government agents not
only neglected their responsibilities under
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the Convention against Torture but actively
sought to violate its requirements.
IV. Legal Justifications
Members of the Bush administration
have presented a number of legal arguments,
both internally and externally, which justify
or excuse the abusive treatment of detainees
suspected of involvement in terrorist activities and direct responsibility for committing
the most unpalatable abuses away from top
officials. These arguments are severely
lacking in a number of respects, although not
to the point of being frivolous. It is therefore necessary to examine them in some detail in order to present thorough counterarguments.
1. Inapplicability of International Law
Starting in the early years of the war on
terrorism, several legal advisors within the
White House advanced arguments to the effect that the Geneva Conventions could be
interpreted to not apply to prisoners suspected of terrorist activity. They also asserted that other elements of international
humanitarian and human rights law could
not restrict the decisions of the President regarding the matter of detainees who posed a
potential security threat to the United States.
Deputy Assistant John Yoo drafted a
memorandum for the United States Department of Defense in January 2002 that put
forth three reasons why members of Al
Qaeda would not be protected by the Geneva
Conventions if they were captured in Afghanistan: Al Qaeda is not a State Party to
the Geneva Conventions; the war in Afghanistan is neither a war between states nor
a civil war, and therefore is not under the
purview of the Conventions; and Al Qaeda
members do not obey the laws of war as
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required by GC III Article 4(a)(2),
such as carrying arms openly and
wearing uniforms or visible symbols
to distinguish themselves from civilians
(Greenberg 49).
This memo also argued that members
of the Taliban would not need to be afforded protections under the Conventions
even though Afghanistan is a State Party because Afghanistan was a failed state while
the Taliban controlled it, and because the
Taliban was connected so closely with Al
Qaeda that the two organizations could not
be legally distinguished from each other
(50). Even if international humanitarian law
applied in Afghanistan, the memo argued,
Taliban members would still not be protected by GC III because of their failure to
meet the Article 4(a)(2) requirements, and
that competent tribunals required by Article
5 would be unnecessary if the President determined that all Taliban members failed to
meet those requirements, thus supposedly
removing “doubt” as to their legal status and
obviating the need for the tribunals to eliminate it (110). It stated that even if the substance of the Geneva Conventions or other
instruments of international humanitarian
law were a part of customary international
law, it would not matter because customary
law is not the federal law of the United
States and therefore is incapable of binding
the powers of the President (112).
Shortly after receiving the memorandum
described above, Alberto Gonzales sent his
own memo to President Bush, advising him
of the positive and negative ramifications of
disregarding the Geneva Conventions in the
Afghanistan war.13 In his arguments against
the likelihood of the negative outcomes hap-
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pening, Gonzales asserted that the Bush’s
official orders to treat prisoners “humanely”
would prevent severe backlashes from other
countries and the undermining of American
military culture (119-121). On 7 February
2002, President Bush gave orders to the effect that GC III did not apply to Al Qaeda
and that all Taliban detainees were to be
considered unlawful combatants instead of
POWs, but that they should be treated humanely anyway “[a]s a matter of policy” but
not a matter of law (135).
An internal report on detainee interrogation was largely informed by these Justice
Department opinions, and also asserted that
the United States has held that the ICCPR
does not apply to international military operations (243).
2. Redefining Torture
Lawyers working in the Bush administration advanced extremely restrictive municipal and international legal definitions of the
word “torture” in a pair of controversial
memos, both of which were dated 1 August
2002 and were sent to Alberto Gonzales.
The first, written by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee of the Office of Legal Counsel, concerned the application of domestic
legal prohibitions of torture. The second, by
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John
Yoo, was about international law and what it
would allow in interrogations of Al Qaeda
members.
The Bybee memo referred to the
definition of torture that is found in the
United States Code Section 2340, the operative words being “severe physical or mental
pain or suffering.” It attempted to refine that
definition further, by showing that the
phrase “severe pain” as used in other
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American statutes meant an indicator of dangerous and permanent
physical damage. Bybee argued that
this phrase meant the same thing in the
legal definition of torture, and that
therefore pain
…must rise to a similarly high level the level that would ordinarily be
associated with a sufficiently serious
physical condition or injury such as
death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions – in order
to constitute torture. (Greenberg 176)
Section 2340 further defines “severe
mental pain of suffering” as “prolonged
mental harm” caused by certain intentional
acts, such as the infliction of pain, administration of drugs, or threats to do the same.
Bybee focused on the word “prolonged” in
interpreting the statute, arguing that the
strain from long interrogation would probably not qualify, whereas actions resulting in
post-traumatic stress disorder or depression
possibly could. The memo also argued that
any potential defendant must have intended
to cause this prolonged mental harm in order
to be guilty under the terms of Section 2340;
if he acted with some other purpose in good
faith with the belief that his actions would
not result in that kind of mental damage, that
should provide a sufficient defense against
prosecution regardless of the actual outcome
of his actions, according to this argument
(178).
Regarding cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, the memo notes that the Convention against Torture calls only for state parties to “prevent” such acts from being carried out in areas under their jurisdiction.
This is interpreted to mean that the CAT
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does not require such acts to be criminalized,
further demonstrating that “torture” is at the
farthest, most extreme end of the spectrum
of methods of inflicting pain (185).
Ultimately, the Bybee memo concluded
that the word “torture” legally referred to
only the most extreme actions of inflicting
physical and mental pain, and that there
were many acts which would be cruel and
degrading without actually being on the
same level as torture (214).
The John Yoo memo noted that when the
United States acceded to the Convention
against Torture, the administration of the
first President Bush included a reservation to
the treaty to the effect that it understood
“torture” as relating to the Convention to
have the same definition as found in Section
2340, and that it was ratified with this meaning in mind. Because treaties cannot affect a
state without its consent, the memo argued,
it is by this definition of torture that the
United States is bound by the CAT (220).
Taken together with the Bybee memo sent to
Alberto Gonzales on the same day, this
means that the same very narrow and extreme definition of what constitutes torture
also applies to the treaty obligations of the
United States under the CAT.
Additionally, legal opinions regarding the
legality of specific interrogation methods
were also issued by the Justice Department.
One was sent to the CIA’s General Counsel
by Jay Bybee on 1 August 2002, the same
day the memos regarding the general definition of torture were officially transmitted.
This memo regarded techniques the CIA
wanted to use in the interrogation of suspected Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah, including forced standing, stress positions,
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physical blows, sleep deprivation,
and waterboarding (Bybee 2). It
ultimately concluded that all of the
techniques failed to qualify as “torture”
under the international legal obligations
of the United States (18). Another memo
concerning techniques that could be used
on “a High Value al Qaeda Detainee” during
CIA interrogations was issued in May 2005,
covering a greater number of methods
(including force nudity and dousing with
cold water) that still encompassed stress positions and waterboarding (Bradbury “Re:
Application of 18 U.S.C. 18 § § 23402340A” 7-13). As with the previous memo,
the conclusions was that all the techniques
were legal so long as they were monitored to
prevent serious threats to the safety of the
detainees (45).
3. Shifting responsibility down the chain of
command
The scandal regarding the treatment of
prisoners at Abu Ghraib required, to a much
greater extent than any other aspect of the
Bush administration’s detainee policy, a
public response and the punishment of the
parties responsible. At first the entirety of
the blame was laid squarely at the feet of the
individual soldiers who had personally committed the abuses seen in the publicly available photographs. Later on, public reports
and investigations forced some top officials
to take some responsibility, at least verbally;
as noted above, no one higher-ranking than a
non-commissioned officer was ever convicted in a court of law for the Abu Ghraib
abuses, and no one at the White House or the
Pentagon was fired or forced to resign immediately.
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In May 2004, shortly after the photographs of detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib
were shown to the public, both Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush attempted to limit the blame to the relatively
few American personnel seen in them. In a
press briefing, Rumsfeld decried the actions
of those people and referred to their actions
as “exceptional and isolated” (DefenseLink).
Rumsfeld stated that he took responsibility
for what had happened in Abu Ghraib during
Congressional hearings a few days later, but
considering that he did not resign and was
not investigated his words seem to have little
meaning (Shanker).
President Bush went on Arab television
in early May to claim that he was appalled
by the scandal, that it would be thoroughly
investigated, and that all responsible would
be brought to justice (Stevenson). On 24
May Bush called the abuses the actions of “a
few” soldiers in an address that was televised in the United States (Roth and Worden
146).
The investigations which followed were
damning to upper-level military and civilian
leaders, but not to the point where any sort
of punishment was recommended or implemented. One panel, which was led by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger
and appointed by Rumsfeld to investigate
the scandal, released a report in August 2004
which blamed failures of leadership on the
part of top officials at Central Command and
the Pentagon for creating a climate and culture that was conducive to allowing abuses.
It also accused them of having missed several warning signs about what was happening at Abu Ghraib. However, it also held
that the scenes in the photographs were not
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the result of direct orders and were
merely excesses of the prison “night
shift” out of control. Critically, the
panel did not recommend that Secretary
Rumsfeld or any other senior civilian or
military leader resign or face some other
punishment (Watson). Other internal military investigations came to similar conclusions; that general policy errors had contributed to what had happened in Abu Ghraib,
but that top policy makers should not be
held accountable the way the actual guards
were. In spite of the involvement of Central
Intelligence Agency interrogators at Abu
Ghraib and their actions toward detainees
there, no one recommended investigating
CIA leaders (Roth and Worden 153).
V. Refuting the Bush administration’s arguments
1. Why international law is applicable
a. Reasons why Geneva should be applied to
Afghanistan
The argument that Afghanistan was a
failed state, that the Taliban was therefore
not its legitimate government, and that it
therefore was not a State Party to the Geneva
Conventions, might have been valid had it
been consistent with the practice of the
United States and other countries. In fact,
however, although the Taliban had not been
recognized as the de jure leaders of Afghanistan the international community, including
the United States, had treated it as having
obligations under Afghanistan’s treaties, including the Geneva Conventions, as then
Secretary of State Powell stated in a memo
to Alberto Gonzales advocating the application of international humanitarian law in Afghanistan (Greenberg 124). In fact, the term
“failed state” carries no weight in interna-
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tional law, and Afghanistan’s legal rights
remained intact even through years of divisive warfare (de Nevers 385). The decision
to treat Afghanistan as a failed state unable
to live up to its treaty obligations was therefore not a reasoned decision based on the
facts, but rather a loophole that the administration tried to use in order to carry out its
favored detention policies with less resistance from the international community.
Legal advisers from the Department of
State agreed with Powell that the Geneva
Conventions should have been applied in
Afghanistan. The United States had always
recognized them whenever it brought its
forces into conflicts in the past, which was a
legacy the DOS was reluctant to break with.
The UN Security Council had called on all
parties to the conflict in Afghanistan to adhere to humanitarian law in a resolution
from 1998, and not recognizing the application of those laws would be inconsistent on
the part of the United States. Furthermore,
the DOS legal department held that it would
not be possible to apply the Conventions to
the Taliban but not to Al Qaeda; either everyone involved in the Afghanistan conflict
was protected by law, or none of them were
(Greenberg 129).
Other individuals and organizations, including the ICRC and the Secretary General
of the United Nations, have also criticized
the rationale for not applying the Geneva
Conventions to the conflict in Afghanistan.
They have argued that any prisoner must
automatically be treated as a POW unless
and until a court removes any doubt that he
or she does not qualify for such protections.
These critics have also argued that Taliban
soldiers qualify as members of military
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forces loyal to “an authority not
recognized by a the Detaining
Power” as described under Article 4
(a)(3) of GC III. Such fighters would
thus need to be treated as prisoners-ofwar regardless of their obedience to the
laws and customs of war as described in 4
(a)(2) (Greenberg 587).
b. Need for competent tribunals
The legal argument that the President of
the United States can decide that all members of a fighting militia fail to meet the requirements of GC III Article 4 (2) is weak
for a number of reasons. It ignores the possibility, however remote, that any units or
individual members of that militia might
meet the requirements for prisoner of war
status in spite of general trends within the
organization towards noncompliance. Also,
giving the executive branch the power to
unilaterally decide that thousands of fighters
are, essentially, in violation of the laws and
customs of war, circumvents traditional standards of due process for accusations of
criminal behavior. Classifying thousands of
people as criminals, or even alleged criminals, without the involvement of a single
impartial judge violates the need for fairness
in legal proceedings required by international humanitarian and human rights law;
an independent court is needed to ensure that
justice is carried out correctly, even when
dealing with potential war criminals captured on the battlefield.
Even accepting for the sake of argument
that every single member of an armed militia
can be classified as a war criminal at once,
the need for tribunals to hear the cases of
captured prisoners would still not be eliminated. Even without legal doubt that any
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member of a certain organization fails to
meet the legal standards required by GC III,
doubt may still remain whether a given individual is, in fact, a member of said organization. It has been shown that civilians were
arrested by United States military and intelligence personnel in Afghanistan and Pakistan
under the mistaken assumption that they
were members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda,
and that many of them were imprisoned either in Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay for
months or years afterward. These errors
would almost certainly have been reduced in
frequency and duration if tribunals had existed to swiftly review the cases of detainees
claiming to have been wrongly arrested.
c. AP I Minimum Standards
The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions has not been ratified by
the United States; however, Article 75,
which guarantees certain rights for prisoners
involved in armed conflicts regardless of
their status, is widely regarded as having
entered or become customary international
law regarding this matter (Sands 150). John
Yoo dismissed the importance of customary
international law in his January 2002 memo,
however, thereby attempting to negate AP I
and other elements of the Geneva Conventions that may have entered into custom.
It is true that customary law is not approved by the United States Congress; however, that does not mean that it should be
ignored so flippantly. That would overlook
the historical and continued importance of
custom to the development of international
and domestic law throughout the world. Declaring that it has no power and can be
safely ignored is disingenuous and selfserving. Moreover, it overlooks the fact
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that United States courts have accepted the validity of customary international law regarding torture and
degrading treatment (Greenberg 600),
d. Human Rights Treaties
The prohibitions against torture in the
ICCPR and the Convention against Torture
apply wherever the States Party to them
have jurisdiction. The CAT specifically requires its prohibitions against torture and
degrading treatment to be a part of the rules
and duties of any government officials of a
State Party involved in the detention or interrogation of prisoners anywhere in the
world. The UN Committee against Torture
has found that several methods used by
American interrogators constitute torture or
degrading treatment under the terms of the
CAT, including frequent beating, excessive
binding of limbs, exposure to low temperatures, long periods of sleep deprivation, and
sensory bombardment (Greenberg 568).
More specifically, the Committee against
Torture found that the patterns of physical
abuse and indefinite detention of prisoners at
Guantanamo Bay violated the Convention
and called on the United States to close the
prison (McCoy 219).
The prohibitions against torture and degrading treatment found in Article 7 of the
ICCPR are absolute and do not countenance
any exceptions for national security or any
other purpose. The Human Rights Committee has found in the past that methods including sleep deprivation, hooding, and others that have been used by American forces
violate Article 7 regardless of how or why
they are used (Greenberg 592),
2. Why some techniques used by the U.S. are
torture
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Jay Bybee’s August 2002 memo went
very far in asserting that the term “torture”
could be legally applied only to an extremely narrow set of practices and that
forms of interrogation that might be considered objectionable were legal under domestic and international law. The memo was
fought by certain Justice Department lawyers, generated a powerful backlash from
legal experts after it became publicly available, and was also inconsistent with the
practices of the United States regarding interrogation methods in foreign countries.
It’s definition of “torture” has been rejected,
and many lawyers, politicians, and NGOs
have since applied that word to American
practices.
a. Legal arguments
After its public release the arguments of
the Bybee memo were roundly criticized by
legal experts. For example, in testimony
given before the Senate Judiciary Committee
in January 2005, the Dean of Yale Law
School Harold Koh called the opinion
“clearly erroneous.” He stated that the narrow definition of “torture” contained within
it contradicted the ordinary and commonly
understood meaning of the word, and that it
would exclude many of the heinous actions
carried out by Saddam Hussein’s security
forces. Dean Koh also argued that the
memo’s interpretation of the Convention
Against Torture to legally permit the use of
cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment
risked giving officials working for the executive branch license to abuse people in
their custody.
Even lawyers who were working at the
Justice Department objected to the reasoning
of the Bybee memo. Jack Goldsmith, who
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became the head of the Office of
Legal Counsel in October 2003, decided that this torture and interrogation policy was legally problematic
shortly afterward. He worked with
other OLC lawyers to have that policy
overturned and the opinion withdrawn –
which had almost never happened over the
course of a single administration before –
until he resigned in July 2004 (Klaidman).
The OLC prepared a new opinion to replace
the Bybee memo which was officially released in December 2004; this new opinion
contained less restrictive definitions of
“torture” and “physical and mental suffering” (Levin).
b. U.S. government practices
The Department of State issues an annual
report on the state of human rights practices
in every other country throughout the world.
It is generally written without undue partisan
political input, and the 2003 report condemned as torture the use of interrogation
methods in foreign countries. Unfortunately,
the United States itself had been using these
techniques against suspected terrorists held
in its custody.
The types of techniques used by the
United States which the State Department
criticized foreign countries for using include,
but are not limited to, stress positions, exposure to extreme temperatures, sleep deprivation, and waterboarding (Roth and Worden
143). Now, it would certainly be possible to
make a serious argument that some of those
methods are not, depending on how they are
used, severe enough to constitute torture; the
State Department isn’t an absolute authority
on such things, after all. However, that the
DOS was willing to criticize these methods
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so strongly in an official, publicly available
document means that these methods are legally and morally objectionable, at least to
the point where they rise to the level of
cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment.
Even saying for the sake of argument that
the State Department is in the wrong and
that some of the above techniques do not rise
to the level of torture does not make them
acceptable. The use of such techniques by
anyone, regardless of their exact legal classifications, should never be tolerated.
c. Severity of techniques
There are, on the other hand, certain interrogation methods which unquestionably
constitute torture according to the plain
meaning of the world, the definition found
in the ICCPR and the Convention against
Torture, and even by the unreasonably severe definitions of the Bybee memo. International human rights organizations have
unequivocally denounced them, and their
victims have been left with permanent physical injuries and disabilities, as well as dangerous and long-lasting mental illnesses as a
result of their treatment.
Several prisoners held at Guantanamo
were driven to suicidal behavior by the conditions of fear, uncertainty, and constant
abuse at the prison camp. During the first
eighteen months of the camp’s operation
there were twenty-eight officially recognized
suicide attempts and over three hundred instances of prisoners acting in a self-abusive
manner. A mass suicide attempt in 2003
involving twenty-three prisoners led to only
two attempts being officially reported, while
the others were classified as merely “selfinjurious.” It seems that the use of that classification in Guantanamo should be
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with some suspicion (Worthington
Guantanamo Files 271). Less severe instances of mental illness have
also been disproportionately common
among the Guantanamo prisoners, as a
group of British citizens released in 2004
reported that a fifth of the prisoners were
taking anti-depressant medications and approximately a hundred had other clearly visible forms of mental illness (280).
Interrogations and abuse by American
personnel in Iraq have also been known to
cause severe mental and physical harm. Red
Cross doctors that were part of the delegation visiting Abu Ghraib concluded that certain prisoners they interviewed at the prison
displayed signs of mental illness including
memory loss, anxiety, problems speaking or
the inability to speak, and suicidal tendencies as a result of their interrogations by MI
personnel (Greenberg 393). Official United
States military documents that had been suppressed but later released also revealed that
several Iraqi prisoners died while in custody
at Abu Ghraib and secret CIA facilities; a
dozen of these deaths were ruled either
homicides or “unexplained” on death certificates. For example, an Iraqi air force general
who surrendered to American troops in November 2003 died several days later as a result of beatings from CIA and MI interrogators at a makeshift facility in the desert
(McCoy 144).
The “enhanced interrogation techniques”
used by the CIA at its secret locations have
come under particularly harsh criticism by
humanitarian organizations throughout the
world, as most of them clearly constitute
torture or extremely cruel and degrading
treatment. A leaked internal document from
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the International Committee of the Red
Cross, for example, labeled these techniques
“torture” based on interviews with prisoners
who had experienced them. Many prisoners
reported that stress positions and forced
standing were the most physically painful
methods (Shane, “Book Cites Secret Red
Cross Report”). Severe sleep deprivation
also qualifies as one of the approved
“enhanced” methods that unquestionably
qualifies as torture; the late Menachim Begin, who experienced such methods while he
lived in the Soviet Union, even wrote that
the desire for uninterrupted sleep can feel
even worse than hunger or thirst (Conroy
34).
One method that has been the particular
focus of controversy and debate is
“waterboarding,” the “enhanced technique”
that has been used on the smallest number of
prisoners and arguably the most severe.
“Waterboarding” can refer to variety of
means for cutting off the victim’s air supply
with water, all of which produce physical
and mental sensations similar to drowning.
The question of whether waterboarding constitutes torture has been in the national consciousness ever since its use on prisoners
suspected of being high-ranking Al Qaeda
members was first revealed; the past three
Attorney Generals of the United States have
been asked at their Senate confirmation
hearings whether they believe the technique
is illegal torture. Neither Alberto Gonzales
nor Robert Mukasey were willing to categorically and unequivocally answer the
question, which is disconcerting when one
considers the painful and debilitating nature
of the technique.
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Waterboarding is undoubtedly torture, by any standard, even Jay Bybee’s “death or organ failure” criteria,
because of the extremely painful and
terrifying feelings it elicits and because
it does indeed feel very similar to death
by drowning. It has been known to cause
long-lasting psychological damage14 resulting in years of anxiety and panic attacks,
thus fulfilling even the strict criteria for
“mental suffering” found in the Bybee
memo. American courts have even convicted Japanese soldiers of war crimes because they waterboarded prisoners during
the Second World War (Amnesty International).
Other legal experts also consider it torture. Daniel Levin, for example, served as
an Assistant Attorney General in 2004 and
wrote the more moderate legal opinion on
the legality of interrogation methods which
replaced the Bybee memo. After volunteering to undergo waterboarding personally, he
concluded that it would constitute torture
unless done in a very restricted way, and that
the Bush administration had not provided
effective protocols for its application. Levin
was fired, perhaps unsurprisingly, after Alberto Gonzales became Attorney General
(Greenburg and de Vogue). The current Attorney General of the United States, Eric
Holder, declared unequivocally that waterboarding is torture during his own Senate
confirmation hearing, an indication of a fortunate reversal in interrogation policies from
the Bush administration (Montanaro).
3. Why abuse was systemic and a result of
top-down authorization
From all the abuses that have been described above it should be fairly clear that
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torture carried out by American personnel is
far more wide-ranging than the mere presence of a few poorly supervised “bad apples” could account for. The memos and
orders regarding the lack of Geneva Convention rights for detainees, the authorization of
indefinite detention and extreme methods of
coercive interrogation, and legal justifications for permitting acts of torture and degrading treatment all draw a line of causality
and responsibility between decisions made
in the White House and mistreatment of
prisoners throughout the world.
Because torture has been universally regarded as morally abhorrent for the past few
hundred years, orders to commit it in the recent past have often been couched in euphemisms and permissive messages instead of
plain language. Official declarations from
top American civilian and military leaders,
including the application of the term “enemy
combatants” by President Bush and statements from military leaders calling detainees
“very dangerous” or “like dogs” served to
dehumanize them and sent signals that inhumane treatment for them would be acceptable (Roth and Worden 162-164). The
President, the Secretary of Defense, or other
leaders may not have given direct orders to,
for example, the “night shift” at Abu Ghraib
to beat, threaten, and humiliate the prisoners
there, but their actions and words did create
a tolerant environment that allowed them
and many of their fellow service members
throughout the world to consider such behavior acceptable. They are responsible, at
the very least, for not doing nearly enough to
prevent these abuses, and possibly for the
deliberate creation of a pro-torture atmosphere (170).
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There are also cases of torture and
inhumane treatment by Americans
that were approved and ordered by
high-ranking American officials, like
the aforementioned “take the gloves
off” authorization from Rumsfeld to John
Walker Lindh’s interrogators (165). He
also personally signed off on the use of
stress positions and forced nudity on detainees at Guantanamo Bay (Greenberg 237).
Waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and stress
positions were legally validated for use on
Abu Zubaydah by an official Justice Department opinion of which White House and
CIA leaders were undoubtedly aware (Bybee
18). The specifics of the CIA’s “enhanced”
methods were chosen and initially approved
by select members of the National Security
Council, including Vice President Cheney,
Attorney General John Ashcroft, and National Security Advisor Rice. Further requests for permission to use the techniques
in specific cases were consistently approved
by this group (Greenburg, Rosenberg and de
Vogue).
Prisoner abuse occurred in every theater
of operations where the “War on Terror”
was waged, and not because of a small number of soldiers who didn’t know any better.
The most senior Bush administration leaders
specifically condoned the use of illegal
methods in several cases and fostered an atmosphere of disrespect for the rule of law
and the human dignity of detainees that led
to many other abuses.
VI. Why Enforcing and Respecting International Law is in the Best Interest of the
United States
Obeying international law isn’t a pointless endeavor which restricts our actions

without generating any benefits. On the
contrary, adhering to the law would increase
the standing of the United States throughout
the world, discredit our enemies, protect our
soldiers, and convince people all over the
world to be more cooperative.
1. Comparative Analysis
In discussing the effects of indefinite detention, torture, and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment on a state’s ability to fight
a war, especially one with a heavy focus on
counterinsurgency operations, it will be useful to briefly examine twp other cases of torture sponsored by democratic states in similar situations. They are: first, the arrest of
hundreds of Northern Irish Catholics and
experimental torture of about fourteen of
them by the United Kingdom in 1971; and
second, the time from 1987-1999 where Israeli security forces were legally allowed to
use limited levels of coercive interrogation
techniques against Palestinian detainees.
a. The United Kingdom and Northern
Ireland, 1971
In the early 1970s the violent unrest
among Catholics in Northern Ireland was
rapidly escalating, and the British government felt that it had to take drastic measures
to prevent further deterioration, starting with
“internment,” indefinite detention with no
need for evidence or courts. Hundreds of
Catholics suspected of membership or sympathy with the Irish Republican Army were
rounded up and “interned” in August 1971
(Conroy 4). The operation was poorly implemented, and several internees were arrested because of outdated intelligence or
mistaken identity. Beatings with clubs were
standard for all the internees (Melaugh).
Fourteen men were taken from the regular
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prison camps to secret locations
where a course of experimental coercive interrogation techniques focusing on sensory deprivation15was applied
to them over the course of eight days.
The men were forced to stand against
a wall in a painfully uncomfortable position
while hooded, beaten severely whenever
they collapsed from this standing position,
exposed to cold temperatures, deprived of
sufficient amounts of food and sleep, and
subjected to overwhelming sound recordings
that prevented anything else from being
heard. After the end of this ordeal the prisoners were moved back to the regular internment camps (McGuffin 57-60). During the
course of these abuses many men suffered
from both visual and audio hallucinations
such as music, religious sermons, and fantasies of escape and suicide (73). In 1978 the
European Court of Human Rights ruled that
the five techniques did not rise to the level
of torture but did constitute inhuman, degrading, and illegal treatment, contrary to
the opinion of the Republic of Ireland and
Amnesty International. No British soldiers
or officials were prosecuted for their roles in
the affair (Conroy 187).
Rather than improving the security situation in Ireland, the internment and torture
caused a marked downturn. Nonviolent
Irish nationalists refused to participate in
Northern Ireland’s government out of protest, and Catholics gave more support to the
Irish Republican Army, which stepped up its
own level of violent action (Melaugh).
The parallels with the United States are
striking. In both cases, a government resorted to extreme, extralegal and illegal
methods of imprisonment and interrogation
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in order to eliminate a threat posed by a terrorist group. Also in both cases, the “tough”
methods did relatively little to impede the
actual extremists and instead hurt mostly
innocent people, infuriating local populations and encouraging them to support the
terrorists’ cause.
b. Israel during the Landau Commission era,
1987-1999
Israel has had well-known, chronic problems with its military and security forces
mistreating Palestinian civilians for years,
even up to the present day (B’Tselem
“Absolute Prohibition”). The problem of
torture being used on prisoners was especially acute, however, during a twelve-year
period when coercive interrogation methods
were formally legalized.
After a pair of scandals concerning the
lack of transparency and use of violence in
Israel’s security forces, a commission
headed by Justice Moshe Landau was appointed to investigate the matter. The Landau Commission concluded in 1987 that the
security forces should be provided with legal
guidelines for the use of a “moderate”
amount of force during interrogations, so
that they could be effective without having
to hide their actions from public scrutiny
(Conroy 213). The Commission’s proposal
attempted to limit both the intensity of coercive methods used through official regulations and the number of suspects to which
they could be applied by limiting their use
only to prisoners who had knowledge of imminent attacks (the “ticking time bomb” scenario) on civilians. Both attempts failed
completely
The methods used by the Israelis routinely exceed the limits set in the Landau
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Commission’s guidelines rose to
the level of torture, and included
sleep deprivation, exposure to extreme temperatures, stress positions,
sensory bombardment, and violent
shaking. At least one Palestinian prisoner
died from being shaken too much (Roth and
Worden 36-37). Security forces also arrested, harassed, and abused the wives of
men being interrogated in order to force out
confessions of wrongdoing or otherwise
pressure the husbands (B’Tselem “Detention
and Interrogation”). The security services
also claimed far too many cases of detainees
having vital information necessitating coercion. Activists, religious leaders, Islamic
charity workers, and others – nearly every
Palestinian interrogated by Israel during this
time – was tortured by Israeli security during
this time period, justified by the specter of
the “ticking time bomb” (Roth and Worden
40). The Israeli justice system did not check
these abuses until the High Court of Justice
banned all the coercive techniques of the
security services for violating domestic and
international law in 1999.
The possibility of torture being legally
allowable in a limited fashion is shown false
by Israel’s example. Without absolute legal
and ethical prohibitions against torture, the
torturers become desensitized to it and practice it routinely. As in the United States,
allowing limited amounts of violent coercion, even with guidelines and requirements
for authorization, caused a culture of abuse
to spread throughout the system, leading to
widespread violations of international law
(41-42).
2. The importance of Geneva Convention
protections for American soldiers
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Many military and legal experts have
called upon the United States government to
respect the Geneva Conventions, not out of
love for esoteric, abstract legal principles,
but for the simple fact that the Conventions
make our troops safer. International humanitarian law often protects American soldiers when they are captured, and even when
we are faced with enemies that do not respect the law they should not be allowed to
bring us to their level. By placing conflicts
in which we participate under the auspices
of the Geneva Conventions and following
the law we would make it easier to bring justice to those who would abuse captured
Americans. Treating our enemies better than
they treat us demonstrates American integrity, improves our moral standing, and
makes it more likely that others will follow
our example in the future (De Nevers 387).
John Hutson, who is the President of the
Franklin Pierce Law Center and a former
admiral of the United States Navy, articulated very clearly in Congressional hearings
the importance of the Geneva Conventions
to the safety of American troops. He argued
that war needs to be conducted in a way that
will allow for peace, that the Geneva Conventions lay out a way to accomplish that
goal, and that only by complying with those
laws itself will the United State be able to
compel others to follow them too. The primary concern of all the U.S. policymakers
who adhered to GC III after 1949 was the
well-being of Americans, and by deriding its
requirements we would be removing safeguards from our soldiers and rejecting the
community of nations. Admiral Hutson
points out that, as the United States has more
soldiers deployed abroad than every other
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nation in the world combined, we
should rightfully be the most concerned about maintaining the integrity
of international humanitarian law
(Hutson).
No less an expert on prisoner of war
abuse than Senator John McCain has also
called on the American people to respect
international law in the wake of the Abu
Ghraib scandal. Cautioning against the view
that the ICRC were mere “do-gooders” and
that obeying the law hinders our soldiers,
Senator McCain argued that the Red Cross
and the Geneva Conventions protect our soldiers, and that those who committed abuses
increased the danger for American troops in
this and future wars by undermining those
safeguards. He also asserted that the United
States should seek to maintain its integrity
and standing as a nation governed by the
rule of law which meets universal standards
of fair treatment towards prisoners
(McCain).
Military veterans and legal experts alike
believe that international humanitarian law
is vital to the well-being of American soldiers abroad. Those who sacrifice to protect
us need and deserve the protections of the
Geneva Conventions.
3. The ineffectiveness of coercive interrogation
The reasoning behind the acceptance of
violent, coercive interrogation methods
amounting to cruel, humiliating, inhuman
treatment or torture relies on necessity and
expediency. Such methods may be thought
necessary in order to obtain vital, life-saving
information from recalcitrant terrorists, or at
least to obtain it quickly enough to prevent
an attack or effectively disrupt a terrorist
network. While this dilemma between com-
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mitting universally reviled acts of brutality
and possibly allowing thousands of civilians
to be killed poses an interesting philosophical question, in actual practice no such dilemma exists. There is no evidence that violently coercive interrogation yields accurate
information, whereas there is much evidence
that legal, non-violent techniques have produced good results even when used against
modern terrorists.
A study of the effectiveness of interrogation methods was published by the Center
for Strategic Intelligence Research in December 2006. This study crucially found
that there was no rigorous research on
whether coercive interrogation methods used
in the fashion that American personnel had
been applying them were effective, but that
the majority of anecdotal information suggested that such techniques were not effective. It specifically concluded that the application of pain to an uncooperative interrogation subject would be more likely to reduce
compliance than increase it, and that the use
of stress-inducing methods impair the cognitive functions of the brain of those subjected
to them, thus potentially reducing the accuracy of subsequently acquired information
(Fein 35).
Academic researchers are not the only
ones who have claimed that torture does not
reliably yield accurate information; American military interrogators who have operated
on both fronts hold the same opinion. One
MI officer who served in Afghanistan, for
example, wrote that degradation such as
what took place in Abu Ghraib does not facilitate intelligence gathering, and that all
the successes he and his unit achieved were
accomplished without threats,
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beatings, or humiliation (Mackey
xxv).
Colonel Steven Kleinman, an intelligence and interrogation specialist of
the United States Air Force, denounced
the coercive interrogation as ineffective
while testifying before Congress. He argued that the perceived effectiveness of such
techniques skewed the public debate over
torture and that extreme physical or emotional stress should not be viewed as necessary for gathering information or appropriate
for punishing terrorists. He stressed that
properly conducted interrogations induce
cooperation between prisoners and interrogators, whereas coercive methods can only
force compliance from a prisoner; communist interrogators often forced confessions of
war crimes from American prisoners-of-war
during the Korean and Vietnam wars, for
example, but these were mostly false and
therefore useless from an intelligence standpoint. Colonel Kleinman also noted, much
like the aforementioned CSIR study, the
“natural fragility of memory,” and that coercive methods would not only make it more
likely for prisoners to be unable to recall
specific information, but also for them to
unintentionally give out misinformation. He
concluded that coercive interrogation fails to
extract information from prisoners fully or
accurately.
The specific methods chosen as the
CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” repertoire
do not have a history of eliciting accurate
information. They were based on methods
that some members of the United States
militarily voluntarily undergo in a limited
fashion during Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (or SERE) training
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courses. The reason these personnel are
trained to resist the SERE techniques is that
they were used against American POWs by
the Chinese during the Korean War, a fact
that high-level government officials who
approved the enhanced interrogation methods were unaware of. The Chinese used
them mostly to extract false confessions of
war crimes; a study of their effects published
in 1956 stated that the Chinese methods led
to suggestibility and memory loss, not truth
(Shane and Mazzetti). The SERE methods
which became the “enhanced interrogation
techniques” are more useful for making people say what they are supposed to say than
they are for acquiring accurate intelligence.
Debates are ongoing as to what information exactly has been gained from using coercive interrogation methods on Al Qaeda
members. Mohammed al-Qahtani, who was
tortured at Guantanamo Bay, accused many
other prisoners there of affiliation with Al
Qaeda during his interrogations only to recant, claiming he had lied to stop his suffering (Zagorin). It is unclear exactly what intelligence was extracted from KSM and
Zubaydah during the time when they were
subjected to waterboarding. Former CIA
officials and Bush administration leaders
have claimed that the use of the technique
led to the acquisition of vital intelligence,
whereas others (such as FBI Director Robert
Mueller) have claimed that coercive interrogations did not yield intelligence that directly prevented a terrorist attack. There are
conflicting reports about when and under
what circumstances Zubaydah and KSM revealed information (Shane “Interrogations’
Effectiveness May Prove Elusive”). Even if
these torturous methods had been necessary
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to acquire the information these Al
Qaeda leaders gave up, the high cost
of using them16 probably negated the
benefits of it. In all likelihood, however, all the intelligence gained from
the high value Al Qaeda detainees probably could have been elicited through legal,
non-coercive methods.
The effectiveness of nonviolent interrogation methods has been borne out not just
historically, but even during the current war
against terrorists in Iraq. Following the media exposure of the Abu Ghraib abuses, military interrogators deliberately set out to use
different methods, ones that wouldn’t debase
or degrade prisoners and shock the consciences of American citizens. These techniques involved respecting prisoners, their
circumstances and their beliefs, establishing
connections and incentives for cooperation,
and compliance with the standards set by
GC III (Alexander “How to Break a Terrorist” 6).
Treating prisoners humanely lead to significant intelligence coups in Iraq, where
obtaining information about the operations
and command structure of Al Qaeda in
Mesopotamia was of paramount importance
in preventing suicide bomb attacks and other
disruptive, violent attacks. By establishing
relationships with prisoners and offering
them (often false) hopes for solving the
problems that had driven them to violence in
the first place, military interrogators were
able to extract vital details about safe houses
and relationships between important figures
(136). On at least one occasion a prisoner
offered an explanation for why and how he
had been mistakenly arrested, and the interrogators made an effort to verify his story
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instead of continuing to assume he was lying, the sort of effort that would have kept a
lot of innocent people of Guantanamo Bay if
it had been consistently applied by American
personnel in Afghanistan earlier in the war
(166).
4. Effect torture and indefinite detentions
have had had on international perceptions
of the United States
The standing of the United States as a
leader in morality, ethics, and upholding the
rule of law has suffered tremendously because of the Bush administration’s illegal
policies. Negative reactions to indefinite
detention and torture have been especially
strong among Middle Eastern Muslims;
many of them have been convinced to join
extremist organizations and fight against the
United States because of these policies.
Global perceptions of the United States
declined significantly during the Bush administration, especially among predominantly Muslim countries but in Europe as
well. How much of that is because of
American policies regarding detainees
would be difficult to pin down exactly, with
other factors such as support for Israel or the
unilateral invasion of and continued American presence in Iraq contributing as well.
Regardless, positive views of the United
States declined in over two-thirds of the
countries where data was available (Pew
Global Attitudes Project).
Images of the prison at Guantanamo Bay
and its orange-suited inmates have become
iconic in predominately Muslim countries.
Stories of disrespect, abuse, and torture have
spread through the media and the personal
accounts of those who have been released
and returned to their homes. The sexual
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humiliation and abuse of detainees,
as well as stories of American soldiers demeaning the religious traditions of Muslims, such as beards and
the sacredness of the Quran, have
strengthened the idea that the war against
terrorism is just a front or disguise for a war
on Islam itself (Sengupta). This is important
because research has shown that Muslims
who believe that the United States is waging
a war on Islam are more likely to support
violence against American soldiers and civilians (Weber 1).
The severe worsening of violent attacks
in Iraq in 2004 and 2005 after the Abu
Ghraib scandal bears this out. One veteran
went so far as to blame half the casualties in
Iraq on fighters who joined terrorist groups
because of America’s torture policies, and
that those policies led to the deaths of about
as many people killed in the September 11th
terrorist attacks (Alexander “I’m Still Tortured”).
VII. Conclusions
The illegal and counterproductive methods of the past must be completely eliminated in order for there to be a chance for the
United States to restore its reputation, repair
the damage done to our ability to lead, and
prevent lawlessness from taking over the
country. The Geneva Conventions should
be applied to the all military operations
against terrorists, and all military operations
of the future in general, as both a matter of
policy and law. Torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, and any other sort of
coercive interrogation method must be
banned absolutely for all U.S. personnel,
who should be required to use nonviolent
interrogation techniques instead. The Guan-
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tanamo Bay prison and the black sites
should be closed, and all prisoners either
treated as prisoners of war as GC III demands, charged as criminals in a normal
American court or released. Those responsible for torture should be investigated and
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
Fortunately, many of these policies are
already being carried out by the new President of the United States, Barack Obama.
He has ordered the closing of the CIA black
sites, banned waterboarding and other torture methods, and ordered the prison at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base closed and the
prisoners’ files re-reviewed, a process which
reportedly will take about a year.
Unfortunately, the new policies aren’t
perfect. Obama’s Justice Department has
continued to try to deny prisoners at Bagram
Air Force Base in Afghanistan the right to
challenge their detentions (Savage). President Obama has also stated that he doesn’t
want the government to investigate people
responsible for torture as the CAT requires it
to, although Congressional Democrats may
press on with that issue regardless. Additionally, there will probably be difficulties
finding places to put many of the released
prisoners from Guantanamo. The case of the
Uighur prisoners, who face difficulties finding new homes because of pressure from the
Chinese, is probably the most extreme case
of such problems (Spiegel and Demick). Despite this, the new administration represents
a real possibility for redemption from this
sordid affair.
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3

See discussion of universal jurisdiction, below.
4

Ibid.

1

International law can also come from
custom, which is based on traditions of
state practice. It is the oldest form of international law, but it can be hard to define
where customary law exists and exactly
what its provisions are (Shaw 69). Treaties
may codify or reflect preexisting customary
law, of course, and it is possible for treaty
provisions to create customary law, depending on how widely adopted they are and
other considerations (Shaw 90).

5

The “exhaustion of domestic remedies rule”
flows from the legal principle of state sovereignty; most human rights treaties explicitly
include it as a provision (Shaw 254).
6

The current Special Rapporteur for torture
is Manfred Nowak, an Austrian lawyer specializing in human rights, according to his
official biography on the OHCHR website.
7

2

Article 130 of GC III defines grave
breaches as “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health, compelling
a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the
hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular
trial prescribed in this Convention.” And
Article 147 of GC IV defines them as
“wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments, wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person
to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or
wilfully depriving a protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in
the present Convention, taking of hostages
and extensive destruction and appropriation
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

The 1949 Geneva Conventions, obviously,
did not operate during the war. However,
the 1929 Geneva Convention afforded a
largely similar set of rights to prisoners of
war; that particular Convention definitely
bound the German government, and the
Japanese government made an agreement
with the Allies near the opening of hostilities
to observe the Convention. A majority of
judges at the Tokyo trial later decided this
agreement was legally binding on Japan
(Boister 184).
8

The Trial of Major War Criminals in Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo both included prisoner of war abuse among the war
crimes with which they charged the leaders
of Germany and Japan (North) (Boister
196). Other trials which followed focused
on lower-ranking war criminals and also included alleged POW abusers from both Germany and Japan (Truman Library) (Kerr
296).
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9

The Charter of the International
Military Tribunal established the
rules and procedure for the Nuremberg Trials, and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East did the same for the Tokyo Trials.
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ture found that psychological problems were
significantly higher among victims who had
experienced a mock execution (Conroy 180).
15

Specifically, a combination of sleep deprivation, starvation, forced standing, hooding,
and bombardment with white noise, later
10
Specifically, Article 42 of GC IV and Arti- referred to as “the five techniques” (Conroy
cle 75, paragraph 3 of AP I state that pro- 6).
tected persons must not be held for longer
than is necessary, and Article 9, paragraph 3 16See section on international perception of
states that anyone who is arrested with the United States, below.
criminal charges must be brought before a
judge and given a trial within a reasonable
time frame
11

Hamdan was sentenced to five and half
years of imprisonment, with time already
spent in Guantanamo Bay counting toward
it; his sentence will be up in January 2009.
12

This was part of a general pattern of attacking men who practiced Islam by targeting their religious beliefs. In addition to the
aforementioned invasion of space by females and forced shaving of facial hair, the
ICRC also gathered credible testimony from
detainees at Guantanamo indicating that
guards had physically disrespected the
Quran, the holy book of Islam (Labott).
13

It was in the discussion of the positives of
ignoring Geneva that Gonzales made the infamous comment about the nature of the war
on terror making parts of GC III “obsolete”
and “quaint.”
14

Because it simulates death by drowning,
waterboarding is arguably a form of mock
execution. One study of the effects of tor-
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Imposing Democracy: State
Building and the War on Terror
Submitted by James M. Duhe
Abstract
The terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 fundamentally reprioritized US
foreign policy. In this environment the Bush
administration crafted what came to be
known as the Bush Doctrine. Though a precise definition of the Bush Doctrine remains
contested, definitions typically include the
idea that the United States may preemptively attack countries harboring terrorists,
and that the US should support the spread of
democracy. But, after eight years, the
United States is not safer. This paper analyzes democratization as a theory and as an
element of the Bush Doctrine through case
studies of Iraq and Afghanistan. By tying
the notion of victory in the War on Terror to
democratization, the United States has angered many Afghanis and Iraqis, wasted an
enormous amount of resources, and damaged its relations with other countries. Overall, efforts by the Bush administration to
impose democracy in these countries have
counterproductive at combating terrorism. I
conclude with policy prescriptions for the
Obama administration, namely that America
must remove itself from the political processes of Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuild ties
with the international community, and develop a strategy for complete American
withdrawal from these areas.

Since September 11, 2001 terrorism
has been a chief concern of American national security. The days of US protection
from foreign threats because of its geography are long gone. Al Qaeda displayed not
only its ability to attack the United States,
but that it was capable of doing so from
American soil. From lone snipers to anthrax delivered through the mail, Americans
became acutely aware of the potential for
additional terrorist attacks. Fortunately,
many experts agree that terrorists generally
lack the logistical capabilities necessary to
inflict mass casualties. Unfortunately, terrorists are constantly working to overcome
these obstacles. Instead of conducting grandiose attacks, terrorists may use smaller,
inexpensive strikes that require low levels
of technical expertise and training. Regrettably, states (especially liberal democracies
like the United States) have great difficulty
countering this approach toward violence.
States are bound by international norms and
laws. Democracies like the United States
are further constrained in the application of
violence and surveillance in counterterrorism by popular consent. Given the ability of
terrorist organizations to adapt and overcome state defenses, alternative methods are
needed for states to preserve their national
security from terrorist attacks.
In this environment, the Bush administration crafted what would later
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become known as the Bush Doctrine. Although the precise definition of the Bush Doctrine is still in
dispute, definitions typically include
legitimizing preemptive strikes against
perceived aggressors and using United
States—supported democratization as a
weapon in the “War on Terror” (for example, see Monten 2005). American backed
democratization is a particularly interesting
element of the War on Terror because it was
a subtle tool capable of changing both government and citizenry. However, despite attempts by the Bush administration to use
democratization to further its foreign policy
agenda of eliminating terrorism, democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan has proved
disastrous. In this paper, I will show how
despite rational theoretical backing, problems resulting from the pledge to democratize Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly diminished America’s capability to wage the
War on Terror.
Definitions and Terms
For this study, it is important that the
language used be a clear as possible. Thus,
for the purpose of this essay, I must define
several words. Essential to my argument is
democratization. For this term, I borrow a
definition from Edward Mansfield and Jack
Snyder’s book Electing to Fight. To democratize is to, “try to create favorable institutional conditions in the sequence most likely
to foster successful, peaceful democratic
transitions” (2007, 16). This definition is
exceptional because it identifies the essence
of democracy (governance with popular sovereignty rested in the will of the people);
but, does not necessitate a successful transition to democracy. This is important be-

SUNY Geneseo

cause, despite best intentions, there is no
guarantee that democratization will actually
result in the formation of a democratic state.
This is very logical. Since it is impossible to
predict the future, how can a reasonable
definition of democratization be contingent
on the emergence of a democratic state?
Additionally, within the span of human history, no state is eternal. While the United
States has been a relatively stable democracy
for over the past 150 years, there is no guarantee that autocracy will not prevail in 100
years. It would be unfair to discount the
long history of American democracy because of the potential emergence of an autocratic state in the future. The central argument of this paper regards the problems associated with continued American presence
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, to understand the motivations for continuous American involvement in these two countries, it is
vital to perceive democratization as a process rather than a result.
War on Terror is the next important
term to define. War on Terrorism, Global
War on Terrorism, War on Terror, and terrorist are terms that were widely used by the
Bush administration to describe and define
its counterterrorist activities since 9-11. One
of the largest obstacles to any serious study
of US policy since this time has been the
disambiguation of such confusing language.
Discouragingly, the Bush administration
made no effort to clarify its terms. In fact, in
the case of prisoner detentions at Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, the Bush administration intentionally obfuscated these
terms to provide leeway in gathering intelligence (Hersh 2004, 264). Thus, since the
Bush administration has not identified
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precise definitions, we must therefore look towards a practical usage.
For this paper, I adapt Bruce Hoffman’s definition and define terrorism as
any attack conducted by a substate actor
with the intent to cause fear in a given
population achieve as an end (Hoffman
2006, 33). A “terrorist” is any person who
commits an act of terrorism. Finally, terror
is an emotion that can be evoked through
acts of terrorism.
The decision to limit terrorism to the
attacks of substate actors is very intentional.
Admittedly, this is a hotly debated topic in
the field of counterterrorism. Many argue
some states have intentionally attacked civilians with the intention of instilling fear just
like a substate actor would. Proponents of
this belief might argue that actions by Nazis
in concentration camps during the Holocaust
should be considered terrorism just like the
actions of the 9-11 hijackers; all human suffering caused by terrorism is equal. Thus,
some might perceive separation between
state—sponsored terrorism and substate terrorism, as unnecessary, ultimately reducing
the effectiveness of counterterrorism at combating human suffering. However, allowing
state sponsored terrorism into this discussion
will becloud the topic at hand. The states of
interest in my investigation are Afghanistan
and Iraq. Prior to the American invasion in
these countries, governments were brutally
authoritarian. Both states would frequently
commit horrible acts against citizens with
the intent of inciting fear. Thus, the two
groups must be separated if only to distinguish the actions of the former Iraqi and Afghani regimes from the actions of current
substate groups currently in these countries.
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Obviously Global War on Terrorism, and the War on Terrorism do not connote the same thing. Furthermore, neither of
these terms act45ually describes American
counterterrorist policy since September 11,
2001. To be at war with terrorism is to be at
war with an action. In this sense, an analogous policy to the War on Terrorism is the
equally ineptly named American War on Illegal Immigration. Both illegal immigration
and terrorism are abstract concepts. Although one might be able to identify a perpetrator of terrorism just as one may be able to
identify an illegal immigrant, it is impossible
to single out illegal immigration or terrorism. Because it is intangible, terrorism cannot be fought on a battlefield. One could attack terrorism insofar as the causes of terrorism could be eliminated, but attacking terrorism itself does not really mean anything.
Because of this, neither of these terms will
be used in my paper.
It is worth mentioning that another
problem with the phrase Global War on Terrorism is that it alludes to US counterterrorist activity on a scale that it much larger than
reality. America has made no great effort to
eliminate terrorist movements that do not
threaten US interests. For example, US activity to destroy the PPK or the Tamil Tigers
has been notoriously absent from the War.
Some may argue that this absence is actually
a tactic in itself (Byman 2009, 472). By not
going to war against all terrorism everywhere, the United States is less likely to
draw the ire of terrorist groups that might
otherwise have left America alone. Really,
the War on Terror is with the terrorists who
seek to harm to the United States. For all
these reasons, Global War on Terror is an
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inappropriate term to describe U.S.
policy since 9-11.
I argue that War on Terror is the
most suitable term to describe current
US action. First, War on terror eliminates ambiguity in distinguishing between
a terrorist and a freedom fighter who employs terrorism. It treats both of these groups
the same. So long as a person uses terror to
advance his agenda he is a terrorist and may
be attacked by the United States. Furthermore, war on terror does not imply intent to
eliminate terrorism itself. This is a necessary element in any description of current
US counterterrorist policy since terrorism, as
was just discussed, is virtually impossible to
eliminate.
I would be remiss to ignore the recent change in recent policy changes made
by the Obama administration regarding terminology. In March 2009, the Obama administration stated it was removing the term
Global War on Terrorism and all similar
terms from the lexicon of United States foreign policy (Baker 2009). Interestingly, the
phrase chosen to replace War on Terror is
Overseas Contingency Operation. Such a
gesture was certainly intended to eliminate
the implication that the United States is at
war with Islam, and to break from the unending dedication of American resources to
counterterrorism. As will be discussed later,
I can certainly agree with these goals. However, the new term the Obama administration has chosen is not particularly good either. Breaking down the phrase, the first
word is rather misleading. While it may be
true that many of the fronts in the War on
Terror are across the ocean, this is certainly
not always the case. The idea to form the

SUNY Geneseo

Department of Homeland Security, was created immediately following 9-11, and was
intended to “create a comprehensive and
shared” national vision for the purpose of
“defeating terrorism” (Office of Homeland
Security 2002, i). The Bush administration
correctly viewed the need for both domestic
and international efforts to eliminate terrorism. By renaming the War on Terror as an
overseas activity, appreciation for the utility
of a two-pronged approach to fighting terrorists may be forgotten. The word
“Contingency” is mystifying. For what activity is the exercise of American might
strength a contingency? Diplomacy against
terrorist is not an option. As stated, substate
actors are less susceptible to the sticks and
carrots of traditional diplomacy. The only
word that accurately describes U.S. policy is
Operation, which is really a meaningless
term on its own. Since this term does a very
poor job at actually describing American
policy, I believe it would be best to continue
using the term War on Terror.
American Motivations
Let us now turn to the reasons for US
democratization. After all, there must have
been some purpose to the efforts that have
now cost the United States almost $864 billion (United States Congress Congressional
Research Service, 16). A historical approach is best for understanding current motives. Realpolitick has typically guided
American efforts at regime change (Pie
Minxin, Amin Samia, and Garz Seth 2006,
64). “Only [since the early twentieth century has America’s political ideals and its
need to sustain domestic support for] nationbuilding compelled it to try to establish democratic rule in target nations.” (Pie et al.
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2006, 65) To look beyond such
gross simplifications of US policy
as, “blood for oil,” the Bush administration’s motives for invading and democratizing Iraq and Afghanistan certainly included security. Afghanistan had
been the safe haven for al Qaeda under the
Taliban. In fact, al Qaeda underwent much
of its organizational development in Afghanistan during the 1980s while fighting
the Soviets. In what turned out to be a tragic
irony, much of al Qaeda’s development occurred as a direct result of American armament and training of mujahedeen during the
Soviet Invasion (Bhutto 2008, 112-114). As
al Qaeda was discovered to be the principal
organizer of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it was no surprise that the
United States saw Afghanistan as a major
battleground in the War on Terror.
The case of Iraq was a bit more complicated. Initially, the United States claimed
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) it had acquired through a
covert weapons development program
(Galbraith 2006, 70). Had this been the
case, Iraq would have been in violation of
numerous international laws; notably,
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 678 and 1441 which all explicitly
forbade Iraq from possessing or developing
WMDs after the 1991 Gulf War. This
breach of international law is obviously serious, but even if Iraq had possessed such
weapons, it lacked the delivery system necessary to attack the U.S such as intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Nevertheless, the Bush administration argues that the Iraqi government under
Saddam Hussein had the potential for selling
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or distributing WMDs to enemies of America. Admittedly, this was rather unlikely.
The secular Arab-nationalist Ba’ath Party
(Iraq’s governing party) would have been a
strange bedfellow for the Sunni Islamist al
Qaeda. An example of this disconnect is
exemplified by Osama bin Laden’s offer to
Saudi King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al Saud of
the use of al Qaeda forces to defend Saudi
Arabia from Iraq during the first Gulf War.
Although the offer was not accepted, it underscores the acrimonious relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the
Bush administration argued that an Iraqi alliance with al Qaeda against the United States
was possible, thereby exacerbating American fear of terrorism. Given the stakes in
nuclear conflicts, the fear created by the
Bush administration was strong enough to
cull dissent, even from many Democrats in
Congress (Althaus and Largio 2006, 4). No
American wanted to be responsible for opposing regime change in Iraq if the connection between the two groups were true.
In both cases, United States policy
was to effect regime change. The Taliban
was deposed because of the asylum it
granted to al Qaeda operative. Former Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein, the President of
a country the United States believed was in
contravention of international law and conspiring with terrorists, was removed from
power as well. But once the dust settled after the invasions, new governments were
needed for the two countries. To strengthen
its national security, the United States
needed to ensure that any successor government would be friendlier towards the United
States than its predecessor. One possibility
was for American instillation of a
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dictatorship (as had been the hallmark of US foreign policy throughout the Cold War). However, American officials likely realized the danger
in empowering dictators in already unstable countries particularly given the nature of terrorism. Arguably, support of dictatorships and authoritarianism was what led
to the conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq in
the first place. Instead, the Bush administration turned to democratization as the answer
to its security dilemma.
Forging a Democratic Peace
In his essay “Perpetual Peace” written in 1795, the political philosopher Immanuel Kant outlined what he believed
would be necessary to stop states from going
to war with one another. Although the terminology differs slightly between Kant’s
time and today, he essentially argued for
three things: that all countries to democratize, that the depth and number of involvements of states in Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) increase, and that international trade increase (Kant [1795] 1970, 9398). Kant reasoned that democracies only
tend to go to war in self defense (Kant
[1795] 1970, 98). Thus, if all countries were
democracies, there would be no war.
A democratic Iraq and Afghanistan
would certainly not have been the end to all
war everywhere. Nevertheless, the Bush
administration reasoned that if these countries became democratic, they would absorb
democratic ideals, and be likely to attack, or
support attacks perpetrated against, the
United States (Gause III, 2005). Of course,
changing the “hearts and minds” of potential
terrorist was an important goal. A strictly
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state-focused approach would not necessarily have influenced subgovernmental terrorist groups. Theoretically however, encouraging democracy would also help diminish
the potential for terrorism. The diminished
potential would be through the growth of
robust civil societies. The London School of
Economics provides an excellent definition
of civil society as, “the arena of uncoerced
collective action around shared interests,
purposes and values. Civil society is theoretically divorced from activities of the state,
though in practice, this relationship may be
negotiated” (London School of Economics,
2004). This concept is certainly familiar to
Americans. From local religious groups to
political action groups, Americans participate in many different manifestations of civil
society. Important to this discussion is that
many groups in civil society seek to effect
change. Civil society provides a medium
through which citizens can express discontent with the status quo without resorting to
violence. Furthermore, to extrapolate from
the theories of Ashtoush Varshney, the associations created by civil society might even
help prevent the emergence of violence
amongst Iraqis. This was an important consideration because of the deconstructed
power relationship during the former Hussein regime between ruling Sunni and the
demographically dominant Shi’a (not to
mention the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Thus, in
the aftermath of the Iraq and Afghanistan
invasions, the United States began reestablishing the two countries as democracies.
To their credit, the Bush administration realized some of the serious roadblocks
to democracy in these two states, and did
attempt to remove them. Immediately after
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the invasions, the Bush administration lifted many of its trade barriers
with Iraq and Afghanistan. Theoretically, this enabled more international
trade for the two countries. Furthermore, the United States brought in the
Army Corps of Engineers and hired over
180,000 independent contractors to assist in
the reconstruction of state infrastructure. As
of August 2008 this has cost the United
States Government over $100 billion for
Iraq alone (United States Congress. Congressional Budget Office 2008, 16). Ironically much of the infrastructure had been
destroyed either as a direct result of American attacks during the invasion or by indigenous pillaging immediately following them.
Assisting in infrastructure projects supported
the development of business, in turn, promoting international trade. Furthermore, by
providing Iraqis with basic amenities, the
United States was clearly reaching out to the
Iraqi polity in the hopes that a future elected
government would not be explicitly antiAmerican.
The situation in Afghanistan was
even worse than the situation in Iraq. Larry
Goodson explains, “After conflict or regime
change, societies usually require some degree of reconstruction… but the destruction
in Afghanistan in late 2001 was far beyond
what is usually encountered in such disrupted societies” (2006, 153). Because of
this major issue, the United States relied on
anti-Taliban groups to establish a process for
transitioning sovereignty of Afghanistan to a
freely-elected Afghan government rather
than a US led coalition force (Goodson
2006, 157). This process, as laid out in the
Bonn Accords, was obviously a pivotal step

in establishing democracy in Afghanistan.
Democratic governance is impossible without a democratically elected government.
By relying on local Afghanis to establish
democracy, the United States – specifically
the military – was free to fighting Taliban
forces in the Afghan countryside. However,
the lack of benchmarks for successful democratization combined with the inability of
the United States to eradicate the Taliban
from Afghanistan has prolonged the American presence without any end in sight.
Democratic Peace Theory (DPT)
may have been a feasible solution for stopping terrorism, so long as it was executed
properly. Although invasion and subsequent
democratization are inherently state-level
actions, the Bush administration believed
these methods better than the alternative of
trying to root out specific terrorist organizations. To a degree, they were correct. It is
very difficult to completely destroy a terrorist group. First, simply finding a group may
prove problematic. Obviously, as a subgovernmental group, there is no terrorist “state.”
Nor is there necessarily a need for one.
With the advent of high-speed internet and
the pervasiveness of telecommunications,
terrorists can live virtually anywhere. Nevertheless, terrorist groups are attracted to
weak and failed states such as Afghanistan
or post-invasion Iraq (Gvosdev and Takeyh.
2009, 80). Weak and failed states may either be too weak to eliminate terrorists, or
may even collude with certain organizations.
This relationship provides terrorists with official documentation such as visas for travel,
and provides a safe haven during the counterterrorist offensives of other countries.
This was certainly the case for Afghanistan
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which, under the Taliban, had
worked with al Qaeda to train the
Afghan military from 1997-2001
(Wright 2006, 355). For countries like
the United States, the protection afforded to terrorist groups in weak and
failed states from international norms respect state sovereignty can seriously infringe
on effective counterterrorist campaigns
(Patrick 2009, 102).
Another problem for most counterterrorist activity is identifying the organizational structure of terrorist organizations.
Unlike the hierarchical style of “old terrorism,” “new terrorism” is characterized by its
nodal quality. Cells operate independently,
and there is no direct links up or down a
chain of command. Lacking the ability to
link one terrorist to another, it is almost impossible to determine the size and leadership
of a terrorist group. Furthermore, since the
cells operate independently, “leadership”
may even be an antiquated concept in the
organizational structure of terrorist groups.
When the United States attacked Afghanistan, and killed or capture many of who it
believed to be top al Qaeda leaders, the
movement did not die. In fact, as of this
writing, Taliban forces have conquered
much of the Swat region, just over the border in Pakistan. Even with Osama bin Laden
in hiding, branches of al Qaeda live on and
continue to fight and recruit. This resiliency
combined with other qualities of new terrorism such as religious motivations and a desire to maximize casualties calls for a nonstate focused response (Howard 2009, 113).
Since terrorists do not control states, they
cannot be dealt with through coercion or
tribute. To them, victory is zero-sum. Ad-

SUNY Geneseo

mittedly, the very notion of a “new” terrorism versus and “old” terrorism is debated.
However, the characteristics of the terrorists
fought in the War on Terror resemble “new
terrorists” rather than “old terrorists.” This is
why I distinguish between the two groups.
It was not entirely unreasonable for
the Bush administration to believe that its
attempts to democratize Afghanistan and
Iraq should have been successful. Since
WWII America has successfully democratized two states: Japan and West Germany.
Both of these democracies emerged from
war-ravaged countries after having been previously ruled by authoritarian governments.
Democratization occurred in both places despite a recent cult-of-personality surrounding
the former leader as well (particularly salient
for Iraqi reconstruction). Furthermore, since
these countries democratized, neither had
been involved in an international conflict.
In fact, since WWII, Japan has not developed an official offensive military (albeit,
this tradition sprang from provisions established in a Constitution drawn up by American military officials (Ike 1950, 24)). If the
United States could harness the characteristics of successful democratization in Japan
and West Germany, perhaps it would be possible to turn Afghanistan and Iraq into democracies as well.
Taken at face value, the reasons for,
the Bush administration’s invasions of Iraq
and Afghanistan are fairly reasonable.
States, unlike amorphous terrorist groups,
are easily identifiable and targetable by the
military. The services these states provided
to al Qaeda could be reduced or eliminated
entirely through regime change. Democratization, had it been carried out properly,
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could have further reduced the potential for terrorism.
The Shortcomings of
Democratization
With such a theoretically sound theory for democratization, why has democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan been a hindrance to the War on Terror? The answer is
lies in how democratization has been shaped
by political elites to define success in the
two countries. In Afghanistan, after the initial invasion, the United States spent most of
its time fighting against Taliban in the hills
of Afghanistan. The United States correctly
believed that by creating a secure environment in Afghanistan, it would be more likely
that a democratic government could flourish
(Fukuyama 2006, 234). However, neither the
safe environment nor democracy ever
emerged. To this day that United States
military continues to fight against Taliban
and al Qaeda forces throughout Afghanistan.
The fighting is so intense that in late March
2009, President Barak Obama ordered an
additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan to
“partner with Afghan security forces and go
after insurgents along the border” (Obama
2009). Because of this instability, the Afghan national government has yet to gain
control over the whole country. Facing internal insurrection, a burgeoning illegal drug
trade, and a lack of infrastructure, Afghanistan has been unable to develop into the democracy necessary for DPT to take effect.
Democracy has become the single criteria
for victory in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, it
has proven elusive.
As discussed earlier, before the 2003
invasion of Iraq, the United States used the
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presence of WMDs and the association of
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden as a
casus belli. So certain was the United States
that it would encounter weapons of mass
destruction during the invasion that media
personnel were imbedded into American
military squadrons (Galbraith 2006, 86—
87). However, after the invasion, in an international investigation by members of the
Coalition of the Willing to determine if Saddam Hussein possessed WMDs at the time
of the invasion. The report came back negative (Duelfer 2004). Internationally embarrassed and responsible for a failed state, the
United States began to democratize Iraq.
Admittedly, Iraq needed reconstruction independent of the presence or absence of weapons of mass destruction. However, for lack
of any other legitimate reason for the invasion, the U.S. turned to democratization as
the criteria for success. Thus, democratization, while a theoretically sound means of
encouraging peace, has become an excuse
for a continued American presence in Iraq
and Afghanistan. It is this continued presence that has caused serious damage to the
ability of the United States to wage the War
on Terror.
The Problems of Continued United States
Presence
Angry Afghanistan, Infuriated Iraq
One of the most obvious problems
resulting from a continued U.S. presence
based on democratization has been the anger
aroused in Iraqi and Afghani citizens. Instead of being greeted, as Vice President
Richard Cheney predicted, as “liberators,”
Coalition troops have been met with intense
and overt hostility. It is far outside the
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scope of this essay to discuss the
legitimacy of this anger. However,
suffice to say that it exists, and it has
a significant impact on how Iraq and
Afghanistan have undergone democratic changes. It should be noted that anger is not necessarily just a negative element in state building. In fact, history has
shown that anger can be used as a catalyst
for regime change. However, anger, particularly when anger causes violence, makes the
emergence of democratic institutions much
less likely (Electing to Fight). As the United
States continues its stay in Iraq and Afghanistan on the grounds that a democratic state
will eventually emerge, this anger is counterproductive for achieving American objectives.
The emergence of religiously motivated political parties and ethnic separatist
movements must be considered regarding
their impact on democratization. Rather
than address the specific goals of particular
organizations, it is most useful to group
them together when analyzing their impact
on democratization efforts. For example,
while one group may want an Iraqi Sunni
state while another may desire a free Kursdish state, the most important aspect of these
groups is that they all inhibit the ability of
the US to engage in state-building, and have
damaged Iraqi or Afghani conceptions of
national unity.
Although the amount of money and
manpower spent on private contractors to
rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan has been immense, by far the United States military has
played the largest role in reconstruction.
Not only has the American military engaged
in civil reconstruction, but its efforts to pro-

SUNY Geneseo

vide security to the two countries are indispensible for the emergence of democratic
states. Although there is no clear, universal
answer as to precisely what is needed and in
what order conditions need to emerge to create democracy. Edward Mansfield and Jack
Snyder (from whom my definition for democratization was taken) have written extensively since 1995 regarding the ordering of
democratic institutions necessary for democracy to emerge. These two scholars argue in
their book Electing to Fight that without the
development of democratic institutions there
can be no security, and thus, democracy,
much less DPT, will not function. Others
may claim that without security there can be
no democratic institutions, obviously inhibiting democracy (Forman 2006, 196). No
matter which side of this chicken—egg debate the reader falls, suffice to say that security is an crucial element important part to
the state building process.
Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier
in this essay, terrorist attack methodology is
remarkable for its simplicity, destructive capability and inability to be detected. Thus,
despite its superior weaponry and training,
one of the greatest threats to the American
military in Iraq and Afghanistan has been
terrorist attacks. Roadside bombs and small
arms fire are a constant problem for the
American military, and the costs of carrying
out these attacks as opposed to preventing
them seriously favors the attacker over the
victim (Howard 2009, 113). Thus, while the
United States has pegged victory in the War
on Terror on the emergence of democracy in
Iraq and Afghanistan, it is attempting to create democracy in an environment extremely
hostile to the American presence.
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Now consider how all of this
within the context of the emergence
of religiously motivated political organizations and separatist movements
on democratization. These two types
of organizations are considered linked in
this essay because they share an important
characteristic: they both tend to reject US
involvement in state development. In Iraq,
separatist movements cannot support US
efforts because, at present, the US is not attempting to break up the Iraqi state. Admittedly, this is not always the case. Until
2006, prior to the Bush administration’s
troop “surge” in which an additional 30,000
troops were deployed to Iraq, the idea of a
three state system was very possible. This is
exemplified by the January 2005 referendum
in which Iraqis in the Northern Kurdish region voted for their independence from the
rest of Iraq. (Galbraith 2006, 193) Even
though the Kurds in Northern Iraq had been
an invaluable asset to the United States during the 2003 invasion, allowing the region to
secede from the Iraqi state was an untenable
solution for the Bush administration and the
Maliki government. To allow a portion of
Iraq to remove itself from the negotiating
table regarding Iraqi reconstruction could
have opened the floodgates for secession by
other groups.
Afghanistan is in a different situation, but one no less hindered by separatist
organizations. To fully grasp the difference,
it should be recognized that the American
invasion in 2001 was done with significant
assistance by native Afghanis. The United
Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UFI, and known to Western media as
the “Northern Alliance”) had worked exten-
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sively with the United States and Great
Britian during the 2001 invasion. Immediately following the capture of Kabul, the
UFI packed government positions with its
cadres (Weinbaum 2006, 127). However, the
ethnic composition of the North Alliance
was such that it was dominated by Tajiks,
Panjshiris, and Uzbeks; all relative minorities in Afghanistan. Absent from the alliance, and thus, the new government, were
Pashtuns and Shia Muslim Hazaras which
were the largest groups in Afghanistan, but
whose members resided in eastern and
southern parts of the country. As the Afghan bureaucracy became occupied by
Northern Alliance loyalists, warlords from
southern and eastern Afghanistan began to
see perceive the newly formed Afghan government as illegitimate (Weinbaum 2006,
129). Thus, while the United States concerned itself with security in Afghanistan,
the Afghan national government proved ineffective at governing in areas much beyond
Kabul.
As for the specific dangers posed to
democratization by religiously motivated
political parties, distrust among Sunni and
Shiites in Iraq almost caused a breakup of
the state (Galbraith, 2006, 181-208). Iraqis
Shiites, the majority Muslim faction in Iraq,
had been the dominant force in drafting the
Iraqi Constitution. Of course, Shiite dominance of the constitutional process was unacceptable to Sunni Iraqis who, with the DeBaathification of the Iraqi government, had
already begun to see democratization as a
not-so-subtle effort to remove Sunnis from
the governing process. Furthermore, attempts by the Sunnis to take control of the
government through democratic reform
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were viewed by many former
Ba’athists as a threat to their power.
This caused Sunni representatives to
object to “nearly everything that was
proposed,” (Galbraith 2006, 194) Subsequent attempts by the United States by
the United States to pacify Sunni dissent
ostracized the Shiite majority who felt that
America was not really interested in forming
a genuine democracy. Religious political
parties were the logical outcome. They
acted a the perfect venue for Sunnis to extend their political control over the process.
As a minority group, political power was at
a premium of importance.
With power concentrated in a few
groups, and with the groups competing for
power, sectarian violence erupted on a horrific scale. Sunni groups attacked Shiia
groups and vice versa. With each attack
came retaliations. Bigger attacks yielded
bigger retaliation. The massive upswing in
sectarian violence after the 2006 bombing of
the al Askari Mosque is an excellent example of the blood feud that consumed Iraq Retaliations were common. It is believed that
the bombing was the immediate cause of as
many as 165 deaths, and most likely contributed to the upswing in violence that occurred
for the months after the attack where average deaths per day rose from 11 to 34.
(Galbraith 2006, 246) The violence was so
prominent, a US intelligence reports released
as late as August 2007 noted the disturbing
frequency of sectarian violence as a major
obstacle in establishing peace in Iraq.
Essentially, the political motivated
religious groups and the separatist movements were fulfilling the gap in civil society
generated by the destruction of the old re-
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gimes. Civil society is the lifeblood of democracy. Ashutosh Varshney , a scholar on
ethnic conflict and civic life, defines civil
society as “the part of our life that exists between the state on one hand and families on
the other that allows people to come together
on a variety of issues (2002, 4). Without the
connections made through civil society,
Varshney posits that the potential for violence in communities will increase. Although Varshney wrote these words of wisdom regarding the relationships between
Hindus and Muslims in India, the same
statement could easily be applied to Sunnis,
Shi’a and Kurds in Iraq, or Tajiks and Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Without civil society
there is violence, and as violence increases,
the likelihood of democratization decreases.
The Poppy Production Dilemma
The inability to administer governance on the part of the Afghan national government has enabled a massive upswing in
the production of poppy in parts of Afghanistan. Afghanistan possess little arable land.
Rocky, dry, and lacking even basic infrastructures in some regions, it is very difficult
for Afghan farmers to scratch out a living.
Because of the inhospitable climate, Afghan’s main agricultural products are limited
essentially to the few things that can grow
easily. Among these are certain types of
nuts, figs, and poppy. Poppy, a plant from
which opium cam be extracted, is used in the
production of many types of narcotics such
as heroin and morphine. These drugs are
intensely lucrative, and their production
poses a serious concern for the fledgling Afghani government. Lawlessness and poor
infrastructure makes the logistics of curtailing the production of poppy very difficult.
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Nevertheless, the unmitigated production of these goods can be very
harmful. Drugs production and sale
are a problem for any government, particularly those with poor domestic support facilities (rehabilitation centers, public health care clinics, etc.). Furthermore,
the sale of poppy has been linked to narcoterrorism, and is a chief element in terrorist
funding (Weinbaum 2006, 133). Ironically,
during the reign of the Taliban, poppy production had been outlawed. However, after
the Northern Alliance came to power, and
certainly after the Northern alliance lost the
ability to administer government across Afghanistan, poppy production has reached an
all-time high (Weinbaum 2006, 126). Thus,
the United States and the newly formed Afghan government finds itself in the tenuous
position of both needing to stop the production of a crop that can by synthesized into a
controlled substance, and the need for farmers to subsist. The United States has placed
itself in a no—win situation regarding poppy
production. If the United States destroys
poppy crops to discourage narco-terrorism, it
harms the wellbeing of Afghan farmers
thereby decreasing the likelihood of the
emergence of a middle class and harming
democratization (Moore 1966, xxii). If the
United States allows the poppy crops to
grow, previous efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are undermined. No matter what it
does, America is hemorrhages resources. A
continued American presence based on the
emergence of a democratic state will only
prolong the bleeding.
Unending Investment
The central theme of this paper is
how continued American presence in Iraq
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and Afghanistan in the name of democratization has reduced the ability of the United
States to wage the War on Terror. A
strained and previously engaged military,
damaged American confidence in political
leadership, and the accumulation of massive
debt from invasion and reconstruction all
reduced the ability of the United States to
respond to future dangers. In this section, I
will explore how and why these costs have
accumulated.
Speaking in fiscal terms, the war has
cost Americans a phenomenal sum of
money. In a Congressional report released
October 15, 2008, Congress admitted to allocating almost one trillion dollars to fighting the War on Terror (including all invasion
and reconstruction activity in Afghanistan
and Iraq) (United State Congress Congressional Report Service 2008, 16). This number is incredible. It is almost one thirteenth
of average annual American GDP
(Purchasing Power Parity) in 2007 (World
Bank, 2007). Some critics of the War on
Terror even claim this number is deflated.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel—prize winning
economist, claims the costs of the war could
actually be as high as $4 trillion
(HERSZENHORN, 2008) To appreciate
these numbers, think of how this money was
not used. Even if the money was still only
used to reduce the threat of terrorism, there
were certainly other, better, uses for it. By
comparison, between 2003 and 2007, the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) received appropriations
from Congress in the amount of $5 billion
dollars (United States Congress. Congressional Budget Office 2008, 3). This is not to
suggest that economic development is a
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suitable alternative from democratization in the War on Terror. However, by providing humanitarian assistance, the United States might at least
have reduced the animosity many in
Iraq and Afghanistan feel towards the
United States. Had Iraq and Afghanistan
turned into model democracies, these costs
may have been bearable. However, this has
not been the case.
The United States military has also
suffered as a result of its democratization
efforts. The U.S. military is engaged in tasks
for which it was not designed. American
soldiers predominantly trained for combat
environments, not the sort of peacekeeping
missions necessary for state building and
reconstruction (Dobbins 2006, 223). As
mentioned earlier, the US military did possess a few resources that would be helpful
for democratization such as the Army Corps
of Engineers for assistance in creating civil
infrastructure. However, these efforts have
obviously proven insufficient. The sheer
quantity of money that has been spent on
private contractors and by Nongovernmental
organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan is a
testament to this deficiency.
The credibility of American political
elites has also suffered immensely because
of the continued American presence in these
two countries. In the immediate aftermath of
9-11, President George Bush experienced
record approval ratings; what many considered to be a manifestation of the “rally
‘round the flag” effect (Muller 2005, 47). In
the run up to the war in Iraq, the Bush administration received another spike in approval. However, as the conflicts dragged
on, as American expenses and casualties

mounted, and as the amount of time necessary for successful democratization became
clearer, American public opinion waned. A
poll conducted by CBS asked 844 American
adults nationwide, "Do you think the result
of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of
American life and other costs of attacking
Iraq, or not?" In August 2003, 46% of those
surveyed said that they believed the costs
were worth the results while 45% thought
the costs were not worth it with 9% unsure
(CBS News Poll, 2009). In March of 2008,
CBS polled the same group and discovered
that according to their survey, support had
gone down significantly. In March 2008,
only 29% of those surveyed though the costs
were worth it while those who believed the
results were not worth the costs rose to 64%
of those surveyed with 7% unsure. This
negative sentiment was directly reflected in
American views of President Bush. In a
Newsweek poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International asked
1,003 adults nationwide, “. . . Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush is handling the situation in Iraq?" In May 2003,
less than one month after the initial invasion
of Iraq, 69% of Americans said that they approved of the Bush administration’s handling, while only 26% disapproved with 5%
not sure. In August 2005, over two years
later, American views had obviously
changed. Again, Princeton Survey Research
Associates International conducted the poll.
This time, 34% of Americans approved,
61% disapproved, and 5% were unsure. At
the end of the second Bush term, the same
poll found 68% of Americans disapproved
of Bush’s handling of Iraq (Newsweek Poll
conducted by Princeton Survey Research
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Associates International, 2009).
One popularly cited reason for why
Americans stopped favoring the war
and supporting American military leadership is “casualty phobia”(Feaver
Gelpi and Reifler 2009, 8). This argument state argues that there may be initial
support for the use of force, but the support
evaporates rapidly and irrevocably at the
sight of body bags.” (Feaver Gelpi and
Reifler 2009, 8). This certainly seems logical. As the criteria for American victory in
Iraq and Afghanistan was made unattainable,
each life lost in the conflicts became more
deplorable. Obviously, as the United States
prolongs its stay in Iraq and Afghanistan for
the sake of democratization, it is likely that
the credibility of political elites may suffer
further damage.
But what has enabled the hemorrhaging of American dollars, lives, and domestic
credibility in the name of democratization?
The answer lies in the epistemological ambiguity of important terms in the War on Terror. Few American politicians stood against
the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. To do
so would have been political suicide in a democratic society. Similarly, in the weeks
leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, few
politicians stood against the Bush administration. The stakes for being wrong were
simply perceived as too high by most politicians (Ravi 2005, 55). Because of this uniform political support, the Bush administration introduced a number of terms into the
discussion of the War on Terror. Two of the
most important terms for this discussion
were “victory” and “democracy.” On May
2, 2003, U.S. President George Bush landed
in full fighter regalia on the deck of the
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U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln. The purpose of
President Bush’s visit to the Abraham Lincoln was to declare as the banner behind him
said, Iraq was “Mission Accomplished.” As
is now known all too well, the mission was
not yet finished. Nevertheless, the Bush administration made wining military campaigns against Iraq seem like the only criteria for a successful invasion (Ravi 2005, 45).
However, when weapons inspectors concluded Iraq never possessed a WMD program, the Bush administration changed
“victory” again. This time, victory took the
current definition of a fully democratic Iraq.
Of course, there no explanation was ever
provided about exactly what a fully democratic Iraq meant. Internationally accepted
free and fair elections? High voter registration and participation? The Bush administration never explained. Despite this ambiguity, in a November 30, 2005 address
where he discussed strategy for the war in
Iraq, George Bush used the term “victory”
15 times, and even posed a sign that said,
“Plan for Victory” next to his podium
(Berinsky Drukman, 2007, 128) Even
though the definition for victory had
changed, it was clear that the Bush administration still expected it. On a similar note,
the Bush administration remained steadfast
against the use of timetables for withdrawal
from the two countries, and because of its
precarious position, was unable to ensure the
developing Iraqi government reached Washington-approved checkpoints. When Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections were
postponed from 2004 until 2005, the United
States could only watch (United Nations Information Service 2005). Removing support
for the nascent Afghani national
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government would not have
yielded faster democratization. All
that the United States could do was
keep promoting security in Afghanistan
and hope for better election conditions
in 2005.
Unfriendly Friends
The Bush administration did a spectacular
job of alienating U.S. allies throughout the
War on Terror. Immediately following 9-11,
nations around the world flocked to America’s support. From long time allies like
Britain to countries with which the U.S. has
had cooler relations such as Iran and Libya,
international solidarity against the hijackings
was astounding. Immediately after the attack, the nineteen members of NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
stating, that “an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them
all.” The members of NATO went even further by pledging action including the “use of
armed force.” (Gordon 2002, 5) However,
two and a half years later, in the weeks leading up to the United States invasion of Iraq,
relations between the United States and its
allies soured.
Prior to the war, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the
United Nations Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),
had been investigating Iraq. These organizations are international bodies charged with
investigating countries possessing nuclear
technology for their compliance with international law. In the case of Iraq the IAEA
and UNMOVIC were responsible for investigating Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441.
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Resolution 1441 offered Saddam Hussein a
final opportunity to have Iraq comply with
previous United Nations Security Council
resolutions restricting Iraq’s possession of
both a nuclear material and certain prohibited armament in the wake of the 1991 Gulf
War (The United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1441, 2009). However, the investigation of Iraq was not fast enough for
the Bush administration. Citing Iraqi unwillingness to allow inspectors into certain
areas, the Bush administration claimed that
Iraq was not fully disclosing its weapons
program and was therefore in contravention
of Resolution 1441 (Galbraith 2006, 102).
The Resolution contained no specific triggers for military action. Nevertheless, U.S.
representative to the United Nations John
Negroponte did comment that, “If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the
event of a further Iraqi violation, this resolution does not constrain any member state
from acting to defend itself against the threat
posed by Iraq, or to enforce relevant UN
resolutions and protect world peace security.” It was Negroponte’s caveat that would
later be used by the Bush administration as a
justification for the Iraq invasion.
The international community was not
supportive of U.S. military action in Iraq.
Particularly after IAEA and UNMOVIC investigators presented evidence for Iraqi
compliance to Resolution 1441, the international community saw U.S. militarism as
disconcerting (Wall, 125). Although the
United States would claim that it assembled
a “Coalition of the Willing” to support it
during a war with Iraq, the coalition was
strongly influenced by bribes and coercion
by the United States (Anderson Bennis and
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Cavanagh 2003, 8—10). Those
countries that were not part of the
“Coalition” were ostracized, in many
cases by the American public itself.
France in particular experienced American rancor through boycotts of French
products, jokes focusing on French military
cowardice, and even childish renaming of
items that contained the word “French” (i.e.
“french fries” became “freedom fries”).
None of this is good for utilizing the international goodwill created after 9-11. For their
part, “The French see a new aggressive
strain of messianic universalism in U.S. policy, a willingness to impose democracy by
use of the U.S. military.” which they see as
deeply troubling (Wall 2004, 126). As the
United States continues its presence in Iraq
and Afghanistan because of a dedication to
the emergence of democracy, this view is
unlikely to change.
Policy Prescriptions
Given these grotesque realities, what
steps should the Obama administration take
to correct America’s course in fighting the
War on Terror? The answer to this is in
three parts. First, the United States must
extricate itself from the politics of Iraq and
Afghanistan as much as possible. Secondly,
the US must reducing instances of overt hostility towards Muslims within US military
practices. Finally, the Obama administration
needs to work to heal relationships between
the US and the international community
while convincing the international community to share the burden of state building
when necessary. These three tactics will address the major obstacles to the War on Terror that have arisen as a result of attempts by
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the United States to democratize Iraq and
Afghanistan. These recommendations are a
start. Had the Bush administration undertaken these policies in the early days of the
two invasions, it is unlikely that conditions
would have degenerated as seriously as they
have. Thus, the impacts of these actions are
likely to carry repercussions that may not
have necessarily have occurred if implemented sooner. The above prescriptions are
likely to encounter serious problems in implementation. However, “obstacles on the
ground” must be addressed one way or another if the United States seeks to correct its
mistakes
It is important to mention that as of
this writing, the Obama administration has
taken several significant steps towards many
of these goals. However, much more work
is needed before the ill—effects of attempts
to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq can be
eradicated. As President, Barack Hussein
Obama (a Democrat, America’s first black
President, and a man with Muslim family) is
in a unique position to shape how the United
States fights the War on Terror. Now, the
only question that remains is if he is up to
the challenge.
American removal from Iraqi and
Afghani governance is critical. Without this,
all other measures to fix the problems generated by these democratizations may be fruitless. At a basic level, governments must
concern themselves with two things: legitimacy and sovereignty. Lacking either of
these things will result in the devolution of
society into lawlessness. Without sovereignty, governments are unable to control
citizens. Without legitimacy, constant internal power struggles will make a unified
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government impossible. While its
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan
may assist in governmental sovereignty (the United States military has
extensively trained local Afghanis and
Iraqis in combat and security measures
(Obama, 2009)) it has hindered governmental legitimacy in the process. With separatist
groups and religiously motivated political
groups jockeying for power, such chinks in
legitimacy of the new governments with
weak civil societies may be fatal.
While it may not be feasible for the
United States to quickly and completely divorce itself from Iraq and Afghanistan, it can
certainly start by removing itself from much
of the politics of the two countries. The
Obama administration must develop a list of
objectives the United States will pursue in
these countries, and fulfill them at the discretion of the host governments. Furthermore, these goals need to be apolitical and
object goods for all Iraqis and Afghanis. A
good example of this is security. Simultaneously, the United States must create a list of
goals and it expects the Iraqi and Afghani
governments to accomplish. These goals
must be reasonable and they also must be
accompanied by reasonable timetables. Despite its weaknesses in fighting terrorism,
the United States military is certainly more
capable of upholding security than the infant
governments. Furthermore, if the United
States enforces security everywhere equally,
not just in areas that are friendly toward
America, the potential for harming the legitimacy of indigenous governments may diminish. However, the Iraqi and Afghani governments must work diligently towards democracy for American efforts to be fruitful.
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Interestingly, if this policy is undertaken, it
is likely that American objectives and Iraqi
and Afghani objectives may sync on a number of key issues. Both the Iraq and United
States governments want al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) agents apprehended. Working with
the Iraqi government may be the best way to
achieve this, while simultaneously making it
more difficult for AQI to gain supporters
who are against the US presence. By creating delineating responsibilities and goals,
the United States will be providing strong
support to democratization, but in such a
way that it will more likely result in a full
democracy.
A serious blunder of the Bush administration was the impact of American
counterterrorist activity on the perceptions
of Muslims around the world. The problem
was so significant that one of the major focuses of President Obama’s first trip abroad
was to assure the “Muslim world” that the
United States, “is not and will never be at
war with Islam” (Cooper, 2009). Of course,
soundbites from President Obama may not
be sufficient to outweigh Muslim antipathy.
Overt targeting of Islam and Muslims in the
War on Terror have scarred American relations with many Muslims (Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center, 2009).
To correct its course, the United States must
not allow further cause to those who think
the United States is at war with Islam.
Obama has made significant strides in this
regard. Closing the infamous American
military base and prisoner detention center at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is an excellent first
step. As discussed, intentionally removing
the phrase “War on terror” from the lexicon
of American foreign policy is another step
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in the right direction. These efforts
must be continued if the United
States is ever to win back the public
opinion of Muslims around the world.
Finally, the United States must work
to reintegrate the international community
into the War on Terror. America had widespread international support after 9-11.
However, the costs of involvement to America combined with American pomposity
have made it unlikely for other countries to
volunteer in the War on Terror. Contributing to this unease is the knowledge that
Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Britain and
chief supporter of the United States during
the Iraqi Invasion, received so much domestic backlash that he lost his position as PM.
Similarly, politicians in countries like Australia and Spain came to power with promises that they would remove their country
from the Coalition. This is obviously a
problem for the United States which already
supplies the majority of resources for the
two conflicts. President Obama’s charge
will thus be twofold for reintegrating the international community into the War on Terror. First, he will need to convince politicians that they will not necessarily loose
popular support just by assisting in the War.
Second (although related), President Obama
needs to impress upon the international community that fighting terrorists must be a concern of every country. If Barack Obama can
get more countries in the world invested in
the notion of preventing terrorist attacks,
then proving that politicians will not lose
domestic support will come naturally. Without the international involvement in the War
on Terror, costs to Americans will be much
higher, and the likelihood for success will be
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much lower.
Conclusion
In this essay I have shown how democratization has harmed the ability of the
United States to wage the War on Terror.
Theoretically, democratization may have
been the solution for rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan after the United States invaded.
However, poor planning, and insufficient
resources have stymied the emergence of
democratic institutions in these two states.
Despite this slowness in democratization,
political elites have defined victory in these
two countries as the emergence of fully democratic governments. This decision has
angered many indigenous Iraqis and Afghanis, necessitated enormous and continual
resource investment from the United States,
and has tarnished U.S. image internationally.
Despite these issues, American policy can be
corrected. The Obama administration must
work to differentiate the War on Terror from
what many Muslims perceive as a “War on
Islam.” Furthermore, the Obama administration must develop concrete criteria for victory and abide by those criteria for committing a judicious withdrawal from Iraq and
Afghanistan. Finally, the Obama administration must involve other countries in the
War on Terror. This is important both because it will enable the United States to defer some of the expenses of the War on other
countries, but also because the goals of the
War on Terror are beneficial to all states.
These tasks will be difficult to achieve, but
not impossible. By halting America’s tireless commitment to democratization in Iraq
and Afghanistan, in the long run, the United
States will be in a much better position to
wage the War on Terror.
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State Capacity, Social Mobility,
and Terrorist Groups In
Thailand and the Philippines
Submitted by Sarah McDonald
Abstract
Thailand and the Philippines face similar
security issues, including separatist violence
in their southern provinces. However, the
developmental paths of the two countries
and the governments’ reactions to the minority ethno-religious separatist movements,
the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the
Philippines, have varied greatly. In Thailand, the government’s desire to create a
singular national identity from mixed ethnic
and religious backgrounds has created periods of forced assimilation tempered by attempts at conciliation. Conversely, the Philippines continued colonial policies of economic and political oppression of the Moro
but created the institutions necessary for
social pluralism. The differing policies of
the Thai and Filipino governments have
shaped the orientation of the separatist
movements within the countries. Currently,
the size and power of the MILF in the Philippines has forced the government to attempt peace talks with the group. However,
in Thailand the reclusive nature of the
BRN‑C remains hinders communications
with the Thai government. This paper demonstrates that the actions taken by the governments of Thailand and the Philippines
have fostered current separatist and terrorist
movements. Addressing these problems will
require state policies that reflect pluralism

and institutions that support social aspirations.
Glossary
ARMM – Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao
Berastu – Unity, separatist group in Thailand
BNPP - Barisan Nasional Pembebasan
Patani
BRN – Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National
Revolutionary Front)
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
CPT – Communist Party of Thailand
Malay – ethnic minority group in Thailand
MIM – Moro Islamic Movement formerly
the Moro Independence Movement
THE MNLF - Moro National Liberation
Front
MILF - Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Moro - ethnic minority group in the Philippines
OIC – Organization of the Islamic Conference
PAO - Provincial Administrative Organizations (Thailand)
PULO - Patani United Liberation Organization
SBPAC – Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre
SPCPD – Southern Philippines Council for
Peace and Development
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Education

Thailand
Regulation of curriculum
in punohs

Reaction from government

Forced assimilation
Relied on military rather
than political action to
deal with violence

Separatist groups

Size of groups

Focus of groups/ conflict

Class issues

Regional affect
Outside funding

Organization of separatist group

Religious demographics

BRN and BRN-C
Goals murky at best,
leaders hide in countryside
Exact numbers unknown,
estimated at times as low
as 300 to 500 active
members
Focus of group unknown.
The conflict is both religiously and ethnically
based
Low overall country output/wages until industrial
revolution in late 1980s
Malay have appealed to
Malaysian government
for aid in crisis
Some claim Jamaa
Islamiya connection to
the BRN but the BRN
and scholars deny these
claims
Top down structure in
the BRN-C, with a military and political wing
94% Buddhist
5% Muslim
<1% Christian,
Hindu, Sikh, or Jewish
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Philippines
Secularization of schools

Peace agreements and
ceasefires
Direct political action
MNLF and MILF
Well known leaders and
goals
At peak 30,000 estimated
members

MILF aimed for a
broader political goal
based on the ethnic/
religious identity of the
Moro
Government reallocation
of ancestral Moro land to
Christians
(cycle of poverty)
Connection with Muslim
community in Sabah and
Borneo
Malaysian government
(weapons, transport, etc.)
Aid from Libya under
Kadaffi
Loosely knit with some
infrastructure including a
central committee and
the BMA (Bangsa Moro
Army)
90% Christian
5% Muslim
<1% Buddhist,
Sikh, or animist
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Introduction
Thailand and the Philippines
are currently experiencing similar security concerns, including separatist
violence in their southern provinces.
The violence stems from minority ethno‑religious groups, namely the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the Philippines. Despite largely similar histories, the developmental paths of the separatist movements
and governmental responses of the two
countries have greatly affected their reactions and level of success with the separatist
movements. The focus in Thailand on identity issues, and the government’s inability to
create lasting and stable institutions through
which to mediate identity issues, has left the
Malay with few official avenues through
which to express their problems. Due to this,
some Malay have begun to work outside of
the system in separatist groups. However, in
the Philippines the government’s economic
oppression has been tempered by a political
readiness to mitigate societal issues. That
has enabled separatist groups to be open
about their leadership and aims, which has
lead to negotiations and attempted peace
treaties with the government.
History before the Modern States
The creation of Thailand and the
Philippines as unified states only occurred in
the early twentieth century. Prior to this,
Thailand was a series of provinces ruled by
local leaders and the Philippines was a colony of Spain. Even after the Philippines became a unified state, it was a colony of the
United States until 1946. However, the history of the Malay and Moro date back much
further than the creation of Thailand and the
Philippines, which has had an impact on the
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current separatist movements.
Thailand
The beginnings of modern Thai history can be traced to the eleventh through
thirteenth centuries when the ethnic group,
the Thai, began migrating south from China
and controlling regions in China as well as
in the Northern provinces of modern‑day
Thailand (Wyatt 2003, 30). However, prior
to the Thai arrival, three ethnic groups, the
Mon, Khmer, and the Malay, resided in the
area of Thailand and controlled independent
provinces. Of these three ethnic groups, only
the Malay in the south were animists, and
the Mon and Khmer, sometimes placed together as the Mon-Khmer, were Buddhist
(Wyatt 2003, 20). The Thai created local
leadership similar to that already existing in
the provinces. In time, the Mon and Khmer
assimilated with the Thai, as they shared a
common faith and Chinese heritage. Meanwhile, the southern provinces of Thailand,
Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun were controlled under the local area of Malacca until
1511 (Harish 2006, 50). At this point, the
Portuguese had overtaken Malacca and all of
the provinces were placed under the watch
of the Kingdom of Siam (Thai government).
This new arrangement included the payments of tribute to the king, but the provinces were allowed to retain local leadership,
often called rajas or kings (Harish 2006, 50).
Around this same time, trade boomed in the
southern provinces and with it brought the
Islamic religion (Islam 1998, 443). It
quickly became the dominant faith in the
south by the late fifteenth century, and being
Malay and being Muslim became synonymous. For the next two centuries, the three
southern provinces would continue to
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govern themselves, occasionally
engaging in skirmishes with the
Siam government but never being under direct control.
In 1785, after numerous rebellions
and refusals to pay tribute, the King of
Siam overthrew the raja of the provinces
and placed them under direct Siam control
(Islam 1998, 443). Despite being under the
control of the Thai government, the raja retained some local status and could be influential in the southern provinces. This would
end when in 1901, when under pressure
from the British government the Siamese
government created an official administrative body to rule the “area of the seven provinces” (Harish 2006, 51). In essence this created a “unified” Thailand (than called Siam),
so that the king had official control over all
of the provinces of Thailand – thus finally
ending the power of local southern leaders.
From this point until 1932, with the
marginalization of the king and the creation
of a democracy in Thailand, the Malay had
virtually no representation in the government. With the establishment of a democracy in Thailand, the Malay won some minimal spots in the National Assembly and Parliament (Harish 2006, 52). It would seem
that Thailand was beginning a promising
new government, including plurality in and
representation from all provinces. However,
in 1938, the fledgling democracy was deposed in a coup and Thailand was forced
under the control of the military (composed
mainly of Thai Buddhists). This would drastically change the quality of life for the Malay in the south and affect relations between
the Thai Buddhists and the Malay throughout the twentieth century.
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The Philippines
The Philippines faced a similar early
historical path to that of Thailand. The islands that compose the Philippines were inhabited by many ethnic groups, collectively
termed Malayo-Polynesian (Islam 1998,
444). They were governed by local leaders,
often termed sultans. The Moro resided
largely in the southern province of Mindanao. No unified state of the Philippines
existed and outside influences from Malaysia remained a force in political life. Similarly to Thailand, Islam was introduced in
the southern provinces in the early fourteenth century through trade (Islam 1998,
444). Soon it too became the dominant religion, most closely associated with the Moro.
Shortly after Islam was introduced in the
Philippines, the Spanish gained control of
the southern provinces of Mindanao and
Sulu (predominately Moro in composition)
in 1565 (Islam 1998, 444). The Spanish
never officially gained a mandate over these
provinces but governed them as a colony
anyway. This is exemplified most predominately in the attempts by the Spanish to convert the Moro to Catholicism. Their efforts
were largely unsuccessful so the Spanish
began to “reallocate” Moro land to Spanish
Catholics (and those they are able to convert) in an attempt to forcibly change the
religious and ethnic composition of the
southern provinces.
Despite the fact that the Philippines
were never officially a Spanish territory, and
that Spanish control was maintained largely
only in the southern provinces of Mindanao
and Sulu, the Spanish relinquished control of
the Philippines to the United States in 1899
as part of the Bates Treaty that ended the
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Spanish-American War. The Philippines would not gain independence until 1946, until that time the
United States created the Manila Government to rule over the Philippines.
During American rule in the Philippines,
there was occasional conflict between the
government and the Moro. This led to the
creation of the Moro Province, encompassing the provinces of Sulu and Mindanao, a
special administrative area created to preemptively quell any growing dissidence
(Magdalena 1977, 300). The Manila Government claimed that it was actively trying
to redistribute land back to the Moro people,
whose land was stripped from them under
the Spanish and were working as tenant
farmers on the land. However, in reality little ancestral land was given back to the
Moro and tenant farming remained the predominant practice until the 1960s, and not
until the late 1980s did any significant land
redistribution take place (Noble 1976a, 406).
This created a system under which the Moro
differed religiously, ethnically, geographically, and financially from the majority of
Filipinos.
Beginnings of Separatist Movements
Separatist tensions in both Thailand
and the Philippines began to emerge in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, as a reaction to
government policies. In Thailand, the military coup in 1938 created an unstable political atmosphere in which the pattern of attempted forced assimilation by the government on the Malay became an increasing
issue. This included the eradication of the
Malay language in schools, regulated curriculum in punohs (religious schools), and
government pressure for Malays to take Thai

names (Harish 2006, 52). Haji Sulong became the leader of the first separatist movement in Thailand, the Islamic Council of the
Pattani Province, sending a list of demands
to the Thai government in April 1947
(Christie 1996, 183). Among the demands
were a separate court that would recognize
the Islamic faith for the basis of the law, for
money derived from the southern provinces
to be utilized in those provinces, and for the
restoration of the Malay language in schools
as well as for it to be the official language of
the three southern provinces (Islam 1998,
444). Sulong and some of his supporters
were arrested in 1948 for treason, resulting
in a steady stream of violence for the remainder of the year ending with the declaration of a state of emergency in the southern
provinces that would last for a decade. In
1959, as the emergency was ending, the
BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan
Patani) was being formed by Tengku Abdul
Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong’s in the
1940s (Islam 1998, 446). The BNPP was the
precursor to the current separatist groups the
BRN and the PULO, its aims included an
independent Islamic state (Islam 1998, 446).
In the Philippines, the Magsaysay
administration continued the policy of stripping the Moro of their ancestral lands by
hastening migration of northern Filipinos
and Catholics into the southern regions
(Noble 1976a, 406). The government
claimed to undertake this movement to increase production in the southern provinces,
which were producing below capacity, and
thus solve the problems that were arising
from an increasing population and low productivity levels (Noble 1976a, 406). However, this had a negative effect on the
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Moros, as the Catholics and northern Filipinos soon became the majority in the south. A combination of
Catholics and non‑Moro northerners
thus gained control of the local government positions and wealth in the region –
and often over Moro land, as few of the
Moros who lived and worked on their ancestral lands had legal documents to prove ownership (Noble 1976a, 407). This resulted in
their land being taken by the Catholics and
wealthier Filipinos who effectively controlled the legal system in the south. The
first coordinated separatist group formed as
a reaction to the Corregidor Incident in
1968. In March 1968, the Filipino government was planning an attack on Sabah, Malaysia. Sabah was a popular trading port that
the government believed to be a smuggling
area for Moros. In order to undertake the
attack, the government constructed an all‑Moro military unit. However, as the Moro
were actively engaged in trade in Sabah and
many Moro had relatives there, the Moro
soldiers refused their orders. The Thai officials claimed that the soldiers staged an uprising in which thirty Moro soldiers were
killed. However, the incident was interpreted
differently by the Moro, who believed that
the government murdered the soldiers and
purposefully attempted to send an all‑Moro
unit to Sabah (Noble 1976a, 408). Following
the incident, Udtog Matalam formed the first
organized separatist movement, MIM
(Muslim Independence Movement), which
the government disbanded in 1970 (Noble
1976a, 408). However, MIM was an important precursor to a currently active separatist
group, the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front).
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The movements took different paths
after this point in time. In Thailand, periodic
uprisings were undertaken by various
groups, but there was not consistent separatist violence from one group until a larger
undertaking in the 1980s and later the most
recent violence occurring since 2004. Conversely, in the Philippines in the 1960s several separatist groups emerged and became
staples in the conflict until the present.
Modern Separatist Groups in Thailand
The two main separatist groups that
currently operate in Thailand are the BRN
(National Revolutionary Front) and the
PULO (Patani United Liberation Organization). The BRN retained the religious underpinnings of the BNPP, as well as responding
to economic issues developing in the southern provinces. The decline in the rubber
market in the 1960s disproportionately affected the southern provinces and thus disproportionately impoverished Muslims as
compared to the rest of Thailand (Islam
1998, 447). The BRN remains a largely secretive group, the leaders are unknown and
the group rarely discussed its goals until recently, when it declared that it is attempting
to create an independent state through revolution. The PULO, unlike the BRN, is secular in nature but still aims to create an independent Pattani state. The group was formed
by college graduates who had received their
degrees abroad, only to come back to Thailand and be unable to work as no one would
hire them (Tan-Mullins 2006, 146). This has
caused some graduates to leave Thailand,
and a marked absence of educated Malay in
leadership positions in the Thai government.
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Modern Separatist Groups in the
Philippines
Almost directly after the disbanding of MIM, the MNLF, the youth
branch of MIM, came to the forefront.
It directly outlined its political goals as
well as the reasons for the formation of the
group. Openness and clarity would remain a
characteristic of the MNLF, as the leaders of
the group are well known and have throughout the struggle been in periodic discussions
with the government. While the Moro identify based on religion as well as culture, the
MNLF focused on broader shared goals, including economic disparities in the southern
provinces and government failures to respond to inequality. In doing so, the MNLF
created a larger scope and support base for
their cause than did Thai separatist groups.
As a result, when the government declared
martial law in October 1972, the MNLF had
support not only in the Philippines but also
in Malaysia which actively funded the group
in the 1970s and 1980s (Noble 1976a, 411).
Differences in Separatist Movements
The separatist movements in Thailand and the Philippines share some similar
qualities, including a minority Muslim ethnic group, movements originating at approximately the same time, and semi-defined
goals for independent states/regions. However, the orientation of the modern dominant
groups in each country has affected the nature of the conflict within the country. The
BRN retains a pure Islamic message, which
has limited its membership (i.e. the PULO).
Additionally, the relative silence and secrecy
of the group has hindered the possibility of
communication with the government. This
has created an atmosphere of suspicion in
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the southern provinces of Thailand, where
even Malays living in the southern provinces
often remark that they are unsure of who is
or is not a member of the BRN (Tan-Mullins
2006, 145). Conversely, membership in the
MNLF has exceeded the tens of thousands at
its peak, with the names and faces of top
leaders well known throughout the country.
The broader message of the MNLF has allowed for compromise, as seen in the recent
peace talks with the government that resulted in the signing of a peace treaty. Despite the Filipino courts’ failure to approve
the treaty and subsequent relapse of violence
in August 2008, the leaders of the MNLF
were willing and able to meet with and compromise on issues of importance to the
Moro, Muslims, and people of the southern
provinces. It is evident that the nature of the
separatist organizations has influenced the
level of success or failure the movements
will have diplomatically; however, it has
been the governments’ responses to the
separatist movements that have influenced
the severity of the groups and the violence
that stems from them.
Government Action in Thailand and the
Philippines
Action taken in part by the governments in
Thailand and the Philippines has fueled
separatist groups. In Thailand, the government’s relentless pursuit of a national identity has caused the Malay to react by fighting
relentlessly to maintain their cultural traditions. In the Philippines, the government’s
misappropriation of land left the Moro underrepresented politically and devastated
financially. However, it is the capacity of the
government to manage these issues that has
most directly affected the ability of the
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government to mitigate separatist
violence.
Initial Government Responses to
Separatist Movements
In the Philippines, major separatist organization began after the Corregidor Incident of 1968 and the subsequent
consolidation of President Marcos power in
1972. One of Marcos’s first actions as president was to declare martial law in the southern provinces. This included a massive reassignment of troops, with over 70 percent stationed in the southern provinces. Additionally, from 1972 through 1978 Marcos consolidated and strengthened his power as
president. This included the firing of over
2000 government positions, a referendum
that allowed him to appoint local officials,
and Marcos holding both the positions of
president and prime minister (Noble 1976b,
180). Despite the increased power of Marcos, he chose to negotiate with the MNLF
leaders. A ceasefire was quickly established
and maintained. Beginning in 1975, the
MNLF leaders presented their goals to the
Islamic Conference in Jeddah (OIC). The
MNLF wanted a politically autonomous region, which would be comprised of thirteen
southern provinces including all of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago (Noble
1976b, 181). President Marcos responded by
offering autonomy but not full independence; instead, four regions would be constructed from the thirteen provinces. Each
region would have a commissioner that
would be directly under his (Marcos’s) authority as well as the placement of Muslims
in additional government positions focused
on economic and social development (Noble
1976b, 181). The general terms were ac-
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cepted by both the MNLF and Marcos.
However, as the fine details of the peace
agreement were being negotiated, the MNLF
called for full autonomy and the implementation of Muslim leaders and law in the
southern provinces. The government refused
to accept these terms since in some of the
thirteen proposed regions Muslims did not
constitute the majority. The reason that Muslims did not constitute a majority in all of
the southern provinces was a result of the
Catholic “land reallocation” pursued by the
government during Spanish colonization.
Following a vote, only ten of the thirteen
regions voted for autonomy and the Tripoli
peace agreement subsequently fell apart.
Hence, colonial policies continued to not
only affect Filipino society but also hinder
peaceful coexistence.
Despite the failure to complete a
peace agreement between the MNLF and the
Filipino government, an important precedent
was set by the Marcos administration. Even
though Marcos governed the Philippines in
an authoritarian manner and amassed exorbitant control by undemocratic means, the
government was willing to negotiate with
the separatist groups in order to attempt to
create peace in the Philippines. Working
through the OIC created a positive dialogue
between the government and the separatist
leaders. Marcos was successful in establishing a five‑year period of relative peace, especially following the 1976 ceasefire. This
precedent allowed future negotiations and
discussions between the government and
main separatist groups in the Philippines,
which has contributed to peace talks between the government and the MNLF for the
last three decades. The value that Marcos
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placed on negotiations became informally institutionalized in a sense,
carrying through to future administrations and creating what would become a
mechanism for separatist groups to air
their grievances and communicate their
goals; in essence, this created additional
political avenues for separatists as opposed
to using purely violent means to communicate with the government.
Thailand, instead of responding both
diplomatically and militarily as the Philippines did, chose only military means to respond to separatism. This resulted in a markedly different outcome. With aid from the
United States, Thailand began counterinsurgency efforts including the reassignment of
troops to the southern provinces. In 1974,
the ISOC (Internal Security Operational
Command) was formed as a subdivision of
the military to directly combat separatist action; which continues to operate in Thailand
and the southern provinces. During this
time, Thailand was politically unstable; student organization was squashed by the military followed by a military coup in 1976
(Morell and Samudavanija 1979, 319-20).
This, along with increasing tensions between
the military and the CPT (Communist Party
of Thailand), created a government unable
and unwilling to negotiate with separatist
groups. In response, separatist violence increased throughout the 1970s, particularly
among the PULO. Unlike in the Philippines,
in which separatist leaders openly communicated with the government and their names
and positions were well known throughout
the country, in Thailand an environment of
secrecy abounded. This was evident not only
in the main separatist groups, the PULO and

the BRN, but also in other politically motivated groups such as the CPT. Both the
separatist groups and the CPT retreated into
the hills of southern Thailand. Just as the
peace talks with Marcos placed value on
open communication, so too did the actions
of the Thai military in the 1970s; however,
the Thai government created an environment
in which identifying, let alone negotiating
with, separatist groups became elusive.
Government Responses to Separatist
Movements in the 1980s
After the failed peace negotiations in
the Philippines of the early 1970s, violence
once again began to increase throughout the
early 1980s particularly as corruption increased in the Marcos administration and
economic and social issues went unresolved.
However, in 1986 Marcos was ousted during
the four‑day February Revolution, also referred to as the EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) Revolution (Villegas 1987,
194). The end of the revolution was accomplished through the resignation of Marcos
and a new democratically elected government coming to power under President
Corazon Aquino (Villegas 1987, 195).
Aquino established a platform based on economic growth and an end to the insurgency;
she began to recreate the stability necessary
for these two goals to be accomplished. This
included the reinstatement of civil liberties
such as the writ of habeas corpus, freeing of
political prisoners, and face‑to‑face meetings with the leaders of the MNLF (Villegas
1987, 196-97). Additionally, Aquino made
efforts to renegotiate the peace agreement
originally proposed under Marcos. The Republic Act 6734 put the original peace
agreement back up for vote in a referendum
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in 1989; however, only four of the
provinces voted for the act (Rabasa
and Chalk 2001, 92). Despite only
four of the thirteen provinces voting in
favor of the referendum, the ARMM
(Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) was created in 1990. The ARMM
operates as an autonomous government; the
governments of the four provinces that voted
in favor of inclusion are under the ARMM
(Bertrand 2000, 40). It may appear as if the
MNLF had reached its goal of an autonomous Mindanao and would subsequently no
longer act as a separatist group. However,
the group deemed the inclusion of only four
of the thirteen provinces unacceptable and it
continued to exist and communicate with the
government.
The new policies of the Filipino government in the 1980s focused on tempering
the insurgency through means other than
martial law or direct military involvement.
Instead Aquino focused on issues of stability
throughout the country that were necessary
for a functioning democracy, including
greater institutional capacity after the centralized power under Marcos. Within a year
of the revolution, the economy in the Philippines had improved and Aquino actively
worked to improve the Philippines’ image
abroad as well as to reduce the Philippines’
external debt (Villegas 1987, 201). This
policy was overall effective in reducing the
amount of widespread violence from separatist groups. While some violent outbreaks
continued in the southern provinces, there
was a clear reduction in the amount and severity of attacks.
During the 1980s, a secondary separatist group came to the forefront in the Phil-
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ippines, when the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), an offshoot of the MNLF
gained a following. This later complicated
communication with the government, as the
government was accustomed to negotiating
with the MNLF and on several occasions
failed to include the MILF in the discussions, which only aided in fueling violence
from the MILF.
There was a significant decrease in
violence in Thailand in the 1980s. This was
due in part to the actions of General Prem
Tinsulanonda as prime minister (1980 to
1988) to liberalize and create institutionalized changes in Thailand (Melvin 2007, 34).
These changes were facilitated by an expanding economy and rapid industrialization
in Thailand. Prior to the 1980s Thailand had
relied on the export of agricultural products,
resulting in Thailand having some of the
lowest wages in the region and widespread
poverty (Hussey 1993, 14). While the Southern Malay Provinces remained largely engaged in agriculture, the significant gains
Thailand made beginning in 1985, led it to
be dubbed “Asia’s fifth tiger” (Hussey 1993,
14). With expanding economic power came
an increase in educational funding and political awareness, which had begun to become evident in the 1970s during the October Revolution, with the increase in student
political activity and the creation of the CPT
(Paribatra 1993, 882). The media became
freer to operate independently of the government, political parties grew and expanded,
and there was the creation of a middle class
in Thailand (Paribatra 1993, 883). These
represent positive changes in Thailand, in
which legitimate institutions existed through
which Thai citizens could express their
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political beliefs. The freedom of
the press is crucial in creating accountability and transparency in a
government. Additionally, increased
political activity and political options
(more political parties) allowed for a plurality not yet seen in Thai politics.
In addition to political and social
changes, changes were implemented to addressseparatist concerns in the southern
provinces as well. A military-civilian court
was established to allow Malay citizens to
report crimes that occurred during the military reign in the 1970s (Macan-Markar
2006). This was done in an attempt to reconcile the egregious crimes committed during
military rule including the “disappearance”
of many Malay activists, the military imprisonment of large groups of civilians, and the
killing of suspected separatist sympathizers.
The goal was to foster greater understanding
between Thai Buddhists and Malays regarding the political situation in the south. The
creation of a court to address the problems
of the Malay signified the changing role of
the government in Thailand. The government began to take political steps to institutionalize the role of the southern provinces
within the Thai government.
Prime Minister Tinsulanonda created CPM 43, a new security taskforce.
Unlike the security forces present in the
south in the past, CPM 43 was subject to the
constitution of Thailand and therefore could
not hold civilians against Thai law (Melvin
2007, 13). Not only had the manner in which
the government ensured security in the south
changed, but also the administration of the
southern provinces was changed in 1981. In
conjunction with CPM 43, the Southern Bor-
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der Provinces Administration Centre,
(SBPAC) was formed (Melvin 2007, 13).
This allowed greater control of the southern
provinces by local officials and established
amnesty for former separatists. This was part
of the new government push for political
participation and legitimate institutions
rather than focusing directly on the eradication of separatist groups. This was a clear
sign of the increasing capacity of the government. The Thai government had the capability not only to create institutions but
also to ensure their success through nonmilitary means, a crucial aspect missing in state
response prior to and after the 1980s. This
had not been possible prior to this point in
Thai history. However, the fragility of the
emerging democracy was challenged in the
early 1990s, when the plummeting economy
in Thailand and a lack of full transparency
by the government reversed the progress of
the 1980s.
Government Action in the 1990s
In 1988, Prem Tinsulanonda stepped
down as prime minister and Chatichai
Choonhavan became the first prime minister
to be an elected member of Parliament
(Neher 1992, 595). It appeared as if the democratic transition in Thailand would occur
effectively and peacefully. However these
prospects were set back in 1991 when a military coup overthrew the elected Thai government. The coup was unexpected and surprised Thai government officials as well as
the international community. There were
several reasons why the coup occurred. With
the increase in political parties and plurality
in the 1980s came widespread factionalism
in Thai politics. No one political party could
hold a majority in parliament,
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so coalitions were necessary. However, coalition alliances changed
quickly and the past problems of corruption still haunted Thailand. With the
freedom of the press instituted under
Tinsulanonda, the corruption was reported on an almost daily basis. This, combined with the frustration of the Thai public
with the incapability/unwillingness of the
government to institute policies to decrease
the gap between the wealthy elites and the
poor majority, led to discontent in the country. Thus, when the military coup occurred
in 1991, there were no immediate protests to
the overthrow of the elected government
(Neher 1992, 596).
The military coup was led by a group
that called itself the National Peace Keeping
Council, which appointed Anand Panyarachun as interim prime minister (Paribatra
1993, 887). Panyarachun worked on creating
a Thai constitution (which became effective
in 1997) and economic reforms. Elections
were scheduled for March 1992. The elections resulted in the appointment of General
Suchinda Kraprayoon (a member of the National Peace Keeping Council) as prime minister. Tensions quickly flared as Kraprayoon
was not an elected member of Parliament.
The Prime Minister attempted to relieve tensions by claiming that he would support an
amendment to the constitution that Panyarachun had begun work on, that would make it
necessary for the prime minister to be a
member of Parliament. The coalition majority supported the proposed amendment but
stipulated that Kraprayoon should remain
prime minister for the duration of his term.
This resulted in what came to be known as
Black May in Thailand (Paribatra 1993,

888). Black May began on May 17, 1992
and continued until May 20. Hundreds of
thousands of Thai citizens protested the premiership of Kraprayoon. The military initially responded by trying to violently suppress the protesters, resulting in approximately fifty deaths and hundreds of arrests.
Under clear public scrutiny the coalition decided to enact the amendment that would
stipulate that the prime minister had to be an
elected member of Parliament, thus, ending
Kraprayoon’s term as Prime Minister
(Shenon 1992). Anand Panyarachun, the interim prime minister from the military coup,
reinstated himself as prime minister. The
military leaders of the Kraprayoon administration were removed from their positions,
and relative peace returned to Thailand for a
time (Paribatra 1993, 890). However, the
problems that reigned during Choonhavan’s
premiership continued, namely widespread
poverty in the southern provinces, which
continued to be ignored due to the political
instability in the central government.
Thailand faced a severe economic
downturn in the late 1990s, along with many
other Asian countries. The growth that had
begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s was
created largely through foreign investments
and loans. When the bubble on growth
“burst” in the late 1990s, investors pulled
out of Thailand and the government owed
large amounts of money to outside investors
(Pempel 1999, 149-150). In addition, the
gap between the elite and the poor in Thailand was never adequately addressed during
Thailand’s economic growth; as such the
poorest in Thailand were most effected by
the downturn. During this time separatist
violence in Thailand was almost
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nonexistent, leading some to believe that the groups were no longer
active. However, despite the signing
of the new constitution in 1997, democratic initiatives in Thailand were overturned with the premiership of Thaksin
Shinawatra in 2001.
Similarly to Thailand, the early
1990s represented a time of relatively little
separatist violence in the Philippines. After
the February or People Power Revolution in
1986, the subsequent administrations were
considered to be legitimate by both the general public in the Philippines as well as by
the main separatist movements (the MNLF
and the MILF) (Bertrand 2000, 38). Coinciding with the precedent set by Marcos, the
Ramos government attempted to reconvene
peace talks with the MNLF. Despite the
creation of the ARMM, the MNLF wanted
more provinces to be included in the administrative region. Unlike Marcos’s administration, the new Filipino government was truly
democratic and as such a lasting agreement
seemed possible. Both the Filipino government and the MNLF had confidence that the
other would uphold their end of the peace
talks. The Ramos government had shown
that democracy was becoming entrenched in
the Philippines and the MNLF gained legitimacy through their backing by the OIC
(Bertrand 2000, 39). These were the conditions under which the 1996 Peace Agreement was signed.
The agreement was largely based off
of the initial Tripoli Agreement set out by
Marcos. An administrative council, the
SPCPD was placed in charge of the execution of the agreement. The implementation
of the agreement took place over a three‑-
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year period in which members of the MNLF
were given positions in the military as well
as the police, in addition to top spots in the
SPCPD. Then, after the establishment of the
SPCPD, a consolidation of the SPCPD and
the ARMM created one administrative body
for the fourteen then‑independent provinces,
after a vote by the fourteen provinces
(Bertrand 2000, 42). In theory, the creation
of these administrative bodies would create
lasting institutions and a political framework
through which separatist leaders could engage politically.
Problems began to emerge within the
ARMM and the SPCPD shortly after their
creation. Both have been plagued by mismanagement (in particular with regards to
the budget), and the SPCPD had an uncertain role. The SPCPD was set up to be a
transitory organization; it was not created to
remain a part of the administration of the
ARMM. As such the SPCPD holds little real
power; its function instead is to convene to
make suggestions to the Filipino government
(Bertrand 2000, 47). The ARMM has been
accused of acting as the “implementing arm
of the government” (Bertrand 2000, 48) as
opposed to an administrative body that
represents the interests of the local communities.
There were several problems stemming from the peace agreement that made
the possibility of a lasting peace settlement
unlikely. First, the MNLF has been steadily
losing power in the southern provinces. With
the relative peace of the 1990s and a legitimate government, membership decreased.
Additionally, the breakaway of the MILF
(the military branch of the MNLF) left the
MNLF with decreased military power as
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well as influence (due to decreased
numbers). This made the MNLF
eager to sign a peace agreement. Second, only four provinces voted to join
the ARMM in 1989 and the likelihood
of the remaining provinces voting to join
only a few years later was slim especially
due to the decrease in separatist supporters.
This limited participation made the creation
of an actual autonomous region difficult.
Also, the widespread corruption and inefficiency of the ARMM and the SPCPD made
their success unlikely. These two factors together, a weakened MNLF and the limited
number of provinces willing to join the
ARMM, set the agreement up for failure. To
complicate matters further, the MILF opposed the signing of the Peace Agreement.
This was because the MILF claimed that the
agreement failed to address the problem of
the loss of Moro ancestral lands. Also, while
they agree that it may have solved the problems of the MNLF, they believed that it did
not address the true problems of the Moro
people (which the MILF claimed to represent) (Bauzon 1999, 264).
The Current State of Separatist
Movements
Amid the fallout of the problems of the 1996
Peace Agreement, the 1998 elections were a
large loss for the MNLF and a new president
was elected, former Vice President Joseph
Estrada. Estrada’s presidency set the backdrop for the rising tensions in the Philippines. Estrada stepped down as president in
2000, facing allegations of payoffs from illegal gambling. A resurgence in violence followed, with an increase in violence and kidnappings in 2000. After Estrada stepped
down as president, Vice President Gloria

Arroyo became president of the Philippines
(Montesano 2004, 94). Separatist violence
continued to grow during Arroyo’s first
term, with other political issues prohibiting
the government from addressing separatist
groups. The government was plagued with
problems, including attacks by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on military bases and continuing accusations of political corruption (Montesano 2004, 95-96).
This corresponded with bombings by the
MILF, the now more violent and powerful
separatist group (Montesano 2004, 96).
Once again, peace talks were initiated to try to put an end to the violence in
the southern provinces. In late 2003 Arroyo
met with the MILF, and not the MNLF,
along with the OIC to attempt to put into
place a ceasefire and initiate peace talks
(Montesano 2004, 97). The peace talks resulted in yet another peace agreement in the
Philippines. In keeping with the pattern in
the Philippines, in January 2005 the MILF
fighters attacked government troops and the
ceasefire was broken, resulting in another
three years of violence (Montlake 2008).
The most recent action in the Philippines
maintains this pattern as well. In August
2008, the Filipino government and the MILF
leaders reached an agreement to expand the
size of the ARMM. This would have solidified a “homeland” for the Moro. However
the Filipino Supreme Court issued a ruling
to block the signing of the agreement, as it
was seen as possibly unconstitutional and
called for a hearing in which both the government and the separatist leaders would
speak (Montlake 2008). This action by the
Supreme Court was deemed unacceptable by
the MILF leaders and violence has once
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again marred the southern provinces. Hundred of thousands of people have been displaced and hundreds
killed in the ensuing violence that continues as Filipino security forces attempt to hunt down the MILF leaders.
Despite relative peace in the 1980s
and 1990s in Thailand, the turn of the twenty
-first century saw a renewal of violence that
had been dormant for thirty years. Following
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
Prime Minister Thaksin wanted to appear as
if separatist violence had ended in Thailand
as the United States announced a war on terror. Clearly, this was due to a fear of a U.S.
invasion in Thailand as part of this war on
terror. Thaksin attempted to eradicate indications of past separatism within Thailand
(Storey 2008, 36). This included the dismantling of CPM 43 and the SBPAC, some of
the only successful political institutions related to separatist violence Thailand had
been able to create and maintain. Thaksin
than installed local provincial leaders who
would respond directly to him (Storey 2008,
37). These actions taken by Thaksin undermined the positive democratic changes that
had taken place in Thailand and created instability with the removal of key institutions
(i.e. CPM 43 and the SBPAC). Thaksin returned to the Thai tradition of centralized
democracy, in an attempt to increase the
power of his political party Thai Rak Thai,
which had received little support from the
south in the previous elections (Bajoria and
Zissis 2008). Renewed violence emerged in
the south in January 2004, including daily
assassinations and kidnappings. Thaksin responded by declaring martial law in the
southern provinces.

SUNY Geneseo

Thaksin quickly lost support as violence continued to wreak havoc on the country and in 2006 he was replaced in a military
coup (Bajoria and Zissis 2008). An interim
prime minister was appointed and the
SBPAC and CPM 43 were reinstalled. The
Thai government attempted peace talks with
separatist leaders for the first time. However,
the government still does not know who the
leaders or members of the BRN (BRN-C)
and the PULO are, so secondary leaders of
disbanded groups were consulted. Due to
this, the peace talks did not occur with current members of separatist groups, and as
such the peace talks were not effective in
resolving the current separatist violence.
Violence continued and worsened in the
southern provinces, peaking in 2007. There
have been over 1,500 casualties since the
fighting began again in 2004. Martial law
continued in the southern provinces, with the
military having full control of the region
(Bajoria and Zissis 2008). This is a clear
violation of the SPBAC, which is supposed
to be in control of security in the south and
has to follow Thai laws. Under martial law,
the military does not have to comply with
Thai laws and historically has not, instead
committing heinous acts against the local
Malay population. The most recent protests,
in April 2009, exhibit the weakness of the
Thai government. Thousands of protestors
marched on the capital, Bangkok, disrupting
the New Year festivities and inciting violence from the police. The protestors are not
separatist members, but citizens frustrated
by the corruption and political instability in
Thailand. The attention now focused on the
protests once again distracts the government
from focusing on separatist violence. As
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government attempts to control the
protests, violence mars the southern
provinces.
In Thailand, where institutions have
been largely incapable of keeping up
with the demand for response from the
public, when attempts to institute policies
that would aid the Malay were tried they
have failed. This is evident historically, as
no lasting political institutions were created
in the sixty years since separatist violence
began with the exception of CPM 43 and the
SBPAC, and even they were dismantled for
a period of time. A more recent example can
be seen in the period following martial law
in 2004, when the government held elections
for Tambon councils (local administrative
bodies) as well as PAOs (Provincial Administrative Organizations). In theory, this
would have created power at the local level
and representation for differing viewpoints
(i.e. the Malay). Additionally, as 35 percent
of budgets must be approved by the PAO, it
would have allowed for Malay representation on financial matters (Albritton 2005,
170). However, by the end of the year the
results had still not been confirmed by the
government (Albritton 2005, 171). This pattern of government repression followed by
attempts at reconciliation, each time too
weak to reach demands, had repeated itself
throughout the twentieth century and continued into the twenty‑first century, each time
eliciting an angered and violent response
from the BRN.
Conversely in the Philippines, institutions were in place to address the grievances of the people. For example, beginning
in the 1950s the Filipino government passed
a series of Land Reform Acts that were
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aimed at ending the cycle of tenant farming
that was impoverishing the Moro. The original Land Reform Acts called for the tenant
farmer to pay the taxes on the land in order
to regain the land; however, the amount of
the taxes owed per parcel of land was an unattainable amount for the Moro, and as such
the acts as they stood aided fewer than
50,000 people within the first thirty years of
its passing. However, due to the strong institutions present in the Philippines there were
committees and councils through which the
Moro could explain their concerns. Recent
Land Reform Acts, in the last decade, have
been more successful as share tenancy has
been outlawed and institutions such as the
Department of Agrarian Reform were established to monitor progress and work toward
greater social justice.
Analysis
After chronicling the development of
the separatist movements and the government responses to them, it is important to
analyze how government action has affected
separatist violence. There are two components upon which the case studies will be
analyzed: state capacity and crisis vs. noncrisis transitions (a theory about democratic
transitions). State capacity will be used to
explain government action in Thailand and
the Philippines from the 1940s to the 1970s,
while crisis vs. noncrisis theory will be used
to explain government action in the 1980s
and early 1990s (post–democratic transition), and both capacity and crisis vs. noncrisis theory will be used to explain the current
separatist situation in each country.
State capacity refers to the governments’ ability to enact change, create institutions and infrastructure, and maintain
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political stability within the country. The crisis vs. noncrisis transition theory, as proposed by Stephen
Haggard and Robert Kaufman, will be
applied not to the democratic transitions
within Thailand and the Philippines
(though they both fit the model), but instead
as a guideline through which to characterize
government responses to separatist violence.
State Capacity
Before their democratic transitions,
Thailand and the Philippines represented
different levels of state capacity. Thailand
had low state capacity, was politically unstable (frequent military coups) and lacked the
ability to create meaningful and lasting institutions. However, the Philippines had high
state capacity, with routine peace negotiations occurring between the President of the
Philippines and the leaders of the MNLF
beginning in 1975. Additionally, the Philippines began land reform acts in the 1960s
and 1970s to restore the ancestral lands of
the Moro.
Thailand suffered from issues surrounding low state capacity, which can be
compared to theories that were presented in
Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in
Changing Societies. Huntington stated that
as political consciousness increases, as a result of increased literacy, education, and industrialization, so too will political demands
and participation. If a state, in this example
Thailand, were to be unable to meet those
expanding political demands, then the state’s
ability to create new institutions as well as
the integrity of the current political institutions would be greatly undermined
(Huntington 2006, 5). This can be seen in
Thailand from the beginning of the govern-
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ment’s reaction to the separatist movement.
As an attempt at conciliation, the Thai government passed the Patronage of Islam Act
in 1945. The Act was aimed at addressing
the complaints of the southern provinces,
namely the Thai government’s attempts at
forced assimilation. The act created a position within the Thai government for an Islamic advisor, the chularajamontri, to the
Thai king (Marshallsay 2008, 4). Additionally, shortly after the passing of the Patronage of Islam Act, the Thai government allowed Islamic law to be used in four of the
southern provinces on issues related to heritage and family affairs. However, the Malay
people did not respond as the Thai government expected. The Patronage Act incited
anger among the Malay, as many thought the
creation of an advisor on Islamic affairs to
the king was yet another way for the government to monitor and undermine the Malay.
Additionally, the chularajamontri did not
come from the southern provinces; instead
often the chularajamontri came from the
Bangkok area (Marshallsay 2008, 4). As the
chularajamontri was in control of the local
leaders in the southern provinces and was
their liaison to the central government, this
only confirmed the Malay suspicion that the
chularajamontri was not created in order to
represent their interests, but instead another
mechanism through which Thai control
could be established over the Malay.
Low state capacity prohibited the
government of Thailand from being able to
make progress in reducing separatist violence. What action the government took
seemed to only further the cause of the separatist groups. Due to its low capacity and
ineffective government action, Thailand
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largely relied on the military to
control the terrorist actions of the
separatist groups. This is evident by
the decade‑long emergency called in
response to the formation of the first
separatist groups in 1949. Additionally,
the relative strength of the military in Thai
society (seven military coups since the beginning of separatist violence) made the
military the only lasting governmental force
capable of dealing with separatist violence.
When government action failed and Thailand faced political instability in the 1970s
(a military coup in 1976 as well as violence
stemming from the CPT), the government
created the ISOC to manage separatist violence. Numerous problems emerged from
the government’s decision to allow the military to handle the separatist movements. The
military did not have to follow Thai laws;
this obviously resulted in widespread abuse
in the southern provinces. Individuals were
held without charges, people went missing,
and executions would occur without trials.
This type of military response did not temper separatist groups; it only helped to further their cause with the Malay people. Additionally, the military abuses undermined
the legitimacy of the Thai government and
failed to encourage political action over
separatist violence.
In the Philippines, high state capacity
worked to foster peace negotiations between
the government and separatist leaders. As
stated earlier, President Marcos first met
with separatist leaders in order to engage in
peace negotiations and a ceasefire in 1976.
The ability for a government to effectively
communicate and negotiate with a terrorist
group is a large accomplishment. With the
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OIC acting as a mediator, the government of
the Philippines was able to communicate its
goals and stance to the separatist leaders and
vice versa. This form of open dialogue created a mechanism through which both parties could air their grievances. Additionally,
it institutionalized a political mechanism
through which separatist leaders’ voices
were heard by top government officials. This
would establish the beginnings of political
participation necessary for leaders from the
MNLF to make the transition to local leaders
in the ARMM.
Peace negotiations and ceasefires
were helpful tools in creating temporary
peace in the Philippines. However, there has
yet to be lasting peace as the separatist
groups, namely the MNLF and the MILF
more recently, periodically renew violent
outbursts. This is often done in response to
an unfavorable result in a referendum or because the Filipino government fails to act
fast enough to their demands. The causes of
this reaction will be discussed in the analysis
of “moral hazard” as well as the crisis vs.
noncrisis theory.
Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory
Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory, as designed by Stephen Haggard and Robert
Kaufman, is used to explain democratic transitions. The theory states that economic and
social conditions that are present in a country during its democratic transition will
shape whether it responds in a crisis or noncrisis manner. There are several characteristics that are said to be emblematic of crisis
and noncrisis transitions. In a crisis transition, the government will act quickly, the
opposition powers gain greater influence in
political decisions, and the military and
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communist party are weakened.
According to the theory, a noncrisis
response looks almost the opposite of
a crisis response. The government reacts slowly to threats and power remains with authoritarian figures, the opposition has little role in government, and
the military and communist parties are
strong within the country (Haggard and
Kaufman 1997, 269). The theory presented
is based on governments in transition responding to economic crisis. Haggard and
Kaufman use Thailand and the Philippines
as examples of noncrisis and crisis transitions, respectively, within their theory (270).
However, these characteristics can also be
used to explain the Thai and Filipino governments’ responses to separatist violence
after their democratic transitions.
The Philippines represents a crisis
transition. This is evident in the government’s action toward separatist groups. The
first criterion of a crisis transition is quick
government response to an issue. This is evident in the Philippines in the government’s
repeated negotiations with separatist leaders.
Shortly after violence begins, the president
of the Philippines reengages in negotiations
with the MNLF leaders in order to successfully create a ceasefire and peace agreement.
There have been over six peace agreements
since Marcos’s initial dealings with the
MNLF leaders in 1976. The second criterion
of a crisis response is increased influence
given to the opposition power. This is arguably the Philippines largest problem in fighting separatist violence. The government’s
patterned response of going to the separatist
leaders in order to create peace agreements
has given disproportionate power to leaders
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of the MNLF and the MILF. The government has already created the ARMM and
created government positions for separatist
leaders, and the separatist groups continue to
demand more from the government. This has
led to the breakdown of peace in the south as
the separatist groups seek greater power and
influence in the country. It appears as if the
government’s capacity to create peace agreements and ceasefires backfired due to the
power that it has given the separatist leaders.
The leaders of the MNLF and the MILF are
aware that if they seek more from the Filipino government, all they have to do is create a violent backlash and the government
will return with another peace agreement,
including further provisions to meet their
demands. As such there is no incentive for
the separatist groups to uphold the peace
agreements they enter into, as greater results
can be garnered through violence. The last
two criteria, a weak military and communist
party, are characteristic of the Philippines.
Additionally, the weakness of these two
groups has enabled the government to focus
on the issue of separatist violence, unlike in
Thailand where political instability due to
the power of the military and communist
party has crippled the government’s ability
to act.
Thailand is an example of a noncrisis
response. The government has been slow to
respond to terrorists. This is for two reasons,
the government’s inability to act and subsequent reliance on the military, and the government’s focus on other issues including
violence from the communist party and political instability. Because of this, little political action was taken to temper separatist
groups. The power in the Thai government
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has remained with the central government due to its noncrisis response. The leaders of the BRN/BRNC and the PULO are not known in Thailand and because of the government’s
lack of political action, there was no attempt to negotiate with them in the twentieth century. When recent attempts at peace
negotiations were facilitated by the Thai
government, the government was so unaware of who the separatist leaders were that
officials met with a secondary separatist
leader from a group that has long since been
disbanded. Additionally, the current low capacity of the government has allowed for a
resurgence in violence as actions taken in
part by the government cannot be enforced
(i.e. the re-installation of CPM 43 and the
SBPAC). The separatist groups’ secrecy was
fueled by the government action taken
against the communist party (as both groups
retreated into the hills of the southern provinces) as well as by brutal military action.
This has in part reduced membership in the
group, as it is difficult for the groups to recruit new members due to their secretive nature and secluded locations. The last two criteria have been shown through government
action, and the military’s power is evident in
its task of controlling the southern provinces. The CPT clearly exhibited a great deal
of power, as the threat of the CPT was seen
as greater than the threat of the BRN or the
BRN-C by the Thai government. This is evident by the government focusing its attentions on the CPT as opposed to the separatist
groups. While the Thai government’s noncrisis response has effectively managed tensions (with the exception of periodic violence) and limited the size and scope of
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separatist membership, it has not been able
to mediate separatist violence when it does
occur. The military has only been able to
suppress the violence, not stop it. Once separatist violence begins, the Thai government
does not have the mechanisms and institutions in place to arbitrate the conflict.
Issues for Future Peace in Thailand and
the Philippines
Both Thailand and the Philippines will need
to alter their policies toward separatist
movements, for either country to be successful in ending separatist violence. In Thailand, the historically weak central government has resulted in the use of military responses to separatist violence and at times
full military control of the south. In the Philippines, the strength of the central government coupled with international support
from the OIC has led to multiple peace negotiations and ceasefires. However, the government’s failure to impose strict consequences for violations of the peace agreements has created a pattern of violence,
through which the separatist groups have
gained greater power over the central government.
Issues in Thailand: Stability and
Diplomacy
As noted previously, the central government of Thailand continues to struggle to
establish political stability. Currently, protests rage in the capital in response to the
recent elections. Until the government can
create lasting stability, including open and
free elections, the government will remain
unable to respond diplomatically to separatist threats. The Thai government’s historical
reliance on the military to control separatist
violence has led to widespread military
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abuses and has left separatist members with no political avenues
through which to express their grievances.
Even if the current government of
Thailand were to sign a peace agreement
with separatist leaders (providing the government could effectively find the leaders of
the main separatist groups, the BRN and the
PULO), the agreements may be of little consequence as the government’s legitimacy is
in question. Also, the ability of the government to follow through on any agreement
would be unlikely. For Thailand to establish
political stability, greater transparency and
institutions that are viewed as legitimate by
the public will need to be put into place. The
beginning of this was seen in the 1980s and
1990s in Thailand, when there was increased
political participation and political awareness. It is not uncommon for a country undergoing a democratic transition to experience increased violence and instability, as
has been the case in Thailand. If Thailand
could reestablish the level of progress it possessed in the 1980s and 1990s, then steps
toward reducing separatist violence could be
taken. This occurred briefly with the creation of the SBPAC and CPM 43 in 1981.
Without diplomatic action, the abuses that
occur under full military control will only
help to further the separatist cause. Additionally, as is occurring presently in Thailand, when there is dissatisfaction in the
country (protestors as well as separatist violence), the government will not have the
mechanisms in place with which to diffuse
the conflict.
Issues in the Philippines: Moral Hazard
The concept of moral hazard applies
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to the peace negotiations between the Philippines and the MNLF, and more recently the
MILF. As earlier stated, the separatist
groups have violated several peace agreements and ceasefires in the last three decades. The reason for this can be explained
through moral hazard. Moral hazard can be
applied to any agreement between two parties; it functions on the principle that parties
will behave according to costs and benefits.
When entering into an agreement, if the
benefits of not following the contract outweigh the costs of breaking the agreement,
then the party may intentionally act in a way
that violates moral norms or the contract itself (Mirrlees 1999).
In the case of the Filipino separatist
groups, the first peace agreement, the Tripoli
Agreement signed in December of 1976,
there were no provisions put in place that
would give the MNLF incentives to abide by
the agreement. There is no mention of repercussions for not following the peace agreement or for breaking the ceasefire. The
agreement outlines the concessions to be
made by the Central Government to the
MNLF, including the creation of an autonomous region in the southern provinces, separate Sharia courts, guaranteed representation
for Muslims in the central government as
well as in all Filipino courts, and amnesty
for political prisoners and separatist group
members for crimes committed in the southern provinces (Government of the Republic
of the Philippines 1976). Concessions to be
made by the MNLF included only certain
areas not to be included in the autonomous
region and a percentage of profits from mining. This agreement conceded to the MNLF
one of its largest goals, the creation of a
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separate autonomous region in the
south to be governed by Muslims
according to Islamic law. However, as
stated, not all of the southern provinces
were to be included in the autonomous
region. The MNLF used this as a reason
to break the agreement and, without penalties for breaking the agreement, incited further violence in the southern provinces. This
led the Central Government to engage in further peace negotiations (and concessions)
with the MNLF and gave the MNLF the
power and influence it wanted in the Philippines.
This is obviously problematic for the
Philippines, despite the government’s ability
to successfully negotiate with separatist
leaders; the negotiations are not effective if
the separatists have no intention or incentive
to follow the stipulations of the ceasefire. In
order to create lasting ceasefires that could
result in an end to separatist violence, the
government needs to enact stringent penalties for breaking a ceasefire or peace agreement. Furthermore, these repercussions need
to be written into the peace agreements so
that they are not merely threats, but legal
ramifications for failure to uphold a contract.
Additionally, if the MNLF or the MILF does
break the peace agreement/ceasefire, the
consequences laid out by the government
must be enforced in the fullest capacity.
Without these consequences, the violence in
the Philippines will continue to escalate as
the separatists seek greater power and influence in the country.
The only attempt to take such action
by the Filipino government was with the
signing of the “Implementing Guidelines on
the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Trip-

oli Agreement of Peace of
2001” (Government of the Republic of the
Philippines 2001). The guidelines established actions taken by the MNLF or the
MILF that would constitute criminal actions
and violations of the agreements established
with the Filipino government. This was a
step forward by the Filipino government in
asserting its authority over the separatist
groups and establishing actions that would
not be tolerated by the government. Additionally, the presence of U.S. military troops
in the southern Philippines temporarily
maintained peace in the region. However,
the government failed to follow through on
the guidelines set forth, as within two years
the government was once again engaging in
peace negotiations with the separatist
groups, despite the failure of the separatist
groups to uphold the guidelines. Additionally, the government has recently attempted
to sign a peace agreement that would expand
the size of the ARMM. This only reaffirms
the process the separatist groups create, creating greater violence to gain greater rewards from the government.
There are several different ways to
deal with the problem of moral hazard in the
Filipino case. The government could simply
place an ultimatum on the separatist groups,
that if they do not comply with future peace
agreements than the government will no
longer negotiate with them. However, considering the track record of the Filipino government separatist groups may not take the
ultimatum seriously. Additionally, if the
government were to diplomatically cut off
the separatist leaders, then it would only
serve to force the separatist groups outside
of the political system and most likely
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increase the violence in the southern provinces. It is a benefit to the
government that the separatist leaders
have been able to marginally integrate
into the political spectrum; it would be
a mistake to alienate the leaders of these
movements.
The government could continue with
the status quo, in which it is able to procure
relative peace for a short period of time.
However, the pattern that has been created
by the government has already given disproportionate power to the separatist leaders
and the current position of the government
does not provide for long‑term solutions to
the problem of separatist violence. The third
option available to the government is to take
a multifaceted approach to the separatists.
This would include both internal diplomacy,
international support, and a military response to noncooperation. The government
should continue to meet with separatist leaders; it is its direct link to the motivations and
demands of the separatist groups. However,
this does not mean that the government has
to necessarily continue to sign peace agreements and give concessions to the separatist
leaders. Due to the creation of the ARMM,
separatist leaders hold political positions
through which they can participate in government. The Filipino government should
encourage participation through governmental as opposed to extra‑political means. International support is necessary due to the
international support that the MNLF and the
MILF hold. Presently, international support
has been behind the MNLF and the MILF;
this has put the Filipino government in a defensive position that has only worsened the
interests of the Philippines in peace negotia-

tions. With the proper international backing,
the Filipino government can present a
stronger front at negotiations and have international backing if military force is necessary against the separatist groups. This can
also act as a preventative measure, so that
the separatist groups understand that the
Filipino government is serious about the
consequences for breaking a peace agreement or ceasefire. The last component, military force, may be necessary if the separatist
groups continue to be combative. As earlier
stated, it would be a mistake to cut off the
separatist groups diplomatically because of
its important link to the groups’ goals and
motivations. By setting out specific military
consequences to not abiding by peace agreements and ceasefires, separatists will have a
clear understanding of the repercussions of
violating the agreements. This is more effective than the current military action, because
the government has not set guidelines for the
military initiatives. Instead the military is
sent to “hunt” down leaders responsible for
certain events, which turns into several raids
and deaths, but soon the government is once
again negotiating with separatist leaders.
There needs to be a clear plan and goal of a
military initiative, not simply letting troops
loose in the southern provinces, which does
not gain separatist compliance. This last option seems the most viable for long‑term
peace. It addresses not only the immediate
problems of violent outbreaks with military
intervention, but also the long‑term problems of separatist noncompliance. This is
not to say that this plan will create immediate peace. It is likely that any new initiative
the government takes against separatist violence will, in the short run at least, increase
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separatist violence. This is because
the separatists are quite content with
the status quo, as it benefits them and
their goals. However, if the government
can mitigate the short‑term violent response and continue with a plan toward
long‑term peace, then the Philippines will
be able to temper and hopefully eliminate
separatist violence.
Conclusions and Prescriptions
The case studies of Thailand and the
Philippines exemplify differing government
responses to terrorism. Both Thailand and
the Philippines experience separatist violence stemming from minority Muslim ethnic groups in the southern regions of the
countries. However, the governments’ responses to these separatist threats have
shaped the current security situations in the
countries. In Thailand, the country’s low
capacity forced a reliance on the military to
control separatist violence. Without restraints on the military, few legal implementations were used in detaining or executing
prisoners. This abuse contributed to ongoing
separatist violence. In the Philippines, the
government’s high capacity allowed for negotiations with top separatist leaders. However, without restraints placed on the separatist groups to ensure their upholding of the
peace agreement, the MNLF and the MILF
continue to wreak havoc on the southern
provinces in order to gain greater control of
the region.
In this sense, Thailand used only
military means through which to subdue
separatist violence due to the inability of the
government to use diplomatic means;
whereas in the Philippines, the focus of government action has been through diplomatic
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means (though increased military initiatives
have been taken recently), but the lack of
follow‑through by the government to impose strict and meaningful repercussions for
violating peace agreements has resulted in a
cycle of violence.
In order for lasting peace to be
achieved by Thailand and the Philippines
changes, will need to be enacted. In Thailand, the first step toward reduced violence
is strengthening and legitimizing the central
government. Separatist groups in Thailand
were largely dormant in the 1980s and
1990s, when the government was at its peak
effectiveness. It seems that the separatist are
willing to accept positive change in the
country, whether it is political, economic, or
social. When the government focused on
domestic issues and not military intervention
in the south, in the late 1980s and early
1990s, separatist violence was at its lowest
point, since its beginnings in the 1940s.
In the Philippines, the government
needs to create one clear message on how it
will handle separatist violence. As it stands,
the government has historically allowed
separatists to break peace agreements, resort
to violence, and then gain concessions from
the government. Only recently has the government expressed what actions would violate peace agreements. Even after the
“guidelines” were presented, the Filipino
government met again with separatist leaders two more times, to offer an expansion of
provinces in the ARMM. These mixed messages offer no incentive for separatist to cooperate with the government. Even when the
government threatens military repercussions,
the separatist have been willing to deal with
the military for a short period, knowing
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the government will soon offer
new incentives and peace agreements, as in the 2003 and 2008 peace
agreements. The Filipino government
needs to not only set repercussions for
not following peace agreements, but to
follow through with these consequences.
Otherwise, the current cycle of violence and
then negotiations, with the separatist leaders
welding the power, will continue to plague
the country.
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Sir Thomas Roe at the Mughal Court:
Seventeenth Century English
Cultural Assumptions

Submitted by Katherine Schwartz
Throughout his time at Emperor Jahangir’s court, Sir Thomas Roe, the first
official English ambassador to the Mughal
Empire in India, complained about the
Mughal people, saying that “my toil with
barbarous unjust people is beyond patience,” and that “we live in a Barbarous
unfaithful place.”1 This type of writing is
consistent with later characterizations of
English superiority and of the Indian people
under British control in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. However, from 1615
to 1619, when Roe was stationed in the
Mughal court, England had little value in
trade and no political or military power in
the Mughal Empire. That Roe writes of the
inferiority of the Mughal people from such a
strong conviction of English supremacy tells
us something important: that English culture
even in pre-imperial times contained those
elements and assumptions necessary for the
later rise of Imperialism.
When Sir Thomas Roe was presented to the Emperor Jahangir, the Mughal
Empire had been a major power on the Indian subcontinent for almost a century and
controlled an enormous area of land.2 Except for a fifteen year period where control
was taken by Afghan nobles, the Mughal
dynasty ruled on the Indian subcontinent

continuously, if only nominally, from 1526
until 1756.3 The Emperor Jahangir ruled
from 1605 until 1627, and while he was not
“a great general, a great organizer, or a great
builder” as his predecessors had been, his
reign saw expansion through conquest and
he was a great patron of the arts, particularly
painting and architecture.4
By the time the first part of what
would become the Mughal Empire had been
conquered, European traders, particularly
the Portuguese, had been active in the Indian Ocean for twenty-eight years. However, the English did not establish official
presence in the Indian Ocean until 1601,
and it would take seven more years until
they made contact with the Mughal Empire.
On December thirty-first in the year
1600, a royal charter was granted to “The
Company of Merchants of London trading
into the East Indies.”5 The most important
reasons traditionally given for this were the
simultaneous feelings that England deserved
a role in international trade and concern that
England would be barred from participation
in this lucrative commerce. Worries that
Dutch presence in the East Indies would cut
off England’s participation in this profitable
trade spurred the creation of the English
East India Company and the subsequent
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English voyages to the East Indies
themselves. At first, the Company’s voyages were short-term and
experimental, but after the success of
several fleets, the Company turned to
joint-stock ownership, a more long-term,
communal source of capital. The Company was active in some fashion from 1600,
when it received its original charter, up until
the 1620’s.
On October fourth in the year 1614,
during the debate on “sending an ambassador to the Grand Magore’s court,” Sir Thomas Roe’s name was proposed.6 Apparently a man of “pregnant understanding,
well spoken, learned, industrious, of a
comely personage, and one of whom there
are great hopes that he may work much
good for the Company,” Roe was also appointed official ambassador by King James
I, indicating his mission’s dual purposes of
securing trade and privileges for the Company and strengthening Britain’s position
overseas.7 Sir Thomas Roe is by himself a
fascinating character, and as the first royally
appointed representative of England in the
Mughal court, who also managed to leave
behind a comprehensive journal, Roe looms
large in the history of the English in India.
Sir Thomas Roe left England with a
fleet led by Captain William Keeling on
March sixth, 1615, and arrived after almost
eight months at Swalley Hole near the modern city of Surat, on the northwest coast of
the Indian subcontinent. Determined that
his arrival to the Mughal Empire should be
“an occasion of dignity and splendor,” Roe
did not leave the ship for a full week,
mainly due to arguments over customs
searches.8 Although he was told multiple
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times that “it was the Custom of this Country that nothing could pass but by the Custom house, and there had to be searched,”
Roe refused to submit, saying that he “had
thought that they had understood that free
kings and their Ambassadors had been
above ordinary customs” and he would by
no means submit to this “Common and barbarous usage.”9 After disembarking in late
September 1615, Roe remained in Surat for
approximately five weeks, finally making
the journey to Ajmir, the current location of
the court, where he was presented to the
Emperor Jahangir on January tenth, 1616.
Roe lived in the Mughal Empire until February seventeenth, 1619, during which time
he followed Jahangir’s court as it moved
from place to place. Throughout the period, he labored to improve England’s reputation among Mughal officials and tried desperately to obtain a royal farman, or contract, for permanent trade. Roe’s efforts at
the Mughal court are documented in a journal which he kept from 1615, when he left
England, to 1619, when he departed the
Mughal Empire. While it is a rich historical source, Roe’s journal does present some
problems. Roe’s journal was intended to be
an account of his expenses for his employers and, consequently, Roe tries to present
himself and his actions in the best possible
light. This paper focuses mainly on the
subconscious cultural attitudes expressed in
the journal, but Roe’s work at the Mughal
court is also reflected in the documents of
the Calendar of State Papers, the works of
Edward Terry, William Keeling, William
Hawkins, and Thomas Mun, not to mention
a broad range of histories about the Mughal
Empire and the English East India
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Company.
Roe’s journal documenting
his time in the Mughal court is a fantastic resource not only for the factual
details it divulges but also because of
the cultural assumptions that it reveals.
It has been documented by historians such
as Michael Brown and Colin Mitchell that
Roe was not writing with Imperialist aims in
mind. Despite this lack of conscious intention, Roe’s journal exposes elements of
Roe’s society, namely feelings about English superiority and the inferiority of exotic
others, that became later in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries integral parts of
English Imperialist culture. These ideas,
though, and the broader ideology that Edward Said terms Orientalism, are incongruous in a time where England was not a
world power and really had very little overseas influence.
The English factors in the Mughal
Empire in Roe’s time were completely dependent on the emperor’s favor. While
England in the early seventeenth century
possessed capable naval power, the English
military was small, even by European standards, and inefficient and ill-equipped.
However, Roe came to the Mughal court
convinced that England was at least as powerful, if not more so, than the Mughal Empire. He claimed that he would restore the
“King’s Honor” by improving the general
opinion of and respect given to the English
or “lay my life and fortune both in the
ground” in trying.10 To this end, Roe insisted on receiving the courtesy he thought
he was due, based upon European treatment
of ambassadors, even in the face of “the
Custom of this Country,” for example using

his own forms of reverence when meeting
with Emperor Jahangir.11 In his journal,
Roe comes off as demanding, obstinate, and
disrespectful of the emperor, the princes,
and Mughal officials. In both formal communications with the Emperor as well as his
daily interactions with the court, Roe tried
very hard to assert England’s prestige, repeatedly saying that he was the ambassador
of a “Mighty Prince in league with him
[Jahangir].”12 Even after spending almost
two years in the Mughal court, Roe asserted
in a letter to James I that the English would
“at last by our force teach them to know
your Majesty is Lord of all the Seas and can
Compel that by your power, which you have
sought with Courtesy, which this King cannot yet see for swelling.”13
At the same time that Roe exaggerated England’s power and prestige, he denigrated the Mughal court for various perceived moral faults, one of these being excessive pride. When describing the Mughal
court in a letter to George Abbott, the
Archbishop of Canterbury, Roe claimed that
“their Pride endures no terms of equality”
and that they are characterized by
“barbarous pride and Customs” and “dull
ignorance.”14 Near the end of his tenure in
the Mughal court, Roe likewise bemoaned
“the pride and falsehood of these people,
that attended only advantage and were governed by private interest and appetite.”15
Roe’s negative evaluation of the pride of the
Mughal people is connected with his conception of them as heathens. In their supposed arrogance they refuse to accept Christianity, in Roe’s eyes the one true religion.16
Roe begrudged any “admiration of such a
virtue in a heathen Prince,” and complained
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that “with envy and sorrow…we
having the true vine should bring
forth Crabs, and a bastard stock
grapes.”17
Another facet of Mughal political life that Roe often complained about
was court intrigue. As Roe wrote, “all the
Policy and wicked craft of the Devil is not
practiced alone in Europe; here is enough to
be learned, or to be despised.”18 Roe stated
as well that “all Cunning that the Devil can
teach is frequent, even in the court, where is
wanting no art nor wicked subtlety to be or
do evil.”19 Roe recorded time and again
instances of Mughal officials offering him
verbal promises and not acting on them,
which Roe takes as a sign of falseness.
This continued, according to Roe, except for
those times when he had presents to offer.
Other forms of deception that Roe noted
have to do with the Portuguese or their
Mughal allies talking badly of the English in
order to force them from the Emperor’s favor.
Roe complained strenuously about
the practice of gift-giving within Mughal
diplomacy. In Roe’s mind, this was yet one
more manifestation of the Mughal people’s
contemptible vanity and desire for wealth in
the form of jewels and novelties. Roe’s
thoughts about presents were established
early on in his time in the Mughal Empire,
as when he told the Governor of Surat that
he “must not expect any [presents] from me
in that kind: presents were for suitors.”20
Two years later, Roe had occasion to lament
how “Asaph Khan [an important Mughal
official], for a sordid hope only of buying
some toys, was so reconciled as to betray
his son, and to me obsequious, even to flat-

tery; for the ground of all this friendship
was that he might buy the Gold taken in the
prize.”21 Asaph Khan’s greed, Roe concluded, consumes him to the point that he is
willing to give up his honor, in Roe’s mind
his very manhood, for a bauble. No
Mughal official seems unaffected by such
greed, even the Emperor Jahangir, whom
Roe said “never takes any request to heart
except it Come accompanied [by presents]
and will in plain terms demand it.”22
Roe’s actual position within the
Mughal court is a striking foil to his sense
of self-worth and national pride. In the
eyes of the emperor, and also the Mughal
officials, Roe was a subject of Jahangir, not
an independent man with the powers of a
king. Instead of being lavishly hosted by
the Mughal emperor, for example, Roe was
allowed nothing by Jahangir “but a house of
Mud, which I was enforced to build half.”23
Roe’s journal, when read carefully, reveals
the extent to which his Mughal hosts viewed
him as a subject. On October twelfth, 1617,
Roe explained how he was taken by Asaph
Khan, one of Jahangir’s primary advisors, to
see Prince Khurram, the future emperor,
about the treatment of English merchants at
Surat. While trying to put Khurram at ease,
Asaph Khan mentioned that the English
“were his Subjects.”24 This might appear to
be a trivial incident, as Roe interpreted this
as a phrase Asaph Khan “must use” when
speaking with the prince, but it becomes
more significant in light of Mughal diplomatic practices.25 Men such as Roe were
incorporated into the “rank and file of
[Mughal] nobility,” and those who were
“staying any length of time were expected
to express an oath of loyalty to the emperor;
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an envoy, in effect, served two
masters while in a foreign court.”26
These diplomats were regularly
granted rank in the Mughal government
and were rewarded with lands and titles
if they enjoyed the emperor’s favor.27
The ambassador’s subsequent duties included following the rules of reverence due
to the emperor, which Roe tried to avoid
doing, and also offering small, personal presents to the ruler “to formalize the oath of
loyalty,” which Roe did, though perhaps
with different intentions.28 In all, these
worked to underscore the foreigner’s subordinate status.
That Roe was considered a subject
of the Emperor Jahangir, and thus of the
Mughal Empire, can be seen elsewhere in
his journal. As was custom among the
Mughal emperors, Jahangir established what
was essentially a personal cult based on devotion to the imperial throne. On August
seventeenth, 1616, Sir Thomas Roe was inducted into this group, receiving a “medal
of gold as big as sixpence” from Jahangir to
signify his position as client of the emperor.
This outwardly simple gift marked him as a
member of the circle of nobles completely
and utterly loyal to the emperor. Although
Jahangir most likely knew that Roe would
remain loyal to the English king, this ceremony and the social position that went with
it signified that Jahangir expected Roe to be,
at least outwardly, loyal and subordinate.
Roe did not comprehend the significance of
this gift but acknowledged its value in the
eyes of the Mughal court, asserting “none
may [wear the king’s Image] but to whom it
is given.”29
Roe’s journal also made it clear that

English trade was uncertain and devalued
by the Mughal elite. Roe admitted on several occasions that the quality of English
trading goods and presents were inferior,
even recounting a story about how Jahangir,
upon receiving gifts from Roe asked a Jesuit
“whether the King of England were a great
King that sent presents of so small value.”30
Roe’s fears that England did not have the
requisite goods to be seen as a valuable
trading partner are validated by the fact that
there is almost no mention of the English in
writings by members of the Mughal court.
Even Emperor Jahangir, in his personal
journal, made not a single mention of the
English as a group or Roe as an individual,
despite Roe’s protestation that “[Jahangir]
appointed me a place above all other men”
and that the emperor “more esteemed me
than ever any Frank [a general term for a
European].”31
Roe’s belief in English superiority
seems, in matters of trade, to equate to a
feeling that England deserved to be given
treaties securing permanent trading rights,
fair treatment, and other similar indulgences. Initially, this was manifested in an
immediate insistence that Mughal officials
sign a farman guaranteeing what Roe considered to be reasonable treatment for the
English. Roe’s idea of reasonable handling, though, included demands that could
not be granted, such as freedom from customs searches. As early as October ninth,
1615, barely two weeks after landing at
Swalley Hole, Roe was already complaining
that “so base are our Conditions in this Port
and subject to so many slaveries, such as no
free heart can endure, that I do resolve either to establish a trade on free Conditions
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or to do my best to dissolve it.”32
Roe’s trade negotiations demonstrate a sense that the English should
be exempt from customary Mughal
rules and procedures. On March
twenty-sixth, 1616, Roe submitted a set
of “Articles to his Majesty’s Consideration.”33
On April third, Roe received notice
from Asaph Khan that his demands had been
found to be unreasonable, and he immediately jumped to the conclusion that this was
merely a bluff, and that “the king had not
seen them, or else” the message from Asaph
Khan was only a “bribe, to which, even to
base and sordidness, he is most open.”34
Roe automatically assumed that, had they
been seen by the emperor, he, as a just and
noble person, would have agreed to them;
the idea that the Mughal court did not value
English trade enough to grant them special
privileges did not enter Roe’s thoughts.
Roe refused to compromise on any significant matter, even late in his embassy, and he
accordingly failed in one of the main purposes of his embassy as his determined adherence to a treaty favoring England prevented him from obtaining any permanent
agreement on trade. Roe’s long years of
work in the Mughal Empire amounted to
very little, financially speaking, and English
trade was just as uncertain in 1619 as it was
in 1615 when Roe first landed at Swalley
Hole.
Roe’s journal reveals a fundamental
loathing of the land, climate, and food of the
Mughal Empire as well as of its people.
Throughout, Roe complained that he endured nearly unbearable circumstances, being “every way afflicted- fires, smokes,

floods, storms, heat, dust, flies, and no temperate or quiet season,” and also being subject to illness.35 When making his initial
journey from Surat to the emperor’s court,
Roe claimed that he was “so sick as at night
I was past sense and given over for dead,”
and that five other men were ill.36 Only divine intervention saved him as “God raised
[him]” from the brink of death.37 In addition to mentioning instances of European
illness, Roe also recorded epidemics among
the Mughal people, including one in Agra
that lasted for several months in 1616.38
Roe frequently complained about the
condition of Mughal territories while traveling. On his journey to Agra, Roe described
“Brampore,” the home of Prince Parwiz, as
“a miserable and Barren Country, the towns
and villages all built of Mud, so that there is
not a house for a man to rest in.”39 On December twenty-sixth, 1616, while following
Jahangir’s court, Roe noted that “we passed
through woods and over Mountains, torn
with bushes, tired with the incommodities of
an impassible way, where many Camels perished... the king rested two days” during
which time “thousands of Coaches, Carts
and Camels lying in the woody Mountains
without meat and water.”40 Roe disapproved not only of the conditions of the road
but also of the way the journey was handled,
saying that “there was not a misery nor punishment which either the want of Government or the natural disposition of the Clime
gave us not.”41 In sum, Roe claimed that
the Mughal Empire “is the dullest, basest
place that ever I saw, and makes me weary
of speaking of it.”42
Roe explains the cultural defects he
perceives in the Mughal people by
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retreating into the language of barbarism. To him, the Mughal people
and their culture were uncivilized,
crude, backwards, and brutal. That
Roe equates barbarism with both brutality and with lack of culture is seen in his
other writings. In a letter to King James I,
he wrote:
Fame has done much for the Glory
of this place… But the Government
so uncertain, without written law,
without Policy, the Customs mingled
with barbarism, religions infinite,
the buildings of mud (except the
King’s houses and some few others):
that even this greatness and wealth
that I admired in England (reserving
due reverence to the Persons of
Kings) is here, where I see it, almost
contemptible…43
Many of Roe’s records of Mughal barbarism
are of violence and physical savagery.
Early on, Roe noted that convicted criminals
were sometimes put to death by being trampled by elephants, and that Jahangir “some
times sees with too much delight in blood
the execution done by his Elephants.”44 Instances of cruelty also provide convenient
occasions for Roe to explicitly state the superiority of English customs. On March
twenty-third, 1616, Roe wrote that Jahangir
had “Condemned a Mogull on suspicion of
felony… [and] sent him to me… for a Slave,
or to dispose of him at my pleasure.”45 Roe
replied that, though this was “esteemed a
high favor… in England we had no slaves,
neither was it lawful to make the Image of
God fellow to a Beast” and so he would “use
him as a servant, and if his good behavior
merited it, would give him liberty.”46 Later

that same year Roe recounted another story
of how Jahangir had condemned a group of
thieves, and “there was no way to save their
lives, but to sell them for slaves.”47 As in
the earlier situation, Roe replied that he
“would not buy them as slaves, only pay
their ransom and free them” and in doing so
would make sure that the Jahangir “should
not be ignorant I had more mercy than he,
and that a Christian esteemed the life of a
Moore above money.”48 Interestingly, most
of Roe’s broadly disapproving comments
concern the emperor Jahangir himself.
Many of these focus on gender, presenting
Jahangir as effeminate. Roe claimed, for
example, that Jahangir was “gentle [and]
soft” and repeatedly asserted that real power
at court rested with Nur Jahan, Jahangir’s
consort, to the extent that the emperor had
“yielded himself into the hands of a woman
[Nur Jahan]”and so could not even control
his family, let alone his country.49
The views that Roe expresses, both
directly and indirectly, are also seen in the
writings of other Englishmen. Similar sentiments about English superiority can be
found in the journals of contemporary Company employees, such as those of Edward
Terry, William Hawkins, William Keeling,
and Thomas Bonner, as well as in the descriptive and business writings of Company
members like Thomas Mun, whose essay “A
Discourse of Trade, from England unto the
East Indies” is particularly peppered with
expressions of religious prejudices.50
In part, Roe’s observations seem to
have been colored by a set of assumptions
about Asiatic regimes, an outlook that Edward Said has termed Orientalism. Although
Sir Thomas Roe lived long before the Raj
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and the height of the British Empire in India, his evaluation of the
people of the Mughal Empire fits
nicely into the “’Oriental’ ideas” that
Said suggests were integral to European stereotypes about Asia.51 Throughout his journal, and particularly in the letters he wrote to employers and acquaintances in England, Roe’s descriptions of the
people he meets and the activities he observes display elements of “Oriental despotism, Oriental splendor, cruelty, [and] sensuality.”52 Roe frequently lamented, for example, the fact that the Mughal Empire is
run with “no written Law. The King by his
own word rules, and his Governors of Provinces by that authority.”53 He also made
sure to note, disapprovingly, the emperor’s
sexual appetites, as when he mentioned that
Jahangir had four wives and also that during
festivals entertainment was provided by
“whores” who “did sing and dance.”54
In discussing such things as England’s prestige, his place in the Mughal
court, the climate of the Empire, religion,
greed, lasciviousness, despotism, and intrigue, Roe clearly positioned England and
England’s civilization as superior to the
Mughal Empire and its society. In stressing
English superiority in his writings, Roe illustrates the fact that the key cultural ideas
that allowed Orientalism and English Imperialism to flourish, and which kept it so
powerful, were present in the English cultural mind even in the early seventeenth
century. It is important to uncover these
ideas in the time before English Imperialism
became a real institution because these preexisting attitudes informed how England
interacted with and acted towards colonized

populations all over the world, even into the
twentieth century.
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Front and Center: An
Anthropological Analysis of Drag
Queens in American Culture
Submitted by Seth Palmer
In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals
the imitative structure of gender itself – as
well as its contingency. Indeed, part of the
pleasure, the giddiness of the performance
is in the recognition of a radical contingency in the relation between sex and gender in the face of cultural configurations of
casual unities that are regularly assumed to
be natural and necessary (Gender Trouble,
187).
The idea of society is a powerful image. It
is potent in its own right to control or to stir
men to action. This image has form; it has
external boundaries, margins, internal
structure. Its outlines contain power to reward conformity and repulse attack. There
is energy in its margins and unstructured
areas (Douglass, 137).

the discipline for being paternalistic, if not
blatantly racist. The process of creating the
“other,” however, continues today both inside and outside of the university, creating a
need for scholars to deconstruct the very
categories that are meant to define and constrain individuals within specific cultural
groups.
In my research on drag queens in
contemporary American culture, I have
been interested in finding a language with
which to deconstruct the institutionalized
gendered and sexualized categories imposed
on individuals in American society. I have
been largely unsuccessful in this endeavor.
Rupp and Taylor had the same struggle in
their research on drag queens in Key West:
“Although we argue that drag queens and
drag performances break down the boundaries between woman and man, gay and
As the discipline has been institutionalized, anthropology within the academy straight, we continue to use these categories,
however flawed they might be to identify
has traditionally focused on the study of
what “the West” considers to be the exotic, people. In part, the language gives us no
choice” (Drag Queens, 5). The Sapir-Whorf
the strange, the weird, and the odd. In the
th
th
late 19 and early 20 centuries, anthrohypothesis, developed by Edward Sapir and
pologists were interested mainly in claiming Benjamin Whorf, speaks to the fact that as
“a people” (often considered primitive)
individuals whose cognitive categories are
from which they could develop a profesinfluenced by a specific language, anthrosional career and academic prestige; for Ma- pologists themselves have difficulty in dislinowski it was the Trobriand Islanders, for cussing concepts that exist beyond the
Boas it was the Kwakiutl, and for Lewis
bounds of their own culture. How can I, as
Henry Morgan it was the Iroquois. Such
a native English speaker, examine concepts
attitudes today are highly criticized within of gender that go beyond “male” and
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“female?” Despite the difficulty of
the task, new linguistic terminologies will have to be created to discuss diverse gendered and sexualized
identities given the genderqueer and
androgynous identity movement within
the queer community today. Because of
such movements, it becomes increasingly
apparent that standard conceptions of gender
and sexuality no longer have complete control over the contemporary American populace.
My study of drag queens in American culture has been made increasingly relevant over the past few months as queer
voices have continued to contest the oppressive sexist and homophobic structures of
American society. The following are just of
few of the issues that have challenged the
normative gendered and sexualized structures in the United States. Most obviously,
the November 2008 elections led to many
important political decisions for the
LGBTIQ community across the country.
Proposition 8 in California passed this November, prohibiting gay marriage in the
state. Similar measures were passed in Florida and Arizona. Act 1, which passed in Arkansas, prevents gay and lesbian parents (or
even unmarried heterosexual couples) from
adopting children. Similar measures are already in place in Utah and Mississippi, for
example. During the 2008 Presidential campaign, the celebrated (and reviled) political
candidates Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton
both fought for the seats of the Vice President and President, respectively. The film
Milk, describing the politician and community organizer Harvey Milk’s rise to power
and assassination won two Academy
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Awards. Katy Perry’s hit single “I Kissed a
Girl” topped the Billboard Top 100 chart last
summer, and was nominated for Favorite
Song at the 2009 Kid’s Choice Awards.
Ironically, Perry’s mother, an Evangelical
Christian Preacher told the press that: “I hate
the song. It clearly promotes homosexuality
and its message is shameful and disgusting…I can’t even listen to that song…when
it comes on the radio I bow my head and
pray” (Lyons, 1). The LGBTIQ community
was further angered by the selection of Reverend Rick Warren to give the benediction at
President Obama’s inauguration: “In a recent interview with the Web site Beliefnet,
Mr. Warren said that allowing same-sex
couples to marry was no different from allowing a brother and sister to
marry” (Zeleny, 1). More locally, on September 30th an anti-gay demonstration on the
College Green at the State University of
Geneseo, approved by Campus Scheduling,
made people again question the limits of the
First Amendment. The approval of a gender
-neutral housing option on-campus at the
State University of New York at Geneseo
represents the gendered revolution that is
taking place on college campuses nationwide. An article in the Lamron, Geneseo’s
college newspaper, recognizes that: “The
current housing form, which requires all incoming freshmen, even those who may not
match a socially-defined gender or biological distinction, to identify themselves as
‘male’ or ‘female.’ The new housing project
will attempt to resolve that issue” (Cioffi, 1).
Even the debate over the curriculum at the
State University of New York at Geneseo is
in part concerned with the representation of
women and sexual minorities. In his letter
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to the Curriculum Review Task
Force, concerning the debate over
the Western Humanities course, Professor Walter Soffer argues that: “the
humanities is the study of the great
books left behind by the greatest
minds” (1). Similarly, Professor Larry
Blackman writes: “The required works in
Western Humanities I and II are not considered great because they were written by
white males. They are great books that happen to have been written mostly by white
males” (2). In other words, it is just coincidence that all of the best works of literature,
philosophy and history were written by male
-bodied persons. These learned individuals
fail to recognize the social structure in which
these “great minds” were writing; they do
not ask how it came to be that such males
acquired the resources needed to be able to
freely philosophize day and night. Who
washed their dishes? Who scrubbed their
floors? Who cooked their meals? Even in
the setting of the university, often considered to be one of the most liberal institutions
in the United States, a male-dominated, heteronormative discourse can run uncontested.
Underneath all of these issues, of course, lies
the problematic status of biological women
and sexual minorities in the American political sphere. Is a woman capable of being the
President or Vice President of the United
States? Should it be legal for two men to be
married and thus be privy to the same rights
afforded to married heterosexual couples?
Are two mothers, two fathers, or even an
unmarried heterosexual couple capable of
raising foster children? What these questions do not address, of course, are the arbitrary gendered and sexualized categories that
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the American populace uses from which to
base their opinions. Such conceptions of
“male” and “female,” then become important signifiers in political decisions in the
United States. The performances of drag
queens speak directly to these sociallyconstructed categories, and have important
literal and symbolic relevance in the larger
arena of American politics.
Throughout this paper, the term
“queer” will be used to encompass the whole
LGBTIQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Queer) community.
The word “queer” in academia and popular
culture is used to reclaim a term that was
once used against the community. The term
is not accepted by all members within or
outside of the community, and its use continues to be controversial. I use the term as
a way to find unity amongst a highly diverse
group of individuals that have many important shared experiences; the term is not being used in a derogatory sense.
In studying drag performance in
American culture, I have been careful to
contextualize the experiences of people who
perform in drag as an extremely diverse
group of individuals who are beyond the
limits of any single anthropological interpretation. As my informant Champagne stated:
“People try to put you in a box, and I don’t
like to be in a box – I’m claustrophobic.”
Additionally, my analysis not only acknowledges, but heavily emphasizes, the power
structure that attempts to control the lives of
those individuals who defy culturallyacceptable gender practices. Indeed, given
the history of queer peoples living in the
United States, drag should be seen partly as
an act of resistance to social norms,
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although this by itself would be a
very simplified explanation.
In this paper, data collected from literature, fieldwork experiences, interviews, film, and social networking and
video sharing websites will be utilized to
examine the meaning of drag and the lives
of those who perform in it. Literature read
and analyzed for this study included the cultural history of drag performance, contemporary gender theory, and the anthropological
literature on drag and queer communities in
the United States. Fieldwork was conducted
by watching drag performances at a small
gay bar in Rochester, NY; interviews were
conducted with a few select drag queens,
and a focus group discussion on drag was
held with a group of young queer college
students. Additionally, I studied representations of drag queens in popular American
culture to gain an understanding of how the
perception of drag queens has, and has not,
changed over time. Finally, I reviewed the
personal pages of drag queens on video sharing websites (such as www.youtube.com)
and social networking websites (such as
www.facebook.com and
www.myspace.com). This paper is a multidisciplinary piece that attempts to contextualize the experiences of drag performers in
the United States, and most importantly,
celebrates them as a people worthy of study.
Recently, representations of drag
performances have entered into mainstream
American culture through the cinema, including such films as Priscilla, Queen of the
Desert, Torch Song Trilogy, Tootsie, Victor/
Victoria, Birdcage, Mrs. Doubtfire, The Crying Game, Connie and Carla, and To Wong
Foo, Thanks for Everything! Julie Newmar.
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Such representations of drag performance in
popular culture have changed dramatically
over time, with one of the most iconic, yet
highly problematic, representations of drag
appearing in the 1959 film Some Like it Hot.
Many older films that portray characters in
drag, such as Some Like it Hot, feature heterosexuals who cross-dress in order to hide
their identity and/or enter spaces that they
would otherwise be barred from. In newer
films, characters identified as “drag queens”
are at times used as an exotic feature to draw
in the audience’s interest; in other cases,
however, they are painted as multidimensional characters, as seen in Torch
Song Trilogy. Overall, representation of
drag performances in film often appear as
one of two extremes, either in the form of
light-hearted comedies or violent thrillers,
typically involving the police force.
This winter, LOGO (an American
cable channel with programming that targets
the LGBTIQ community) began airing RuPaul’s Drag Race, a reality TV show in
which drag queens compete to be reigned in
as the ultimate diva. With LOGO being
available in an estimated 35 million American homes, the concept of the drag queen is
no longer relegated to liberal, urban, industrialized environments on the American
landscape. Increasingly, Americans outside
of the LGBTIQ community are being confronted with drag performances through
print media, television, film, and cyberspace.
Additionally, as members of the queer community continue to feel more comfortable
challenging gender norms in the public
sphere, American society will be forced to
address those individuals who, while previously confined to the margins, are now

174
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47

180

: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009

Great Day 2009
fighting for inclusion in the center.
Theoretical Orientation
The new anthropology of genders and sexualities is a dynamic subdiscipline that integrates theory from
the interdisciplinary fields of queer and
performance studies, and in part focuses on
what anthropologist Rosalind Morris defines
as “institutions of ambiguity.” Such institutions highlight the importance of understanding gendered and sexualized categorizations as cultural constructions embedded
in a specific historical, spatial and cultural
context. The primary theoretical perspective
used in this study was Judith Butler’s concept of gender performativity. By linking
performance studies to the existing literature
on the anthropology of genders and sexualities, one can critique the gender binary as a
social construction that is performed, and
more importantly, one can understand
“normative genders and sexualities” as performances in and of themselves. Morris recognizes the fecundity of a performative
analysis of genders and sexualities in the
house of anthropology:
The anthropology of gender is
emerging under the influence of performance theory resists such conflations, however. Instead, it is concerned with the relationships and
dissonance between the exclusive
categories of normative sex/gender
systems and the actuality of ambiguity, multiplicity, abjection, and resistance within these same systems.
Oscillating between a desire to unseat the hegemony of sexual dichotomies in the modern West through
exemplary counter-example and a
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yearning to locate resistant practices
in non-Western systems, much of the
new anthropology of gender seeks…
examples of “institutional transvestism” such as the berdache of North
America, the hijra of Inda, or the
kathoey of Thailand (570).
By studying the gendered performances of
drag queens, therefore, one can understand
the gendered performances that all people in
all cultures enact on a daily basis. Gender,
then becomes something very fluid: “Butler
argues that gender is not a fact or an essence,
but a set of acts that produce the effect or
appearance of a coherent substance…Butler
goes further than this when she argues that,
although gender is a set of acts, it works and
derives its compulsive force from the fact
that people mistake the acts for the essence
and, in the process, come to believe that they
are mandatory” (Morris, 572-573).
My analysis of drag performance in
American culture has led me to recognize
that all gendered performance is inherently a
drag performance in and of itself. This theoretical conclusion is by no means original.
Other gender theorists have been drawn to
this conclusion as well. Morris comments
on this perspective:
When theorists of gender performativity say that all gender is a form of
drag, they mean that, like drag, the
Western system of compulsory heterosexuality is a set of limitations.
What is being imitated is the ideal of
binary difference, a difference that
only prescribes social roles but also is
supposed to determine sexual desires…In this context, cases of third
genders and/or institutionalized
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tranvestism can be treated as
framed examples of the performativity that underlies the entire logic of
binary sexuality (580).
In fact, in the documentary Judith Butler: Philosophical Encounters of the
Third Kind, Butler notes that the strict male
and female gender norms of Hollywood in
the 1950s and 1960s prompted her to write
Gender Trouble in order to make sense of
these exaggerations (Zadjermann). Through
recognition of the fact all gendered performance is drag, one can create a dialogue that
does not relegate such examinations to a
queer, or often “othered” population. Veritably, the power of an analysis of drag performance comes not only from the fact that
it is part of a queer sub-culture, but that such
performances critique all gendered spectacles as institutionalized acts with little biological import.
It is also important to note that
within queer performances one is always in
a state of performing; that is to say, one is
always being critiqued, analyzed, and judged
for the gendered and sexualized performances that they are producing on the stage
and in the street. In an interview for a documentary on Judith Butler, Butler herself
notes that while Simone de Beauvoir argued
that one is not born a woman, but becomes a
woman, she believes that one is always becoming a woman (Zadjermann). Thus, she
emphasizes the continued performative nature of gender as something that continues
throughout one’s lifetime and does not end
when the curtains fall. The anthropologist,
however, must try to interpret such performances from both the perspective of the audience member and of the performer, both of
which are highly diverse groups within
themselves. Analyzing both the audience
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and the performer allows the anthropologist
to understand how space, behaviors, and ideologies are negotiated on and around the
stage. Audience members come to drag performances primarily for entertainment, while
drag queens perform primarily for economic
reasons. However, the interactions and relations between performer and audience member are far more diverse and dynamic than
this generalization.
Historical Roots of Drag Queens
Historical particularlists, who set the
foundation for American anthropology in the
early 20th century, believed that cultural anthropologists should study each culture as its
own entity, with its own particular history
and developmental trajectory. Following in
this tradition, I believe that it is important to
study the history of drag from its beginning
in Great Britain to its current form in the
United States in order to understand contemporary drag queen performance in American
culture. It is clear that contemporary drag
performance has borrowed from cultures
other than those that existed in Great Britain
(or continental Europe); however, the history
of drag performance is mainly rooted in gendered performance on the European stage.
Contemporary drag culture in the United
States has only more recently been influenced by the diverse ethnic groups that make
-up the American social landscape.
From a European perspective, crossdressing was essential in British theater because of a restriction against biological
women from acting on the stage. Because of
this social fact, certain actors would consistently play the role of women onstage and
would work to perfect their own gender performance. Baker notes that these actors
were usually young boys who “would be
expected to lead a strange and somewhat
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dubious life. He would be trained
to dress up daily as a fascinating
young woman and parade before the
rowdy populace in the dangerous and
insalubrious atmosphere of the public
playhouse” (66-67). After Charles II
introduced women onto the stage in England, it became less popular for men to play
the role of women:
For this is what ultimately happened
to the last of the female impersonators. They ceased to impersonate on
the refined, serious level that derived
from the Elizabethan period and began to burlesque their female roles.
As they became less in demand, so
their parts got shorter and they
tended to make them comic. One, a
man called Lacy, became famous for
his burlesque of female characters
and here we may discern the beginnings of the pantomime dame tradition as we see it today (Baker, 103).
While the sexual orientation of these early
female impersonators is not entirely clear,
Baker notes that “two of the most famous
were widely known to be homosexual. They
were Ernest Boulton and Frederick William
Park and both are dealt with quite fully in a
collection of essays called The Sins of the
Cities of the Plain, a survey of homosexuality in London published in 1881” (123).
Throughout the 19th Century in the
United States, male-bodied drag performances were enacted by men who were perceived to be heterosexual. Their performances were purely comedic, and not meant to
address political concerns or alternative genders or sexualities. Later it entered into the
theatrical arenas of burlesque and vaudeville
at the turn of the twentieth century. Such
performances were sexually-suggestive, and

had an important comic element to them as
well: “as the nineteenth century began, men
in women’s clothes on the professional stage
were, with rare exceptions, dame comedians” (Chauncey, 295).
It is not until the rise of American
industrial urban environments that a visible
gay culture emerges. George Chauncey, a
scholar of gay and lesbian histories in the
United States, notes how the presence of a
visible queer culture on the American landscape only became possible after a period of
urbanization:
In his hometown he had needed to
conform at all times to the social
conventions of the community, for
he had been subjected to the constant…surveillance of his family and
neighbors. But in the city it was
possible for him to move between
social worlds and lead a double life:
by day to hold a respectable job that
any queer would have been denied,
and by night to lead the life of a fairy
on Bowery…The complexity of the
city’s social and spatial organization
made it possible for gay men to construct the multiple public identities
necessary for them to participate in
the gay world without losing the
privileges of the straight: assuming
one identity at work, another in leisure; one identity before biological
kin, another with gay friends (133).
Writing in 1972, the anthropologist Esther
Newton similarly noted that: “Homosexual
communities are entirely urban and suburban phenomena. They depend on the anonymity and segmentation of metropolitan
life” (21). Chauncey also highlights the experiences of biological men who perform as
women in certain social environments
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during the turn of the 20th century.
Such environments included, but
were not limited to, public parks,
streets, bars, and prisons. Such men
were labeled fairies, and “were the most
famous symbols of gay life, and the impression of that life they conveyed was
reinforced by the countless other effeminate
men who were visible in the streets of the
city’s working-class and amusement districts
in the early decades of the century” (Chauncey, 47). Such men could be
identified by “a limp wrist or an exaggerated, swivel-hipped, mincing walk – known
as ‘swishing’ in the gay world [something
that] was regularly caricatured on the vaudeville stage and occasionally seen on the
street as a sign of the ‘true’
fairy” (Chauncey, 55). Like contemporary
drag queens, “The fairies reaffirmed the conventions of gender even as they violated
them: they behaved as not man should, but
as any man might wish a woman
would” (Chauncey, 57). The Bowery, a
small neighborhood in Manhattan, was an
important geographic space for the developing gay culture in New York City. According to Chauncey,
The ‘female impersonators’ on display at the Bowery resorts were the
most famous symbols of gay life, and
the impression of that life they conveyed was reinforced by the countless other effeminate men who were
visible in the streets of the city’s
working-class and amusement district in the early decades of the century (47).
While the fairies may have been marginally
accepted in very specific urban spaces such
as the Bowery, they were first and foremost
defined by their pathology. Up until 1973,
homosexuality was considered a psychologi-
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cal disorder in the United States. Sexologists, beginning around the second-half of
the nineteenth century, created an understanding of homosexuals as “inverts,” meaning that male homosexuals had a feminine
spirit, thus explaining why they could be
attracted to men. Likewise, female homosexuals had a masculine spirit, thus explaining why they were attracted to other women.
In other words, the medical community reinforced compulsory heterosexuality because
biological men could only be attracted to
other biological men because one of them
was internally a woman (in male-male sexual encounters at this time, men taking the
active role were not perceived of as a homosexuals, but as “perverts” who were conventionally masculine men with a “perverted”
sex drive). During this time period, the male
homosexual was a marked individual. According to Foucault, he “became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood,
in addition to being a type of life, a life
form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet
anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality” (43).
Gay men, then, would often perform in a
“feminine” manner to identify themselves as
homosexual to others. As Chauncey notes:
“gay men pursued a variety of strategies as
they negotiated their presence in the city’s
restaurants, cafeterias and speakeasies.
Some of them boldly claimed their right to
gather in public, speaking loudly about gay
matters, dancing with their friends, even putting on a ‘show’ for the other customers of
them” (176). This gendered performance
would be an important step in the development of a drag queen identity.
After the turn of the twentieth century, however, male-bodied drag performances became increasingly common in
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urban areas dominated by gay culture. Particularly during the Prohibition Era in the 1920s, drag balls and
performances by female impersonators
became increasingly visible within the
gay world of New York City. The Pansy
Craze, which hit New York City just prior
to the Prohibition era, embodied this cultural movement. Upper-class heterosexual
residents of New York went “slumming”
during this time period in American history
to listen to African-American jazz performances; they would also go to watch male homosexual performances on stage. Chauncey
notes the connection between these two voyeuristic pursuits:
“The efforts of nightclub impresarios to cultivate and respond
to the growing fascination of
white middle-class club goers
with African-American jazz and
performance is the best-known
aspect of this phenomenon, and in
many ways the ‘Negro Vogue’ of
the mid-twenties set the stage for
the pansy craze that soon followed it…If whites were intrigued by the ‘primitivism’ of
black culture, heterosexuals were
equally intrigued by the
‘perversity’ of gay culture” (309).
Pansy acts were performances given by
highly effeminate homosexual men who performed their sexual orientation on stage,
again often to heterosexual audiences.
Sometimes, however, such performers identified as heterosexual. Chauncey these performances to blackface, characterizing them
as “straight actors putting on drag or stereotypical mannerisms to mimic and ridicule
gay men, to the hoots and jeers of an antigay audience. This buffoonery became a
standard feature in the burlesque and high-
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class cabaret venues alike, which reinforced
the dominant public image of homosexuals” (310). They were incredibly popular,
and embodied the daring sense of rebelliousness that accompanied the illegal consumption of alcohol. Performers such as Gene
Malin became famous for their pansy acts in
New York City.
After the stock market crashed in
1929 and the Great Depression Era loomed
over American society, drag performances,
and gay and lesbians and cultures in general,
fell under increasingly heightened scrutiny:
“The revulsion against gay life in the early
1930s was part of a larger reaction to the
perceived “excesses” of the Prohibition
years and the blurring of the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable public
solidarity” (Chauncey, 353). Gay and lesbian bars were routinely raided by the police; if an individual should be arrested not
only would they serve a sentence, but their
names would be placed in the newspaper,
often leading to loss of employment or familial ties. In fact, by 1931 “several of the
city’s newspapers began a campaign against
clubs featuring female impersonators…on
the night of January 28, 1931, they [the police] raided the Pansy Club on West FortyEighth Street and the Club Calais at 125
West Fifty-First Street.” The next day, Police Commissioner Edward Mulrooney announced: “There will be a shake-up in the
night clubs, especially of those which feature female impersonators” (Chauncey, 331).
Laws were passed across the country that
required individuals to wear at least five articles of clothing that matched their biological
sex. According to Senelick, even in New
York and San Francisco in the 1960s, drag
remained illegal (384). Such actions were a
way of reinforcing the very hegemonic
structure that prevented drag performances
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from entering mainstream culture:
“Prohibition culture had allowed
gay visibility to move into the center
of New York’s most prestigious entertainment district, but in the early thirties, the authorities were determined to
return it to the city’s periphery” (Chauncey,
333). Ironically, however, police attempts to
restrict gay and lesbian cultures forced them
to perform as homosexuals themselves:
“Since the cops often went over on the ferries posing as homosexuals, the ferry owners
always knew when raids were coming, said
Ken Stein; the cops absurdly wore perfume
and dressed inappropriately” (Cherry Grove,
193). In 1939, the Jewel Box Revue opened
in Miami. This would soon become the
most famous drag venue in the United
States. However, “although it originated in
a gay bar and was managed and staffed entirely by homosexuals, the Jewel Box Revue
was geared for straight audiences, aiming to
win acceptance through comedy (Senelick,
380). As the first interracial drag club, the
Jewel Box Revue broke ground for future
performances to challenge restrictive legislative policies, and to create a more open
(although still closeted) dialogue about pluralism in American culture.
Following the larger trends of drag
queen performance in the United States, performances prior to the disco era were usually
meant to impersonate famous female figures,
or they were completely comic in nature.
Teri Warren, a drag queen who performed
on Fire Island, told Esther Newton that:
“when I first arrived out here, drag was not
drag per se. Drag was a hairy chest, hairy
arms, moustache…which is commonly
known now as ‘gender fucking’…and I was-

n’t into that form of drag, so I stood in the
background” (Cherry Grove, 174). With the
disco era came the concept of glamour drag
that differed from previous drag queen performances: “In most glamour drag the performer simply mouthed, or ‘lip-synced’ to
the words of a recorded female vocalist.
When they did comic drag, working-class
men tended toward broad and vulgar sight
gags and very explicit sexual suggestions
which offended conservative
Grovers” (Cherry Grove, 174). Newton asserts that drag played an important role in
allowing residents, particularly gay men, to
claim a territory as their own: “After 1950,
witty repartee, parody, double-entendre, and
gender reversal were used ever more openly
and boldly to create a ‘gay reality’ – not
only an escape from heterosexual domination on the mainland, but an evolving subculture in which camp was the
norm” (Cherry Grove, 75). Due to constant
police raids and the physical dangers of performing in drag in a public space, gay men
would often restrict such performances to
private spaces. House parties, and particularly tea parties, were a popular venue for
such performances: “Besides theatrical productions… theme parties were the most important venues of camp representations” (Cherry Grove, 77). Thus, drag performances were (and are) enacted in private
spaces to create social solidarity amongst
members of the queer community.
The cultural mosaic that makes up
the United States is not restricted to a European past, despite what much scholarship
may suggest. While it is not completely
clear what impact Native Americans, African Americans, Latino Americans, and
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Asian Americans have had on the
historical evolution of the “drag
queen” in the United States, it is obvious the concept of the “drag queen” has
been appropriated and altered within
communities of color. Another section of
this paper will be devoted to how drag
queen performances are “racialized” on the
stage.
Drag Queens as “Other”
As individuals with an unconventional gender performance, drag queens face
stigma both outside of and within their own
sub-culture. Representations of drag in film
often reflect this stigmatization. In The Adventures of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert,
for example, one queen, Tick, faces a difficult struggle of revealing his real identity to
his son. Another drag queen, Bernadette,
faces heckling from the other queens because she identifies as transgender. The
three drag queens face violent, homophobic
attacks in the Australian outback, and struggle to survive in a hate-filled social environment (The Adventures). In To Wong Foo,
Thanks for Everything! Julie Newmar, three
drag queens must go on the run in order to
escape the grasp of an angry, homophobic
local law enforcement official (To Wong
Foo). Even today, some drag queens continue to have an uneasy relationship with the
police force. Champagne, a drag queen
from Schenectady, New York, noted that she
was pulled over by a police officer while she
was riding in her friend’s car in drag. Her
friend driving the car, David, was also
dressed in drag. Champagne stated that
when David stuck his head out to talk to the
cop she thought: “we’re all going to jail.”
After being pulled over, the officer made

them wait in their car for an extended period
of time while other police cars drove past
and flashed their spotlights in the car. Finally, the policeman came back to the vehicle and said “okay, you can go now” while
laughing at David, Champagne, and their
friends. In response to these kinds of interactions with the police, Champagne said
“you let it roll off your back and move on.”
Narratives on drag queens in American culture often focus on their marginalization,
and the inability of society to accept them
for who they are.
Oppressed groups often feel quite
free to oppress others, and the same is true
within the queer community in the United
States. David Valentine, an anthropologist
who specializes in transgender studies, notes
how many queer rights organizations have
mainstreamed their goals “at the expense of
representing non-‘respectable’ gay men and
lesbians – drag queens, butch women, effeminate men, and the leather community –
implicitly marking ‘gay’ as white, middle
class, and gender normative” (227). Rupp
and Taylor concur, stating: “From the assimilationist ‘We’re just like you’ tendency
of gay and lesbian activism, from the homophile movement of the 1950’s to the present,
drag queens have been an embarrassment” (Drag Queens, 185). Like drag
queens today, certain gay American men in
the first half of the 20th century felt angry
towards fairies for embodying the stereotypes that society placed on male homosexuals. Chauncey notes that:
The resentment many gay men felt
toward the fairies, though, may have
resulted as much from the affinity
they felt with them as from the
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affinity they felt with them as
from the difference in their
styles. The fact that many men
referred to ‘flaming faggots’ or
‘swishes’ as ‘obvious types’ or
‘extreme homosexuals’ suggests the
extent to which they saw themselves
as part of a continuum linking them
to the public stereotype, a continuum
on which they represented merely a
‘less extreme’ form of the fairy
(104).
In her research on drag culture in the
1960s, Esther Newton also found that drag
queens were stigmatized within the community: “For instance, female impersonators are
considered by most homosexuals to be too
overt. They are consistently placed on the
low end of the continuum of stigmatization,
and one of the first things that female impersonators must learn is not to recognize anyone on the street or in any other public place
unless they are recognized first” (Mother
Camp, 25). Newton goes on to note that:
The drag queen symbolizes all that
homosexuals say they fear the most
in themselves, all that they say they
feel guilty about; he symbolizes, in
fact, the stigma. In this way, the
term ‘drag queen’ is comparable to
‘nigger.’ And like that word, it may
be all right in an in-group context
but not in an out-group one. Those
who do not want to think of themselves or be identified as drag
queens under any circumstances attempt to disassociate themselves
from ‘drag’ completely. These homosexuals deplore drag shows and
profess total lack of interest in them.

SUNY Geneseo

Their attitude toward drag queens is
one of condemnation combined with
the expression of vast social distance
between themselves and the drag
queen. Other homosexuals enjoy
being queens among themselves, but
do not want to be stigmatized by the
heterosexual culture. These homosexuals admire drag and drag queens
in homosexual contexts, but deplore
female impersonators and street fairies for ‘giving us a bad name’ or
‘projecting the wrong image’ to the
heterosexual culture. The drag
queen is definitely a marked man in
the subculture (Mother Camp, 104).
During this same time period on Fire Island,
Newton notes that the social stigma of being
a drag queen made it difficult for them to
support themselves economically: “The
poorest and least accomplished as performers or those with drug habits turned to hustling, which compounded their stigmatization; many of the more ambitious and talented became hairdressers as the only legitimate employment that would allow them to
supplement their incomes from female impersonation” (Cherry Grove, 133). One of
Cherry Grove’s star drag queens, Dick Addison, “understood that the gay movement was
hostile toward drag because ‘they don’t want
homosexuality laughed at’” (Cherry Grove,
241). Chauncey also suggests that the antagonism between masculine gay men and
fairies was really a kind of class antagonism,
as the majority of fairies were a part of the
working class, and the majority masculine
gay men were a part of the middle-class
(106). Even today, antagonism between
mainstream gay men and drag queens
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persists. Champagne, whom I interviewed, stated how a former boyfriend asserted: “no boyfriend of mine
is going to be a drag queen.” In his anthropological study of drag queens in
Atlanta, Georgia McNeal noted that:
“Likewise, there is an internal social hierarchy within the gay community in which drag
queens literally embody the stigma of male
homosexuality as effeminacy and therefore
occupy a lower, more stigmatized position
within the gay community as a
whole” (355). Thus, when one begins to
analyze the political import of drag performances, one must also recognize the double
stigma that drag queens embody. Berkowitz
similarly notes that:
Drag queens comprise a community
that is not only labeled as deviant by
mainstream society, but is also separated from the stigmatized groups of
non-cross-dressing gay men and heterosexual transvestites. The drag
queen is part of a subgroup that consists of the outcasts of two stigmatized groups, gay men and heterosexual cross dressers, and thus endures
the effects of multiple negative identities. Furthermore, the relatively
small number of drag queens increases the likelihood that this behavior is perceived as unusual and
bizarre (13).
In their performances, then, drag queens
must resist both heterosexual and conservative homosexual agendas that restrict their
often sexually-explicit critiques of the gender dichotomy.

Subversive Politics: Drag as a Political Act
The subversive power of drag performances in queer communities in the
United States has been well-documented;
drag performances reveal the sociallyconstructed nature of gender and critique the
binary. Anthropologist Rosalind Morris
agrees, noting that “By making gender so
fabulously artificial, these performances are
said to show up the artifice of gender” (583).
Drag performances are also linked to the
politics of the body because: “In such protests, the body of the performer highlights
the social basis of gender and sexuality and
becomes a weapon to contest the dominant
heterosexual gender codes” (“Chicks with
Dicks”, 116). In other words, by confusing
categories of “man” and “woman,” drag
queens are disrupting one of the most important organizing principles in all human societies: gender. Pandora Boxx, who performs in Rochester, believes that drag shows
can reveal the socially-constructed nature of
gender: “It is we as human beings who dictated how each sex should look when it
comes to hairstyle, makeup, [and] clothes.
We are not born that way. It’s a learned behavior. If you look back at history some of
what men wore as regular clothes would be
considered drag now. Drag makes us question our stereotypes and our gender role assignments.” Not all anthropologists believe
that such rituals of inversion subvert cultural
norms; some have even argued that they are
“intended to preserve and even…strengthen
the established order.” From his analysis of
African rituals of inversion, Max Gluckman
argues that: “the lifting of the normal taboos
and restraints obviously serves to emphasize
them” and “by allowing people to behave
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normally prohibited ways, gave
expression, in a reverse form, to the
normal rightness of a particular kind
of social order” (115-116). It is, then
“the acceptance of the established order
as right and good, and even sacred,
[which] seems to allow unbridled license,
very rituals of rebellion, for the order itself
keeps this rebellion within
bounds” (Gluckman, 125). While this perspective has some validity, it does not recognize the dynamic quality of cultural systems.
Through time and space, the very
“established order” to which Gluckman refers will evolve, changing what is and what
is not considered acceptable behavior.
The practice of drag performance in
the United States has certainly evolved over
time, yet it continues to challenge traditional
notions of “masculinity” and “femininity” in
American culture. Drag queens, who can
appear to be particularly convincing women,
speak in low baritone voices. They also
make comments about their feminine bodies;
Ambrosia Salad, a drag queen in Rochester
informed that audience one night that: “I
think I just lactated.” Butler goes even further, arguing that audience members assume
the actor’s “true” biological gender before
they interpret the performance: “It would be
a mistake to take it as the paradigm of subversive action or, indeed, as a model for political agency. The point is rather different.
If one thinks that one sees a man dressed as
a woman or a woman dressed as a man, then
one takes the first term of each of those perceptions as the “reality” of gender” (Gender
Trouble, xxiii). In sum, drag performances
are not artistic performances for art’s sake.
Taylor and Rupp agree: “We suggest that

drag as performed at the 801 [Cabaret]
should be understood not only as commercial performance but as a political event in
which identity is used to contest conventional thinking about gender and sexuality” (Drag Queens, 2). Pandora Boxx, who
performs in Rochester, definitely believes
that her performances are political:
Anything that goes against the norm
becomes political at some point. I
think because drag queens are often
more visible is does poise drag to
become more political and outspoken. American politics are drag in a
way too. Drag is all about putting on
the appearance of someone else.
How many politicians put on their
own version of a drag face and go
out and smile to the people while
they are dealing with the devil behind the scenes?
Judith Butler emphasizes that the artistic, the performative, and the cultural have
always been political for queer communities
in the U.S. Indeed, the theatrical aspect of
gay and lesbian activism in the United
States, particularly during the outbreak of
AIDS in the gay male community was crucial to furthering a gay and lesbian agenda:
“To oppose the theatrical to the political within contemporary queer
politics is, I would argue, an impossibility: the hyperbolic
“performance” of death in the practice of “die-ins” and the theatrical
“outness” by which queer activism
has disrupted the closeting distinction between public and private
space have proliferated sites of politicization and AIDS awareness
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throughout the public realm.
Indeed, an important set of histories might be told in which the
increasing politicization of theatricality for queers is at stake…Such a
history might include traditions of
cross-dressing, drag balls, street
walking, butch-femme spectacles,
the sliding between the march (New
York City) and the parade (San Francisco); die-ins by ACT UP, kiss-ins
by Queer Nation; drag performance
benefits for AIDS…the convergence
of theatrical work with theatrical activism; performing excessive lesbian
sexuality and iconography that effectively counters the de-sexualization
of the lesbian; tactical interruptions
of public forums by lesbian and gay
activists in favor of drawing public
attention and outrage to the failure of
government funding of AIDS research and outreach” (Bodies That
Matter, 233).
An example of performative resistance within the gay and lesbian community
out of drag was documented by Newton on
Fire Island. Heterosexual tourists would
regularly spy on gays and lesbians in their
homes during the 1970s. Amelia Migliaccio
noted that one time “a group of women, with
husbands standing behind [said] ‘Oh, how
cute, they’re eating!’ Whereupon Babe
jumped up and said, ‘Come on in, your
daughter’s here!’…And another time she
took a can of Raid and went outside and just
started to spray. That was terrible. But that
was the attitude…’Oh, look, they’re eating.’
You know, I mean like just a zoo” (Cherry
Grove, 247). Champagne, a drag performer
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from Upstate New York, noted the important
role that drag queens have played within the
larger gay and lesbian movement, particularly during the Stonewall Riot: “it wasn’t a
bunch of gay men and lesbians, it was drag
queens who were pulled out and arrested…
if it wasn’t for stonewall, a lot of gay rights
wouldn’t be where they are today.” The importance of drag queens in the larger gay and
lesbian movement was not lost on Taylor
and Rupp, who noted: “their resistance has
also been important to the organized gay and
lesbian movement. From Jose Sarria, drag
queen and political candidate, to the drag
queen chorus line challenging the police the
night of the raid at the Stonewall Inn in
1969, drag queens, however ambivalently
viewed by the movement, have been
there” (Drag Queens,186). Drag queens
have used their persona to enact particularly
powerful performances of resistance. For
example, Gene Malin, who performed as a
pansy (not a drag queen) in New York City
during the early 20th Century, was not afraid
to stand up for himself:
After winning a prize for being the
‘best dressed woman’ at a Greenwich Village drag ball, he had wandered into a cafeteria without having bothered to change his
clothes…when a part of four rough
looking birds tossed a pitcher of hot
water at him as he danced by, he
pitched into them. After beating
three of them into insensibility, the
fight went into the street, with two
taxi drivers coming to the assistance of the surviving member of
the original foursome (Chauncey,
316).
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Champagne also discussed how
drag queens reacted to the introduction of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s:
“when AIDS and HIV first came out it
was the drag queens who were going
out and doing benefits, giving money
when it first was the gay cancer…trying to
get people aware of what this was.” This
history is not lost on Champagne, who raises
money for children and families affected by
HIV/AIDS through the annual Snowball
Benefit, which she spearheads. It is a personal issue for Champagne, who acknowledges that a lot of drag queens are no longer
performing because they have “died of
AIDS.” Champagne says that as a drag
queen performing in her benefit “you want
to update them [the audience], you want to
make them aware of what’s going on, you
want to be politically aware and you know
responsible…a lot of people don’t fucking
know because it’s kinda like really blasé
now – it’s [referring to HIV/AIDS] still here
people, it still exists, we still need money,
they are still looking for a cure.”
An important ritual of drag performance in American culture is the Invasion of
the Pines. It began when Teri Warren, an
Italian-American drag queen went to the
Pines (a primarily upper-class, conservative,
gay community on Fire Island) in drag to get
dinner, but was not served because he was
“not properly attired.” After the incident, a
group of gay men (and at least two lesbians)
dressed in drag and marched to the Pines in
protest. Between eight and fourteen people,
wearing “the most ridiculous drag” participated, and as they marched they sang “God
Bless America.” Amelia, a participant, remembers:

So…people …started to look and
say, ‘what the hell is that?’…Well,
we got out of the boat and Nick is
carrying this big sign. It says, “Pines
people are plastic’ or, ‘Pines people
don’t know how to live.’ And I’m
saying, ‘We’re gonna die, I know
we’re gonna die here. They’re gonna
kill us.”…But what happened was
everybody started to laugh, I mean
they thought it was really funny.
And we just walked around and we
went into the Blue Whale [the restaurant that Teri Warren was kicked out
of] and they were so ecstatic that we
were there they bought us a drink
(Cherry Grove, 269-270).
This protest became a tradition, and “by the
late 1980s it took the largest double-decker
ferry to carry all the invaders to the Pines,
and the crowd awaiting them there could be
numbered in the thousands” (Cherry Grove,
270). Newton argues that the ritual “insists
on kinship and commonality…bridges invidious class and generational distinctions
and reasserts gay nationalism” (Cherry
Grove, 271).
A particularly poignant moment in
my fieldwork was when I witnessed a drag
queen perform as Sarah Palin. The emcee of
the show, Ambrosia Salad, asked the audience: “How many are following politics? A
loud set of applause then erupted out of the
audience. “We have a special treat for
you…she was just debating against Biden…
she can see Irondequoit [location near Rochester, NY] from her house.” Miss Darienne
Lake then came out onto the stage wearing
glasses, a wig and a wardrobe similar to that
worn by Sarah Palin. In the performance
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. she sang Meredith Brooks’ song
“Bitch,” which emphasizes the
multi-faceted roles and personalities
that women sport. Her performance
was highly sexualized; she used a lot of
tongue action and revealed a large bosom.
After the performance, Ambrosia Salad said
“she’s very folksy tonight” in reference to
political commentators’ opinions that Sarah
Palin’s ability to speak to the common
American was her greatest asset. This ethnographic moment was heavily steeped in
meaning; it can be read as political commentary, gender critique, and the history of
American conservatism and the queer community. As a social conservative, Sarah
Palin sparked fear in the queer community,
and represented the socially-conservative
segment of the Republican Party that former
President George Bush supported during his
two terms in office. Miss Darienne Lake’s
representation of Sarah Palin, however, was
highly sexualized; in a way this counters her
socially-conservative façade and plays with
the notion of Sarah Palin as a sexual being.
In fact, after her performance the emcee,
Ambrosia Salad said: “She’s a cock-sucking
mom who loses her lipstick.” While this
representation is clearly problematic from a
feminist perspective, it does point out the
hypocrisy of a politician who supports abstinence-only education. All human beings,
even socially-conservative politicians, such
as Sarah Palin, are sexual, and this is a
theme that drag queens try to bring to their
audiences.
Often, overtly political statements
are made as side-bar commentary in drag
performances. In Key West, Rupp and Taylor observed drag queens “talk about the gay
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and lesbian movement, AIDS, gay marriage,
and discrimination” (Drag Queens, 143). I
observed such statements during my fieldwork as well; when introducing a visiting
performer from Florida, Ambrosia Salad
cried out: “You know the state with the
hanging chads…maybe this is too long ago
for some of you…You know, back when
Gore was supposed to win.”
Young queers as a whole seem do
not seem to be as embarrassed by drag performances as some older members of the
community are. In fact, it is the radical and
rebellious nature of the performance that
makes it so intriguing to young, queer
Americans. In a focus group discussion
among queer college students and allies at
the State University of New York at Geneseo, the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence were
brought up in the conversation. The international organization consists of drag performers who wear the traditional attire of Catholic nuns. Their highly visible performances
are clearly political in nature, and are of
course a parody on the strict social conservativism present in the Roman Catholic Faith.
As Senelick notes: “By 1981 the order contained fifteen sisters and two novices, including Sister Missionary Position, Sister
Homo Fellatio, Sister Hysterectoria, and Sister Searching for Men. The following year,
Sister Boom Boom…ran for a post on the
Board of Supervisors, San Francisco’s governing body” (466). Their political activism
included:
reciting litanies and antiphonies at
public events, for example, ‘From
the prejudice of Ronald Regan/Let
us protect ourselves.’ They
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protested the Pope’s visit to the
city by canonizing the late Harvey Milk; exorcised Jerry Falwell
and Phyllis Schalfly; gave public
readings of The Satanic Verses, and
conferred sainthood on such fellowtravelers as Harvey Feinstein, Lily
Tomlin, and Shirley MacLaine.
They made frequent television appearances to debate political issues
and gay rights. By the time they
celebrated their Decade of Decadence in 1989 with a formal ADIS
benefit there were thirty sisters, several of them female and/or heterosexual (468).
One student noted that: “they [Sisters of
Perpetual Indulgence] are everywhere in the
world, they are all over the place.” Immediately, another student interrupted saying:
“they’re doing missionary work.” After a
period of collective laugher, a third student
asserted: “they’re recruiters,” playing off the
assertion in mainstream heterosexual culture
that gay men and lesbians have to “prey” on
youth to try to convert them to a homosexual
lifestyle.
While drag queens emphasize the
differences between audience members in
their performances (in terms of gender and
sexual orientation specifically), they also
seem to emphasize the unity that all human
beings share. As Champagne emphasized,
“we’re all people…we breath the same…we
think the same…we go through the same
shit.” In my fieldwork in Rochester, I have
found that drag performances are always
lead by an emcee who welcomes the audience as a whole, and throughout the performance tries to create a sense of unity
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amongst everyone in the bar. In their study
of drag queens in Key West, Rupp and Taylor have also noted how drag queens try to
emphasize the humanity of all peoples
through their performances on the stage.
Not all drag queens see their performances as inherently political. Champagne asserted that aside from a few political jokes, her performances are not necessarily political. Part of the difficulty in determining whether queens view their performances political or not is the very term
“political” itself, and it is often only read in
its most formal sense (in reference to party
politics, judicial systems, etc). Additionally,
one must acknowledge that drag queens, as
individuals often living outside of the academic community, are often unexposed to
the language and concepts explored in gender and queer theory. Thus, one cannot expect them to understand their performances
within the framework of gender theory,
which is often relegated to the ivory tower of
the academy. Rupp and Taylor agree: “the
drag queens and their audiences, as we have
seen, are unlikely to talk ‘cultural repertoires’ or ‘counter-hegemonic gender and
sexual meanings’ or even ‘collective identity,’ but that does not make their performances of protest any less confrontational,
intentional, solidarity-building, or indeed,
any less compelling” (Drag Queens, 22).
Whose interpretation, then wins out, the anthropologist’s or the performer’s? Numerous anthropologists, particularly those examining ritual studies, have noted the etic/emic
paradox that exists in the discipline. Victor
Turner posits this same question: “How,
then, can a social anthropologist justify his
claim to be able to interpret a society’s
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ritual symbols more deeply and
comprehensively than the actors
themselves?” (Forest of Symbols, 26).
Turner thinks that the anthropologist
can and should interpret the symbolic
meaning of a performance: “he [Turner
assumes that all anthropologists are male]
can place this ritual in its significant field
setting and describe the structures and properties of that field” (Forest of Symbols, 2627). At the same time, he acknowledges that
the anthropologist is embedded within her/
his own “structural perspective.” By this he
means that the anthropologist’s “own vision
is circumscribed by his particular position,
or even a set of situationally conflicting positions, both in the persisting structure of his
society, and also in the role structure of the
given ritual” (Forest of Symbols, 27). As a
self-identified gay man, I think that my position makes me well-suited for interpreting
the meaning behind drag performance. In
the end, I think it is important to find a balance between these two perspectives. Of
course, the lives of LGBTIQ individuals are
inherently political; their very existence is
made political in a society where they are
treated and represented as second-class citizens. However, the way that the anthropologist and the performer define a “political
performance” may be vastly different.
Overall, drag queens are not afraid to address the discrimination faced by queer
Americans with their sassy, dynamic, and
feisty personalities. When discussing legacy
of George Bush’s presidency, Champagne
chimed in with: “it’s like you’re trying to
tell us who we can and cannot love and who
we can and cannot marry…who the fuck are
they…you are supposed to represent your

entire country.”
Problematic Performances: Racism and
Misogyny in Drag
Within some feminist circles, drag
queens are seen as perpetuating negative images of American women; in fact some compare the performances of drag queens to racist blackface performances. With their hyper
-femininity, drag queens represent a certain
type of woman on the stage. This woman is
often represented as white, blonde, very attractive, highly sexualized, with large
breasts. Perhaps one of the greatest theoretical hurdles that one must confront when
studying drag queen performances in the
United States is the often sexist representations that they support. Morris describes the
central theoretical issue that has made studies of drag problematic for scholars:
Indeed, the theory of performativity
has turned to drag for its metaphors,
its exemplary instances, and its
structural models. The literature on
this topic is divided between works
that treat transvestite and transgendered performances as subversive of
the dominant sex/gender system and
those that see them as an element
buttressing and reconfirming binary
opposition through an instructive but
ultimately resolved blurring (582583).
One need only look at the critiques surrounding Jennie Livingston’s documentary
Paris is Burning to understand how divisive
this issue is amongst gender theorists (Paris
is Burning). bell hooks in particular has
been critical of drag performances for perpetuating misogynistic, racist themes
(hooks, 214).
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Other critics have noted incidents
of misogyny in drag performances.
Morris recounts an incident that
Esther Newton describes in her ethnography of Fire Island in which men performing in drag prevented lesbians from
participating in the experience:
“Newton has done just that with her
description of a conflict that arose in
Cherry Grove, New York, when lesbians attempted to enter a drag show
and gay men rejected their right to
masquerade in the feminine. Somewhat soberingly, accounts like these
indicate that, even when selfconsciously addressed to the matter
of gender, drag can reinscribe dominant ideology – not because it provides an exemplary resolution but
because the subject of conscious manipulation can never fully enter into
the realm of the unconscious” (584).
The debate centering on drag performances
as anti-feminist is rooted in issues of identity, identity politics, and internalized homophobia. McNeal, perhaps the only gay male
anthropologist to have studied drag queen
performances in the United States, notes
painfully that
We should remain ever cognizant of
how individuals and groups may exacerbate and even intensify certain
oppressions at the same time that
they attempt to reclaim and rectify
others…Drag highlights the performative aspects of gender, and it is
subversive and parodic by turns. But
it is important that as observing analysts we do not foreclose upon any
final interpretation of drag because

in many ways it re-instantiates the
hegemonic system of binary gender
and buttresses the status quo as
much as it subverts it. It is much too
simplistic to pose drag performance
as either subversive or reaffirming of
dominant cultural models of gender
and sexuality… It is sobering and
disheartening to observe attempts at
assertiveness, empowerment, and
transcendence through the marginal
play of drag that resorts to restigmatization and sexism (360).
From my fieldwork experiences, I
have seen several examples of drag queen
performances that can be read as misogynistic. I observed one performance in Rochester, NY that was particularly troubling. In
the performance, Miss Darienne Lake performed as Rihanna, a popular female musical artist who had just recently been in the
news for having suffered from domestic
abuse. Miss Darienne Lake came out on
stage wearing make-up to simulate a bruised
body (with a particularly dark black eye),
and was punched, kicked and scratched on
stage by another performer. Later, Miss
Aggy Dune performed as M.I.A., the pregnant Sri Lankan female rapper. The drag
queen wore an outfit similar to the one
M.I.A. wore at the Grammys – it was made
of black fabric, and had a black-and-white
polka dot pattern fabric on the breasts and
stomach (a fake pregnant stomach was hidden under the clothes. At the end of the
show, the drag queen used a coat hanger
(handed to her from backstage) on stage to
simulate an abortion. Then, Miss Darienne
Lake, who was still dressed as Rhianna,
came out on stage and proceeded to punch
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Miss Aggy Dune repeatedly in her
stomach. Certainly such a performance can be read as being misogynistic. During another fieldwork visit, a
special drag contest was being held for
amateurs. One of the categories was lawn
attire, meaning that they had to dress in a
lawn ornament theme. One performer wore
a black burqa, and carried on stage plastic
flowers and a flamingo whirligig and lay on
the floor to imitate a lawn. The same performer came out in the same black burqa in
the “recession gown” (cheap attire) category
and revealed a short skirt underneath made
from newspaper. The emcee, Pandora Box,
exclaimed: “code orange, code orange!” and
the performer ran off stage. The audience
found both performances extremely comedic, if not the most comedic of all the performances. Such representations of women,
however, “play” with the oppression of
women. Butler, who finds a way to mediate
from both sides of the debate, asserts that:
“The feminist analysis [of drag] thus makes
male homosexuality about women and one
might argue that at its extreme, this kind of
analysis is in fact a colonization in reverse, a
way for feminist women to make themselves
into the center of male/male homosexual activity (and thus to reinscribe the heterosexual
matrix, paradoxically, at the heart of the
radical feminist position) (Bodies That Matter, 127). Coming from a lesbian perspective, Newton is able to look at male-bodied
drag performances through both a heterosexist and misogynistic lens. She notes how
feminist critiques of drag queen performances can be very limiting. Using the perspective of psychological anthropology,
McNeal (who self-identifies as a gay male)

tries to understand how sexist representations of women emerge in drag queen performances. In part, gay men embrace performing as women because “For these few
moments, the ‘femininity’ attributed to gay
men is not stigmatized and ashamed, but in
control and assertive, retaliating against a
hegemonic straight world” (346-347). Thus,
through representing women on the stage,
performing as drag queens is an act of resistance: “the symbolic inversion of the drag
show provides catharsis for those gay men
present who enjoy and laugh as the personification of their own stigma takes undisputed control over the court” (348). Gay
men are able to control, and indeed, reappropriate the femininity that has been placed
upon them by mainstream society through
these performances. Therefore, “Gay men
have responded to this situation not only by
poking fun at the world, but also by poking
fun at themselves and women who occupy a
similar, though not equivalent, psychocultural position in relation to men concerning matters of desire” (347). This is supported by drag queens who assert that they
are celebrating, not demeaning women in
their performances. Indeed, Champagne
sees drag performance as “an homage” to
women. Pandora Boxx does not believe that
drag queens’ performances are inherently
sexist:
I certainly understand where that
comes from but I think it’s ridiculous. You can’t portray something
so amazingly if you view it in a
negative light. If drag queens truly
hated women or anything like that
they would not be able to go out on
stage and celebrate the image of a
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woman. If anything drag
pokes fun at the image of what
we have deemed women should
look like and be like. I don’t know
if you would ever find a drag queen
who says, I dress up like a woman
because I hate women. Dressing up
like a woman comes from a place of
love. Love of the image of a woman,
love of the powerful woman, love of
our own mothers, love of femininity.
It’s all about love.
Similarly, Milla, a drag queen in Key
West exclaimed: “Yes, ladies and gentlemen, women are power. You wouldn’t be
here if it wasn’t for them…And that’s why
we spend all of our time being effeminate
and looking up to women and thinking that
they are all that they are” (Drag Queens,
144). In the documentary Wigstock, two
African-American drag queens discussed
their opinions on the issue. One argued that:
“I think of myself as a butch drag queen –
I’m paying homage to strong black women.”
The other agreed, stating; “Women are a lot
stronger than men generally anyway because
since they’ve been oppressed so long…they
are more emotionally strong, they’re more in
touch with their spirituality” (Silvers). Finally, McNeal acknowledges that many drag
queen performances are indeed sexist, despite any psychological explanation. However, one way to make sense of these sexist
representations is that such “misogyny…is
deeply tied to gay men’s internalized homophobia and culturally learned shame” (348).
Thus, until gay men are able to fight their
own internalized homophobia, drag queen
performances are likely to continue to have
many misogynistic themes.
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Additionally, the argument has been
made within the queer community that contemporary drag queens are not impersonating women; instead they are performing as
drag queens, a unique category of individuals unto itself. As Champagne notes, “it’s
really not about portraying a woman.” Instead, they perform as drag queens, which
tend to represent an extreme femininity. Because drag queens have formed their own
unique subculture within the United States,
drag performances tend to have particular
similarities in different regions of the country. Such performances have their own established norms and rules, which amateurs
must accept. As Goffman notes, “When an
actor takes on an established social role, usually he finds that a particular front has already been established for it. Whether his
acquisition of the role was primarily motivated by a desire to perform the given task
or by a desire to maintain the corresponding
front, the actor will find that he must do
both” (27). In other words, drag queens cannot be said to perform as women; instead, in
order to perform in professional venues, they
must perform as drag queens.
Performances of drag queens have
also always been “raced” as much as they
have been “gendered.” Some contemporary
drag queen performers actually do don
blackface. One student in a PRIDE meeting
focus group at the State University of New
York at Geneseo noted how she had heard
about: “a blackface drag queen…the character is a three hundred pound welfare queen
who has nineteen kids and drives a Cadillac.” The student was troubled by this character, which clearly played off painful
stereotypes of black femininity in American
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culture. This character was not a
myth, however. Chuck Knipp, a
white gay male, performs in blackface
under the persona Shirley Q. Liquor, an
obese African-American woman on
welfare who has nineteen children. He is
well-known within drag queen circles, and
has videos featured on YouTube
(McCullom, 1). Champagne stated that she
has seen drag queens perform in blackface,
and asserted that “I didn’t even recognize
him until he walked up to me – I was like
you look fabulous as a black woman!”
On an episode of RuPaul’s Drag
Race, a reality show competition for drag
queens that aired in the spring of 2009, had
an episode in which contestants were asked
to make a drag persona inspired by Oprah
Winfrey. At least one of the contestants,
Jade, took this instruction literally, and tried
to darken his complexion for the role
(“Queens of All Media”). Champagne noted
that she has seen some performers in blackface and said that sometimes it can be very
realistic looking. As troubling as the history
of blackface is, drag performances in America have always required performers to experiment with new identities. The ritualistic
role reversal in drag performances makes it
an appropriate cultural space for actors to
“play” with the concept of racial and/or ethnic identity.
Sexualizing Drag Performance
An important function of drag is to
highlight the sexualized experiences of
Americans; indeed, drag performances can
be read as a critique of the puritanical nature
of American culture. Sexuality is in itself,
of course, a metaphor for power, and thus it
is rational for drag queens to use sexual per-

formances, jokes, metaphors, acts, and innuendos in their shows to combat an oppressive power structure. Rupp and Taylor explain the power of bringing sexuality to the
forefront of drag queen performances:
“the sex talk and the public nudity
and the groping serve as an extension
of the way the girls challenge conventional understandings of male and
female, straight and gay. In their
public talk about sex and the slang
words for body parts and sex acts
that they bring into regular use, the
drag queens practice what might be
called a politics of vulgarity…In the
same way that they blur the boundaries of gender and sexual categories
and violate traditional distinctions
between public and private, they
cross the line between the respectable and the vulgar. Their bawdy
talk about sex acts shocks the audience, creating an opening for the introduction of ideas about gender and
sexuality that are shocking in a different sense” (Drag Queens, 140).
Indeed, an important part of the drag
performance is its “shock factor.” In “On
top of all this is the fact that drag queens
make sex, which is usually far more private,
a very public affair…The language the drag
queens use about sex and their constant talk
about sex acts contribute to an environment
in which anything goes and nothing is
shocking” (Drag Queens, 138). During their
fieldwork, Taylor and Rupp observed Sushi,
a drag queen, remind the audience that: “we
are drag queens! We do have dicks and two
balls!” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 114). In the
field I also noticed many different
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performative acts that were meant
to shock the audience. Such acts
would range from drag queens suddenly speaking in a very low, masculine
voice, to placing the hands of audience
members on their genitalia. In an interview with Champagne she noted that the
point of the show is not to sexually arouse
the audience, however, “if you do get
aroused…meet me after the show.” Champagne’s statement exemplifies drag performances; it combines comedy with an openly
sexual discourse. Even student members of
the Pride Alliance at the State University of
New York at Geneseo recognized the importance of sexuality in drag performances; one
student noted how “drag is very sexualized
in so many ways.” Drag queens perfect their
gender performance by learning how to
move their bodies in a sexual manner.
When asked how she moves when she performs, Pandora Boxx stated: “Well, I try to
dance. I’m no professional dancer by any
means. I watch other entertainers like
Madonna, Britney Spears, Pink and such to
try and take little moves here and there and
make them my own. There is usually a lot
of sexuality to my moves on stage.” On the
eve before Valentine’s Day, a drag performance in Rochester, NY was highly sexualized; this was especially fitting given the
date of the show. The emcee of the drag
show, called the Salad Bar Review, stated:
“we’ll do a little demonstration right here,
no that’s all extra ladies and gentlemen,
that’s the after hours show – once the bar
closes down we lock the door and that’s
when the real Salad Bar Review starts.”
Some audience members are not always comfortable with the highly sexualized
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nature of drag queen performances. Champagne “in case you haven’t guessed, you are
at a drag show if someone comes over to
you and sits on your lap…its all in fun…we
are here to entertain you…if you can’t handle that then here is the door and I can refund your ticket money.” Some people have
even pushed her away when she approached
audience members during the show; when
asked about who pushed her away, she said:
“I’ve had lesbians do that, I’ve had straight
men do that.” The anxiety that drag performances can elicit is not restricted to any
one “category” of people. However, it does
seem that straight audiences, who may be
less comfortable with drag queens, show
higher levels of anxiety. In her ethnographic
research, Esther Newton observed the different ways that gay and straight audiences interacted with drag queens:
In Chicago, one very popular performer came down off the stage as
part of his act and held out his hands
to the gay audience sitting along the
bar. The people in the audience virtually climbed all over each other to
touch him. In Kansas City, I saw the
same performer come down into the
straight audience, and the people at
the tables as he walked among them
visibly shrank back. At one point he
accidentally touched a woman, and
she actually screamed ‘Get it away
from me.’ At this point another
woman jumped up yelling, ‘I’ll touch
it,’ and pulled his wig. Since the
wigs are usually glued on fairly
firmly, it did not come off. The second woman then screamed louder
than the first, ‘It’s its own hair!’ and
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jumped back (66).
Milla, a drag performer in Key West
similarly asserted: “If you don’t like
the show, there’s an escalator right
there. If it’s not turned on, just tell me,
I’ll help you down the stairs” (Drag
Queens, 113). By making such statements,
drag queens claim their space on the stage,
and assert their dominance over audience
members who may not be comfortable challenging traditional notions of gender and
sexuality.
In addition, drag queens subvert traditional definitions of sexual identity by
achieving the sexual arousal of heterosexual
men in their performances. Champagne provided a specific example of when she was
able to sexually arouse a heterosexual man
at the request of his girlfriend: “I got down
on my hands and knees…put the zipper in
my mouth and got right up in his crotch and
he was turning his head…he started to get
hard…the girlfriend was taking pictures and
laughing…it’s fun because they
[heterosexual men] get kinda embarrassed.”
Although not performing in drag at the time
of this incident, Champagne also noted a
time when she resisted male heteronormative culture when being bullied in high
school: “the kid came out in the hallway
and started saying shit to me…and I said
what’s wrong? You’re girlfriend ain’t blowing you the right way? You drop your fucking pants and I’ll show you how to suck a
cock…his mouth was gaped open and he
couldn’t say anything…I blew him kisses
the rest of the day.” During a show in
Rochester, Samantha Vegas harassed a
young heterosexual man celebrating a
bachelor party by saying: “I bet you’re
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Irish…Oh, well does the top match the bottom [in reference to his red hair]?” Samantha then proceeded to call him “Ben-Gay”
and asked him to “Ben-Dover.” The other
men in the bachelor party were very nervous
to approach the drag queen. However,
Samantha Vegas told Ben that if he took off
his shirt she would show him her breasts.
She then preceded to hand him one of her
fake breasts and put it under his shirt. In
doing so, she confused the gender identity of
the male, heterosexual audience member.
Joe, another heterosexual male member of
the party was reluctant to approach the stage
when called upon. Samantha Vegas then
cried out: “I bet you take it like a man but
scream like a woman.” At one point in the
performance, the bachelor’s friends told him
to “just back down.” Samantha Vegas then
questioned why his friends didn’t want him
to get married: “Do you have a crush on
him? I bet you’re so far in the closet that
you can’t even find the door.” She then
picked out one of the party members who
was hiding in a corner and asked him to
come and stage and dance to the music. Surprisingly, when on stage he took off his
shirt, danced, and thrust his behind at Joe; he
proceeded to take off his pants and lowered
his boxers, and even received tips. Rupp
and Taylor also observed that drag queens in
Key West badger straight male audience
members: “Although the drag queens appreciate their straight audiences, Kylie also
says, ‘straight people don’t know how much
gay people love to see us make fun of them.’
The gay men in the audience enjoy, as one
said the drag queens ‘get some guy up there
trying to take his shorts off and things like
that. Especially because they always get
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the straight boys up there to do
that.’ Another gay man commented, ‘I mean, I love it when they
hassle straight men” (Drag Queens,
191). A specific ethnographic event
highlighted for Rupp and Taylor the centrality of fighting male heteronormative
structures in their performances: “Kylie
pours right from the bottle into volunteers’
mouths, making comparisons to fellatio.
When the straight man gags, Kylie gives
him grief: ‘God. And I bet you beg her to
suck it until you come. Maybe now you understand why she doesn’t want to swallow.’
In this way, they express anti-male sentiments and critique male domination of
women. There’s a lot of hostility in the
show directed at straight men” (Drag
Queens, 134). Esther Newton argues that by
celebrating their “gayness,” drag queens can
invert the traditional social structure in
which something that is “so gay” becomes
something positive, not negative:
The drag queen symbolizes an open
declaration, even celebration, of homosexuality. The drag queen says
for his gay audience, who cannot say
it, ‘I’m gay, I don’t’ care who knows
it; the straight world be damned.’
‘Live’ impersonators whom I saw
working in gay bars almost invariably ‘put down’ any obvious heterosexuals who happened in, to the great
satisfaction of the gay audience
(Mother Camp, 64).
In fact, drag queens can use their
skills as comediennes to oppose dominant
heterosexual systems. In her fieldwork,
Newton observed this first-hand:
The performer was attempting to talk
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to a lady in the audience whom I
could not see, and referred to her
date as ‘that fat man you’re with.’
The man shot back, ‘We’d get along
a lot better if you’d address me as
sir.’ This obviously angered Tris
[drag queen], who retorted, ‘You
paid a dollar to come in here and
watch me; you’d better believe I
wouldn’t pay a dime to watch you
roast in hell.’ The man wouldn’t
give up, but repeated his demand,
where upon Tris replied with elaborate sarcasm in his voice, ‘Sir…?’
I’m more sir than you’ll ever be, and
twice the broad you’ll ever pick up.’
This drew a laugh from the audience
and silenced the man (Mother Camp,
66).
Drag queens also harass heterosexual
women in many of their performances.
McNeal notes that one reason for this is that
drag queens, who are most often gay men,
are often perceived as vying for the sexual
attention of masculine men, as are heterosexual women. He also asserts that: “If the
drag queen – or male homosexual – manages
to beat women at the glamour game, then s/
he has at least momentarily outwitted one
aspect of the cultural model of compulsory
heterosexuality” (359). During fieldwork,
there were several times when drag queens
would bring heterosexual female audience
members into their performances. During
one drag performance in Rochester, I witnessed two separate heterosexual women
both turning fifty years old on the same
night. One of the women was asked by a
drag queen to “de-boxer” a “straight” young
man in the bathroom. She was followed
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into the bathroom with this young
man, where she proceeded to take
off his pants. The other woman,
highly intoxicated, was brought on
stage where she danced provocatively
with the drag queen. On another date two
heterosexual female audience members
were harassed by the drag queen emcee who
asked if this was their first time attending a
drag performance. Upon confirmation, the
drag queen asked the woman why they were
holding on to their jackets and purses, and if
they were too afraid [of a queer space] to
bring them to coat check.
In general, drag performances confuse the sexualized identities of audience
members themselves because they often
combine “sex acts that are outside their category of gender and sexual preference” (Drag
Queens, 136). For example, in Rupp and
Taylor’s study, both lesbians and heterosexual women were sexually attracted to the
drag queens in their study: “obviously, people have different responses to the girls, but
it is noticeable that women, both straight and
lesbian, tended to talk about their attraction
to those…who look most like women in
drag” (Drag Queens, 193).
Theatricality of Drag
The performative aspect of drag
shows begs for an anthropological analysis;
indeed, it too is bounded by specific norms
and rules that determine when and who can
perform on stage. From my fieldwork experience, specific lighting and musical signs
are used to cue the audience that a show is
about to begin. Curtains and doors block off
the “sacred” space in which the performers
transform into queens and the “profane”
space of the bar and dance floor. McNeal
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describes the sacred space as a
“circumscribed arena that provides a privileged window into the psychic realities of
gay men, even though they are – for dynamically defensive reasons – unaware of the
conflicts and ambivalences expressed in that
forum” (366). One must note that the stage
is only sacred during the drag performances;
between or before and after acts the stage
can be used as a space for resting, dancing,
or occasionally, stripping. Thus the conception of a sacred or profane space is not simply limited to place, but time as well.
Drag queens inhabit a liminal space
in their performances; they are, in the words
of Victor Turner, “betwixt and between.”
Turner argues: “liminal entities are neither
here nor there; they are betwixt and between
the positions assigned and arranged by law,
custom, convention, and ceremonial. As
such, their ambiguous and indeterminate attributes are expressed by a rich variety of
symbols in the many societies that ritualize
social and cultural transitions. Thus, liminality is frequently likened to death, to being
in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to
bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an
eclipse of the sun or moon” (Ritual Process,
95). Drag queens are not necessarily
“male,” nor are they “female.” Similarly,
they inhabit a space in which individuals are
allowed to explore, and challenge the confines of their gender. This is both a powerful place and a dangerous place. It is within
this space that they challenge the status quo.
In her ethnography Mother Camp,
Esther Newton notes that: “In fact the distinguishing characteristic of drag… is its group
character; all drag, whether formal, informal,
or professional, as a theatrical structure
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style. There is no drag without an
actor and his audience, and there is
no drag without drama (or theatricality)” (37). As an artistic endeavor,
drag performances require queens to
have a solid command of the stage, and
by extension, of the audience. In their article, Rupp and Taylor note the affinity that
many drag queens have to the theater:
“Being a drag queen also means embracing a
theatrical identity, and many of them have
background in theater. Scabola has been
involved in theater since elementary school
and always loved it…Although for Milla
being a drag queen is more profound, she
also identifies as a performer. She, too, was
in theater groups from a young age. What
she loves is being able to use her feelings, to
evoke the pain and anger and love that audience members have felt in their own lives…
R.V. had been in professional summer stock
theater as a boy…Inga has been in the theater since she was ten, and she, too, loves performing.” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 123). In
my interview with Rob (who performs as
Champagne in Schenectady, New York), he
made it clear that his experience with the
theater in high school made him more comfortable performing on stage in drag: “with
acting in high school and everything we had
to do classes in watching people and studying their mannerisms.” Champagne also
stated that “I was involved in drama in high
school and I looked at it as an acting role…
Rob was always the shy person where if I
was Champagne I could say anything I want
to.” Experience within the theater allows
drag queens to get into and develop a persona, a topic that will be examined in the
following section. Taylor and Rupp found
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that the majority of the drag queens that they
studied in Key West also had familiarity
with the theater: “With their theatrical experience, the drag queens engage in street
theater – both in the cabaret and literally on
the streets - in a way that brings their work
into alignment with their identity politics” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 125). In their
ethnography, Taylor and Rupp also note that
many drag queens became familiar with using makeup through their theater experience
(Drag Queens, 13). One student in the
PRIDE focus group noted that the collectivity found among a group of drag queens is to
be expected, as it mirrors the experience of
many who are a part of a theatrical cast:
“any performance, any group that you’re
seeing everyday you’re going to have that
sisterhood.” Drag queens tend to be very
critical of their work. After all, for most of
them performing is an economic activity,
and better performances mean better tips.
Champagne noted that: “I’ll like have a
videotape and come back home that night
and I’ll watch the show…I’ve very critical
of my own performances” and stated that
she treated drag “like a career.”
By attending amateur drag performances in Rochester, I learned to appreciate
the artistic and performative talent of professional drag queens. Often amateurs are not
self-confident enough to act as professionals,
and will occasionally forget to or mess-up
their lip-synching. Berkowitz notes that
“amateur drag queens have limited status
and are the ones subject to the most overt
discrimination by their gay peers. Although
it was at this amateur bar that we witnessed
the most interactions between the drag
queens and mainstream gay men, much of
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this contact was characterized by
disrespect and vulgarity, rather than
appreciation” (29).
There are specific theatrical performances that are common throughout different drag queen performances in the
United States. From my fieldwork, I have
noticed that a common line for drag queens
to use to start a show is “the more you drink
the prettier we look.” Ambrosia Salad, an
emcee drag queen at a gay bar in Rochester
called this the “rule number one.” Champagne said that she used the same saying: “I
made the announcement: ‘the more you
drink the prettier we look’ so of course everyone is running up to that bar.”
Forging A New Persona
Drag queens create persona(s) from
which to express themselves as femalebodied. Professional performers cling to a
specific persona as a way of making themselves identifiable to returning audience
members. Indeed, Pandora Boxx argues that
“If you don’t have some sort of personae,
then you are not an entertainer.” The line
between the drag queen’s everyday self and
their drag persona, however, often becomes
blurred. Roger claims that his persona,
Champagne, was very different from him.
Champagne was confident, whereas he was
shy; Champagne was bold, whereas he was
calm. However, with time he has found that
both sides of his life (Roger and Champagne) have learned from one another, and
have in many ways merged into one being:
“Rob and Champagne have slowly morphed
or learned from one another.” Taylor and
Rupp recorded similar experiences in Key
West: “This theatrical identity involves, just
as in traditional theater, taking on a new per-
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sona. ‘Sushi is different than Gary,’ says
Sushi. Even Margo, who became a drag
queen late in life, describes David as ‘an entirely different person’ from Margo, although ‘now they are coming together more
and more” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 124).
Drag personas are highly dramatized, and
are representative of an extremely sexuallycharged female body. In his analysis of gay
male culture in New York City just after the
turn of the 20th Century, Chauncey notes that
the self-identified “fairies” would speak,
move, and gesture like prostitutes, whether
they were selling themselves or not. Similarly, Taylor and Rupp note that the drag
queens they observed in Key West like to
“hassle the straight men.” “If some of this
behavior sounds masculine, they view it
more as ‘acting like hookers,’ deploying the
kind of sexual aggressiveness of female
prostitutes” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 124).
The creation of a persona can have a
very real psychological effect upon a performer. Champagne noted a shy male friend
who went out in drag on Halloween (which
is, of course, a holiday during which all
Americans play with new roles and personas), and “as soon as he had the body suit
on…he was like a totally different person…
you would never know that it was him inside
that costume.” Indeed, many drag queens
note how their performances can be, in
Champagne’s words: “kind of liberating…
there’s a sense of freedom…you’re still the
same person but you have a sense of freedom.” Pandora Boxx has also found drag
performance to be a positive experience:
“Drag can give you a sense of empowerment. All eyes are on you for the brief moment on stage and to see that you’ve

199
205

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47

Great Day 2009

affected people, even in a small
way, can really be truly powerful.”
Champagne also asserted that her persona has taught her: “not to take any
crap form anybody…if you can’t love
yourself, how are you gonna love somebody else?”
Drag queen personas, it then seems,
have the ability to increase self-confidence
and self-respect in ways perhaps unattainable for gay men living in a homophobic
world. Analyzing the human mind however,
is not what anthropological analysis is bestsuited for, and I would leave this interpretation up to the psychologists, even given their
problematic relationship with the queer community in America.
Globalizing Identities and Drag Culture
Ted Lewellen, among many other contemporary cultural anthropologists, stresses the
importance of understanding processes related to globalization in order to contextualize ethnographic studies. He states: “The
subjects of anthropological globalization
studies are less likely to be communities or
cultures than translocalities, border zones,
migrations, diasporas, commodity chains,
transnational corporations, foreign aid agencies, tourists, refugees, cyberspace, the influences of television and other communications media, the international processes of
science or commercialized art” (57). One of
the most important conclusions that can be
drawn from globalization studies is that individual actors are not simply helpless victims
of Westernization, but interact with technological processes to achieve personal
agency. Drag performers are no different,
and with the growing importance of videosharing websites such as www.youtube.com
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and social networking websites such as
www.facebook.com and
www.myspace.com, it is clear that they are
creating identities that exist as mutable beings in cyberspace.
As professional drag queens, these
performers use the internet to advertise their
personas and exhibit their work. On the
video sharing website YouTube, this can be
easily done by creating a username profile
that holds videos of a single performer to be
linked to one another. Drag performances
from a specific contest, such as Miss Syracuse or Miss Rochester are also posted
online and threaded to one another on the
related videos link. This allows viewers to
go from one drag video to another, shifting
between performers or looking at the varied
performances of a single performer. Most of
the drag queens that I observed in Rochester
had pages on Myspace, although I was unable to find their pages on Facebook. Champagne asserts that Myspace is “better in
some aspects.” The drag queens on Myspace
featured images of them with audience
members and fellow queens. Their pages
were also quite political, with at least one
drag queen posting an image used in Barack
Obama’s presidential campaign that featured
a rainbow with the words “Obama Pride.”
Miss Darienne Lake featured her picture
dressed as Sarah Palin as her profile picture.
Myspace pages can also be used to legitimize the person who performs in drag as a
“normal,” educated American. For example,
Samantha Vegas notes that she holds a Master’s degree in biomedical engineering from
the University of Massachussetts – Boston,
and both Ambrosia Salad and Pandora Boxx
define themselves as a “college graduate.”
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Facebook has several groups devoted to drag queens, including
“Drag Queens Rock My Socks Off,”
through which I met my informant,
Champagne. The group, as of May 12,
2009 has 953 members, with 12 different
discussion topics, 145 wall posts, 497
posted pictures, and six posted videos.
As cyberspace continues to become
an increasingly important aspect of American culture in particular, drag queens will
probably continue to use the internet to sell
their personas and showcase their work.
Any dynamic, contemporary study of drag
queens, or any other identity group that transcends political boundaries, is incomplete
then without an analysis of this performance
space as well.
Conclusion
The very nature of drag performance
is one of illusion. Indeed, on some level all
male-bodied drag queens do attempt to make
the audience believe that they are biologically female. As Goffman asserts: “When
an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them” (28).
Drag queens do just that. In addition, drag
queens tend to portray American women in a
highly exaggerated manner, in part as a way
of critiquing the clearly defined gender roles
in American culture. It is important to note,
however, that the performances of drag
queens are very ambiguous within themselves; without soliciting information from
the performer, one can never be sure if the
individual is truly male-bodied or femalebodied. In fact, the power of the performance rests upon the fact that the audience
may not be able to definitively identify the
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biological facts of the performers. Certainly
in this new technological age where body
modification, including gender reassignment
surgery, is not unknown, it becomes difficult
to define what exactly is “male-bodied” and
what is “female-bodied” in the first place.
These elements of illusion, parody, satire
and ambiguity, make it very difficult to draw
any concrete conclusions from my study of
drag queens in contemporary American culture. Yes, drag queens challenge gender
norms and act as agents of resistance by putting forth a new kind of public transcript; at
the same time, however, a paradox remains
in that they often reproduce the same stereotypical performances of women that American society has formed. Gluckman would
argue that by showing an extreme femininity
on stage, drag queens reinforce, not subvert,
the gender dichotomy. Such arguments do
not acknowledge the fact that drag queens
are themselves, a particular category, and
community, of individuals who create their
own social norms, and therefore impose
boundaries on their own members’ performances.
What does the future hold for drag
queens in American culture? Without
prompt, Champagne stated: “I don’t think
that drag queens’ or drag kings’ history are
quite yet done because their still gonna play
an important part in the future – what future?
I don’t know yet but I think that it’s going to
be part of our society.” Rupp and Taylor
share an optimistic perspective by suggesting that “drag can serve as a catalyst for
changes in values, ideas, and identities in
twenty-first century American society” (Drag Queens, 6). With new identities
evolving in the LGBTIQ community such
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as “genderqueer” and
“androgynous,” as well as practices
such as “genderfucking,” drag performances highlight the importance of
gender-bending in queer communities
in American culture. Overall, however,
drag queens reveal the hidden truth that all
Americans, especially those who identify as
heterosexual and “gender normative,” are
putting on a gendered performance at all
times and in all spaces. Indeed, we are all
performing in drag.
Reflections
As a queer student of anthropology,
my study of drag queens in American culture has given me the opportunity to act as a
native anthropologist and study those within
my own community. Unlike queer anthropologists who study in “mainstream” cultures or focus on non-queer topics, such as
many of those described in the groundbreaking text Out in the Field (edited by
Ellen Lewin and William Leap), I easily maneuvered between the queer, or native community and academic anthropological community, both of which have their own culture, and thus their own norms, values, and
beliefs.
From this unique vantage point, I
have attempted to interpret drag queen performances from the objective, analytical perspective of an anthropologist and from the
subjective, emotional perspective of a queer
American. The harmony of these two perspectives has deepened this experience, and
if nothing else, calls out for more native anthropology to be conducted. Unfortunately,
many within the discipline see native anthropologists as “trapped” within their own community, making them unable to impartially

analyze it. I ask, with both membership in a
community and “objective” training in anthropological theory and methodology, who
is better suited to represent a culture than a
native anthropologist? Given the postmodern concern that all anthropologists are simply bias-filled outside observers, caught in
their own, often Western, worldview, native
anthropologists can mediate between these
two positions and provide new insights into
the paradox of the emic and the etic views
within the discipline.
More broadly, native anthropologists
call into question many of the central dilemmas of the discipline: Who has the right, or
the privilege, to speak for a given community or describe a given culture? Who
should speak for whom? Whose interpretation is correct, or at least considered more
authoritative, the anthropologist’s or the native’s? Or more critically, given the fluid
nature of identities, what makes one a
“native” and one an “anthropologist” in the
first place? My study of drag queens on the
American landscape reveals, if nothing else,
that native anthropologists occupy a critical
and unique space in anthropological inquiry.
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Petro-State Policy-Making and the Oil Curse:
A Case Study of Hugo Chávez’s Latin American
Foreign Policy throughout the Oil Boom and
Bust of the 2000s

Submitted by Lucie Coates
Introduction:
Possession of abundant oil reserves
is often referred to as a “trap” or even a
“curse” for developing countries.1
Despite oil being one of the most valuable
commodities in the world today, very few
petro-states have been able to successfully
convert large oil revenues into long-term
national development. In studying why so
many oil-rich countries have been unable to
bring about much needed economic and social development through large oil revenues,
analysts noticed a pattern known as the
petro-state curse that oil-rich countries are
prone to follow. Historically, numerous
petro-states have fallen into this oil trap,
including Iran in the 1970s2, Nigeria in the
1980s, and Venezuela in the late 1980s3 and
early 1990s.4 Large oil revenues are easily
mismanaged and often lead to the two main
components of the oil curse: “Dutch disease” and the “absorption” problem.
Dutch disease refers to a common problem
of resource-rich countries wherein a sudden
increase in the value of a resource causes
the value of the exporting country’s currency to increase in relation to other countries’ currencies.5Consequently, other sectors become less profitable as non-oil exports become less competitive in global
markets and as increased oil revenues bring
in more imported goods. The result of
Dutch disease is, therefore, increased de-
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pendency on oil and a significant decrease
in economic diversification. The
“absorption” problem refers to the initial
effect of an oil boom when large increases
in revenue give petro-state administrations
the impression that they can afford to fund
multiple, capital-intensive policies and projects, such as large-scale development projects, military upgrades, social programs,
and job creation.6 In addition, increased oil
revenues often fuel corruption amongst government officials. However, this grandiose
spending limits the development of non-oil
sectors of the economy while creating an
overly large non-tradable sector. Furthermore, the absorption problem leads petrostates to spend too much money to fund immediate projects and policies rather than
saving or investing it in sustainable development, such as improving oil infrastructure, thereby leaving them financially illequipped to adapt to a sudden price drop.
Unfortunately, under the leadership
of President Hugo Chávez, it looks as
though Venezuela is once again headed toward suffering from economic and political
instability as a result of his heavy spending
throughout the oil boom of the 2000s.
Chávez won the 1998 presidential election
by appealing to Venezuela’s impoverished
masses and by promising to replace the
flawed Punto Fijo system with a new government and constitution based upon his
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leftist ideology of equality.7 When
he came into office in 1999, oil
prices were low as each barrel sold for
only about $10 per barrel (see Figure 1).
Furthermore, during his first year as
president, Venezuela’s economy was
weak as a result of mismanagement of finances under the Punto Fijo system. Therefore, Chávez maintained good relations with
the United States and other western powers
to encourage investment in Venezuelan oil
and continue the flow of foreign money into
the economy.
However, oil prices soon began to
rise and Chávez used that opportunity to
consolidate control over Venezuela’s national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela
Sociedad Anónima (PdVSA), and to push
foreign investors out so that the government
could collect more revenues from the Venezuelan oil industry. Chávez took several
steps toward taking over PdVSA by replacing company employees with individuals
who were loyal to him, most notably in 2002
when he fired the then-president of PdVSA
and attempted to change the company’s
board of directors.8 His actions resulted in
the temporary overthrow of Chávez in an
April 2002 coup d’état attempt, as well as a
strike at PdVSA, beginning in 2002 and ending in 2003, which led to a decrease in
Venezuela’s oil output that has yet to be restored.9 However, Chávez used this opportunity to permanently install his supporters
into essential PdVSA positions, thus consolidating his administration’s control over
the company.
With complete control over PdVSA,
Chávez has also gained control over its revenues, which he has used to fund an array of
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costly, large-scale policies and projects.
Throughout the recent oil boom, he has committed billions of dollars, not only to domestic development, but also to a series of expensive foreign policy initiatives throughout
Latin America. Analysis of Chávez’s regional foreign policy reveals that it is wasteful in that these expensive initiatives fail to
achieve his goals. However, with unusually
large oil revenues coming into Venezuela
throughout this oil boom, Chávez was able
to continue to fund his policies despite inefficiencies. Now that oil prices have decreased dramatically and suddenly, the flaws
and the wasteful nature of Chávez’s foreign
policy are likely to be exposed, once again
leaving Venezuela susceptible to the petrostate curse. As a current example of a petrostate that spent heavily throughout an oil
boom and must now adjust to the subsequent
oil bust, Venezuela under the leadership of
Chávez serves as an interesting case study to
test the effects of the petro-state curse and to
predict what can be done to prevent economic collapse in Venezuela.
This paper will analyze Chávez’s use
of Venezuelan oil revenues to fund his foreign policy in Latin America and the effects
that the end of the oil boom is likely to have
on his efforts. The first section of the paper
will discuss Chávez’s various initiatives in
Latin America and analyze their success in
accomplishing his main goals of establishing
Venezuela as a strong regional power and
diminishing western influence in the region.
The next section will examine the implications that Chávez’s foreign policy has had in
Latin America as his initiatives have contributed to both political and economic instability in the region. The third section of the
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moting his Bolivarian ideology throughout
Latin America in order to attract support.11
Using these tools, Venezuelan foreign policy
throughout Chávez’s presidency has focused
largely on providing development assistance
and on fostering a sense of solidarity
throughout the countries of South America,
Central America, and the Caribbean.
Chávez has developed numerous bilateral
and multistate initiatives in Latin America
aimed toward goals such as economic development and energy security. In recent years,
promising billions of dollars in aid each
year, Venezuela has surpassed the United
States in the amount of direct aid provided
throughout Latin America.12 By spending
large amounts on development efforts
throughout Latin America and establishing
trade agreements on preferential terms with
countries in the region, Chávez seeks to fulfill two main goals: to strengthen Venezuela’s position in Latin America through
the creation of alliances in the region and to
minimize Latin American dependence on the
West.
Strengthening Venezuela’s Position in Latin
America:
One of Chávez’s major goals is to establish
Foreign Policy in Latin America:
Chávez’s foreign policy in Latin
Venezuela as an influential regional power
America can best be described as a counter- in Latin America. Chávez seeks to speardependent foreign policy. This type of for- head the spread of “twenty-first century socialism” that he feels is an improved, more
eign policy is exercised by leaders, like
Chávez, who are fed up with their country’s sustainable leftist agenda that will encourage
equality in the region, though it is, thus far,
dependence on other countries and, thus,
10
an ill-defined concept.13 As such, in order to
want to minimize that dependence. To
achieve his foreign policy goals, Chávez has gain crucial support for his radical policies
used a combination of hard power, most of- and ambitions in the region, Chávez has
dedicated large portions of Venezuelan oil
ten through the use of economic means to
revenues to his efforts to form alliances with
strongly influence the decisions of foreign
governments, as well as soft power by pro- neighboring countries in Latin America. In
paper relates Chávez’s expensive
foreign policy to the theory of the
oil curse in order to determine
whether his heavy spending is likely to
lead Venezuela’s economy to fall victim to “Dutch disease” and the
“absorption” problem or whether Chávez
will be able to overcome these symptoms
and navigate his country through the oil
bust. I predict that due to Chávez’s focus on
funding costly agreements and projects
rather than save high percentages of Venezuelan oil revenues, Venezuela will only be
able to avoid economic collapse for a short
period of time unless oil prices rebound,
thereby forcing Chávez to alter and eliminate many of his regional policies and programs. Finally, the conclusion builds upon
the analysis of Chávez’s Latin American foreign policy to extract lessons from Chávez’s
decisions and to establish general guidelines
that should be kept in mind by petro-state
leaders as they decide how to allocate oil
revenues, particularly during oil booms
when leaders are prone to a misleading sense
of economic security.
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addition to trying to gain the support of Latin American leaders, he
tries to win over the support of Latin
Americans through the use of public
diplomacy, which can be defined as “a
government’s diplomatic efforts that target citizens, the press, and other constituencies in other countries rather than their governments.”14 His economic and oil incentives have earned him some support in Latin
America for his regional ambitions, however
he has only had limited success in achieving
his goal of broadening his influence in Latin
America.
Chávez has used oil and its revenues
to strengthen important alliances in the region, most notably with former Cuban President Fidel Castro and Bolivian President
Evo Morales. Cuba has arguably been
Venezuela’s most important ally throughout
Chávez’s presidency. According to Max
Azicri, the strong relationship that Chávez
has cultivated between Venezuela and Cuba
operates on three levels: Chávez and Castro
have established a personal friendship, they
have arranged for the exchange of goods and
services, and they have joined together in the
pursuit of common goals for Latin America
in the name of the Bolivarian Revolution.15
The personal friendship between the two
leaders is very evident as it is often highlighted in the media. However, it is the latter two exchanges that are of great interest to
analysis of Chávez’s regional foreign policy.
First of all, each country is able to
fill a void for the other, as Cuba needs to
import about 100,000 barrels of oil daily and
Venezuela requires individuals with specialized skills and services to fulfill Chávez’s
plans for domestic social growth, which in-

clude educating Venezuela’s population and
providing medical care to impoverished areas of the country.16 Therefore, in many
ways, Venezuela receives immediate benefit
through the Cuban-Venezuelan alliance that
has been cultivated under Chávez. Since
Chávez came into power, there have been
numerous exchanges between Venezuela
and Cuba, beginning with the CubanVenezuelan Petroleum Pact signed on October 30, 2000 stating that Venezuela would
provide Cuba with 53,000 barrels of oil
daily on preferential terms, and in turn receive services from Cuban doctors, sports
trainers, and experts in a range of industries.17 The agreement also allowed Venezuelans to travel to Cuba to receive training
to become doctors or to receive free medical
treatment. The Barrio Adentro mission, a
social program initiated by Chávez in April
2003, builds upon this exchange of Cuban
health professionals and medical supplies by
extending free health care services to about
seventeen million Venezuelans, many of
whom had never received medical care prior
to this program.18 By 2005, over twenty
thousand Cuban doctors and health experts
had relocated to Venezuela where they provided basic and even specialized health care
to poor populations in needy neighborhoods.19 In addition to medical exchanges,
Venezuela and Cuba have reached a number
of agreements throughout Chávez’s presidency, including forty-nine agreements in
2005 alone ranging from lowering tariffs to
“the creation or improvement of rail infrastructure in both countries.”20
In addition to the immediate benefit
derived from close ties between Venezuela
and Cuba, Chávez connects with Castro on
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an ideological level. According to
Michael J. Bustamante and Julia E.
Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations, Castro has served as a role
model and a mentor to Chávez, as the
two share similar socialist and antihegemonic views. On one hand, due to his
ability to hold onto power despite Cold War
pressures, numerous United States-backed
assassination attempts, and years of economic sanctions, Castro is in many ways
symbolic of defiance against the United
States, and Chávez is certainly well-aware
that his alliance with Cuba contributes to
unease amongst United States policymakers.21 On the other hand, Castro, like Chávez,
has focused much of Cuba’s foreign policy
on public diplomacy, most notably by sending Cuban doctors and health professionals
to developing nations around the globe.
Bustamante and Sweig claim that Castro has
better mastered the ability to gain international legitimacy through actions of public
diplomacy.22
If Bustamante and Sweig’s claim
were accurate, then having the support of
Castro could help Chávez gain the support
and trust of some countries where he might
otherwise have difficulties. However,
Chávez’s and Castro’s public diplomacy
campaigns have not succeeded in winning
over public support in Latin America. Latinobarómetro polls, which were conducted
every year between 2005 and 2008, show
that both Castro and Chávez are among the
least popular world leaders as evaluated by
pollsters in eighteen Latin American countries and Castro is, in fact, regarded more
negatively than his Venezuelan counterpart
(See Table 1). Table 1 shows that not only
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were Castro and Chávez ranked similar to
American President George W. Bush, as the
three leaders comprise the bottom three
world leaders every year except for 2008,
but support for both Castro and Chávez has
declined since Latinobarómetro began asking pollsters to evaluate a list of world leaders. Therefore, although Venezuela’s alliance with Cuba may give Chávez legitimacy
in some leftist countries, it is not helping
him gain legitimacy and may even be hurting his image in Latin America.
Chávez has also established close ties with
Bolivia’s current president, Evo Morales.
Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, is a leftist leader who also holds antineoliberal and anti-United States views quite
similar to those of Chávez. During a visit
Morales paid to Venezuela in 2006, Chávez
“offered $30 million in assistance for social
programs and pledged to supply Bolivia
with 150,000 barrels of diesel fuel in exchange for agricultural products.” 23 Furthermore, Chávez promised to contribute $1.5
million to a Bolivian social project that will
broadcast a literacy program to rural areas
via the radio, thereby promoting literacy
among Bolivia’s poor indigenous population.24 Morales has demonstrated his willingness to stand by Chávez on many of his actions. For example, in 2006, Morales joined
the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas
(ALBA), an agreement which will be discussed later, which was originally signed by
Chávez and Castro in December 2004.25 The
three leaders began calling their pact the
“Axis of Good.”26
However, Bolivia may also be
viewed as one example of how counterproductive Chávez’s anti-Western policy can
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be. Bolivia relies much more on
foreign aid than Venezuela does,
despite its large reserves of valuable
natural gas. Morales’ actions have consequently been somewhat more reserved than Chávez’s when it comes to
attacking the United States. Yet, in recent
years, Morales has appeared to grow more
confident in his alliance with Chávez and his
commitment to extend aid and agreements to
Bolivia. For example, in 2006, Colombia
was considering a free trade agreement with
the United States that would have affected
its importation of Bolivian soy. Morales
assured Bolivian soy producers that Venezuela would purchase their soy, despite the
fact that the Venezuelan market probably
lacked the economic strength to import as
much soy as Colombia did.27 With this increased confidence, Morales has taken more
of Chávez’s advice and adhered to his proposed policies, for example, by nationalizing
the hydrocarbon industry in Bolivia. This
decision alienated one of Bolivia’s most important trade partners, Brazil, which imported about $700 million worth of Bolivian
products at the time.28 It also impeded foreign investment which could have made Bolivia’s hydrocarbon industry more productive and more profitable. Therefore, in the
case of Bolivian nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry, Chávez’s advice hurt
Bolivia which is rich in resources like natural gas, yet still lacks the means to maximize
its economic return for these resources without foreign investment.
Chávez can usually count on support
from his close “Axis of Good” allies who
have proven useful to an extent. For example, Morales stood alongside Chávez in
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threatening to withdraw from the Andean
Community of Nations (CAN) if any of the
other three Petroandina countries signed a
free trade agreement with the United States.
29
Yet the support of Chávez’s allies is often
not enough to persuade neighboring countries to accept his proposed policies. Despite
their threat, all three of the countries continued free trade talks with the United States
with both Peru and Colombia signing free
trade agreements with the United States in
2006.30 Chávez did follow through with his
threat by withdrawing from CAN, however
Bolivia, which is in a less secure financial
position than Venezuela, remains a member
of the organization.31
In 2006, Rafael Correa, a leftist who
received his Ph. D in Economics in the
United States, was elected president of Ecuador. In many ways, his win represented a
win for Chávez as well. When Correa won
the election, Chávez sent him a replica of
Simon Bolívar’s sword as a sign of solidarity and friendship. Chávez also attended
Correa’s swearing-in ceremony in January
2007 where the new Ecuadorian president
stated that his government was Bolivarian
and he announced his support for Chávez’s
notion of “twenty-first century socialism.”32
Correa has taken several actions that reflect
some of Chávez’s moves when he came into
office. For example, similar to Chávez who
passed a referendum to approve his Bolivarian Constitution in Venezuela, Correa
passed a referendum shortly after being
sworn in as president that proposed the creation of a national assembly to draft a new
constitution in Ecuador.33 Furthermore, he
opted not to renew an agreement with the
United States that grants its forces the
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to use Ecuador’s Manta air base in
the American war on drugs, similar
to Chávez who denied the United
States use of Venezuelan territory for
the same war.34 The two leaders have
had a friendly relationship and they have
seen eye to eye with each other on many
issues. Since Correa came to power, Venezuela and Ecuador even negotiated a joint
agreement to build a large refinery in Ecuador.35
However, Correa is not as close an
ally to Chávez as Cuba and Bolivia are as he
has been much less radical in his actions.
For example, although he set up an “excess
profit tax” for foreign oil companies in Ecuador, he does not intend to nationalize the
Ecuadorian oil industry as Chávez and Bolivia did with their hydrocarbon industries.36
Furthermore, as will be discussed later,
Chávez put Correa in an uncomfortable
situation in 2008 after Colombia sent military troops to attack a FARC camp on Ecuadorian territory. In response to the action,
Chávez sent Venezuelan troops to the border
of Colombia, however his inflated response
to the event that did not even occur in Venezuela placed pressure on Correa to have a
large response since the incursion had been
onto his country’s territory. As such, Correa
also ordered Ecuadorian troops to go to the
border of Colombia before all of the countries settled the dispute diplomatically.37
Though he supports some of Chávez’s policies and ideas, Correa attempts to balance
Ecuador’s relations with both Venezuela and
the United States as many Latin American
leaders choose to do.
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
of Brazil has also cooperated with Vene-
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zuela quite a bit under Chávez. When Lula
won the 2002 presidential election in Brazil,
Chávez hoped that the new president would
work with him to resist neoliberalism in
Latin America. Chávez publicly expressed
his support for Lula, extending his congratulations as well as a replica of Simón
Bolívar’s sword.38 Shortly after Lula’s victory in Brazil, Chávez requested that Lula
send oil experts to Venezuela to assist in resuming oil production during the 2003 lockout of PdVSA, a request which Lula agreed
to. Lula’s decision to send Petrobrás specialists to Venezuela reflects not only Brazil’s dependence at the time on Venezuelan
oil imports to fulfill its national energy
needs, but also Lula’s interest in Chávez’s
idea of “regional energy self-sufficiency.”39
Since then, in addition to building and improving refineries together, the two countries
have explored for oil near the coast of Venezuela. Chávez has offered about $273 million toward funding the paving of a major
highway and building a sports complex and
civic center in Brazil.40
Despite Lula’s cooperation on several issues and projects, the Brazilian president has not stood unequivocally alongside
Chávez. For example, in 2004 after Haitian
President Jean Bertrand Aristide was ousted
from office, Chávez refused to officially recognize the newly-instated regime, whereas
Lula sent troops to Haiti to protect the new
administration.41Lula’s decision to recognize
and protect the new government in Port-auPrince reflects Brazil’s desire to maintain
good relations with the United States, which
is a known opponent of Aristide and is often
accused of involvement in the Haitian coup
d’état. Furthermore, the major discovery of
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(an agreement which will be discussed
later), publicly lent their support to Venezuela.44 On some levels, then, Chávez’s foreign policy has been successful in gaining
support for his ambitions as demonstrated by
his ability to gain the support of the Caribbean in his bid for a Security Council seat.
However, Venezuela did not win the seat,
which suggests that even where Chávez’s
foreign policy decisions earn him some support, he is still unable to win over the support of crucial majorities to achieve many of
his ambitions.
Chávez seeks to acquire allies and
rally support throughout Latin America in
order to further his leftist goals and policies
in the region. Chávez is in pursuit of allies
who share his ideologies and will implement
policies similar to his, along with new trade
partners to diversify Venezuelan markets.
He has also mentioned the possibility of
military alliances within Latin America. To
attract allies, Chávez has exploited Venezuela’s large supply of oil and high revenues
from the recent oil boom to carry out an extensive and very costly foreign policy that
focuses on providing oil, money, and funding for development projects in neighboring
countries. Through his foreign policy, he
has been able to earn conditional support
from some countries and leaders in Latin
America, however analysis shows that his
efforts have been counterproductive in some
countries in the region.
Chávez has also attempted to gain
regional allies by publicly supporting politiIndeed, when Chávez was seeking to cal candidates in national elections in
win a United Nations Security Council seat neighboring countries. Throughout
for Venezuela in 2006, the Caricom nations, Chávez’s presidency, there have been many
which comprise the majority of Petrocaribe accusations of him funding foreign

the Tupi oil field in Brazil in 2007
may affect relations between Lula
and Chávez. The oil field is estimated
to carry between five billion and eight
billion barrels of oil which is enough to
render Brazil self-sufficient in terms of
energy. Furthermore, Petrobrás believes it
has discovered three more deep-water wells
which, if proven to possess significant
amounts of oil, could make Petrobrás an “oil
giant,” comparable to PdVSA.42 These oil
discoveries decrease Brazil’s dependence on
Venezuela compared to 2003 when Venezuelan oil imports were filling the gap in
Brazilian energy needs. As such, Lula has
more autonomy to challenge Chávez’s policies and actions.
The Caribbean is of particular interest to Chávez in his quest for increased regional influence as the countries that comprise the region carry particular weight in
the Organization of American States (OAS).
A 2007 article analyzing Venezuelan policy
in the Caribbean notes the strategic importance of the region to Chávez:
[Chávez] recognizes that Caricom countries represent almost half of
the 34 votes in the OAS, where debates on the hemispheric political
situation are played out; and they are a
solid bloc in the Latin American and
Caribbean group at the UN. If he
could get them on his side, his policies could influence significantly the
discourse of these bodies.43
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elections. For example, he has
been accused of financially backing
Morales when he was a candidate in
the 2002 Bolivian presidential election.45 Chávez actively supported Sandinista candidate Daniel Ortega in the
Nicaraguan presidential election of 2006 by
providing subsidized oil to Sandinista politicians to distribute throughout Nicaragua to
help Ortega gain support.46 Whether or not
Chávez’s oil shipments had an effect on the
election outcome, Ortega, who Chávez so
clearly supported, won the presidential election and took office in 2007.
Yet Chávez’s efforts have not always
been successful in influencing foreign elections in his favor. In the 2006 Peruvian
election, for example, his fervent support for
leftist candidate Ollanta Humala, who many
expected to win the election based on polls
taken before the election, proved to be counterproductive.47 A win for Humala would
have been a key victory for Chávez because
it would have given Venezuela strong influence in the Andean region. Though he did
not fulfill his rhetoric through action,
Chávez went so far as to threaten to end
Venezuela’s diplomatic ties with Peru if
Alan Garcia became president. Yet this
threat did not stop the Peruvian population
from electing Garcia as their new president.48 In fact, many argue that support for
Humala declined as a result of Chávez’s
support, making Humala’s defeat a loss for
Chávez as well.49 Therefore, it is clear that
Chávez’s support for political candidates
abroad has met with only limited success.
Decreasing Dependence on the West:
With hopes of challenging the current hegemonic global structure, Chávez’s foreign
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policy throughout Latin America has focused largely on aid and agreements that are
meant to minimize countries’ dependence on
the West and on western-based international
financial institutions (IFI). Venezuela managed to pay off its IFI debts five years early,
completing the last of its debt payments to
the World Bank in April 2007 and having
already paid off its debts to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). 50 However, Latin
America is not yet free from debt to westernbased IFIs as these institutions are still providing loans to countries in South America,
Central America, and the Caribbean (see
Figure 2). Furthermore, in light of the
global financial crisis, IFI loans taken out by
Latin American countries increased, particularly loans from western-based institutions
like the World Bank, and IFI lending to the
region is expected to continue to increase
(see Figure 2).51
In addition to debt, these countries
often import resources and goods that they
could potentially produce themselves given
the vast natural resources that are found
throughout Latin America. This is largely
because agricultural subsidies in western
countries make western imports cheaper
than domestic products. As imports become
cheaper than domestic products, a cycle is
created that hurts Latin America: the development of potential productive sectors is
limited in Latin American countries because
imports outcompete domestic products,
causing dependence on the West. However,
if the price of imports increases, the sectors
that could have produced the product are
less equipped to fulfill the country’s needs,
thereby forcing them to continue importing
goods and perpetuating western
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dependence. Noting these two
trends, one of the major goals
Chávez seeks to address through his
foreign policy in the region is to diminish dependence on the West and to
make Latin America as self-sufficient as
possible.
One of the ways Chávez has used
increased oil revenues is by providing countries with the economic means to pay off
part of their IFI debts. Although estimates
vary as to the exact amount Chávez has
spent offering loans to and purchasing bonds
from Latin American countries to permit
them to settle their IFI debts, he has doubtlessly spent billions of dollars on these efforts. According to Terry Gibbs, Venezuela
extended loans of $300 million to Ecuador
and $500 million to Argentina to be used to
pay back part of their IFI loans.52 In a
more recent article, Michael Dodson and
Manochehr Dorraj state that Chávez bought
$3.5 billion worth of bonds that permitted
Argentina to finish payments on its debt to
the IMF.53 Amongst other countries to
which Chávez has offered loans to pay back
IFI debts is his close ally, Bolivia, to which
he extended an offer of $1.5 billion.54 Offering this much money to pay these high IFI
debts is extremely costly, however Chávez’s
efforts have significantly limited the IMF’s
presence in Latin America. In February
2007, Bloomberg reported that “IMF lending
in the area has fallen to $50 million, or less
than 1 percent of its global portfolio, compared with 80 percent in 2005.”55In this way,
Chávez’s policy has succeeded in diminishing Latin American dependence on westernbased IFIs and, consequently, in limiting the
ability of IFIs to exert influence over gov-
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ernment policies in the region. However, his
policy does not eliminate debt. By offering
loans to Latin American countries to pay off
their IFI debts essentially, Chávez is merely
redirecting their indebtedness from multistate IFIs to one nation, Venezuela. This
redirection of debt may create new, and riskier, dependence for impoverished Latin
American countries, an issue which will be
discussed in the following section.
One of the major goals that Chávez
stresses in his Bolivarian Revolution is the
solidarity of Latin America in order to promote self-sufficiency in the region and to
challenge Western dominance. Chávez has
come up with numerous ideas for integrating
Latin America economically. For example,
one ambitious suggestion of Chávez’s is to
create a Bank of the South that could provide loans to Latin American countries who
need money rather than taking out a loan
with the IMF and being forced to abide by
its conditions.56 This proposal has yet to
come to fruition, however Chávez has made
some steps toward regional integration and
self-sufficiency.
The Bolivarian Alternative for the
Americas (ALBA) was proposed by Chávez
as an alternative to neoliberalism that is
based, instead, upon regional integration and
unity. Chávez feels that the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA), which was heavily
encouraged by the Bush administration,
would continue to serve the interests of multinational corporations, while doing little to
promote national development and growth in
the poorer countries of the hemisphere.57
ALBA, on the other hand, is a multistate
agreement intended to integrate Latin America by establishing a Compensatory Fund
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that will be used to develop the
poorer nations of the region in order
to lessen economic disparity and
strengthen the region.58 According to
Chávez, this agreement encourages
Latin American countries to “…integrate
with an eye toward solving the problems
we have in common… Together we can do
so much more than anyone can do alone.”59
ALBA, thus, focuses on region-wide issues
such as combating poverty and marginalization, endogenous development, and ending
dependence on western-based institutions.60
However, with one of the key premises of
the proposal being a redistribution of wealth
to the more impoverished countries of Latin
America, it is of little surprise that the only
countries that have shown enthusiastic support for the proposal are Chávez’s close allies and poor, leftist countries, most notably
Cuba, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.61 Although
very few countries have signed onto ALBA
thus far, Chávez bases much of Venezuela’s
foreign policy on ALBA principles and he
hopes that others will join his cause.
With large oil and gas reserves in
Venezuela and several other Latin American
countries possessing natural energy resources, Chávez has seen more success in
sparking cooperation between states through
the promotion of regional energy integration.
Between 2004 and 2005, Chávez signed
three regional oil cooperation agreements:
Petrosur, Petrocaribe, and Petroandina. The
most important of these agreements is Petrocaribe, which was signed in June 2005 by
fourteen Caribbean countries, including
Cuba.62 With most of the countries in the
Caribbean lacking oil reserves of their own,
Chávez has committed Venezuela to provide
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the region with 198,000 barrels of oil
daily.63 Petrocaribe aims to provide Caribbean countries with natural energy resources
so that leaders can pursue development policies geared toward the needs of their population. Petrocaribe countries do not receive
subsidized oil, but rather the agreement offers them a type of loan wherein countries
receiving oil shipments must pay sixty percent of the bill within three months. Then
the remaining cost is to be paid over a period
of approximately twenty years at an interest
rate of one percent, or two percent if the
price of oil falls below $50 per barrel.64 Oil
shipments received through Petrocaribe can
be exchanged for goods and services if
countries are unable to pay with money.65
Unlike the other two regional agreements,
Petrocaribe set up a collection of savings
meant to finance development programs and
projects in the Petrocaribe states, known as
the ALBA Caribe Fund. According to the
PdVSA website, Venezuela has donated
$100 million to the ALBA Caribe Fund and
nine Petrocaribe countries have already been
able to draw from the fund to finance development projects.66 Although PdVSA may
be exaggerating the success of the ALBA
Caribe Fund, there is no doubt that Petrocaribe is the most elaborate and successful
energy integration agreement that Chávez
has established.
Petrosur and Petroandina are currently less developed than Petrocaribe and
they have taken little meaningful action.
Petrosur, developed in late 2004, was the
first regional oil integration agreement to be
signed in Latin America and it was signed
by Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.67 The Petroandina agreement was
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signed in July 2005 by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. 68 The goal of these agreements is to ensure that the signatories
meet their energy needs by minimizing
extra costs, extending preferential financing options, and permitting countries to pay
for oil shipments through goods and services.69 Thus far, the result of Petrosur and
Petroandina has mostly been the discussion
of potential projects rather than taking the
necessary action to begin them. For example, through Petroandina, Ecuador is working on negotiations to send some of its crude
oil to be refined in Venezuela, an arrangement that could save the country part of the
$1 billion it spends annually on importing
fuel, but the project has yet to begin.70
Chávez hopes that one day these
three regional energy cooperation agreements will merge into one large entity
known as PetroAmérica. Firstly, Chávez
envisions that this agreement will include
the distribution of energy as the three regional agreements already aim to achieve.
Secondly, he hopes that PetroAmérica will
facilitate large-scale infrastructure projects
such as a gas pipeline that would run more
than half the length of South America from
Venezuela’s northern coast to Argentina.71
Finally, Chávez hopes that this integration
agreement will make Latin America selfsufficient with more resources than just energy. For example, he wants Venezuela and
Colombia to produce wood pulp regionally
to make paper rather than being forced to
spend the extra money to import wood pulp
from abroad.72 The implementation of this
agreement would help to shift the global
structure away from the current hegemonic
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global structure, making Latin America a
largely self-sufficient region and, consequently, limiting the amount of influence
western powers could exert over regional
affairs. However, with the oil boom over
and global recession setting in, it is doubtful
that Chávez will have the resources to set up
and gain support for PetroAmérica in the
near future.
Even if Chávez were able to successfully set up PetroAmerica, it is unlikely that
the agreement would be able to succeed in
the long-term. First of all, the construction
of pipelines and other equipment would be
extremely expensive just to launch this continent-wide energy integration. It could very
quickly drain Latin American resources and
drive countries in the region further into
debt. Furthermore, leaving oil fields open to
foreign investment would be wiser than establishing government control over all of
Latin America’s hydrocarbons, as experienced foreign oil companies have proven to
be most able to keep oil production at its
maximum level. After Chávez consolidated
government control of PdVSA following the
2003 strike, oil production in Venezuela has
decreased significantly from about 3.5 million barrels per day in 1997 to about 2.7 million barrels in 2007 (see Figure 3). Finally,
trying to become a self-sufficient continent
would severely limit the system’s long-term
sustainability. International trade allows
countries to specialize in the production of
certain products and then trade with other
countries to obtain any other goods that they
require. Limiting trade to Latin America
would decrease efficiency in the region since
other countries may be able to produce
goods at a lower cost, making products
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cheaper for Latin American consumers. It would also throw off the
market balance, as regional demand is
likely to be limited for a given product,
but internationally there will probably
be large, profitable markets with high demand.
Effectiveness of Chávez’s Policies in Achieving his Goals:
Although counterdependent foreign
policies may meet with success in some instances, they often fail to achieve their goals
as these strategies often anger more powerful states and, consequently, alienate the
country.73 Furthermore, much of Chávez’s
foreign policy is based on economic incentives which sometimes produce a desired
outcome, however they are a “less precise
instrument” for state leaders.74 In other
words, the recipient of economic incentives
does not always take the action that the provider of economic incentives wants them to
take. As such, analysis of Chávez’s policies
reveals that his regional foreign policy has
been unsuccessful in reaching his goals of
establishing Venezuela as a major regional
power and minimizing Latin Americaan dependence on the West.
First of all, he has been unsuccessful
in his attempt to strengthen Venezuela’s position in Latin America, largely due to his
inability to establish strong alliances in the
region.75 His strong relationship with Cuba
brings some direct benefit to Venezuelans in
the form of quality medical care, but this
exchange of medical services for oil is very
costly and arguably brings more benefit to
Cuba than to Venezuela. Most other Latin
American leaders, such as Lula, are pursuing
a delicate balance between relations with
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Venezuela and with the United States. Even
countries with left-wing leaders such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua lack the financial strength to stand unfalteringly with
Chávez in all of his policies. Some of
Chávez’s attempts to gain allies in the region
have outright backfired as in the case of Humala’s defeat in the Peruvian election. As
such, Chávez’s attempts to build alliances
have brought him only conditional support
as most Latin American leaders prefer to
weigh the benefits and the risks of supporting Chávez.
This lack of reliable support has
largely inhibited Chávez from spreading his
policies and furthering his goal of making
Venezuela a major regional power. Although he has won the support of some
countries on certain issues, he has still had
trouble gaining enough support to achieve
his many ambitions, such as winning a
United Nations Security Council seat. Furthermore, Chávez is not well-received by
Latin Americans who do not hold positions
of power as demonstrated by the fact that he
was ranked one of the worst world leaders
according to a Latinobarómetro poll taken in
2008 (see Table 1). There is little doubt that
Chávez’s involvement in the domestic affairs of other countries is a major factor in
this aversion to Chávez. Failing to receive
widespread support from both Latin American government officials and Latin Americans, many of Chávez’s policies have been
ineffective or counterproductive. Therefore,
by involving himself in other countries’ affairs and by offering countries incentives,
Chávez has failed to make his country a respected and influential power in Latin America.
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Furthermore, he has not succeeded
in ending Latin American dependence on the West. Although he may
have minimized some individual countries’ debts to western-based IFIs, he
has not eliminated Latin America’s dependence on the West. The West, particularly the United States, maintains a strong
presence in the region and even though the
country is not popular amongst Latin Americans (see Table 1), they are forced to accept
their need for Western-based assistance programs. As such, most countries in the region are not even interested in ending relations with the United States. In addition,
two of the three regional energy agreements
that Venezuela has signed have prompted
very little action. Latin America is, therefore, still dependent on the western governments, non-governmental organizations, and
western-based multi-state organizations such
as the IMF.
As Chávez’s goals of strengthening
Venezuela and minimizing western influence in Latin America have had only limited
success, there are now two separate forces
working in Latin America. On one hand, the
neoliberal model is promoted by numerous
Latin American countries, such as Mexico,
and also by the United States which maintains a strong presence in the region. On the
other hand, Chávez encourages the adoption
of his Bolivarian model by his Latin American neighbors. These two clashing models
have led to much controversy throughout
Latin America as support for neoliberal and
socialist models varies as leaders support
policies that they expect to be in their best
interest at the time. The next section will,
thus, analyze the conflicts and the instability
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that has arisen as a result of Chávez’s policies in the region.
Implications of Chávez’s Policy throughout Latin America:
Analysis of Chávez’s foreign policy
decisions and their effects throughout Latin
America shows that his policies are not in
the best interest of countries in the region or
of Latin America as a whole. As discussed
in the previous section, Chávez has had only
limited success in accomplishing his goals
of strengthening Venezuela’s role in the region and minimizing regional dependence
on the West. First of all, many countries are
beginning to distance themselves from
Chávez due to waning support for him in the
region and a pragmatic understanding of the
continued necessity to cooperate with the
West.76 Chávez’s strong attitudes and rhetoric are even contributing to conflict in the
region, despite increased economic and technological cooperation. Furthermore, the
similarities of Chávez’s development policies to Latin America’s failed experiment of
import-substituting industrialization (ISI)
pose a great threat to the stability of the region. Chávez’s foreign policies, therefore,
are not unifying Latin America meaningfully, but rather they are contributing both to
political and economic instability in the region.
Political Instability Resulting from Chávez’s
Foreign Policy:
Chávez has become a controversial
figure both regionally and internationally.
This is largely due to his aggressive rhetoric
against those who disagree with him, combined with the hasty decisions he has been
known to make and retract. As Table 1
shows, Latin American opinions of Chávez
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between 2005 and 2008 decreased
more overall than any other world
leader that Latinobarómetro polled
individuals about, with the exception of
George W. Bush. These statistics suggest that Chávez is not the highly esteemed leader that he hopes to be in Latin
America. As Chávez and Bush became two
of the most negatively perceived leaders according to Latin Americans and two of the
most prominent figures in the region, there
emerged a major divide in Latin America
over their policies and influence. As such,
Chávez’s policies have not been well received across all of Latin America and policy differences have led to political conflicts
within the region rather than facilitating the
regional integration and cooperation that
Chávez wishes to see.
First of all, support for Chávez has,
in many ways, become a “liability for politicians in Latin America,” meaning that politicians who have connections to Chávez may
now run the risk of losing the support of
their populace.77Indeed, as previously discussed, this was the case in the 2006 Peruvian elections when Chávez publicly backed
Humala who then lost the election, in part as
a result of Chávez’s support. Despite the
economic catastrophe that Alan Garcia was
remembered for from his first presidential
term between 1985 and 1990, his slogan of
“Peru or Chávez” attracted many in the
population who were against Chávez’s involvement in Peruvian affairs.78 In other
Latin American countries, exposing and accusing politicians of having ties to Chávez
has become a tactic used by candidates to
defeat the opposition in elections. In the
Nicaraguan election of 2006, although Or-

tega ultimately won the election, his opponent used Chávez’s shipments of oil to
Sandinista leaders as a tactic to criticize Ortega’s supporters.79 Even in Mexico’s 2006
election, presidential candidate Felipe Calderón accused his opponent Andrés Manuel
López Obrador of having ties to Chávez, an
accusation that Obrador denied. 80Following
Calderón’s ad campaign, Obrador lost his
lead in the polls and Calderón won the election by a margin of less than one percent.81
Chávez’s involvement in numerous
national elections in 2006 may help to explain why approval ratings among Latin
Americans suddenly dropped from an average of 4.9 on a scale of 10 to 4.5, as shown
in Table 1. The trend in both Peru and Mexico of support for the leftist candidate shifting to their opponent following accusations
of political ties to Chávez clearly demonstrates that significant percentages of the
Latin American population are against
Chávez’s involvement in domestic affairs.
For support of leading candidates to decline
so definitively following Chávez’s backing
for leftist candidates, the threat of his influence must have been perceived as a more
important concern for a significant portion
of voters than other domestic issues that
were guiding their decision in earlier polls.
It is very likely, then, that Chávez’s interference in the domestic affairs of other countries contributed to this large drop in Latin
American opinion of the Venezuelan president.
In addition, tensions arose in Latin
America as a result of Morales’ 2006 decision to nationalize the hydrocarbon industry
in Bolivia, and frustration was once again
felt toward Chávez who supported Morales’
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decision and offered him advice on
carrying it out.82Argentine-Spanish
company Repsol YPF and Brazil’s
state oil company Petrobrás were both
heavily invested in Bolivia’s hydrocarbon industry and, therefore, were negatively impacted by the nationalization of
Bolivia’s hydrocarbon industry. Argentina,
which imported significantly less oil than
Brazil, was able to strike a deal with Bolivia
rather quickly by agreeing in 2006 to pay $5
per billion BTU as compared to the $3.18 it
paid before Bolivian nationalization.83Brazil,
on the other hand, was much more invested
in the Bolivian hydrocarbon industry with
more than 50% of Brazilian gas and 75% of
gas consumption in São Paulo being imported from Bolivia.84 Lula spoke very diplomatically of Morales’ decision to nationalize Bolivia’s gas reserves, however he refused to meet with Morales to negotiate augmented gas prices. It was not until October
28, 2006, after Lula developed a firmer
stance in favor of Brazilian national interest,
that Brazil and Bolivia reached a deal that
would allow Petrobrás to continue its operations in two Bolivian gas fields.85
Although Lula has remained diplomatic in his relations with Venezuela, some
analysts believe that Brazil began loosening
its ties to Chávez in light of Bolivian nationalization of gas reserves which was encouraged by Chávez. It is important to note that,
as discussed in the previous section, Lula
was never an absolute supporter of Chávez’s
policies. That being said, Brazil’s support
for some of Chávez’s policies that it had
once supported has waned even more in recent years. For example, following the hydrocarbon conflict, Petrobrás officials

sounded less enthusiastic about plans to
build the $20 billion pipeline that Chávez
envisions and that would begin in Venezuela, traverse Brazil, and end in Argentina.86 More explicitly, the Brazilian press
criticized Chávez for his involvement in encouraging and assisting Bolivia to nationalize its hydrocarbon industry.
One country with which Chávez has
had particularly rocky relations is its
neighbor to the west, Colombia, though
Chávez has periodically shown signs of
wanting to cooperate with its neighbor.
Prior to Chávez’s taking office, Colombia
and Venezuela, under the administrations of
former presidents Carlos Andrés Pérez and
Rafael Caldera, followed a policy of
“degulfisation,” meaning that the two countries focused on pursuing trade relations and
downplayed political tensions, such as territorial disputes.87 However, throughout
Chávez’s presidency, relations with Colombia (which is known to have close ties to the
United States) have been dynamic, alternating between pragmatic cooperation between
the two countries and Chávez’s use of aggressive rhetoric and actions toward Colombia.
When Chávez first came to power in
1999, he experienced good relations with
then-Colombian President Andrés Pastrana
as the two leaders worked together to address issues surrounding the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist
guerilla group in Colombia to which Chávez
is sympathetic.88 However, their relations
quickly worsened, particularly after Pastrana
adopted Plan Colombia, a plan wherein Colombia receives $1.3 billion from the United
States to train its military to eliminate drug

220
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47

226

: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009

Great Day 2009

SUNY Geneseo

trafficking.89 Chávez opposes Plan
Colombia, believing that this drug
eradication plan wrongfully targets
the livelihood of Latin American coca
farmers rather than Western drug abusers. In 2002, having recently been restored to power following the short-lived
coup d’état that temporarily ousted the
Venezuelan president, Chávez showed a
more cooperative attitude toward Colombia
as its current President Álvaro Uribe Vélez
took office. However, relations between the
two countries worsened, once again, and
have remained poor due to policy differences.
Relations between Venezuela and
Colombia came closest to a military confrontation in 2007 when Uribe ordered Colombian military troops to attack a FARC
camp on Ecuadorean territory. Chávez responded to this by “closing the Venezuelan
embassy in Bogotá, expelling the Colombian
ambassador in Caracas, sending 10 battalions of troops to the border with Colombia
and threatening to deploy Russian fighter
bombers.”90 As previously mentioned,
Chávez’s exaggerated response to the incursion into Ecuador pressured Correa into
sending troops of his own to the Colombian
border. Chávez’s response was criticized
regionally and internationally. Even Castro
and Lula, who have enjoyed good relations
with Chávez in many situations, discouraged
the prospect of war between Colombia and
Venezuela. Chávez quickly called back
Venezuelan troops, however his rash decision to mobilize his troops over an incident
that did not even occur on Venezuelan territory demonstrates how Chávez’s actions often create controversy and could even lead

to military conflicts. Although Chávez and
Uribe agreed to meet to reestablish diplomatic ties following the conflict, tensions
between Venezuela and Colombia remain.91
Another major political concern
within Latin America is that Chávez may be
starting a regional arms race. In 2006,
Venezuela struck a major arms deal with
Russia by purchasing assault rifles, fighter
jets, and helicopters for the price of nearly
$3 billion.92 Since then, Chávez has struck
even more weapons deals with Russia, as
well as with Brazil, Belarus, China, and
Spain. Chávez maintains that these purchases are merely intended to update Venezuela’s outdated arsenal, however there have
been implications that these arms deals were
a response to the United States’ arming Colombia through Plan Colombia and the subsequent Patriot Plan.93 Since then, several
other Latin American countries have begun
to significantly increase military spending.
Lula, for example, requested that the Brazilian Congress set aside about $5.6 billion toward the countries 2008 military budget.94
Chile’s military expenditures are also noteworthy, spending about 3.8 percent of its
GDP on national defense.95 Some countries
have expressed concern over these increases
in military spending throughout the region,
for example, Peru feels threatened by
Chile’s heavy investment in its military due
to a border dispute between the two countries.96 As more Latin American leaders feel
threatened by the level of military spending
in surrounding countries, it is very plausible
an arms race will escalate in the region,
thereby causing more instability and divide
in Latin America.
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The Path to Economic Instability:
Chávez wants integration of Latin
America to occur under his terms and
according to his Bolivarian ideology,
however his plan for the economic integration of Latin America resembles the
failed policy of import-substituting industrialization (ISI). ISI is a policy that provides
an alternative to capitalism and was tested in
Latin America beginning in 1930 and ultimately failing by the early 1980s.97 The
book Modern Latin America describes the
theory behind ISI growth:
In contrast to the largely laissez-faire policies of nineteenthcentury England and the United
States, Latin American governments
actively promoted industrial growth.
They did so in various ways: erecting
tariff barriers and raising the price of
imported goods to the point where
local industrial firms could successfully compete in the marketplace;
creating demand by favoring local
producers in government contracts
(involving, for example, purchases
for the military); and, most important, establishing government-run
companies and investing directly in
industrial firms. Through protection
and participation, the state in Latin
America furnished critical impetus
for the regions industrial growth.98

manufacturing their own goods. However,
rather than make Latin America selfsufficient, it made these countries dependent
on the West for expensive goods, such as
machinery to manufacture products, rather
than the finished products themselves.99
Next, ISI limited local demand for manufactured products as they were manufacturing
industrial goods, such as refrigerators.
Many locals could not afford such goods
and, given the nature of the products, those
who could afford them did not need large
quantities. Furthermore, there was little
trade between countries so companies were
forced to accept market demand within their
country.100 Finally, the use of advanced technologies limited job production as they replaced much manual labor. With machines
performing tasks that could have otherwise
been done by humans, unemployment rates
increased and few people could afford to
buy the finished products.101
Chávez is encouraging Latin America to become self-sufficient by promoting
the integration and solidarity of the region.
Chávez’s policy of regional integration resembles ISI in that it encourages national
development by giving preference to local
products over foreign imports. 102
However, Chávez claims that the key difference between ISI and his policy is that the
latter focuses on sovereignty and the individual needs of a specific country.103 His policy
of endogenous development is not intended
ISI failed during this period in Latin Amer- to stop all trade as Chávez relies on oil reveica due to three key shortcomings. First of nues to carry out his domestic and foreign
all, it failed to eliminate foreign dependence policies. Yet as previously discussed, he
in Latin American countries. Latin Ameri- wants Latin American dependence on the
can countries hoped to become selfWest to be as minimal as possible. Despite
sufficient through industrialization and
Chávez’s belief that Latin American
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integration and endogenous growth
will promote sustainable development in the region, analysis of
Chávez’s foreign policy suggest that
countries that become too closely entwined in Chávez’s economic and development plans will be susceptible to one of
the shortcomings of Latin America’s twentieth-century experiment with ISI, which is its
failure to eliminate dependence on the West.
As mentioned in the previous section, Chávez’s attempts to minimize Latin
American dependence on the West only redirect Latin America’s foreign dependence.
One major problem with ISI growth in twentieth century Latin America is that in order
to industrialize, these countries had to purchase products such as technology and industrial equipment from the West, thereby
altering the goods that Latin America was
dependent on importing.104 As Chávez has
flexed his power in Latin America through
oil diplomacy, he has already begun to make
Latin American countries dependent on
Venezuela. For example, in recent years,
Morales has shown signs of “drifting away
from Washington’s orbit” as his close relations with Chávez have provided Bolivia
with aid and support from Venezuela. However, if Chávez cannot afford to continue to
help Bolivia financially, Bolivia will be in a
precarious situation. The Petrocaribe countries would be particularly susceptible to instability if Chávez were forced to abandon
his foreign policy in the region as Venezuela
is now the primary energy supplier in the
Caribbean. Prior to Petrocaribe, Trinidad
and Tobago was the primary provider of energy in the Caribbean, however they allowed
for Venezuela to step into that role. Despite

the decision to permit Venezuela to replace
Trinidad and Tobago as primary energy supplier of the region, Prime Minister Patrick
Manning has made it clear that his country
would sell their oil in new markets and be
unable to fill the regional energy void if for
any reason there were to be a disruption in
oil supply.105 If decreasing oil revenues and
rising debt force Venezuela to alter its policy, the Petrocaribe nations will have few
back-up options.
The new dependence that Chávez’s
foreign policy creates is potentially more
worrisome than dependence on IFIs because
rather than multiple countries contributing to
loans, Venezuela is the sole country responsible for many of the loans Chávez has provided in recent years. First of all, this creates dependence on Chávez’s decision to
continue any agreements that are reached for
Latin American countries that accept
Chávez’s loan and trade offers. Chávez can
use loans that Venezuela provides unilaterally as a form of hard power to coerce loan
recipients to abide by certain conditions.
Chávez has persistently criticized IFIs for
using loans as a means of hard power to coerce developing world governments to adopt
mandatory conditions in order to receive
loans. However, there is a good chance that
Chávez will use Venezuelan loans in this
way if he believes it will further his goals.
Furthermore, Chávez’s foreign policy in the
region renders Latin American countries dependent upon his ability to perpetuate the
numerous and costly agreements that he has
reached. IFIs like the IMF and the World
Bank are institutions that draw funds from
multiple states, therefore if one contributing
state runs into financial trouble, money will
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still be available due to the financial contributions of other states.
With Venezuela as the sole lender,
loan recipients become dependent on
the economic and political stability of
Venezuela. This dependence is particularly problematic for many Latin American
countries because oil prices vary greatly and
are unpredictable, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The biggest danger for Latin America is the fact that all of the agreements and
projects that Chávez has committed to are
dependent on high revenues from one natural resource, oil, of which the value is difficult to predict. Figure 1 shows that throughout most of Chávez’s presidency, he has
benefited from significant increases in the
price of oil, with prices rising from as low as
$8.85 per barrel in December 1998 to a peak
of $137.98 per barrel in July 2008. Since
then, prices fell as low as $32.06 per barrel
on December 26, 2008 and, in recent weeks,
they have been hovering at about $50 per
barrel.106 With so much of Venezuela’s oil
revenues going toward advancing Chávez’s
political agenda as opposed to investment in
Venezuelan oil infrastructure, PdVSA’s oil
production is not as high as it could be (see
Figure 3) and the addition of decreased demand in the context of the global crisis will
drive Venezuela toward unsustainable debt.
With the oil boom ending and global recession setting in, Chávez will be forced to
make many changes to his policies throughout the region, which is likely to have negative effects that will be felt throughout Latin
America.

The Effects of Falling Oil Prices on
Chávez’s Foreign Policy:
Although Chávez has, thus far, been
able to use high oil revenues to fund his foreign policy, analysis of his policies and programs reveals that, with Venezuelan oil
prices hovering at about $40 per barrel, he,
too, may be headed toward the downward
slope of the petro-state trap. However, despite his strong rhetoric, he has proven
throughout his presidency to be a rational
politician and to have a pragmatic side in
making his decisions. In January 2009, in
light of the decrease in oil prices, Chávez
allowed Western oil companies to make bids
on Venezuelan oil fields. 107 Furthermore, in
March 2009, he announced plans to revise
Venezuela’s 2009 budget, basing it upon oil
prices of $40 per barrel rather than the $60
per barrel that it was originally figured
around. 108 By taking the proper actions to
adjust to decreased oil prices and by managing Venezuela’s international reserve savings of $42.2 billion wisely, Chávez may be
able to resist Venezuela’s succumbing to the
oil curse this year. However, if oil prices do
not continue to rise, budget cuts will be necessary that are likely to have negative ramifications both for Venezuela and for
neighboring countries in Latin America.109
Venezuela, Chávez, and the Oil Curse:
When analyzing how Chávez’s policies are being affected by the oil bust, it is
helpful to consider the policy weaknesses of
the Punto Fijo system or puntifijismo, which
was the political system that preceded
Chávez. The Pact of Punto Fijo was a
power-sharing agreement signed in 1958
which was said to protect democracy in
Venezuela by respecting elections.110
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Elected officials were to work with
members of the other political parties that signed the pact and consider
differing viewpoints in forming government policy. In practice, this agreement
limited political power to the two main
political parties of Venezuela, Acción Democratica (AD) and COPEI, intentionally
shutting the Communist Party out of the political system.111 The system was strong in
Venezuela for about thirty years until economic and political instability ensued in the
1980s, largely as a result of the end of the oil
boom. Puntofijismo officially ended in 1999
when Chávez took power and created his
Bolivarian Constitution.112
The downfall of the Punto Fijo system can be primarily attributed to the effects
of the oil curse. For about a quarter of a
century, oil wealth masked many of the
flaws of puntofijismo, however when oil
prices plunged in the 1980s, the trends of the
oil curse began to appear, thereby exposing
the weaknesses of the system and paving the
way for political instability.113 Chávez took
advantage of this instability by rallying support among the poor and working classes
and promising to overturn the Punto Fijo
system, which ultimately led him to win the
1998 Venezuelan election.114 Yet, despite
Chávez’s rhetoric about creating a better political system in Venezuela, analysis of his
economic policy reveals that he, too, may be
headed toward the two main destabilizing
trends of the petro-state curse by replicating
several fundamental weaknesses of the
Punto Fijo system. To prevent an economic
collapse through this indefinite period of
decreased oil value, Chávez must attempt to
diversify his government’s sources of reve-

SUNY Geneseo

nue and cut down on unnecessary expenditures.
First of all, as a major oil exporter,
Dutch disease has been a constant concern
for Venezuela. Under the Punto Fijo system, Venezuela enjoyed two oil booms between 1960 and 1980 that contributed to
rapid economic growth, a higher quality of
life compared to the rest of Latin America
(as measured by health, education, and
wages), and, consequently, political stability.115 The government was dependent on oil
revenues as the high value of the Venezuelan bolívar with relation to other countries
suppressed non-oil production sectors within
Venezuela. As such, when oil prices
plunged in the 1980s, the Venezuelan government could not fall back upon other
sources of export revenue, forcing it to take
out foreign loans and artificially control its
currency, which ultimately caused the progress that had been made during the oil
booms to regress.116
Dutch disease has continued to have
an adverse effect on the non-oil sector under
Chávez’s leadership as his policies also rely
almost entirely on oil revenues to finance his
policies. As was the case under puntofijismo, Venezuela’s non-oil sectors have been
unable to develop because large oil revenues
strengthened the value of the bolívar with
relation to other currencies, making imports
cheaper and lowering the competitiveness of
Venezuelan products. Analysis of the export
and import rows in Table 2 illustrates the
escalating problem of Dutch disease in
Venezuela between 1998 and 2007. As oil
revenues increased following the end of the
2003 PdVSA strike, the value of goods being imported into Venezuela skyrocketed,
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reaching an unprecedented $29.5
billion.117 On the other hand, while
oil revenues rose consistently following the 2003 oil strike, the amount of
money gained through non-oil exports
decreased between 2005 and 2006.118
Data compiled in 2009 shows that Venezuela’s non-oil sector continued in this
downward trend, shrinking by about 5 percent annually over the past three years.119
With the value of oil being less than
one-third of its value at the peak of the oil
boom, Dutch Disease stands out as a particular threat to stability in Venezuela. Similar
to problems faced by administrations under
puntofijismo, Chávez has been unable to
provide Venezuelans with sustainable
jobs.120 Chávez’s Vuelvan Caras mission
attempts to create jobs and expand the nonoil sector by assisting Venezuelans in setting
up cooperatives. However, this mission is
not enough to create long-term jobs and notably expand the non-oil sector as many cooperatives fail shortly after the government
stops providing them with resources.121 Furthermore, Chávez’s decision to set an overvalued fixed exchange rate of 2.15 bolívares
to the dollar has contributed to high inflation
in recent years, reinforcing Dutch disease
trends by making imports artificially cheap
while exports become more expensive and
less competitive in global markets.122
To stave off the effects of Dutch disease, Chávez must find a way to broaden his
government’s sources of revenue so that it is
less dependent on oil revenues which could
be done by increasing non-oil taxes. According to Venezuela expert Terry Lynn
Karl, ever since the Hydrocarbons Law of
1943, which increased taxes on oil compa-
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nies so that profits would be split “fiftyfifty” between the companies and the government, there has been “a permanent temptation to cut into the profits of foreign companies as a means of sustaining oilsubsidized activities while avoiding the taxation of domestic groups.”123 Failure to adequately collect non-oil taxes proved to be a
major downfall of the Punto Fijo system
which, between 1977 and 1979, was receiving 70.3 percent of Venezuelan tax revenues
from corporate income taxes, primarily from
oil companies.124 Chávez appears to recognize that this was a major weakness of puntofijismo and he, consequently, announced
along with his 2009 budget cuts his plan to
increase sales taxes in Venezuela as well.125
The increase will allow Chávez to diversify
his sources of government revenue so that it
may be less dependent on unpredictable oil
revenues.
The fall of puntofijismo was also due
in large part to ill handling of the absorption
problem by Venezuelan presidents during
the oil booms between 1960 and 1980. Under this system, oil revenues were spent irresponsibly as military loyalty was largely
purchased through incentives, corrupt leaders mismanaged funds, and the government
spent a significant amount of money on social programs, whether or not they proved to
be effective.126 The Venezuelan government,
thus, spent large amounts of money to fund
its policies during this period, yet it was relying primarily on oil revenues to do so.
When the second oil boom ended in the
1980s, rather than implement more taxes in
Venezuela, presidents opted to borrow
money internationally and artificially control
the bolívar’s exchange rate, causing debt to
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accumulate and reinforcing symptoms of Dutch disease.127
Chávez’s foreign policy is a
testament to his unwise use of government funds to finance often ineffective
policies and, as he spends that money, he
is replicating many of the mistakes made
under the Punto Fijo system. Similar to
presidents under the Punto Fijo system who
purchased new arms as incentives for the
military, Chávez has committed billions of
dollars to upgrading Venezuela’s military.
As previously discussed, Chávez has made
multiple major weapons purchases from several countries, agreeing to buy over $4.4 billion worth of weapons from Russia alone.128
Furthermore, as discussed throughout the first
section, Chávez has also spent billions of dollars on aid and development projects throughout Latin America, despite evidence that his
regional foreign policy has had only limited
success in achieving his goals. Chávez has
spent billions of dollars on capital-intensive
programs and projects that depend on oil
revenues, including an estimated $12 billion
on “oil assistance handouts” last year
alone.129The fact that Chávez has committed
such large sums of Venezuelan money to
fund various policies around Latin America
shows that, like other petro-states, the high
revenues from oil exports have given him a
sense of economic stability, and even infallibility. Empowered by the influx of oil revenues, he has pursued a variety of costly policies to further several goals that were only
indirectly related to benefiting Venezuela’s
population, such as encouraging Latin American countries to break away from westernbased IFIs.
Furthermore, Chávez’s missions,
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which are comparable to social programs implemented during the Punto Fijo era, have
been one of his largest expenditures, requiring billions of dollars to finance, yet their
success has been debatable. As previously
mentioned, the Vuelvan Caras mission has
only had limited success in creating successful cooperatives and sustainable jobs in
Venezuela. It is doubtful that the Robinson
mission (which aims to educate Venezuela’s
rural population) actually succeeded in teaching 1.5 million Venezuelan adults to read and
write as Chávez claims it did, however even
if they did reach this goal, it came at a high
price as the government spent $50 million to
fund the mission.130 This equates to about
$536 per adult that successfully became literate through this program, a very high cost
when compared to the average per pupil cost
of $47 in Sub-Saharan Africa, $30 in Asia,
and $61 in Latin America.131 The Barrio
Adentro mission, which was previously discussed, is also very costly for Venezuela, as
in addition to supplying Cuba with fuel, it
involves transporting patients to and from
Cuba if medical treatments are not available
in Venezuela.The operating budget for this
mission is $5 billion each year.132 These are
only three of Chávez’s missions, yet as we
can see, they are very expensive social programs with only a limited rate of success.
The fact that Chávez has borrowed
money in recent years to help fund his policies could be somewhat alarming for Venezuela now that the oil prices have decreased
so much. Taking out loans during an oil
boom can be particularly troublesome for
petro-states. As long as oil prices remain
high, banks are willing to lend these states
money, however when the value of oil
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decreases, banks become unwilling
to continue lending and petro-states
must quickly pay back their loans at a
time when less oil revenues are coming
in. Nigeria became an infamous example of a petro-state failing as a result of
this pattern as it borrowed large amounts of
money during a 1980s oil boom to fund expensive, wasteful projects, and then found
itself in debt and unable to adjust to the sudden plunge of oil prices in 1986.133 Loans
also deepened the financial troubles of Venezuela under the Punto Fijo system as the later
administrations, reluctant to raise non-oil
taxes, took out loans which led the country
further into debt.134
Throughout Chávez’s presidency,
Venezuela’s external debt rose from about
$27.9 billion when he was elected in 1998 to
a peak about $47.1 billion in the second half
of 2005 (see Table 2). Following this peak,
Venezuelan debt steadily decreased, however
the C.I.A. World Factbook reports that in
2008, external debt increased to nearly $48
billion as Chávez has taken out several new
loans.135 For example, in February 2008,
China agreed to furnish Venezuela with a $4
billion loan which Venezuela is to pay back
in shipments of refined oil, rather than in
cash.136 In September 2008, Russia also
agreed to loan Venezuela $1 billion to help
Chávez fund his massive arms purchases.137
Yet, despite the fifty percent increase from
the 1998 figure in dollar amounts, at its current rate, debt is unlikely to cause economic
instability in Venezuela as it did in Nigeria
because it represents only 14.7 percent of
Venezuela’s GDP, a manageable percentage,
particularly when compared to other countries. 138 Although oil prices are currently at
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about $48 per barrel, unlike Nigeria and the
Punto Fijo administrations, Chávez has a significant amount of money saved in international reserves to temporarily supplement the
oil revenue that Venezuela is able to generate
during this oil bust.139
Analysis of Chávez’s mismanagement of oil revenues with relation to the
common trends of the petro-state curse raises
the question of how long Venezuela can sustain itself through this oil bust. This analysis
shows that his economic policies have replicated several common weaknesses that have
led other petro-states to the point of economic collapse. Norway has been one of the
most successful petro-states, in large part due
to its Government Pension Fund—Global
(formerly the Government Petroleum Fund)
which is a stabilization fund established in
1990 to help offset the effects of future declines in the value of oil.140 Venezuela also
has a stabilization fund, known as the Fund
for Macroeconomic Stabilization, though it is
only valued at about $800 million compared
with Norway’s fund which is worth about
$326 billion.141 Venezuela’s international
reserve savings may insulate the country
from some of the effects of the oil price drop,
however these reserves can only prevent the
economic decline for a limited amount of
time. Chávez will need to make wise adjustments to his budget in order to avert complete destabilization in Venezuela as a result
of the petro-state curse.
To prevent the absorption problem
from rapidly destabilizing Venezuela’s
economy without squandering its savings,
Chávez must look carefully at each of his
policies, evaluate their effectiveness, then
improve the efficiency of those that are
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crucial and eliminate those that are
not absolutely necessary. As revealed through analysis in the first
two sections of the paper, Chávez’s
policies throughout the region have
only earned him conditional support for
his ambitions and they have not achieved
his intended goals. For example, Chávez’s
missions need to be reconsidered too as their
effectiveness has been severely limited as
demonstrated by the Vuelvan Caras, Barrio
Adentro, and Robinson missions. These
types of ineffective policies and programs
must be changed or eliminated so that
Chávez is not squandering Venezuelan
funds.
By expanding the government’s
sources of non-oil revenue and altering or
eliminating ineffective policies, Chávez will
be able to forestall economic collapse in
Venezuela, however he will not be able to
prevent economic decline completely. With
regards to Venezuela’s current situation,
Karl stated, “Regardless of intentions no
[previous] regime has been able to manage
these booms to overcome poverty. The end
result is the shortages, inflation and slowing
of economic growth that we’re seeing
now.”142 Venezuela is likely to face balance
of payment problems with its high imports
and lower revenues. Its inflation rate is currently the highest in Latin America at 30.7
percent, and economic growth has slowed
significantly.143 Indeed, if oil prices do not
continue to rise as they have been since the
middle of February (see Figure 1), then
Venezuela could be slated for economic instability within several months. However,
throughout 2009, Venezuela is likely to forestall economic collapse as long as Chávez

handles government funds responsibly. Unfortunately, Venezuela does not have adequate funds to avoid economic decline if the
oil bust lasts several years and any policy
changes that are made may come at the expense of some of Latin America’s most impoverished countries.
Changes to Chávez’s Latin American Foreign Policy:
The threat of economic and political
instability resulting from decreased oil revenues will force Chávez to focus on improving conditions within Venezuela, especially
after his referendum to eliminate limits on
the number of terms that elected officials
can serve passed in February of this year.144
In making foreign policy decisions, leaders
are always involved in a “two-level game”
meaning that their policies must “satisfy simultaneously both their domestic audience
and their counterparts in other countries.”145
Seeking to win the 2012 presidential election in Venezuela and serve a fourth presidential term (including his brief first term
before his reelection under the Bolivarian
Constitution), Chávez cannot risk alienating
his supporters by allowing the oil bust to
exacerbate Venezuela’s domestic problems.
As a rational leader, Chávez will be forced
to reevaluate his policies and programs in
Latin America to ensure that his political
actions are effective and directly benefit
Venezuela, resulting in a turn away from
Chávez’s current ideological influence and
goals in the region.
First of all, many of Chávez’s programs and agreements that offer cheap
loans, credit, and oil to countries around the
region will be among those policies that he
will have to alter or eliminate. Given the
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cost of maintaining such programs
compared with their effectiveness in
achieving his goals, Chávez will have
to make budget cuts and improvements
to these agreements to keep from overspending Venezuela’s limited revenue. In
January of this year, Chávez already altered
Petrocaribe, which is one of the most important agreements he has reached in Latin
America. When the agreement was first
signed in 2005, countries purchasing oil
through Petrocaribe only had to pay for forty
percent of the oil up front, and then pay the
difference over the next 25 years at an interest rate of one percent. With significantly
lower oil prices, the conditions of the agreement now require that countries pay fifty
percent of the cost of oil up front.146 Chávez
will inevitably have to make many similar
adjustments to his policies around the region, for example by limiting funding for
development in other countries.
Furthermore, Chávez’s large-scale
energy integration plans will have to be put
on hold as long as the price of oil remains
low. With oil worth less than one-third of
its value at the peak of the price boom and
Chávez needing to keep his Venezuelan constituency content to win the 2012 election,
he will be unable to fund the numerous large
-scale projects, such as refineries and pipelines, that he has promised to help build in
neighboring countries. As of January 2009,
Chávez was already reconsidering his country’s ability to fund the development of oil
refineries that had been planned for Nicaragua and Ecuador.147 Although he has attempted to give the impression that such
projects will still be carried out as promised,
Venezuela currently lacks the extra funds
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that are necessary to fulfill Chávez’s promises. Therefore, it is unlikely that much progress will be made toward the completion of
these large-scale energy infrastructure projects throughout Latin America because the
oil bust will force Chávez to prioritize Venezuela’s domestic affairs.
The result of these budget adjustments will be a reverse of Chávez’s foreign
policy goals of establishing Venezuela as a
strong regional power and minimizing western influence in Latin America. Throughout
Chávez’s presidency, most Latin American
leaders have attempted to balance their relations between Venezuela and the United
States. However, with Venezuela’s economy lacking the strength to continue the
very policies that have won Chávez conditional support throughout the region, Latin
American leaders are likely to move closer
to the United States and other western countries which tend to be more stable than developing countries like Venezuela. Figure 2
shows that the amount of IFI loans being
taken in Latin America increased significantly in 2008 when the global financial crisis began and this trend is likely to continue
through 2009 as the crisis worsens. Latin
American countries including Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Jamaica, Colombia, and Mexico
are all beginning to take out new IFI loans in
light of the economic crisis.148 Ecuador, too,
which maintains good relations with
Chávez, is looking to take out $2.6 billion in
credits which Correa would prefer to receive
from regional multilateral lenders including
the Inter-American Development Bank, the
Andean Development Corporation, and the
Latin American Reserve Fund.149 Given the
fragile state of the world economy, even
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countries that maintain amicable
relations with Chávez are likely to
pursue policies that improve their relations with the West in order to encourage foreign investment along with
other incentives that could come from
maintaining good relations, such as aid.
Chávez’s foreign policy budget cuts
will most hurt the impoverished Latin
American countries that have become dependent on Chávez’s policies, pushing many
of them closer to the West as well. For example, the ten percent increase of money
Petrocaribe countries must pay up front for
oil may affect the amount of oil that some of
the poorer Caribbean countries can afford to
buy and it is very possible that Chávez will
be forced to alter the agreement even more.
Although it is likely that Chávez will continue Petrocaribe, the countries of the Caribbean will continue to maintain strong relations with the United States as it provides
them with necessary aid. Cuba and Bolivia
have become particularly dependent on
Chávez’s assistance to their countries.
Chávez is likely to continue the oil for medical care exchange that is set up by the Barrio
Adentro mission between Cuba and Venezuela because it brings direct benefit to
Venezuelans in the form of health care.
However, Chávez still may be forced to limit
the amount of oil sent to Cuba and the free
medical services that Venezuelans are provided if Venezuela’s economy becomes too
weak. Bolivia, on the other hand, is likely to
suffer heavily from budget cuts that Chávez
will be forced to make as the country is already extremely dependent on foreign assistance and Morales has opted to receive aid
and loans from Venezuela over the West
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when he could. As a result, he has accumulated over $100 million in debt to Venezuela
that Bolivia will be unable to pay back in the
near future if Chávez finds that he needs
those funds.150 With the global economic
situation worsening, if Venezuela loses the
financial strength to continue its aid and programs in the country, then Morales will be
forced to pursue policies that are in accordance with western interests because Bolivia
is dependent on foreign aid that industrialized western countries will most likely be
able to provide.
Given Venezuela’s economic fragility due to the oil bust, Chávez himself may
be forced to pursue improved relations with
the United States. Similar to Chávez’s first
year in office when financial mismanagement under the Punto Fijo system left Venezuela’s economy weak, the oil bust has led
Venezuela to once again face many of the
same economic problems today that it faced
then, including “recession, confronted inflation, capital flight, and low oil prices.”151 In
a move that reflects his recognition of the
fragile state of Venezuela’s economy in this
post-oil boom period, Chávez invited western oil companies to make oil bids on Venezuela’s oil reserves in January of this year.152
This suggests that Chávez will once again
pursue better relations with the West, including the United States, in order to attract foreign revenue.
Although increased foreign investment in Venezuela’s oil industry would be
beneficial in maximizing its oil production,
the necessity to improve relations with the
United States would limit Chávez’s ability
to act definitively against American interests
and to influence neighboring countries to
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do the same. Furthermore, it is very
likely that western companies will
be wary of investing in Venezuela
given his actions to remove foreign investors from Venezuela’s oil industry
and consolidate government control over
PdVSA. Foreign investors may fear that
when oil prices rise, Chávez will once again
attempt to regain control over their oil fields.
Due to concern over Chávez’s past actions,
foreign oil companies may look toward other
oil fields to invest in, such as those that were
recently discovered in Brazil. As such, inviting foreign investment in Venezuela’s oil
industry would greatly limit Chávez’s freedom to pursue his policies, especially as he
will need to find a way to regain the trust of
foreign investors so that they feel that Venezuelan oil is a worthwhile investment.
Conclusion:
As we have seen, Chávez has fallen
into the same petro-state trap that led to the
downfall of puntofijismo and other petrostate administrations around the world by
attempting to capitalize off of an oil boom
by using the money to fund lavish and
wasteful policies throughout Latin America.
Despite saving $42.2 billion in international
reserves, his management of Venezuela’s oil
wealth shows little foresight for the price
plunge that inevitably followed the sudden
oil boom. Oil prices are constantly fluctuating, therefore large oil booms are always
accompanied by price busts that history
shows can have devastating effects on a
petro-state if the government does not adequately plan for such market changes. The
oil bust of 2008 was particularly sudden and
drastic, however petro-states must do their
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best to prepare for such sudden changes in
oil prices. Analysis of Hugo Chávez’s foreign policy throughout the boom-and-bust
cycle of oil prices offers many lessons that
should be noted by other petro-state leaders
who face the challenges that accompany
natural resource management, particularly
when that resource is the country’s primary
source of revenue.
First of all, petro-state leaders must
understand that increased revenues from an
oil boom do not make an oil-dependent
country rich, because oil prices can plunge
as quickly as they rise. Chávez’s foreign
policy serves as an example of what petrostate leaders should avoid in managing their
budget during an oil boom. Chávez spent
much of Venezuela’s oil revenues on costly
programs throughout Latin America that did
not directly benefit Venezuela in the longterm and, furthermore, were ineffective in
accomplishing the goals that they set out to
achieve. This is not to say that petro-states
must completely neglect foreign policy, but
rather they should prioritize domestic affairs
and pursue only policies that will further the
primary goals of their country. For example,
Chávez’s Barrio Adentro mission provides
Venezuelans with health care, an important
service that was lacking for most Venezuelans prior to the mission’s creation, therefore
it is a program worth pursuing through
Venezuelan foreign policy. However, the
program is currently expensive and inefficient due to the large oil shipments and the
range of medical treatments that are offered
to Venezuelans. As such, it is likely to undergo changes, for example, by decreasing
the amount of oil that is shipped and offering fewer medical services, which would
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make the program more efficient
and economically sustainable. As
long as such policies and programs
are cost-effective, efficient, and geared
toward the direct, long-term benefit of
the public (for example, through coupling
such a program with an educational ex
change program to train domestic workers),
then they may be worth pursuing by petrostate governments.
Furthermore, petro-states must not
chase away foreign investment in the oil industry as large, experienced oil companies
have proven to be most effective in ensuring
peak oil production. Chávez’s decision to
consolidate government control over PdVSA
in 2003 proved to be one of the greatest mistakes of his presidency as Venezuelan oil production dropped by about 800,000 barrels of
oil per day (see Figure 3). Venezuela has undoubtedly lost billions of dollars in potential
oil revenues that could have provided Venezuela with more money and jobs throughout
the oil boom. Furthermore, if oil production
were at its peak in Venezuela, then the country would be bringing in more revenues now
that oil prices are low. For petro-state leaders,
the easiest policy option may appear to be
heavy taxation of the oil industry, or even
complete control of it to increase the government’s budget, and low taxation of other sectors to please the population.153 However,
foreign investment is key to maintaining the
upkeep of a country’s oil infrastructure and
keeping its oil industry at peak production.
Petro-states must, therefore, allow at least
some foreign investment in their oil industry
and also diversify their sources of revenue by
promoting and taxing non-oil sectors of the
economy.
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Finally, it is essential that petro-state
leaders exercise great prudence by saving
large amounts of money to offset the detrimental effects of future oil busts. The $42.2
billion that Chávez managed to save may help
Venezuela get through this year, however it is
little compared to the $326 billion that Norway has saved in its Government Pension
Fund.154 Due to resource depletion, petrostates must maintain very high rates of savings and investment throughout oil booms to
generate real wealth and to secure economic
stability in the event of an oil bust.155 Norway
has been one of the most stable petro-states in
the world due to responsible management of
its revenues. As such, other petro-states
should follow Norway’s lead in establishing a
strong stabilization fund that is not to be
touched unless their economic situation requires it. Many petro-states are beginning to
set aside large portions of their resource revenues to create stabilization funds, including
Russia, Brazil, and even Libya.156 Chávez, on
the other hand, has not invested heavily in
Venezuela’s stabilization fund, choosing instead to squander large amounts of oil revenues through his costly foreign policy. Other
petro-state leaders can, thus, learn from his
mistake.
Unfortunately, in the case of Venezuela, Chávez’s management of oil revenues
throughout the oil boom-and-bust cycle has
made his country susceptible to economic decline as a result of the oil curse. If oil prices
remain low or drop even further, Venezuela’s
economy will quickly destabilize due to
Chávez’s decision to spend more money immediately and to save less for an emergency.
Furthermore, his wasteful spending will
negatively impact poor Latin American
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countries that have come to depend
on his foreign policy. However,
through the combination of wise adjustments to Venezuela’s budget and
luck in the form of rising oil prices,
Chávez may have the chance to learn
from his mistakes and prepare Venezuela to
be secure in the event of a future oil bust. It
is important, then, that he and other petrostate leaders, both present and future, understand the mistakes that allowed Venezuela to
quickly transform from an economically secure country that was purchasing allies and
regional influence into a country that runs
the great risk of suffering from economic
instability. In order to promote the economic security of their countries throughout
the duration of the oil boom-and-bust cycle,
petro-state leaders must refrain from wastefully spending oil revenues on immediate
projects, and instead encourage foreign investment and a diversified source of revenue, and save large amounts of money to
ensure economic security despite the unpredictable nature of market prices.
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Appendices
Figure 1: Weekly Prices of
Venezuelan Crude Oil, 1978-2009

This graph shows the weekly prices of Venezuelan crude oil between January 1978 and March 2009. Prices from
the recent oil boom hit their peak in July 2008 at a price of $137.98 per barrel and they have declined dramatically
since then. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Weekly Venezuela Tia Juana Light Spot Price FOB,” Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government (Washington D.C.: April 29, 2009).

Table 1: Evaluation of Leaders, 2005-2008

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
King Juan Carlos I
José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero
Michelle Bachelet
Fernando Lugo
Álvaro Uribe
Rafael Correa
Felipe Calderón
Tabaré Vásquez
Evo Morales
Cristina Kirchner
Alan García
Hugo Chávez
Fidel Castro
George W. Bush
Daniel Ortega

2005
5.8
5.8
5.5

4.9
4.4
4.9

2006
5.6
5.9
5.6
5.4

2007
5.6
5.9
5.6
5.4

4.9

4.6
4.9

4.9
4.7
5.0
4.6
4.9

4.6
4.5
4.3
4.7

4.6
4.5
4.3
4.5

2008
5.9
5.7
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.2
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.8
4.7
4.3
4.3
4.2
4.2
4.0

Q92ST. I’m going to list a number of foreign leaders. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, where
0 means a “very bad” evaluation and 10 means “very good”. Or do you not know enough to give an opinion?
Source: Latinobarómetro 2008
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Figure 2: IFI Lending to Latin America and the Caribbean, 1997-2008

This graph shows the amount of money being loaned to Latin America and the Caribbean by the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) each year between 1997 and 2008. The amount of loans furnished by the western-based IFIs, the World Bank and the IDB,
was down significantly until about 2006 from their peak in the late 1990s, while the amount of loans from the
CAF was increasing since 1999. However, as illustrated in the graph, between 2007 and 2008, loans from all
three IFIs increased significantly.
Source: Center for International Policy
Vince McElhiny, “Global Crisis is Good News for IFIs in Latin America,” Americas Program Report.
(Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, January 27, 2009).
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Figure 3: Venezuela’s Oil Production and Consumption, 1987-2007

This graph illustrates the varying trends of Venezuela’s oil production and consumption between 1987 and 2007.
In 2007, Venezuela only produced about 2.7 million barrels of oil, significantly down from the approximately 3.5
million barrels of oil that the country was producing around 1997.
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Venezuela: Oil,” Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government
(Washington D.C.: January 2009).
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The West Wing
Submitted by David Lombardo
For me The West Wing will be primarily remembered as compelling entertainment, but the experiences from this class
have proven that a political education can be
gleaned from the episodes. Although extracting that knowledge is not an easy task,
and is one that requires further study as the
DVDS of this show could be a useful supplement to any political science program.
In terms of educating a student The
West Wing should either be used as a base
from which to build or it should be a final
capstone in a curriculum so that students
can see theories and concepts applied in a
meaningful and relatable way. My experience has essentially been a combination of
the two approaches, as I began watching the
show in high school and have rewatched
every episode in the second half of my final
year at SUNY Geneseo.
The first approach, using the show
as a foundation for a political education is
promising but would seem to have drawbacks. The main drawback is that it presents
an idealistic and optimistic world that isn’t
always indicative of reality, and would instill a sort of naiveté in a young student who
doesn’t know anything beyond what he’s
learned from television. But while the show
may present unrealistic outcomes, the scenarios and challenges they lay out to politicking and governing are very real, and are
of a relevant interest to anyone with a desire

for a well rounded political education.
Many of the lessons that can be
learned from The West Wing come in a very
elementary fashion, so that if this was the
primer for an education it would be adequate. Aaron Sorkin was writing for a general audience, and as such, many of the
characters go to great lengths to explain
what they’re dealing with, the history of the
issue, and present all sides of the issue. The
history and various viewpoints that are presented are the most compelling reasons why
this show could be extremely useful at a rudimentary level. At points you feel like
you’re in a classroom when you watch the
show, as they delve into statistical sampling,
explain Senate procedural rules, and debate
the role of the media.
These conversations serve as an excellent starting point for any political education, and for me they made my textbooks
much more comprehensible. I was able to
imagine pocket vetoes in terms that didn’t
seem so abstract or have an added appreciation for how hard reforming social security
actually is.
Beyond added comprehension from
the show was an inspired love of politics
that might have been equally as important as
any quantifiable knowledge gained. The fact
that the show was entertaining, and that it
presented the political realm in a worthwhile light made the whole adventure
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appealing to me, which is why I
became more involved in politics
and eventually sought a B.A. in political science. Thus, while the romanticism of the show may take away from its
grounding in fact, it serves an ulterior
purpose by driving people, like me, to explore the issue further and hopefully reaching their own understanding of issues and
events. It’s this drive that is instilled in people that makes The West Wing a very useful
starting tool, as if it was an energy bar before a big race. It keeps you motivated, intrigued, and aware of the fact that there is a
world outside of lectures and sometimes inaccessible books.
The second way to utilize The West
Wing, as a culmination of theories and history, would most likely not have the same
effects as if the show was used for a starting
point. It’s most useful capacity in terms of
cementing an education would be as a frame
of reference from which to debate things,
probably in a manner similar to our Thursday discussions. The idea would be for a 300
level class of upper classmen to view how
certain issues are covered and prepare to debate the validity of how things play out on
The West Wing. Presumably they would be
able to utilize their earlier knowledge from
other classes to ensure an informed debate
that would arise over how the show deals
with issues like funding legislation, campaigning, and polling.
An upper level class most likely
would be able to have a higher appreciation
for the show than a general audience, and

would benefit from the political professionals that worked on the show. The list of contributors with respectable political credentials includes George Stephanopoulos, Dee
Dee Meyers, and Lawrence O’Donnell.
Their role on the show, of providing their
own stories and creating new storylines,
gives the show a high level of legitimacy.
The new storylines they create could serve
as test cases for students to debate, as they
could muse about events that haven’t come
to fruition and could espouse their own predictions compared to the happenings on The
West Wing.
It would also serve as a way to compare similar events from the show to history,
and contemplate why they turned out differently. Two good examples would be the
shutdown of the Federal Government in season five and the Presidential election in season four. The former would be applied to the
standoff between Gingrich and Clinton,
while the latter would be comparable to the
Presidential election of 2000. With regards
to both elections you can analyze the public
strategies utilized by both campaigns, which
in terms of the 2000 election would present
itself as an interesting opportunity to assess
Gore’s terrible strategy and execution.
There is no downside to this approach of using The West Wing for upper
level students, which is why I would recommend it. I think a class full of engaged students could really benefit from certain episodes and certain clips, cut in a fashion similar to the way I presented my GREAT Day
video.
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If I had to choose between the two
approaches I would say that the latter is more effective and realistic. My
own experience with The West Wing, in
which it served as the base for my education, is probably impossible to reproduce in a classroom setting since I had the
time to watch every single episode. With
that understanding though, I would still recommend utilizing The West Wing for lower
level classes as well as upper level classes.
I would recommend using the show
in conjunction with both classes because it
can work for a general audience or a more
specific crowd. In terms of a general audience, which is what you have in an American Government class (110), there are specific episodes that could make certain
themes more accessible and that’s why I
think those clips could be shown intermittently through lecture. The difficulty that
arises is in understanding the fictitious world
and its characters, but mandating they watch
the first episode would provide enough understanding that no one would be lost after
that.
That first episode could also be used
in the higher level class to debate the role of
the religious right in politics, as the White
House contemplates appeasing the religious
right over a perceived slight. Ideally a more
specific audience, consisting of upper level
students, would appreciate this dilemma for
the White House, and it would serve as fresh
way to approach politics.
Finally, the accessibility of The West
Wing is derived from the fact that it is entertaining. I know academics don’t like to think
that a video can do their job or that entertainment has a role in a rigorous academic
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life, but I think there’s no reason artificial
borders should be placed that would prohibit
this show from educating students.
Frankly, I think it would be easier for
students to learn if they were entertained
with the source material. Since The West
Wing is entertaining while remaining informative it should be used as a tool to supplement a political education, in terms of cultivating an interest and knowledge amongst
beginners and honing the ideas of more seasoned students.
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Tomorrow Will Shine
Submitted by Geoffrey Griffiths
Martin Luther King Jr’s “Letter from
a Birmingham Jail” shares remarkable similarities with the books Hosea, Jonah, and
Amos from the Old Testament. By comparing these writings, we discover not only
what makes a prophet and why they arise,
but we also discover the general pattern that
prophets follow in their efforts to bring
about change. The prophets of old, such as
Hosea, Jonah, and Amos were the messengers of God, and were usually “outsiders”
with an innate calling to reform social and
moral injustice. At first, the prophets of old
appeared reluctant because they were undertaking a dangerous journey; however, with
the help of God, they brought the message
that all people could earn forgiveness and
salvation if they changed their ways. Martin
Luther King Jr. can be seen as a modern
prophet, and perhaps he recognized this because he likens himself to the prophets of
old. King reminds us that prophets are still
needed to fix the injustices and immorality
of contemporary society.
Humans have inhabited the Earth for
millions of years, and, unfortunately, universal human rights are still not guaranteed
to all people. Freedom is not “ringing” everywhere, not even in modern times. Within
the past century, the world has witnessed
some of the worst dehumanizing events, including the repression of women, the oppression of African Americans, and the vic-
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timization of people during the Holocaust.
In 1948, the United Nations introduced the
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in
an attempt to create a standard, whereby all
human beings can be treated with respect
and dignity (1). Yet, human rights violations
still occur today. This can change. The answer is in speaking out against discrimination and cruelty. Conditions cannot change,
if people remain silent. Ultimately, human
rights and human flourishing come through
the tireless efforts of people willing to put
their lives on the line to combat injustice.
These people are prophets. They are people,
like Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi,
Nelson Mandela, Henry David Thoreau, and
Martin Luther King Jr.—people who exercised their freedom of speech to rise above
injustice. They appear in the eighth century
B.C., and they still appear today.
Marvin Perry, author of Western
Civilization: A Brief History, conveys that
prophets are “outsiders” that bring messages
of social change and “attack oppression,
cruelty, greed, and exploitation” (29). In
other words, prophets are “outside” of the
corrupt, immoral, and faithless population—
whether it is because they come in from a
foreign area or because they are not taking
part in the sins or violations of the majority.
Perry asserts that prophets, “often emerge in
times of social distress and moral confusion” and “plea for a return to the covenant
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and law” (29). Prophets are
needed when things are not going
well or when people have strayed
from morality. The prophets of old
emerged, when people sinned against
God by disobeying the Ten Commandments. It was the job of the prophets of old
to educate people about their sins and to
bring an end to decadence. In contemporary
society, to follow God’s way is analogous to
being morally good in thought and action.
No religion is required to do what is not
only good for you, but also to do what will
benefit others. To borrow an idea from the
philosopher, Immanuel Kant, we should
“treat everyone as an end in themselves, and
not a means to an end.” More simply, all
people should be treated with respect.
Hosea, Jonah, and Amos are three of
the prophets of old, and they represent some
of the earliest human and civil rights activists. The prophet Hosea comes from the
north and entered the southern population of
Israel because the people have been showing “no faithfulness or kindness and no
knowledge of God in the land; there was
swearing, lying, killing, stealing, and committing adultery” (Revised Standard Version, Hos. 4.2). Hosea used an analogy of
his personal life to convey the message of
God. Hosea’s wife, Gomer, has committed
adultery and has “played the harlot,” just as
the people of Israel have “left their God to
play the harlot” (Hos. 1.2). A second
prophet, Jonah, also represents an
“outsider,” when he is commanded by God
to “go to Nineveh that great city and cry
against it, for their wickedness has come up
before me” (Jon. 1.2). Jonah tried to escape
on a ship, but God “hurled a great wind

upon the sea” to prevent him. This reminds
us that the prophets of old were doing the
work of God and that God remained in control as the ultimate moral judge of humans
(Jon. 1.15). More universally, no person has
the authority over anyone else. People must
act responsibly, and must consider the consequences to other people before acting.
Amos, a shepherd from Judea,
brought the sins to the attention of the people of the different villages of Israel. He relayed God’s message to Damascus, Gaza,
Tyre, Judah, and several other villages that,
“God will not revoke the punishment” for
their “transgressions” (Amos 1.3). Amos
declared that the people have forsaken their
humbleness before God and have adopted a
life of self-indulgence. They have become
people who “oppress the poor, who crush
the needy” in favor of materialistic needs,
such as alcohol and wealth (Amos 4.1). This
criticism originates from the transition from
tribal society to settled civilizations that occurred in Israel during the Eighth Century
B.C. The transition resulted in class distinctions. With this development, the wealthy
Hebrew Kings began to mistreat the poor
(Perry 29). For the prophets, this type of
“national misfortune was an opportunity for
penitence and reform” (Perry 29).
Prophets have an innate calling—
whether from God or within themselves—to
undertake the dangerous job of being the
“gadfly” according to Socrates, and to speak
out against injustice. According to Perry,
prophets are people who “felt compelled to
act as God’s messengers” (29). The prophets sought something beyond the law, they
sought “a deeper spiritual insight or a zeal
for morality in daily life” (Perry 30). Hosea
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loved Israel and felt compelled to
carry the word of God throughout
the land to deliver the land that he
loved so much from the “deep corruption” (Hos. 9.3). Hosea was “the
watchman of Ephraim [Israel]” (Hos.
9.8). As the “watchman,” it was his job to
prevent corruption from sweeping across
Israel. It was his job to cry out against injustice, and to stand in the way of the oppressors of the weak.
Similarly, God called upon Jonah to
“proclaim the message that I tell you” to the
city of Nineveh on several occasions (Jon.
3.2). However, Jonah illustrates that prophets may not be fully prepared to carry out
their calling; they need the guidance of God,
or some other moral judge. After the first
call of God, Jonah set sail on a ship and ignored his calling, which caused God to send
a treacherous storm to remind Jonah of his
purpose (Jon. 1.13). Along the journey,
prophets can stray from their noble cause,
and adopt a selfish lifestyle, leading to the
emergence of false prophets. True prophets
are altruistic, and seek the betterment of humankind, not just themselves. Just as Jonah
was “thrown into” being a prophet, he was
thrown into the sea, swallowed by a fish,
and delivered to Nineveh to continue his
role (Jon. 1). The prophet Amos also felt a
moral obligation to relay God’s message to
the people of Israel. In chapter three, Amos
called for the people to “hear this word that
the Lord has spoken against you.” It was
his duty to warn the people that their sinful
lifestyles and mistreatment of the poor
would result in punishments from God
unless they changed their ways (Jon. 3.5).
Being a prophet is a dangerous job.

In the Eighth century B.C., Hosea, Jonah,
and Amos faced persecution, imprisonment,
ostracism, and other atrocities for speaking
out against the sins of the majority. In other
words, they spoke out against human rights
violations. What if people did not embrace
the messages of the prophets? Would God
protect the prophets and punish the people
as was described? These questions may
never be fully answered; yet, in many cases
the prophets did face persecution. Hosea,
Jonah, and Amos may have remained relatively unscathed in the end; however, others
may not have been so fortunate. Prophets
fulfill their role no matter what the consequences are—perhaps it is because they are
“caught up by the Zeitgeist,” or the spirit of
the time, especially during times of crisis as
Martin Luther King Jr. illustrates (King 5).
Prophets bring a message of forgiveness, salvation, and hope for the future. If
the people follow the message of the prophets, then God will have mercy on them. According to Perry, the prophets believed that,
“life on earth could be improved, that poverty and injustice need not be accepted as
part of an unalterable natural order, and that
the individual was capable of elevating himself or herself morally and could respect the
dignity of others” (Perry 30). The denial of
human rights can be reversed, the mistreatment of people can be stopped, and the conditions of society can change with some effort. In Hosea, God revealed that he “would
heal their faithlessness” if the people repented (Hos. 14.5). Hosea conveyed that
God “would be as the dew to Israel; he shall
blossom as the lily, he shall strike root as
the poplar” (Hos. 14.6). In Jonah, after the
people repented and had “turned from their
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evil way,” God did not punish
them, and instead commended them
on their actions (Jon. 3.10). Amos
also related that, “as the shepherd rescued from the mouth of the lion two
legs, or a piece of an ear, so shall the
people of Israel who dwell in Samaria be
rescued” (Amos 3.12). In other words, Hosea, Jonah, and Amos illustrate that change
can occur and that good behavior will be
rewarded.
Similar to the prophets of the Old
Testament, Martin Luther King Jr. represents the “outsider” bringing messages to a
sinful population when he travels to Birmingham and throughout the entire South.
James A. Colaiaco relates that, “King
[actually] compares himself to the prophets
of the Old and New Testaments of the Bible” (4). In the third paragraph of the
“Letter from Birmingham Jail,” King states
that he is “in Birmingham because injustice
is here. Just as the prophets of the eighth
century B.C. left their villages and carried
their ‘thus saith the Lord’ far beyond the
boundaries of their home towns” (King, 1).
Although, Martin Luther King Jr. may be
called an “outsider” to Birmingham, he is
“in Birmingham by affiliation and by invitation” with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to “participate in nonviolent efforts to secure equal rights for
blacks” (Colaiaco 4). King may not live in
Birmingham, but he belongs there because
Birmingham is the center of injustice, and it
his calling to end it.
Martin Luther King Jr. is a prophet
who is responding to racial injustice and the
mistreatment of African Americans, as well
as all people of color. King calls for an end
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to the immoral practices of segregation. In
fact, King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail”
was written in response to a document published by “Alabama clergymen charging
that the recent direct actions in the city had
been ‘unwise and untimely’” (Colaiaco 2).
The Alabama clergymen refer to the recent
“anti-segregation” demonstrations and boycotts led by Martin Luther King Jr. and
other civil rights activists (Colaiaco 1). King
and others were left with few options except
to undertake a nonviolent campaign to combat the segregation, brutality, and “grossly
unjust treatment in courts” of African
Americans (King 1). Civil disobedience,
similar to that of Mahatma Gandhi, was the
best option because a violent campaign
would only escalate the problems. Perhaps,
the only right that should be denied to people is the right to harm others. Treating others with brutality because of their appearance or beliefs benefits no one.
Martin Luther King Jr. adamantly
pronounces his moral calling to rise up
against justice when he writes that, “there
comes a time when the cup of endurance
runs over, and men [and women] are no
longer willing to be plunged into the abyss
of despair” (King 3). King asserts that the
injustices occurring in Birmingham have
continued far too long and believes that it is
his duty, as well as the duty of everyone affected by racial discrimination to speak up
against it. Colaiaco supports King’s assertions when he writes, “As long as blacks
throughout the nation were denied justice
and equality, the dream embodied in America’s Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution would remain unfulfilled” (3).
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In addition to the civil laws
of a society, there are “higher laws”
that apply to every community, religion, and government. They are the
moral laws, such as treating people
equally. That is why “segregation is not
only politically, economically, and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and
awful” (King 3). King’s calling extends far
beyond any law or written rule and it delves
into a moral obligation. As is written in the
“Declaration of the Independence of the
United States of America,” everyone in
western society is given certain “inalienable
rights” for “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness” and everyone in western society
is protected by natural laws against mistreatment, discrimination, and enslavement.
These are the very rights being denied in
Birmingham through the practice of segregation. Martin Luther King Jr. “cannot sit
idly by in Atlanta,” while this is occurring
because “injustice anywhere is a threat to
justice everywhere” (King 1). Injustice in
Birmingham stands in the way of justice in
other places. The oppressors in Birmingham
must be dealt with, otherwise oppression
will continue indefinitely. As Immanuel
Kant writes in Perpetual Peace, “A transgression in one place is felt everywhere” (119). Mistreatment and denial of
rights of people based on race, color, gender, ethnic background, or appearance is felt
by all people.
The role of a prophet is a struggle,
but change often “comes through the tireless
efforts of men [and women] willing to be
coworkers with God” (King 5). Martin Luther King Jr. and many of his contemporaries during the Civil Rights Movement faced

unimaginable horrors during their nonviolent campaigns and acts of civil disobedience (Colaiaco 6). Homes of African
Americans and white sympathizers were
burned to the ground, prominent Civil
Rights leaders were shot down, and families
were torn apart. During some of the
“freedom rides,” many men and women
“suffered savage beatings” (Colaiaco 6).
Even King was jailed about a dozen times
for bringing the message of peace and demanding an end to suffering, just as the
prophets before him had done.
Although immediate results may not
be seen, positive change likely prevails with
the efforts of prophets. Tragically, Martin
Luther King Jr. was assassinated on April 4,
1968, before he could see the full result of
his efforts. King eventually was victorious
in Birmingham, and his efforts represent a
“turning point in the battle for civil rights,
after which the forces of segregation in the
South began to crumble” (Colaiaco 1). In
1964, the Civil Rights Act came into fruition and outlawed segregation. Then, in
1965, the Voting Rights Act outlawed discrimination in voting. We can only imagine
the smile that would have spread across
King’s face after Barack Obama was elected
President of the United States of America
this year, and we can only guess at King’s
satisfaction of seeing the diversity of the
candidates running for the 2008 election.
Times have changed and conditions have
improved from the effort of people, such as
Martin Luther King Jr. However, in King’s
attempt at creating unity among people,
many of the human rights violations not in
the public spotlight were forgotten and
many of the struggles of people in poor
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neighborhoods were ignored.
Many of these problems persist
today.
As Socrates would argue, society is always in need of the “gadfly,”
or dissenter, but prophets are much more
than dissenters; they speak up against
injustice and serve as messengers of morality for the people (The Apology). Through
the efforts of prophets, great changes are
made. Evil can be converted to Good, immorality can be changed to morality, and
injustice can be restored to justice. Martin
Luther King Jr. emerged in a time of racial
injustice and applied the same practices of
Hosea, Jonah, and Amos from thousands of
years ago. Martin Luther King Jr. helped
end segregation in the United States, but he
was not the only one. Thousands of other
civil and human rights activists did their
part too. Society needs prophets to expose
the injustices of society, but prophets would
not be successful, unless they received the
support of their peers.
Today, we are closer than we were
before to guaranteeing universal human
rights; however, more work must be done.
For example, why did the Apartheid segregation in South Africa endured into the
early 1990s? In the United States, Brown v.
Board of Education (1954) outlawed segregation, but segregation in America’s education systems still exists today, as Jonathan
Kozol argues in his book, The Shame of the
Nation. This is something that King did not
get a chance to combat, and it is something
that another modern prophet, Jonathan Kozol, brings to our attention. Perhaps, society
will always need prophets to speak up for
the oppressed. Who will be the Hoseas,
Jonahs, Gandhis, and Kings of the future?
Whoever they may be, tomorrow will shine
with their help.
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Diamond Certificate Report:
The Ghana Project
Submitted by Jesse Parent, Rejoyce
Owusu, and Ben DeGeorge
The report is the pinnacle of the Diamond
certificate. Please answer the following
questions in your report:
Name: Jesse Parent, Rejoyce Owusu, and
Ben DeGeorge
Title of Project: The Ghana Project
Dates of Project from beginning to completion or still in progress
The project began September 20, 2008
and it is an on gain service learning project
under the center of community at SUNY
Geneseo. The Ghana Project originally
started off as a service learning/civic engagement/ volunteering project through the
GOLD department. The Ghana Project is
focused on spreading Ghanaian culture
through cross culture dialogue amongst students that have studies abroad in Ghana and
students that are thinking about service
learning opportunities on campus.
Through the efforts of SUNY Geneseo
students we want to create global awareness
on campus. Specifically, we want to create
awareness and establish a connection with a
University in Ghana. We have successfully
had educational programming, community
partnerships, fundraising efforts and a
GREAT Day presentation every year on
campus.
Our main goals for this semester were
the cultural dinner, T-shirt advertisement,
the 5K race and our Great day performance.
All these events were fantastic.
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Inspiration: What was your inspiration
for doing your project?
The Ghana Project was created in
Fall 2008; it was born out of GOLD’s
“Diamond Civic Engagement” certificate.
GOLD Mentor Rejoyce Owusu developed
the idea as a way to share her homeland of
Ghana. Joined by fellow GOLD Mentors
Jesse Parent and Ben DeGeorge, the founding members The Ghana Project began
working together to establish a group based
on civic engagement and service learning,
focusing on Ghana and its culture and increasing global awareness. A major long
term goal of the project is helping to build
or establish a school in Ghana. While the
first year of the Project has been about establishing and creating awareness, already
raised significant funding and made valuable connections to help in pursuing this
goal.
Funding: Did your project require funding? How did you go about acquiring
these funds?
Major fundraising for The Ghana Project has been sponsored T-Shirts. Thanks to
a combined effort with SUNY Geneseo’s
Educational Department groups – Council
for Exceptional Children (CEC), Elementary and Secondary Educational Association
(ESEA), and The Young Children’s Council
(YCC) – The Ghana Project has been able
to raise over $1,000 in one week’s time.
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Upcoming fundraisers also include
a Walkathon / 5K race in mid-April.
“Geneseo Moves for Ghana” will be
another means to raise funding for the
long term goal of building a school in
Ghana. The Ghana Project has received
wide recognition, support, and great publicity. It has appeared in the student-run newspaper, The Lamron, frequently over the
course of it’s short existence.
Community Contacts, Collaborators &
Partners: Names of organizations and individuals who you worked with in the
community and/or on campus to make
your project a reality? Please include contact information for future reference.
Since the launch of the Ghana Project in
the Fall of 2008, we have collaborated with
multiple student groups on campus that also
concentrate on bringing awareness to the
issues in Africa and created a committee to
ensure that we are working together and
sharing the resources on campus. The
amount of people that have been reached
through the project is simply amazing. We
have a growing facebook group of over 720
people, a mailing list of over 100 people,
and we have a partnership with students in
the Brockport, Robert Wesleyan, Cornell,
Buffalo, and Syracuse campus.
In November ‘08, the Project held its
first major event, an educational model
about Ghana. Speakers included Dr. Osman
Alawiye, Dean of School of Education, Dr.
Dennis Showers. Guests from SUNY Brockport shared their stories. March ‘09 was the
first ever Ghana Gala. The event included a
traditional Ghanaian dinner, dancing, modeling Ghanaian clothing, and other activities.
Speakers included Dr. Osman Alawiye,

Prof. Wes Kennison, (International Studies)
and Prof. Owusu-Dapaa, from Nkrumah
Technical University, Ghana. Special thanks
to Wyoming Hall for hosing the event, especially Area Coordinator of Wyoming and
Putnam hall, Yolany Gonell.
The Ghana project has had individuals
that has help sponsor the project such as
Tom Matthews, Leadership Education, Development & Training and David Parfitt,
Teaching & Learning Center, Dean of the
School of Education, Yolany Gonell, Mark
Scott Director of Campus A Services, and
all other supporters including GOLD, ResLife, CAS, CEC, YCC, and ESEA.
On April 21, 2009 The Ghana Project conducted a dance performance in the
Union Ballroom Stage introduced by President Christopher Dahl. Our dance was a
three and half minute long dance - a combination of African hip hop music. The lyrics
of the song are African-French, and the
moves will be exciting and energetic. It will
be a celebration of African culture. We will
be wearing traditional Ghanaian clothing.
The members of the team include: Abigail
Boateng, Dalia Calix, Deon Edwards,
Heather Ford, Kerisha Hawthorne, Theona
Hudson, Rejoyce Owusu, Jesse Parent, and
Angela Snook
Timeline: What were the different steps
to completing your project?
The heart and soul of The Ghana Project
is sharing Ghanaian culture. From teaching
group members the Ghanaian handshake to
working on major culture events, the Project
seeks to welcome others into warm Ghanaian culture. The project was introduce to the
community through educational programming and educating students about our
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cause and getting students excited
about joining the cause.
Last semester the Ghana Project held
an informational program in Wayne
Hall and we were happy to have Wes
Kennison from the International Studies
department, Dr. Alawiye, Dean of Education, and study abroad student Ben
De’George present on their experience in
Ghana. Members of the Brockport Ghana
Project were in attendance along with various community members that had an interest
in Ghana.
Recently, the Ghana Project sponsored a
Ghana Gala in Wyoming Hall. At the Gala
we had Wes Kennison, present on the customs of the Ghanaian people during his visit
to Ghana. Dr. Alawiye, and Professor
Owusu-Dappa, who teaches in the Faculty of
Law at the Kwame Nkrumah University of
Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana
were both in attendance and shared some
words with the audience about the issues in
Ghana. Overall, the Ghana Gala was a fantastic success, with traditional Ghanaian
food, music, dancing, clothing, modeling
and other decorative display of information
of various tribes in Africa. To say the least,
the event had full capacity attendance, and
many people spoke highly about it. We were
even featured in the student newspaper, The
Lamron.
Challenges: What challenges did you foresee in executing your project? What challenges did you actually encounter?
We have encountered many challenges
dealing with the direction of the project and
combining all three Gold mentors’ leadership styles. We also had to deal with working with the college policies, especially in
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regards to fundraising at the college. We had
to be aware of the student association rules
and be careful not to break these since we
were not a campus organization. One of the
major problems we encounter was the miscommunication between other organizations
on campus. We have learned that through a
large civic engagement project such as this
managing every detail aspect of the project
is very important. We had to inform all college officials on campus so the communication was smooth because everyone on campus is concern with activities taking place on
campus. Another important thing we learn
was learning how to delegate responsibilities
to influences students to take upon themselves roles they thought they could have
done.
Benefits: What are the short-term and
long-term societal benefits to your project?
The long term benefit of the project is
to establish a partnership in Ghana and to
contribute a school building in Ghana. We
also hope students would be citizen diplomats across the world and gain more experiences through civic engagement project such
as the Ghana Project. We also want to continue to encourage students to try something
new and challenge their leadership skill on a
different level. We hope that through the
GOLD program we could bring enough
awareness of the issues in Ghana to build a
school in Ghana and have students from
Geneseo continue to conduct their internship
there.
Future: How could this project be replicated in the future?
In the future, we hope this project will
be an ongoing service project that students
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will be passionate about and continue to expand their knowledge
through other countries. This project
hopefully will help Geneseo network
with the global world and connect students with various internship opportunities. This project can be replicated in many
different ways through forming connections
with other countries and working towards
the goal of doing that nation a service.
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